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Abstract
Dramatic recent expansion of intellectual property protection in the field of biotech­
nology has led to concerns that ongoing innovation will be blocked unless action 
is taken to preserve access to and freedom to operate with those tools that are 
important for further research and development.
The "open source" approach to technology licensing, development and com­
mercialisation evolved out of the free software movement, initiated in the early 
1980s in response to restrictive copyright licensing practices adopted by commer­
cial software developers. This approach offers a means of reconciling the public 
interest in broad access to software development tools with the economic self in­
terest of intellectual property owners.
Building on discussions with public and private sector industry participants, 
funding agencies, leaders of the free and open source software movement and 
scholars in a range of disciplines, this thesis assesses the desirability and feasibil­
ity of extending open source principles to biotechnology research and develop­
ment. It argues that "open source biotechnology" is both desirable and broadly 
feasible, and demonstrates that many of the essential elements of an embryonic 
open source movement are already present in this field.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The idea for this thesis occurred to me in early 2002. At the time I was writing 
a history of biotechnology regulation in New Zealand, where a Royal Commis­
sion on Genetic Modification -  the first public inquiry of its kind anywhere in 
the world -  had recently completed its report.1 The prospect of the first envi­
ronmental release of genetically modified organisms had become a major issue 
in New Zealand's national elections, and in time-honoured fashion, proponents 
of commercial field trials were doing their best to label the public's opposition to 
genetically modified agriculture as irrational and ill-informed. A closer look had 
convinced me it was neither. The companies whose field trial applications were 
waiting in the wings were large North American and European firms seeking to 
shorten product development times by exploiting the southern hemisphere grow­
ing season; any profits the field trials might ultimately generate were unlikely to 
stay in New Zealand. Meanwhile, there was a possibility that the environmental 
release of genetically modified organisms would harm New Zealand's economi­
cally valuable reputation as a "clean green" holiday destination and producer of 
high quality food exports for northern hemisphere consumer markets, in which 
resistance to genetically modified products was rapidly increasing. As a remote 
island nation whose heavily agriculture-dependent economy included a strong 
and growing organic sector, New Zealand could make a unique and potentially 
lucrative claim to be truly "GM-free". Leaving aside questions about the inher­
ent safety of the technology and the morality of tinkering with the molecule that 
scientists themselves had dubbed "the secret of life", many New Zealanders did 
not see why they should tolerate such a -  literally incalculable -  risk to their eco­
nomic future for the sake of a small and uncertain share in the profits of overseas 
corporations.
Indigenous landowners' reactions to commercial field trial applications in New 
Zealand were particularly instructive. The better informed local Maori became, 
the more likely they were to oppose such applications, but although this opposi­
tion was generally expressed in terms of a clash between scientific objectives and 
Maori spiritual values, Maori were often surprisingly pragmatic in their dealings 
with commercial applicants. This pragmatism was seen by many as hypocrisy; to 
me it simply reflected the fact that, for Maori (whose spirituality centres around
1 Royal Commission on Genetic Modification (2001).
1
2 Introduction
responsible stewardship of New Zealand's genetic heritage) as for the rest of the 
community, what mattered most was not the technology itself but the purposes 
for which it was used, by whom, at whose risk, for whose benefit, and at whose 
behest.
As I grappled with the implications of commercial influence on the direction 
and applications of biotechnology research, my physicist husband recommended 
a book to read during coffee breaks: Sam Williams' free (as in beer)2 online bi­
ography of Richard Stallman.3 Struck by the parallels between Williams' account 
of the increasingly proprietary culture of software engineering during the late 
1970s and early 1980s and the effects of the commercial biotechnology revolution 
on university-based life sciences research during the same period, I wondered 
what might happen if Stallman's simple but creative solution -  copyleft licensing 
-  were applied in biotechnology.4
A quick Google search revealed that I wasn't the first person to have this idea. 
The previous year, physicist Rob Carlson had written an essay entitled "Open 
Source Biology and its Impact on Industry"; the essay was linked to the Mole­
cular Sciences Institute (MSI), a non-profit research organisation headed up by 
Nobel Prize-winning geneticist Sydney Brenner.5 The MSI homepage included 
the following question and answer:
What is open source biology? MSI is committed to making its 
research and its technology available to benefit the public. To this 
end, MSI publishes its scientific results in the open literature, makes 
reagents and methods freely available to the research community, and 
posts unpublished data on the web. MSI also distributes its software 
under Open Source licensing arrangements. Researchers at the MSI 
have been working with other institutions, scientists, engineers and 
legal experts to develop the concept of "Open Source Biology". If 
viable "Open Source" licensing schemes for biological methods and 
reagents can be developed, the Institute intends to use these schemes... 
to satisfy the criterion that the new technologies are disseminated for 
maximum public benefit.6
Subsequent investigations turned up other groups of scientists interested in ap­
plying open source principles to biotechnology research. For example, in 1999, a 
professor at Ontario Agricultural College had formulated a draft "GPL for Plant 
Germplasm";7 a year or so later, human genome project researchers at Britain's 
Sanger Centre had briefly toyed with releasing sequence data under a copyleft- 
style licence.8 Non-scientists were also thinking along similar lines: in April 2001,
2See below, p.68.
3Williams (2002).
4See below, p.68.
5Carlson (2001).
6The Molecular Sciences Institute (2004).
7McNaughton (1999).
8John Sulston, personal communication.
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law professor Dan Burk presented a paper on "open source genomics" at a Sym­
posium on Bioinformatics and Intellectual Property Law hosted by Boston Uni­
versity.9 Three and a half years on, references to open source biotechnology and 
its variants crop up with increasing frequency at conferences, in journals and 
magazines, on the Internet and in successful funding applications. It seems that 
open source biotechnology was an idea whose time had come.
One part of the explanation for this spate of "parallel invention" may be the in­
creasing involvement of researchers with hard science backgrounds -  engineers, 
computer scientists and physicists -  in biological research. The advent of the ge­
nomics era created a demand for people with new skills to manage and interpret 
large data sets. These new biologists have brought with them the philosophy and 
terminology of free and open source software development, just as the physicists 
who helped to found the discipline of molecular biology in the 1930s brought 
with them a revolutionary commitment to methodological reductionism.10 On 
this view, it is no coincidence that bioinformatics research tools are predomi­
nantly open source. Another factor is the growing prominence of open source 
software itself -  evidenced, for example, by a 2001 report for the United States 
Department of Defence demonstrating the applicability of Linux to the military 
business case.11 But the ultimate cause of scientists' and others' reaching for an 
open source approach to biotechnology research and development is a growing 
sense of frustration with the failure of both the technology and the industry that 
has grown up around it to live up to its hype. Consumers are frustrated at being 
expected to buy unfamiliar products that do not seem to offer any direct benefit 
even in terms of price, and corporations are frustrated at consumer reluctance to 
accept genetic modification as a normal part of product development. Entrepre­
neurs, investors and science policy-makers are frustrated that the biotechnology 
industry has turned out not to be as profitable as everyone had hoped. Interna­
tional aid agencies are frustrated at the failure of a potentially cheap and power­
ful new technology to deliver on its early promise as the driver of a much-needed 
follow-on to the Green Revolution in agriculture or the source of new treatments 
for killer diseases like HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Finally, there is the 
day-to-day frustration of scientists who find themselves constrained by red tape 
as they attempt to exchange resources that are essential to major projects. This 
in itself is nothing new, and various manifestations of the problem have in fact 
been effectively resolved; but the understanding is beginning to dawn that from 
now on scientists may have to struggle to maintain access to every important 
resource, even -  in fact, especially -  those that are inherently non-substitutable. 
Researchers are realising with dismay that if it isn't ESTs, or sequence data, or 
SNPs, it will be the next tool, and the next.12 The attraction of open source is
9Burk (2002).
10Regal (1996). 
n Kenwood (2001).
12SNPs: Single Nucelotide Polymorphisms. ESTs: Expressed Sequence Tags. Both have been 
the subject of controversy in relation to proprietary claims: the National Institutes of Health's 1991 
patent application on ESTs (partial cDNA sequences), though eventually withdrawn, sparked on-
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that, as described in subsequent chapters, it appears to offer at least a partial so­
lution to all of these problems -  not as a replacement for other strategies, but as 
an option that may be taken up by individual players irrespective of the success 
or failure of other attempted solutions.
The obvious objection to open source biotechnology is that licensing and de­
velopment principles that evolved in relation to software development may not 
be applicable in the biotechnology industry. Not only is software code itself quite 
different from a knockout mouse (say) or a method for inserting foreign genetic 
material into living cells, but there are other differences between software and 
biotechnology that could block the implementation of open source principles in 
the latter field: for example, compared with software development, the capital 
costs of development in biotechnology are higher, the prevailing industry culture 
is more proprietary, and innovations are typically protected under different legal 
regimes.13
With these potential obstacles in mind, I set myself the task of exploring the 
limits of the open source analogy in biotechnology. I chose to frame my re­
search in terms of an analogy with "open source" rather than "free" software 
because the open source emphasis on appealing to innovators' economic self- 
interest, as distinct from their social conscience, addresses an important prob­
lem in biotechnology research and development. As sociologists of science have 
repeatedly demonstrated, scientists are not specially unbiased, altruistic or co­
operative creatures, and their dealings with one another, like all human interac­
tions, are often characterised by fierce controversy, ruthless competition, personal 
animosity, greed and dishonesty.14 Nevertheless, the desire to serve the public 
interest -  to do good by inventing useful technologies -  is, at least in my per­
sonal experience, a strong motivating factor for many scientists. The difficulty 
is that shifts in patterns and sources of funding for scientific research have left 
scientists without a vehicle for making their technology freely accessible to users 
while simultaneously meeting the costs of development. The best option in many 
cases, despite its disadvantages, is for technology owners to follow one version 
or another of the proprietary business model, in which access to the technology 
is legally restricted in order to make it saleable by imbuing it with excludabil­
ity, a characteristic of private goods. The open source approach offers a way of 
reconciling the public interest in minimising restrictions on access to new biotech­
nologies with the need of many innovators for economic self-sufficiency; 15 thus, 
the commercial applicability of open source is an important part of its appeal in 
this context.
The methods I used to carry out this research were essentially those of an
going debate about access to DNA sequence information and other materials, information and 
techniques needed to enable scientists to conduct cutting-edge research: National Research Coun­
cil (1997).
13See section 5.2, p.96.
14See section 2.4, p.13.
15Open source licensing as a revenue-generating strategy is introduced in section 4.3.3, p.75, 
and discussed in more detail in chapter 7.
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investigative journalist. Working largely from informal "hacker" writings pub­
lished on the Internet, I identified a range of business strategies compatible with 
an open source approach to intellectual property management (see chapter 4). 
Using web addresses published by the Biotechnology Industry Organisation and 
regional business associations in the United States, I searched the business de­
velopment pages of innovative technology companies, looking for conditions 
that might favour the application of open source principles: actual or potential 
sources of revenue, apart from licensing income, that might be boosted if a com­
pany's key technology were to become more widely used, as well as the poten­
tial for companies to reduce the cost of technologies that they used in-house by 
sharing research and development with other users. I wrote to the executive of­
ficers of companies in different technology areas requesting the opportunity to 
discuss alternative business models; the aim was to learn whether it would be 
feasible to implement open source strategies in those areas or, if not, to discover 
which aspects of the open source approach were considered unworkable. At the 
same time I contacted representatives of other institutions from different sectors 
of the biotechnology industry, including universities (both techology transfer of­
fices and academic departments), private non-profit research institutions, large 
agribusiness and pharmaceutical companies and research hospitals; scholars in 
the fields of law, economics, sociology of science and innovation management; 
leaders of the free and open source software movement and their attorneys; pro­
gram directors of major philanthropic organisations; the secretariat of the Con­
sultative Group on International Agricultural Research; instigators and leaders 
of existing collaborative research programs in biotechnology; venture capitalists 
with investment experience in both biotechnology and open source software; and 
a handful of other people including freelance journalists who had published on 
open source biotechnology or related topics. In each case I sent a fax or email 
requesting a personal meeting or telephone discussion; to increase the chances 
that my letters would be read by their busy recipients, I kept each letter short, 
referring the reader to an Internet site hosted by the Australian National Uni­
versity (which I established for the purpose in January 2003) that contained a 
detailed description of the project.16 My intention was not to conduct any kind of 
formal empirical study, but to complement an investigation based primarily on 
documentary analysis with insights drawn from the direct experience of a broad 
range of informants. For this reason I did not request written consent to partici­
pate in the study from interviewees or their employers; nor did I seek to establish 
a representative sample of participants from any particular industry sector. Al­
though some of my messages went unanswered, I did manage to meet with a 
substantial number of informants, most of them during a six week field trip to 
the United States in March and April 2003 funded by the Intellectual Property 
Research Institute of Australia;17 some meetings generated further contacts, as 
did the Internet site. Before leaving for the United States I also committed to or-
16Open Source Biotechnology Project website, http://rsss.anu.edu.au/ janeth. 
17See http:// www.ipria.org/.
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ganising a half-day workshop on Open Source Biology to be hosted by the MSI 
in Berkeley, California, during the second week of my visit. Before and after 
the United States trip I conducted telephone interviews with informants in the 
United Kingdom and Ireland and on a number of occasions visited the Centre 
for Application of Molecular Biology in International Agriculture (CAMBIA), a 
close Canberra neighbour of the Australian National University. A complete list 
of informants and a separate list of invited attendees at the MSI workshop are 
included in the Appendices .18
Soon after I began this fieldwork, it became apparent that my goal of making 
a straightforward comparison between the fields of software and biotechnology 
with respect to the feasiblity of implementing open source principles was too am­
bitious. The reason was essentially that the people with whom I spoke meant too 
many different things by the term "open source". The Open Source Biology work­
shop was a turning point in terms of my conception of the project. On one view it 
was a great success: the attendees were interested and well-informed, the discus­
sion was wide-ranging and robust, and the informal atmosphere allowed people 
to form important personal connections. Yet, on reflection, by the end of the last 
session we had not advanced much beyond agreeing on the need for a better 
solution to problems of access and participation in biotechnology and reiterat­
ing the broad differences between software and biotechnology referred to above. 
Across the board, I found that discussions of open source biotechnology tended 
to gloss over important distinctions, such as that between open source licensing 
and simple dissemination of a technology without obtaining intellectual property 
protection; they also often proceeded on faulty premises, for example that open 
source licensing would be incompatible with the use of the licensed technology 
in any commercial application or that open source development would mean ex­
cluding profit-seeking firms from the development process. Without a common 
analytical framework, it was difficult to establish what role different organisa­
tions might play in bringing about a move towards open source biotechnology or 
how different stakeholders might gain or lose from such a change. Moreover, in 
the absence of clear criteria for determining whether and, if so, how much the dif­
ferences between software and biotechnology really mattered, simply alluding to 
those differences allowed skeptics to dismiss out of hand what I believed might 
turn out to be a very valuable idea.
These problems highlighted the fact that the concept of open source biotech­
nology was in a much earlier stage of development than I had at first supposed. 
As a result of this realisation, I decided to shift the emphasis of my research: 
instead of a conducting a detailed assessment of the feasibility of open source 
biotechnology, I would need to start by constructing a conceptual model that in­
corporated all the fundamental aspects of open source without losing its meaning 
when applied outside the software context. This new focus would not require me 
to abandon my original aim altogether, but I would no longer be focussed solely 
on the feasibility of an open source approach in biotechnology. Instead, I would
18 Appendix A does not include anonymous informants, of which there were three.
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have to confine myself to asking whether the concept of open source biotechnol­
ogy would stand up to any degree of scrutiny -  in which case its feasibility under 
a range of circumstances would merit further investigation -  or whether it would 
turn out on first serious examination to be a mere catchphrase or (as one speaker 
at an international conference in 2003 put it) "pie in the sky" notion.19
Given this decision, I considered how to convey a feel for my informants' 
struggles to come to grips with the still-embryonic concept of open source biotech­
nology. It was not appropriate to report on the fieldwork as if it had been a formal 
piece of ethnographic research, because this would have required the imposition 
of a greater degree of methodological rigour from the outset. However, I did de­
cide to incorporate a number of direct quotes from interviews into the text of the 
thesis in order to bring the reader into closer contact with the individuals who in­
fluenced my investigations. The decision to incorporate direct quotes raised the 
ethical question of how best to protect the privacy of these individuals: none had 
been explicitly approached as a research subject, but information about speakers' 
roles and identities would in many cases help to illuminate the quoted mater­
ial. The policy I have adopted is to identify informants by name when they were 
speaking as experts on matters of fact or expressing sentiments that they have re­
peated on the public record, and in other cases to make a judgment as to whether 
any legitimate interest might be compromised by full identification. If not, the 
informant is named; if there was any doubt, I have either sought explicit permis­
sion to identify the informant or, where this was not practicable (permission was 
never actually refused), provided information about the speaker's role sufficient 
to put the quote in context but not to allow precise identification.
The substantive chapters of this thesis can be divided roughly in half accord­
ing to subject matter: chapters 2, 3 and 4 deal with the desirability of an open 
source approach to biotechnology, while chapters 5, 6 and 7 deal with the ques­
tion of feasibility. Chapter 2 is written as an historical review of legal, economic 
and sociological literature dealing with the likely impact of intellectual property 
rights in biotechnology-related innovations. In addition to demonstrating the 
importance, in theoretical terms, of access to and participation in biotechnology 
research by a diverse range of actors, this chapter introduces concepts that inform 
the discussion in later chapters, including the "data stream" analysis of scientific 
research and the idea that information exists in varying degrees of codification. 
Chapter 3 shifts the focus from theory to a question of empirical fact: has the ex­
pansion of intellectual property protection that has accompanied the growth of 
a global commercial biotechnology industry hindered scientific progress in this 
field? The chapter begins by asking whether a "tragedy of the anticommons" 
has eventuated in either medical or agricultural biotechnology, then broadens 
the discussion to take into account important structural effects of intellectual 
property rights on the direction of research and development in both industry 
sectors. Chapter 3 concludes by asserting the need for a more effective mecha­
nism for promoting broad participation in biotechnology-related innovation, and
19Rai (2003).
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suggests that open source software licensing might provide some valuable in­
spiration. Chapter 4 introduces the concept of open source software as both a 
licensing scheme and a development methodology. The history of open source 
reaches back to the conventions of information exchange adopted by the first 
computer scientists immediately following the second world war, as documented 
in Steven Levy's Hackers,20 and more recently by Steven Weber in The Success of 
Open Source,21 but chapter 4 picks up the thread with Richard Stallman's initi­
ation of the GNU project and the invention of "copyleft" software licensing.22 
Much of the chapter is devoted to a detailed overview of the Open Source Defin­
ition, which sets out the criteria used by the open source movement's dedicated 
advocacy organisation and licence certification body, the Open Source Initiative, 
to determine whether particular software licences are "open source".
This overview of the Open Source Definition provides a starting point for 
chapter 5's exploration of the applicability of an open source licensing model 
in biotechnology. A definitive account of the issues that arise in translating open 
source licensing principles into the biotechnology context would be beyond the 
scope of this preliminary study, and in any case I am not qualified to write it. 
Nevertheless, I have considered it worthwhile to include some technical material 
(despite the fact that it is of necessity both very general and rather dry) in order 
to demonstrate how critical the adoption of a particular set of licensing criteria 
has been to the overall success of the open source model in software and to illus­
trate the need for careful attention to detail in the construction of a functionally 
equivalent set of criteria in biotechnology. Chapter 6 addresses the other key as­
pect of the open source approach identified in chapter 4, that of open source as a 
loosely defined but characteristic mode of innovation. This chapter, the longest 
in the thesis, carries the main burden of establishing an analytical framework for 
comparing open source software development with biotechnology research and 
development and of demonstrating that the differences between the two fields are 
not such as to rule out the possibility of successfully implementing open source 
principles in a biotechnology context. The structure of chapter 6 is drawn largely 
from the innovation management literature on user innovation, which also un­
derpins the discussion in chapter 7 of the potential economic significance of open 
source biotechnology. Chapter 7 examines the commercial applicability of the 
open source model in biotechnology from the perspective of individual indus­
try participants, then moves into conjecture, based on analyses of the impact of 
open source on the structure of the software industry, as to the possible future of 
open source research and development in biotechnology. The chapter closes with 
a brief account of moves within the industry towards an open source model of 
licensing and innovation.
20Levy (1984).
21 Weber (2004).
22Note to readers of the corrected version: readers who are familiar with open source software 
licensing are advised to skip this chapter.
Chapter 2
Theoretical perspectives
2.1 Introduction
Since the 1960s, legal theory has expanded to take into account insights drawn 
from other disciplines, especially economics and sociology. Economic approaches 
to law have greatly enriched the theoretical framework of legal thought, while 
sociological approaches have emphasised the importance of empirical data as a 
basis for sound legal policy. Because the strengths and weaknesses of these two 
styles of legal thinking tend to complement each other, combining economic and 
sociological perspectives on particular legal issues can greatly enhance under­
standing of those issues.1
Both economics and sociology have traditionally had something to say about 
intellectual property rights. This chapter reviews traditional and more recent 
thinking in both disciplines about the likely impact of strengthening intellectual 
property in biotechnological innovations, especially those that have value not just 
as end products but as tools for further innovation.
This review of the literature reveals that even though early economists and 
sociologists of science came to opposite conclusions about the best way to pro­
mote innovation in the context of scientific research, the two disciplines have 
now largely converged on a view of the process of innovation that emphasises 
the need for interaction among many independent participants, as far as possible 
unfettered by restrictions on the transfer of relevant information and materials.
2.2 Commercialisation of biotechnology 
research and development
The first genetically engineered organisms were created in the United States in 
1973 by academic scientists Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen.2 Five years later, 
Genentech -  the company founded by Boyer and venture capitalist Robert Swan­
son to commercialise the new technology -  announced the synthesis of human
JSee Galanter & Edwards (1997); Dau-Schmidt (1997).
2Cohen et al. (November 1973); Morrow et al. (May 1974); Chang & Cohen (April 1974).
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insulin in bacterial cells.3 This remarkable early success captured the imagina­
tion of investors, and when Genentech went public in 1980, its stock underwent 
the most dramatic escalation in value in Wall Street history.4 By the end of 1981, 
over 80 new biotechnology firms had been established in the US.5 Two decades 
on, biotechnology forms the basis of a multibillion-dollar global industry.6
Historians of the biotechnology industry have observed that despite indus­
try legend surrounding the explosive growth of the 1970s and 1980s, neither the 
technology itself nor the commercial exploitation of academic life sciences re­
search were without antecedents.7 What was new was the convergence of a num­
ber of factors that brought molecular biology research and product development 
closer together than ever before. These included declining public support for 
scientific research; ready availability of venture capital and other private fund­
ing sources; changing expectations about the roles of academic institutions; the 
technical achievements of Cohen, Boyer and many others;8 and, in 1980, two sig­
nificant legal changes -  one legislative, the other the result of a landmark court 
decision -  that were to accelerate the rate of commercialisation through the rest 
of the decade and beyond.9 Earlier links between university scientists and indus­
try had largely preserved the boundaries between the academic and commercial 
spheres.10 From the late 1970s, those boundaries became increasingly blurred.* 11
Following World War II, academic science had enjoyed relative independence 
from external influences as the result of large grants from national governments, 
distributed by scientists themselves through funding agencies such as the United 
States' National Research Council.12 The emergence during the 1970s and early 
1980s of closer relationships between universities and industry -  particularly 
those in which individual scientists or their institutions expected to profit directly 
from the commercialisation of research13 -  generated lively discussion among 
academic scientists about the possible impact of commercialisation on the in­
tegrity of the research process.14Specific concerns expressed by scientists and ob­
servers from the beginning of the 1980s related to the prospect of corporate in-
3Genentech website, http://www.gene.eom/gene/about_genentech/history/#1976, last ac­
cessed 18 March 2004.
4"Biotech At 25: The Founders", University of California at Berkeley Library website 
http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/Exhibits/Biotech/25.html, last visited 4 March 2002.
5INTECH (1991), p.5.
6For an overview of the modern biotechnology industry, see generally Ernst&Young (2000). 
7Bud (1998); Kay (1998); Creager (1998).
8Thackray (1998), Introduction, p.ix; Etzkowitz (1989), pp.15-16; Owen-Smith & Powell (2001),
p.2.
9Bayh-Dole Act (Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980), 
codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 200-212 (1994)); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,309 (1980). 
10Etzkowitz (1989), p.15.
11 Blumenthal et al. (1986); Blumenthal (1992); Blumenthal et al. (1996a); Blumenthal et al. 
(1996b); Blumenthal et al. (1997); Campbell et al. (2000).
12Etzkowitz (1989), p.15.
13Kevles (1998), pp.66-67.
14For example, see Fox (1981). In 1981, Congress held a series of hearings on the impact of 
commercialisation of academic biomedical research; see Eisenberg (1987), p.178, note 3.
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terests dictating the direction of research, possible deterioration in the quality 
of research due to the undermining of traditional peer review mechanisms, ex­
ploitation of graduate students and postdoctoral researchers, divided loyalties 
and financial conflicts of interest, and the danger that academic scientists would 
lose their credibility as impartial experts on matters of science policy.15 But the 
overarching concern was that, by disrupting relationships among scientists and 
interfering with the flow of scientific communication, commercialisation would 
hinder the overall progress of science.16
2.3 Scientific progress and the "norms of science"
To understand the source of this anxiety, it is necessary to have some familiarity 
with contemporary conceptions of the nature of science and the scientific enter­
prise.
The concept of "scientific progress" dates from the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, and since that time has been linked with an ideal of free and open dis­
semination of scientific information.17 During the 1940s, sociologists of science 
formalised this conceptual link by theorising that a norm of common ownership 
of research results -  the norm of "communism" or "communalism" -  functioned 
together with other scientific cultural norms to align the interests of individual 
scientists with the overarching institutional goal of scientific progress, defined as 
the extension of knowledge certified as true.18 According to sociologist Robert 
K. Merton and others of his school, these norms were not codified or necessarily 
explicit; rather, they operated as "prescriptions, proscriptions, preferences and 
permissions... legitimated in terms of institutional values... transmitted by pre­
cept and example and reinforced by sanctions".19 Their existence could, it was ar­
gued, be inferred from a moral consensus among scientists expressed "in use and 
wont, in countless writings on the scientific spirit and in moral indignation di­
rected toward contravention of the ethos". 20 Disagreement among scientists was 
acknowledged by sociologists, but regarded as deviant and generally attributed 
to insufficiently internalised norms.21
The "norms of science", especially the norm of communism, reflected what 
sociologists regarded as the essentially cooperative and cumulative nature of sci­
entific research. In order to collaborate and build on each other's work, scientists
15Fox (1981); Eisenberg (1987), p.178, note 3.
16For example, see Fox (1981), p.41.
17Eamon (1975), p.335 and pp.338-340.
18"Certified knowledge":Merton (1957), pp.40-41:552-553. During the same period, philoso­
phers of science -  logical empiricists led by Karl Popper -  developed and elaborated their own 
picture of how science behaved. Despite differences of emphasis, both disciplines at this time 
were preoccupied with explaining what seemed a surprisingly high degree of agreement in sci­
ence: Laudan (1982).
19Merton (1957), p.39:551; see also Nowotny & Taschwer (1996).
20Merton (1957), p.40:552
21 Laudan (1982), p.260.
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needed access to a common fund of knowledge. The norm of communism was 
supposed to encourage scientists to contribute to this common fund by commu­
nicating the results of their research to other scientists: the norm ensured that 
secrecy was condemned, while timely, open publication was rewarded. 22
The norm of communism was also supposed to preserve scientific knowledge 
within the public domain, where it could be freely used and extended. Like 
the ideal of open dissemination of scientific knowledge, the notion that science 
should be publicly owned and pursued in the public interest has long been as­
sociated with the concept of scientific progress.23 In the 1930s and 1940s, leaders 
of the "radical science movement", from which the research agenda adopted by 
early sociologists of science evolved, set out to consider how science could best 
be organised for maximum social benefit.24 Thus, Merton intended his examina­
tion of the normative structure of science as an introduction to a larger problem: 
the comparative study of the structure of science under different political con­
ditions.25 He argued that because the institution of science is only a part of the 
larger social structure, with which it is not always integrated, the scientific ethos 
can be subjected to serious strain when the larger culture opposes a scientific 
norm.26 In the case of the norm of communism, Merton saw such conflict arising 
out of the incompatibility of the scientific norm with the definition of technology 
as private property in a capitalist economy. He wrote: "The substantive findings 
of science... constitute a common heritage in which the equity of the individual 
producer is severely limited. An eponymous law or theory does not enter into 
the exclusive possession of the discoverer and his heirs, nor do the mores bestow 
upon them special rights of use and disposition. Property rights in science are 
whittled down to a bare minimum by the rationale of the scientific ethic. The 
scientist's claim to 'his' intellectual 'property' is limited to that of recognition and 
esteem."27 Merton referred specifically to patents, with their exclusive rights of 
use (and, he remarked, often non-use), and to the suppression or withholding 
of knowledge (for example, through trade secrecy) as opposing the rationale of 
scientific production and diffusion.28
Returning to the trends of the 1970s and 1980s: it was clear that if early sociol­
ogists of science were correct in their analysis of the normative structure of scien­
tific research, the rapid commercialisation of biotechnology research constituted 
a threat to scientific progress because it might tip the balance of incentives away 
from contribution to a common fund of knowledge and towards restrictive com­
munication practices motivated by the prospect of private ownership of scientific
22Merton (1957), p.45:557.
23Eamon (1975), pp.338-340.
24Nowotny & Taschwer (1996), p.xvii.
25Merton (1957), p.40:552.
26Merton (1957), p.41:553. In each case of conflict between a norm and the wider social values, 
Merton's starting assumption was that the guiding principles of democracy (though these may 
be inadequately put into practice) are aligned with the scientific norm, so that scientists find 
themselves subject to less conflict the more democratic the society: p.40:552.
27Merton (1957), p. 44:556.
28Merton (1957), p.46:558.
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knowledge. The pressure experienced by academic scientists to commercialise 
their research appeared to be an example of the larger culture distorting a more 
or less efficient existing professional ethic, in particular the norm of communism, 
and thereby impeding scientific progress.
In fact, by the time Cohen and Boyer made their historic discovery, many 
sociologists of science had begun to doubt the reality of normatively controlled 
behaviour, preferring instead to treat references to norms in the course of scien­
tific debate as rhetorical tools or rationalisations for interest-driven behaviour.29 
Nevertheless, the idea of scientific norms remained influential both within and 
outside the discipline of sociology.
2.4 Insights from the new sociology of science
The reason why mainstream sociologists of science largely abandoned models 
of scientific research based on Merton's theory of scientific norms relates to the 
historical development of the discipline. Early philosophers and sociologists of 
science regarded science as unique among intellectual activities. In particular, 
they thought that science as a discipline was defined by a high level of agree­
ment among scientists about assertions of fact. For this reason early sociologists 
of science, including Merton, were chiefly concerned with constructing models 
to explain the phenomenon of scientific consensus.30 However, during the 1960s 
and 1970s -  influenced by developments in the history and philosophy of science 
-  sociologists of science began to take a more cynical view of competition and 
collaboration within scientific communities. Questioning the existence of any dis­
tinctive scientific ethos, they turned away from an idealised picture of consensus 
among scientists and instead became preoccupied with studying scientific debate 
and disagreement.31 As a result of this shift in focus, many of what had been cen­
tral issues in the classical sociology of science came to be generally neglected, 
among them issues relating to intellectual property and the openness of scientific 
communication. Moreover, because the new "sociology of scientific knowledge"
29See Mulkay (1976). Laudan has identified a number of criticisms of Merton's theory in more 
recent sociology of science literature (Laudan (1982), p.261.). First, disagreements among sci­
entists cannot really be treated as minor deviations from a consensual norm: as Harry Collins, 
Trevor Pinch and others have shown, controversy is ubiquitous in science (Laudan (1982), p.266; 
see also Collins & Pinch (1994)). Second, scientists who are doing their best to follow norms 
of disinterestedness, objectivity and rationality find themselves led to very different conclusions 
about what constitutes conformity with these norms: Mulkay has pointed out that since no rule 
can specify completely what is to count as following or not following that rule, we cannot as­
sume that any norm can have a single meaning independent of the context in which it is applied 
(Mulkay (1980)). Third, violations of Merton's norms are frequent, often rewarded, and some­
times even important for scientific progress: for example, Mitroff has presented substantial ev­
idence of successful "counternormal" behaviour (Laudan (1982), p.263; Mitroff (1974), cited in 
Eisenberg (1989), p.1048, note 130).
30Laudan (1982), pp.254-257.
31 Nowotny & Taschwer (1996), pp.xix-xx: the biggest single influence from the philosophy of 
science was Kuhn (1970). See also generally Laudan (1982).
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incorporates a diverse range of theoretical approaches, its insights have not been 
as easily accessible to scholars outside sociology as those of Merton and his col­
leagues.
In 1994, sociologists Stephen Hilgartner and Sherry Brandt-Rauf moved to 
address this problem by presenting a model of scientific exchange -  the "data 
stream" model -  incorporating insights from the new sociology of science.32
The first such insight is that the concept of "data" should be subjected to so­
cial analysis rather than treated in commonsense terms.33 In contrast to earlier 
models of scientific research, the data stream model conceptualises data not as 
well-defined, stable entities -  the end products of research -  but as elements of an 
evolving data stream.34
Data streams have four key characteristics. First, they are composed of het­
erogeneous networks of information and resources, including many categories 
commonly used by scientists to describe the input and output of their work: data, 
findings, results, samples, materials, reagents, laboratory techniques, protocols, 
know-how, experience, algorithms, software and instruments. However, because 
the meaning of each of these terms is context-dependent, and each element is 
linked to many others in the data stream, it may be difficult to assign any given 
element to a single category.35
Second, their elements range from mundane items which are part of the or­
dinary social infrastructure, such as water, electricity and computers, through 
elements specific to a research area but widely available either free or as commer­
cial products, such as journal articles or assay kits, to specialised elements which 
are not publicly available but may be disseminated through personal contacts, 
and finally to novel or scarce elements available only by special arrangements. 
Hilgartner and Brandt-Rauf remark that critical issues in the analysis of scientific 
access practices most often concern elements of the data stream lying towards the 
"novel or scarce" end of this spectrum.36
The third property of data streams is that different elements have different 
information status. At one extreme, elements of a data stream may be generally 
accepted as reliable and valuable, while at the other, they may be so uncertain 
that even the scientists who produce them doubt their credibility or usefulness. 
Data are constantly interpreted and reinterpreted through the research process, 
so that scientists' perceptions of the reliability and value of particular parts of 
the data stream vary with time; this can be important in decisions about access, 
as scientists ask themselves whether data are "ready" for dissemination, or how 
much data are "worth".37
32Hilgartner (1997); Hilgartner & Brandt-Rauf (1994).
33Hilgartner & Brandt-Rauf (1994), p.358.
34Ibid., p.359.
35Ibid., pp.359-360.
36Ibid., p.360.
37Ibid., pp.360-361. Jordan and Lynch (Jordan & Lynch (1998)) describe how the polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) technique has been adapted to different circumstances in science, medicine, 
industry and criminal forensics. Their paper explores in detail the evolution of the information 
status of a molecular biological technique from unreliable to standardised.
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Finally, data streams are composed of chains of products. Scientists initially 
record data using primary inscription devices, such as x-ray film or electrophore­
sis gel, then convert the data into second, third or fourth order inscriptions; ma­
terials may be processed and purified; electronic information may be subjected 
to a series of manipulations; and so on. Hilgartner and Brandt-Rauf argue that 
these translations and conversions affect access practices because they alter not 
only the information content and material form of the data, but also the purposes 
for which they can be used.38
The second insight that Hilgartner and Brandt-Rauf draw from recent social 
studies of science is that transactions involving data are negotiated within com­
plex research networks.39 They argue that analyses of data access patterns are of­
ten framed in terms of relationships between two parties -  the primary researcher 
or producer of the data and the secondary researcher who wants to obtain access 
-  but that in reality, each member of a research network is linked to many other 
people and organisations. Moreover, access practices are intimately involved in 
the construction and maintenance of such networks. Therefore, the analysis of 
data access practices should take account of a range of relevant actors. A decision 
about whether to grant access to data may involve many parties: a research team 
of scientists, possibly from several institutions or several fields of study, with 
different levels of training and of involvement in the project; government and 
corporate sponsors providing funds; perhaps also a host university, with all its 
internal bureaucracy. These parties may have different goals and differing claims 
to portions of the data stream, and they may disagree about the optimal means 
and timing of dissemination.40 Similarly, audiences or markets for data do not 
necessarily consist of individuals or undifferentiated groups: they may include 
competing research groups, potential collaborators, authors of studies with con­
flicting results, gatekeepers who control key resources (e.g. department heads, 
corporate sponsors), potential markets for research based products, or venture 
capitalists.41
The third relevant insight from the new sociology of science is that there is 
a wide range of mechanisms available for granting, limiting or denying access 
to data, and that analysis of data access practices should take into account the 
incentives and strategic considerations associated with each.42 While traditional 
models of data access emphasise peer recognition as a scientist's primary reward 
for discovery, with open publication as the primary legitimate means of achieving 
recognition, open publication is only one of many mechanisms for disseminating 
portions of a data stream. Data may be bartered in negotiations with prospec­
tive collaborators or sponsors, distributed to selected colleagues, patented, trans­
ferred by visitors being trained in new techniques, provided to a limited group 
on a confidential basis, bought and sold, pre-released to existing sponsors, kept
38Ibid., p.361.
39Ibid., p.358; pp.362-363. 
40Ibid„ p.363.
41 Ibid.
42Ibid., p.358; pp.363-366
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in the lab pending future decisions about disposition, and so on. (In other words, 
researchers engage in both bargaining and gift behaviours.43) Hilgartner and 
Brandt-Rauf again identify a spectrum, from limited access to widespread dis­
tribution, and argue that as access becomes more widespread, the competitive 
edge conferred by possession of unique data declines. Scientists can exploit this 
competitive edge by restricting access, using data to produce more data, or by 
providing carefully targeted access; or they may choose to provide widespread 
access in order to enhance their scientific reputation.44 Other factors affecting de­
cisions about how to provide access include timing, the portion of the data stream 
to be made available, and the costs and logistics associated with different modes 
of access. Hilgartner and Brandt-Rauf observe that in order to comprehend these 
strategic issues in relation to a particular area of research, it is necessary to acquire 
a detailed understanding of the structure of data streams in that area.
The fourth and final insight from the new sociology of science is the impor­
tance of examining how access practices interact with strategies for commercial­
isation.45 In his 1994 article with Brandt-Rauf and more recently, Hilgartner ac­
knowledges that legal mechanisms of commercialisation may have a significant 
impact on scientific data access practices, noting that the law is clearly relevant 
to these practices because it addresses questions of ownership and control.46 He 
describes the legal approach to data ownership as atomistic: it involves plucking 
items from the data stream and attempting to place them into discrete categories 
in order to designate an end product that may qualify for some type of protection 
-  patent, copyright, trade secrets, misappropriation, contract, or conversion,47 
while data which are not construed as falling into one of these categories are con­
sidered to fall within the public domain.48 Distinguishing between areas in which 
the law offers a relatively stable set of data protection mechanisms, and areas -  
like biotechnology -  in which the law is still evolving (so that legal and scientific 
practices are simultaneously constructed in part through their interaction), Hil­
gartner proposes that future empirical research should focus on the relationship 
between scientific practices and the law.49 In particular, he believes it is important 
to understand how researchers try to employ legal mechanisms for controlling 
data access, what dilemmas and strategies are created by the disparity between 
the law's reductionist approach to ownership and the continuity of data streams 
and research networks, and how access practices, the law and the political econ­
omy of research interact to redefine legal regimes governing fast-moving areas 
such as biotechnology.50
The present study contributes to this research agenda, but for Hilgartner the
43Ibid., p.363.
44Ibid., pp.364-365.
45Ibid., p.358.
46Ibid, p.358 and pp.366-368; Hilgartner (1997), pp.7-8; Hilgartner (1998), p.202.
47Transferred material is bailed property.
48Hilgartner & Brandt-Rauf (1994), pp.366-367. Increasing use of the more general term "intel­
lectual property" may reflect a creeping reversal of this default position.
49Ibid., p.367.
50Ibid., pp.367-368.
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prior question is whether an emphasis on intellectual property in academic sci­
ence should be expected to cause a reduction in scientific openness. Applying 
the data stream perspective, Hilgartner suggests we need answers to a series of 
empirical questions. Do intellectual property considerations influence what por­
tions of data streams are provided, to whom, and when? Do they introduce new 
sources of delay, or change the kinds of restrictions that are placed on the use of 
data? Do intellectual property considerations increase the complexity and for­
mality of negotiations over access to data, make collaborations more unstable or 
difficult to form, or complicate the development and maintenance of shared un­
derstandings about control over data streams that are collectively produced?51 
We examine these issues in the context of biotechnology research and develop­
ment in chapter 3.
Hilgartner argues that, at any rate, we should not expect intellectual property 
protection to lead to an increase in openness among academic scientists: restric­
tions on openness motivated by possible commercial exploitation probably tend 
to propagate upstream from the point of potential commercialisation back into 
the research process, so that portions of data streams that are believed to be pre­
cursors of potentially patentable products are likely to be relatively tightly con­
trolled.52 He notes that existing empirical evidence suggests intellectual property 
considerations do actually reduce openness,53 but warns that the effects of in­
tellectual property protection on academic science will not be uniform across all 
fields, hypothesising that access practices are most intensively shaped not at the 
level of the discipline or field but at levels of research that can be defined in terms 
of a characteristic data stream and a particular competitive structure 54
Ultimately, in Hilgartner's view, the most important questions about scien­
tific data access practices are normative. He asks whether the public domain 
should be defended against encroachment by proprietary categories of informa­
tion -  though in the light of sociological literature problematising the concepts 
of "public" and "private" in scientific research, we should perhaps prefer his al­
ternate formulation, in which the problem is expressed as one of deciding which 
data access policies are most likely to contribute to research productivity while 
promoting other social goals.55 We return to this question in chapter 4.
51 Hilgartner (1997), p.7.
52Ibid.
53Ibid., referring to the work of Cambrosio, Mackenzie and Keating on the interaction of sci­
entific and legal innovations in the commercialisation of monoclonal antibodies (Mackenzie et al. 
(1990); see also Cambrosio & Keating (1998)), to his own empirical work (see Hilgartner (1998), 
Hilgartner (1995)), and to the controversy which led to the formation of the Committee on Intel­
lectual Property and Research Tools in Molecular Biology and to attempts to develop a Uniform 
Biological Materials Transfer Agreement (for more detail, see Enserink (1999) and Council on 
Governmental Relations (1996)). Hilgartner also refers to Blumenthal (1992), one of a series of 
survey studies investigating the effects of academic-industry relationships in the life sciences (see 
note 11, above.).
54Hilgartner (1997), p.8.
55Hilgartner & Brandt-Rauf (1994), p.369; see also Cambrosio & Keating (1998), p.176. Cambro­
sio and Keating give examples in which the private ownership of monoclonal antibodies became 
the key to public circulation. They argue that the issue of access pertains less to ownership in
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2.5 Intellectual property law and policy developments
The reason for Hilgartner's focus on legal mechanisms of commercialisation is 
that the commercialisation of biotechnology research and development in the fi­
nal quarter of the twentieth century was closely linked with the evolution of US 
intellectual property law and policy.
The trend towards stronger intellectual property rights in biological innova­
tions began with the decision of the US Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.56 
Before 1980, the policy of the US Patent Office was to refuse applications for 
patents on living organisms.57 The basis for refusal was the long-standing "prod­
ucts of nature" doctrine, which specified that although processes devised to ex­
tract products found in nature could be patented, the products themselves were 
not patentable subject matter because they were not inventions.58 Accordingly, 
when Ananda Chakrabarty applied in 1972 for a patent on a living bacterium 
capable of consuming oil slicks, the application was refused. Chakrabarty ap­
pealed, and in 1979 the case reached the US Supreme Court. In June 1980, by a 
close majority, the Supreme Court held that Chakrabarty had a right to a patent 
on the microorganism under the existing patent law. The majority noted that 
the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but be­
tween products of nature and human-made inventions; patentable subject matter 
included "anything under the sun that is made by man", including living organ­
isms produced using genetic technology.59
Through the 1980s, further decisions consolidated the policy reversal initi­
ated by the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty. In 1985, the US Patent 
and Trademark Appeals Board awarded a patent for a type of genetically engi­
neered corn, holding that the general availability of plant patents had not been 
restricted by the passage of legislation granting specific plant patent and plant 
variety rights protection.60 In 1987, it confirmed that, in principle, patents could 
be granted on nonhuman higher animals.61 By 1988, the Patent Office's willing­
ness to grant a patent to Harvard University on "any nonhuman mammal trans- 
genically engineered to incorporate into its genome an oncogene tied to a specific 
promoter" -  exemplified by the famous (or infamous) oncomouse -  indicated that 
the turnaround was complete.62
A second significant development in US intellectual property law and policy 
was the passage in 1980 of the Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act (PL.
itself, or to the distinction between public and private sectors of the national economy, than to the 
construction of an infrastructure that allows specific techniques or tools to be transferred from 
local to extended networks. Private companies may be part of such an infrastructure.
56Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,309 (1980).
57The only exception was statutory: the Plant Patent Act 1930 allowed patenting of plants that 
could be reproduced asexually. See Kevles (1998), p.66.
58Kevles (1998), pp.65-66, citing Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Com. Pat. 123.
59Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) quoting SEN. REP. NO. 1979 (1952).
b0Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interferences 1985).
61 Eat parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interferences 1987).
62Leder et al., Transgenic Nonhuman Animals, United States Patent No. 4,736,866,12 April 1988.
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96-517), more commonly known as the Bayh-Dole Act.63
In the US, the enormous increase in federal funding support for scientific re­
search following World War II had been explicitly intended as a vehicle for en­
hancing the economy through transfer of scientific discoveries from the labora­
tory via industry to the marketplace.64 By the late 1970s, policymakers recog­
nised that despite the development of a substantial knowledge base established 
with federal funds at leading public and private research universities, most of this 
knowledge had not been successfully translated into economic development.65 In 
the face of competitive pressure on US industry, and concerned about an apparent 
decline in American innovation, the federal administration decided that the tech­
nology transfer problem was due to its existing patent policy.66 Up until 1980, fed­
eral funding agencies generally retained ownership of intellectual property rights 
arising out of funded research as a public resource; exceptions were rare and re­
quired the funding recipient to negotiate a lengthy and difficult waiver process.67 
Government policy dictated that licences be granted non-exclusively, with the 
result that potential private sector licensees were discouraged by the prospect 
of competition from investing in and developing new products.68 In 1980, leg­
islators and the administration concluded that the presumption of ownership of 
patents arising from federally funded research should be reversed. Despite ongo­
ing controversy, the Bayh-Dole Act was enacted into law on 12 December 1980.69 
Under the Act, universities and small businesses were permitted to elect owner­
ship of inventions made under federal funding; exclusive licensing was also per­
mitted, provided the licensee undertook diligent commercial development of the 
invention, while the government retained a royalty-free, non-exclusive licence to 
practise the invention for government purposes.70
The impact of the Bayh-Dole Act was not immediate, but it was dramatic. 
Certainty of title to inventions, together with uniform procedures and the ability 
of universities to grant exclusive licences, provided a secure footing for industry 
investment in university research. The Act has been identified as one of the main 
drivers behind the development of university-industry research collaborations in 
the 1980s, with most active licences being in the area of life sciences, where most 
academic research was federally funded through the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH).71
63Above, note 9.
64Council on Governmental Relations (1999), p.l.
65Etzkowitz (1989), p.16.
66Council on Governmental Relations (1999), p.l.
67Ibid., p.2.
68Ibid.
69The Act became effective on 1 July 1981 and was amended by RL. 98-620 on Nov 8,1984. The 
finalised and consolidated provisions appear at 37 CRF Part 401 (52 FR 8552, March 18,1987).
70Council on Governmental Relations (1999), p.6. Subsequent legislative initiatives broadened 
the reach of the Act even further by relaxing anti-trust restrictions on joint funding of research 
and development, and by authorising federal laboratories to enter into cooperative research and 
development agreements with private firms and universities. See generally Council on Govern­
mental Relations (1999).
71 Ibid., p.2.
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2.6 Questioning the scope of protection
Both the developments outlined above were justified by reference to the sup­
posed incentive function of patent law (the primary intellectual property regime 
relevant to biotechnology). In the case of the Bayh-Dole Act, the relevant in­
centive was the incentive to develop an existing invention, the incentive to in­
novate.72 Amicus curiae briefs in the Diamond v. Chakrabarty case also referred 
to the incentive to innovate, but in addition, the Genentech and Pharmaceuti­
cal Manufacturers' Association briefs emphasised a different kind of incentive. 
They argued that allowing patents on living organisms would keep genetic engi­
neering research "out in the open" because patents compelled publication of the 
means and methods that led to a patentable product. In other words, they argued 
that patents provided an incentive to disclose the results of research.73
At first glance, this argument -  one of several traditional justifications for 
patent laws developed in the midst of recurring controversies over the past sev­
eral centuries -  seems to contradict the reasoning, described above, behind con­
cerns that patents and other forms of intellectual property protection would pro­
vide a disincentive to open communication among scientists.74 This apparent 
contradiction disappears on consideration of the context in which the patent in­
centive was expected to operate: against a background of industrial secrecy, patent 
protection may well promote disclosure. But what becomes of this argument if 
the alternative to patent protection is not secrecy, but (relatively) free and open 
publication? This question has particular poignancy in the United States, where 
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to enact intellectual 
property legislation only as a means to "Promote the Progress of Science and use­
ful Arts".
In 1987, legal academic Rebecca Eisenberg published a paper titled "Propri­
etary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research", in which 
she conducted a detailed examination of the interaction of proprietary rights 
in biotechnology with traditional (Mertonian) scientific norms.75 Eisenberg con­
cluded that although patent protection sat better with traditional norms than did 
trade secret protection, the incentives of patent law clashed with those of tradi­
tional norms in relation to the timing of knowledge dissemination and the abil-
72 Ibid.
73Kevies (1998), p.67.
74In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Britain, controversy surrounded the Crown's abuse of 
the royal prerogative and its use of patents as a source of patronage and revenue: Ricketson & 
Richardson (1998), pp.544-547. The anti-patent movement re-emerged during the Industrial Rev­
olution, and again in the 1860s, when the main focus was on the restraining effects of patents 
on industry and free enterprise: Ricketson & Richardson (1998), pp.556-557. The movement col­
lapsed during the Great Depression, but at the end of the twentieth century the shift towards 
an information-based global economy again sparked fierce debate over the value of intellectual 
property protection. Persistent opposition to patent laws over the years has forced proponents to 
develop theories justifying patent protection. Some have relied on notions of justice: see chap­
ter 3: "Locke, labour and the intellectual commons", in Drahos (1996). Other justifications are 
considered below (section 2.7).
75Eisenberg (1987).
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ity of scientists to use and extend new discoveries. With respect to knowledge 
dissemination, Eisenberg argued that because disclosure requirements under the 
patent law were in some ways stricter than under traditional norms, patent laws 
might actually work to reinforce existing norms, at the same time countering 
commercial pressures in the direction of trade secrecy by granting a property 
right that would survive disclosure.76 On the other hand, she noted that many 
scientific discoveries may become eligible for patent protection only at a much 
later stage in the research process than they would normally be ripe for publi­
cation (the primary traditional means of disseminating scientific knowledge).77 
Because a patent cannot be granted for an invention which has already been dis­
closed, this meant that the trend towards patenting might result in substantial 
publication delays and the consequent slowing of related research projects which 
might have been helped by access to published data.
Eisenberg further pointed out that although patents might not prevent disclo­
sure altogether, disclosure is only one side of the patent law bargain. In order 
to build on discoveries disclosed by one scientist, other scientists must be able 
to apply the discovery; but while publication of results in a journal article or at 
a conference makes those results freely available, in the patent system disclo­
sure marks the beginning of a long period of exclusive possession.78 Eisenberg 
speculated that the adverse impact of exclusivity on scientific research was likely 
to be greatest in relation to inventions which are primarily useful for research 
rather than commercial applications, and that this impact was likely to be exacer­
bated in circumstances where the patentee is reluctant to grant licenses to other 
researchers -  out of a desire to prevent competition, because use of the invention 
in further research may undermine the future value of the patent by facilitating 
inventing around the patent, or because by preserving exclusivity in subsequent 
research the patentee can maximise future claims to priority of discovery both for 
scientific recognition and patent purposes.79
Of course, as Eisenberg went on to acknowledge, patent exclusivity is not 
absolute: certain uses of an invention during the patent term do not constitute 
infringement.80 In her 1987 article, and again in a 1989 article entitled "Patents 
and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use", Eisenberg 
examined the rationale and scope of the "experimental use" defence to patent in­
fringement.81 The appropriate scope of the defence, she argued, was a question of 
balance: too narrow a defence could stifle basic research, while too broad could 
cause industrial sponsors either to lose interest in biotechnology research or to 
rely on trade secrecy instead of patent protection.82 Eisenberg concluded that 
the case for allowing a defendant to escape infringement liability on the grounds
76Ibid., pp.206-207.
77Ibid., p.207.
78Ibid., p.217.
79Ibid., pp.217-218.
80Ibid., p.219.
81 Ibid., pp.220-224; Eisenberg (1989). 
82Eisenberg (1987), p.224.
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that use of the patented invention was for experimental purposes was strongest 
where the user was attempting to check the adequacy of the patent specification 
or the validity of the claims, or to devise alternatives to the patented invention, 
and weakest where the invention is essentially being used as a tool in an unre­
lated research effort -  in other words, where the user is effectively an ordinary 
consumer of the invention.83
These early papers dealing with the impact of intellectual property protec­
tion on the progress of scientific research in biotechnology are significant because 
they anticipated key aspects of the present debate over the appropriate scope of 
intellectual property rights in that field. During the 1990s, as research scientists 
and their institutions became more familiar with patenting and other aspects of 
commercialisation, legal discussion shifted from the broad question of whether 
research discoveries should be protected by intellectual property laws at all to 
subtler questions about what sorts of research discoveries should be protected 
and how to preserve the benefits of intellectual property while minimising inter­
ference with scientific progress.84 In her 1987 and 1989 articles, Eisenberg had 
drawn attention to possible problems associated with patenting of inventions 
which are primarily useful as tools for further research and to issues surround­
ing licensing of such inventions. As it turned out, during the 1990s perceived 
problems of access to proprietary research tools became the focus of heightened 
controversy within the academic biotechnology research community 85 Thus, by 
the late 1990s, intellectual property policy in relation to proprietary research tools 
was of intense practical interest to researchers, as well as being of theoretical in­
terest as an illustration of the difficulty of reconciling the rationale for intellectual 
property protection of research discoveries with the need for scientists to be able 
to build freely on those discoveries in the interests of scientific progress.
2.7 Economic justifications for intellectual property 
protection
The extension of legal protection to intellectual property has been justified by ref­
erence to both moral and economic arguments, but in countries with a British 
legal heritage the latter have been the most influential, especially in relation to 
patents. As noted above, the US Constitution incorporates an exclusively instru­
mental justification for patent legislation, and there is no doubt that today, intel­
lectual property protection is regarded by policymakers at both national and in­
ternational levels primarily as a means of stimulating technological innovation.86
83Eisenberg (1989), pp.1074-1078; see also Eisenberg (1987), pp.224-225.
84National Research Council (1997), Preface.
85Ibid., Introduction.
86Loughlan provides a modern perspective on moral justifications for intellectual property 
rights: "there is no widespread social and economic acceptance of a general proposition that 
persons ought to be legally entitled to regain the full value of their labour. What do you think 
capitalism is about?" Loughlan (1998), p.15.
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The literature dealing with economic justifications for intellectual property 
protection is enormous. Fortunately, a paper by Richard Nelson and Roberto 
Mazzoleni provides a convenient entry point. Nelson and Mazzoleni identify 
four economic theories purporting to explain how patent protection promotes 
technological innovation. They are the "invention-inducement theory", the "dis­
closure theory", the "development and commercialisation theory" and the "prospect 
development theory".87
The invention-inducement, disclosure and development and commercialisa­
tion theories all treat patent protection as a response to potential market failure 
resulting from the "free rider" problem. A free rider is someone who imitates 
and thereby gets the benefit of an invention without having made any significant 
investment of time, effort, skill or money. Assuming that inventions are easier 
to copy than to make, a rational actor would not choose to invest the resources 
necessary to make a new invention or to develop and commercialise an existing 
invention -  or at any rate would not choose to disclose a new invention -  without 
some means of protecting that investment. The invention-inducement theory, the 
disclosure theory and the development and commercialisation theory each pos­
tulate that, by conferring on the patentee or his or her assignees the exclusive 
right to commercially exploit an invention for a limited time, patent rights create 
a needed economic incentive to engage in the relevant phase of the innovation 
process.
According to these theories, the social benefit of promoting innovative activ­
ity through exclusive patent rights comes at a social cost. In effect, a patent is a 
limited monopoly: an opportunity to create a legally enforced market structure 
in which the patent holder can charge more for his or her product than would be 
possible in a competitive market.88 Because monopoly rights impose a cost on the 
community by way of increased prices and reduced output, patent laws should 
be designed to grant patents only for inventions which would not otherwise have 
been made, or which would not otherwise have been made available to the com­
munity through disclosure or development and commercialisation. This leads to 
a fundamental problem with incentive arguments in favour of patent rights. To 
justify patent protection in any given context -  for example, for research tools in 
biotechnology -  it is necessary to demonstrate first, that some extra incentive to 
engage in innovative activity is needed; second, if it is needed, that the patent 
incentive is likely to be effective; and finally, that there is no better way to achieve 
the desired result. But this is difficult, perhaps impossible, to do.89 Patent own-
87Nelson & Mazzoleni (1997). Nelson and Mazzoleni give a brief outline of each theory as 
follows (p.l): "Invention-inducement theory: The anticipation of receiving patents provides mo­
tivation for useful invention. Disclosure theory: Patents facilitate wide knowledge about and use 
of inventions by inducing inventors to disclose their inventions when otherwise they would rely 
on secrecy. Development and commercialisation theory: Patents induce the investment needed to 
develop and commercialise inventions. Prospect development theory: patents enable the orderly 
exploration of broad prospects for derivative inventions."
88Loughlan (1998), p.93.
89Methods for empirical studies have included examination of historical records of industrial 
development for countries with and without patent systems; qualitative research to determine
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ership is not the only way to obtain an economic return from new inventions: 
for example, innovators may enjoy a pioneer advantage even in the absence of 
patent protection. As sociological studies of science show, economic incentives 
are not the only kinds of incentives which motivate innovation.90 And while em­
pirical evidence suggests that overall levels of innovation do respond to economic 
stimuli, governments have at their disposal a range of economic instruments for 
stimulating innovation other than patents, including the provision of research 
funding or venture capital, tax concessions, procurement policy, export develop­
ment grants, tariffs and bounties.91 With respect to the disclosure theory, it has 
been argued that patents may not in fact create an incentive to disclose inventions 
that would otherwise be kept secret, because patent protection is most attractive 
relative to trade secrecy for those very inventions which could not easily be kept 
secret for long.92 Given this complexity, it is not surprising that empirical assess­
ments of the incentive function of patent protection have been inconclusive.
Nelson and Mazzoleni's fourth theory, the prospect development theory, dif­
fers from the older incentive theories just discussed in that it treats the patent sys­
tem not merely as a device to enable the capture of returns on investment in inno­
vation, but also as a system for efficiently allocating resources to the development 
of existing inventions. Introduced by Edmund W. Kitch in 1977, the prospect de­
velopment theory postulates that granting broad patents on early stage inven­
tions allows patent holders to coordinate subsequent research and development 
within the area of the patent claim (the "prospect"). If the patent holder has an 
exclusive right to exploit the new technological prospect, later arrivals will be un­
able to derive economic benefit from developing the prospect unless they negoti­
ate directly with the patent holder to obtain licences to the underlying technology. 
Thus the patent holder becomes a link among all those working to develop the 
prospect, preventing wasteful duplication of effort and facilitating the transfer of 
information.93
the impact of patent incentives on research and development decisions in firms; and measure­
ment of the difference between private and social rates of return to investments in research and 
development. Eisenberg (1989), pp.1031-1033.
90 Also note in this connection the comments of Burger CJ, delivering the judgment of the court 
in Diamond v Chakrabarty (1980) 447 US 303 at 317-318: "It is argued that this Court should 
weigh... potential hazards in considering whether respondent's invention is patentable subject 
matter.... We disagree. The grant or denial of patents on microorganisms is not likely to put an end 
to genetic research or to its attendant risks. The large amount of research that has already occurred 
when no researcher had sure knowledge that patent protection would be available suggests that 
legislative or judicial fiat as to patentability will not deter the scientific mind from probing into 
the unknown any more than Canute could command the tides."
91 Eisenberg (1989), p.1031, note 59.
92Long-term secrecy is not always feasible in relation to a new invention, for example because 
marketing the invention as a product provides an opportunity for reverse engineering (see chap­
ter 6, section 6.3). In that case, there is no need to provide an incentive to disclose the invention -  
it will be disclosed anyway. But where long term secrecy is feasible, the inventor may have little 
to gain from patent protection, which may not last as long as a well-kept trade secret, and which 
may be difficult to enforce if infringers are also able to keep their use of the invention secret. See 
Eisenberg (1989), pp.1028-1029.
93Kitch (1977), pp.276-279.
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In Kitch's view, the prospect function of the patent system enhances its pub­
lic welfare effect. However, the prospect development theory as a justification for 
patent rights has a twist in its tail when applied to research tools in biotechnology. 
As Nelson and Mazzoleni point out, the assumption that development of techno­
logical prospects is most efficient when it is centrally coordinated by the patent 
holder is inconsistent with the scientific ideal of individualism and independence 
in research, which is based on the belief that coordination or central planning of 
research impedes scientific progress by weakening the initiative of researchers 
and substituting the judgment of the co-ordinator for that of the individuals who 
are actually immersed in the details of the research.94 Sociologists of science have 
argued that the most efficient possible organisation of scientific research involves 
independent initiatives by competing scientists working with knowledge of each 
other's achievements.95 Even where imperfect knowledge leads to duplication of 
effort, such duplication may be valuable: for example, multiple overlapping re­
search efforts may improve the impact and accessibility of new research claims or 
help establish their validity, while different researchers may make different mis­
takes, interpret results differently or perceive different implications of the same 
results, thereby achieving greater overall understanding.96
Assuming both Kitch and the sociologists of science are correct -  that is, as­
suming that patents do function as a claim system for new technological prospects, 
but that innovation in relation to research tools in biotechnology proceeds most 
efficiently by way of independent initiatives on the part of many different re­
searchers -  it follows that granting broad patents on early stage inventions in 
biotechnology may actually threaten innovation by forcing subsequent researchers 
to enter into potentially costly license negotiations with the patent holder. The 
unattractive alternative would be for later arrivals to give up hope of deriving 
economic reward from working on the prospect, provided of course that the work 
did not have to be abandoned altogether for fear of infringing the patent. The 
higher the transaction costs associated with obtaining a license from the patent 
holder, the greater the likelihood that a prospect will not be efficiently developed. 
Thus, the implications of the prospect development theory for patent protection 
of research tools turn on whether the transaction costs of patent licensing are as­
sumed to be high or low.
94Nelson & Mazzoleni (1997), p.6; Eisenberg (1989), p.1060.
95Eisenberg (1989), p.1061, citing Michael Polanyi, "The Republic of Science: Its Political and 
Economic Theory" (1962) 1 Minerva 54.
96Eisenberg (1989), pp.1063-1065, citing works by Robert K. Merton and Warren O. Hagstrom. 
According to Kitch, the patent system cannot perform a prospect function in the context of basic 
scientific research because it is impossible to fashion a meaningful property right around a mere 
discovery or explanation of scientific phenomena. However, he does believe that basic research 
faces the same problems of coordination among researchers as are found in applied research, 
and suggests that the prospect function performed by the patent system in relation to applied 
research may be performed in relation to basic research by peer review procedures for research 
grant applications: Kitch (1977), pp.288-289.
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2.8 An information economics perspective
Kitch's acknowledgement of the information function of patents reflects an im­
portant shift in economic thinking about patents since the 1960s. Until that time, 
economic discussion had centred around the role of patents in facilitating product 
markets by allowing owners of goods to sell the goods separately from the asso­
ciated intellectual property.97 However, in 1962 Kenneth Arrow observed that 
patents and other intellectual property rights also facilitate markets in informa­
tion.98 In the commercial world, the integration of valuable information from a 
range of sources requires firms to bargain for the transfer of that information. But 
in the absence of patents, such bargaining runs into difficulties. If the owner of 
information discloses it to a prospective buyer, the buyer has obtained the infor­
mation for free. On the other hand, if the owner does not disclose the information, 
the buyer will be unable to judge its value and will therefore be unwilling to pay 
the asked price. A patent allows the owner of the information to disclose it to 
prospective buyers without losing its value; at the same time, the parties may 
reach an agreement about the transfer of related information not directly covered 
by the patent, for example information about how to apply the technology ef­
ficiently ("know-how"). Although Kitch did not refer directly to Arrow's paper, 
his article describes the information aspects of patents in essentially these terms.99 
Arrow's observation switched the focus of economic discussion from product to 
information markets and eventually triggered further insights into the relation­
ship between information flow and the patent system, including insights about 
the significance of transaction costs.
In his 1996 book Understanding Novelty: Information, Technological Change, and 
the Patent System, Thomas Mandeville builds on Arrow's work on information 
markets to develop a new economic theory of the patent system.100. Mandeville 
observes that although conventional economic theories of the patent system do 
not give clear policy guidance as to the appropriate scope of patent protection, 
they do seem to suggest that a strong patent system is desirable for the reasons 
touched on above: strong property rights enable firms to control their technol­
ogy and appropriate returns from it, thus providing incentives for the allocation 
of resources to innovative activity.101 He proposes an alternative, "information" 
perspective on innovation which points to a more complex but basically contrary 
view of appropriate patent scope.
According to Mandeville, conventional economic theories of the patent sys­
tem share two underlying assumptions. The first is that technological informa­
tion is easy to copy, resulting in a lack of incentive to invest in innovation. The
97For a comprehensive overview of the patent system before the 1960s, see generally Fritz 
Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study No. 15 of the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
98Arrow (1962).
"Kitch (1977), pp.277-278.
100Mandeville (1996)
101 Ibid., p.9.
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second is that the market is, or should be, the primary mechanism for the ex­
change of technological information among firms. Together these assumptions 
give rise to the perception that patents are necessary in order to overcome "mar­
ket failure due to inappropriability" (of investments in technological innovation). 
But, says Mandeville, an information perspective on innovation suggests neither 
assumption is correct for more than a very small proportion of technological in­
formation.
To construct his information perspective, Mandeville begins by outlining the 
characteristics that distinguish information from material goods with respect to 
production and dissemination within the economy. For example, information is 
inexhaustible; it is accumulative, in that it grows with use and its social value is 
enhanced through dissemination; it has some of the characteristics of capital, in 
that the acquisition of information usually represents an irreversible investment; 
information is indivisible; the cost of producing it is independent of the scale on 
which it is used; and most importantly for Mandeville's arguments, the greater 
part of the cost of transferring information is the cost incurred by the recipient in 
absorbing the information and allocating scarce resources to its use.102
The second essential element of Mandeville's information perspective is his 
continuum model of technological information.103 Defining technology as "in­
formation applied to doing things", he observes that some of this information is 
codified into machines, blueprints, technical and trade journal articles, and patent 
specifications, but that much of it exists in less codified form. For Mandeville, 
codification represents formalised learning -  that is, learning arranged, organ­
ised into a pattern and ultimately embodied in a tangible object. Predictability 
is an important element of codification: a technique is not codified unless it con­
sistently yields the same output. Thus, highly codified or tangible information 
appears only after substantial prior learning has taken place. At the other ex­
treme, uncodified information consists of undeveloped ideas and unarticulated 
know-how; uncodified information is "pure", intangible information. Mande­
ville's model is a continuum because there are degrees of codification: for exam­
ple, information contained in patent specifications will generally be less codified 
than that embodied in a prototype machine, which in turn is less codified than the 
information embodied in a mass produced machine. In the process of innovation, 
codified information evolves out of uncodified information.
Mandeville argues that although most of the real world probably lies some­
where in between the two extremes of highly uncodified and highly codified in­
formation, the bulk of economic phenomena associated with innovation occurs 
toward the "uncodified" end of the continuum.104 Further, in any given field at 
a particular time, the proportion of technology which remains uncodified is de­
termined both by the degree of complexity inherent in the technology and by its 
newness. Generally, says Mandeville, the older or more mature the technology,
102Ibid., pp.57-66.
103This model is elaborated in chapter 4, "Developing an information-theoretic perspective on 
innovation", Mandeville (1996).
104Ibid., pp.52-54.
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the more it has been codified. A new industry based on a new technology is in a 
fluid situation where most relevant technological information has yet to be cod­
ified.105 Compared with other industries, the biotechnology industry certainly 
fits this description, and many research tools in biotechnology are likely to be 
relatively uncodified.
Having developed his continuum model, Mandeville points out that the de­
gree of codification of technological information affects the ease, speed and mode 
of its diffusion, transfer or imitation .106 For example, while highly codified infor­
mation can be communicated without the need for personal interaction, uncodi­
fied information is best communicated in person, through practice and "learning 
by doing". Because transfer costs are higher the less codified the information, 
the conventional assumption about ease of copying holds only for the highly 
codified end of the information spectrum; for uncodified technology, informa­
tion and user costs inhibit imitation. Similarly, high transaction costs associated 
with the transfer of uncodified information affect the efficiency of the market as 
a means of coordinating its production and distribution. Mandeville illustrates 
this point by reference to the case of technology licensing, observing that several 
well-established difficulties faced by the market in this context are exacerbated 
in relation to highly uncodified information .107 He argues that because the mar­
ket does not work well as a facilitator of information exchange with respect to 
uncodified information, various nonmarket mechanisms have arisen to fill the 
gap. These include information transfer via hierarchies within firms, personal 
communication networks and personal mobility, open publication, collaboration 
between technology supplying firms and between technology users and suppli­
ers, and the use of consultants.108
Thus, Mandeville's argument is that conventional theories of the patent sys­
tem exaggerate both the problem of inappropriability and the role of the market 
in the innovative process. If most technological information is not easy to copy 
-  that is, if free riding is not after all such an attractive option -  and if the costs 
of acquiring and transmitting most technological information are much higher 
via the market mechanism than via a range of other existing mechanisms, then 
it follows that there is no need for a strong patent system to shore up a failing 
technology market. However, Mandeville goes further, arguing that strengthen­
ing property rights on technological information may be not just unnecessary, but 
actually counter-productive to overall technological advance.
According to Mandeville, an information perspective on innovation highlights 
the cumulative and collective nature of the process. This is in contrast to the con­
ventional view, which emphasises the role of the individual innovating firm .109 
Innovation is cumulative in the sense that the existing stock of technology is a 
crucial input in the production of new technology, and collective in that it relies
105Ibid., pp.50-51.
106Ibid., p.57.
107Ibid., chapter 5, "Information flow mechanisms in the technological change process". 
108Ibid., p.75.
109 Ibid., p.9.
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on the interaction of many participants. Because innovation is cumulative, it de­
pends on information flow between present and future innovators; because it is 
collective, it depends on information flow among current participants, including 
rivals. From this viewpoint, even unauthorised copying among competing firms 
is beneficial to overall technological innovation because it is part of a process of 
transfer and learning.110
Patents, however, have the effect of blocking other firms from freely adopting, 
imitating or improving on the patented idea without the consent of the paten­
tee. Although patents may (as Kitch theorised) encourage the diffusion of ideas 
by giving patent holders an incentive to sell the patented product or licence the 
patented technology, this occurs via the market mechanism; Mandeville argues 
that while patents can aid the market exchange of highly codified, tangible tech­
nology, they tend to discourage the flow of associated uncodified information 
via nonmarket mechanisms (absent the patentee's consent, that is exactly what 
they are intended to do).111 Further, the argument that the blocking effects of 
patents can be overcome through licensing and other contractual arrangements is 
not convincing with respect to uncodified technology -  that is, most technology: 
even if the patent holder is willing to license the technology to all comers, license 
agreements between arm's-length agents in the marketplace are a much slower 
and more costly form of information transfer than nonmarket mechanisms -  and 
the more uncodified the technology, the higher the transaction costs.112 While 
conventional theory supposes that the restrictive effects of patents can be jus­
tified if they ultimately encourage the production of new information, such a 
trade-off makes no sense in the realm of uncodified information because there is 
no clear distinction between production and use: stifling the flow of information 
automatically stifles its production.113
In a mature industry where much of the relevant technology has already been 
codified, Mandeville suggests that patents may not do much harm. But in new, 
highly innovative industries, a greater proportion of technology remains uncod­
ified and nonmarket mechanisms are crucial to the information exchange nec­
essary for cumulative technological advance.114 If Mandeville is correct, strong 
patent protection in the field of biotechnology may be particularly harmful, im­
peding the necessary flow of information and deterring the formation of clusters 
of firms working to develop new technologies.
The relevance to the biotechnology industry of Mandeville's arguments against 
strong patent protection is demonstrated by the work of Walter W. Powell. Writ­
ing from a sociological perspective, Powell has argued that in fields where knowl­
edge is developing rapidly and the sources of knowledge are widely dispersed, 
the locus of innovation is found in interorganisational networks. In a recent arti-
110Ibid., p.93. 
n i Ibid.,p. 98. 
112Ibid., p.99. 
113Ibid„ p.96. 
114Ibid., pp.50-51.
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d e , 115 he emphasises the importance of relational contracting among participants 
in the biotechnology industry: because the underlying science and technology is 
so diverse, not even the largest players can build a sufficiently strong research 
base to cover all areas of technical innovation, and similarly, it is not easy to as­
semble the full range of skills required to get new products to market beneath 
one roof. To compensate for this lack of internal capability, participants in the 
field have turned to joint ventures, research partnerships, strategic alliances, mi­
nority equity investments and licensing arrangements. Powell regards informa­
tion flow as being so important in the field of biotechnology that he describes the 
biotechnology industry as not so much an industry in the traditional sense, as 
a "conduit" for a wide range of surrounding sectors to access fundamental new 
technologies.
Two points may be made in relation to Mandeville's theory. First, as Mande- 
ville acknowledges, the incompatibility of property rights with pure, intangible 
information has always been recognised in patent law: patent doctrine excludes 
theories and abstract ideas from protection .116 However, recent developments 
in patent law -  emanating in particular from the US Federal Circuit -  have ex­
panded the boundaries of patentability to such an extent that the patent sys­
tem now comes close to allowing capture of the value of information itself.117 
In a recent article dealing with the patentability of DNA sequences of unknown 
function, Rebecca Eisenberg warns against applying "bricks and mortar" rules 
to information goods; 118 Mandeville's position, that property rights are inconsis­
tent with the economic characteristics of uncodified information, supports Eisen- 
berg's conclusion that there are sound policy reasons to be wary of expanding 
property rights in intangible information .119
The second point is that Mandeville's vision of clusters of competing firms 
working on related problems within the same field, exchanging information rel­
atively freely through a range of mechanisms and placing little emphasis on for­
mal property rights and marketplace transactions, is strongly reminiscent of the 
conditions described by sociologists of science as optimal for the progress of sci­
entific research. Mandeville is aware of this: he observes that informal personal 
communication, networking and incentives for individuals to communicate and 
signal the possession of new information seem as important in the realm of un­
codified technology as they are conventionally acknowledged to be in the realm 
of science.120 Thus it appears that recent sociological and economic theories about 
the effects of property rights on information flow and the overall pace of techno­
logical advance overlap substantially, at least with respect to leading-edge tech­
nology exemplified by many biotechnology research tools. The parallels between 
Mandeville's and Hilgartner's models of technological innovation are especially
115Powell (2001).
116Mandeville (1996), p.103. 
117Eisenberg (2000), pp.791-792. 
118Eisenberg (2000), p.796. 
119Mandeville (1996), p.103. 
120Mandeville (1996), p.105.
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striking: for example, both postulate that the ease and mode of information trans­
fer depends on where the particular information lies along different kinds of con­
tinuum (uncodified to codified, novel or scarce to widely available, untested to 
reliable); and both treat the process of innovation as a continuous cycle driven by 
complex interactions among many participants, present and future.
2.9 Economic studies of cumulative innovation
Other economic theorists building on Arrow's insights about the relationship be­
tween property rights and information transaction costs have also focused on the 
cumulative nature of innovation. Robert Merges notes the emergence in the early 
1990s of a strand of economics literature attempting to describe how intellectual 
property rights affect bargaining between pioneer inventors and follow-on im­
provers in contexts where research activity is directed toward the development 
of improvements or applications of a previous invention.121 This "cumulative" 
or "sequential" innovation literature is part of a broader economics literature on 
optimal design of intellectual property rights sparked by William D. Nordhaus' 
1969 observation that patent length represents a trade-off between encouraging 
innovation and avoiding the deadweight loss associated with monopoly prof­
its.122 The optimal design literature considers how refinements in the duration, 
breadth and standard of intellectual property protection might impact on its ef­
fectiveness as an incentive mechanism.123
When economists began to think about how the cumulative nature of innova­
tion affects optimal patent design, they immediately saw a problem of incentive. 
An invention that facilitates future innovations may be assumed to be of greater 
social value than one which is only useful in itself. However, in such a case it 
is difficult to turn social value into private value, because the incremental value 
of future innovations is not automatically reflected in the price of the initial in­
vention. Unless social value can be converted into private value, so the argument 
goes, early innovators will have inadequate incentive to invest.124 This problem is 
especially likely to arise in the case of research tools, because a large proportion of 
their social value resides in the innovations they facilitate.125 A solution is to give 
early innovators some claim on profits arising from subsequent innovations, but 
this creates a new problem by reducing incentives for follow-on innovators.126
From this starting point, much of the literature on cumulative innovation 
has focused on how intellectual property rules determine the division of prof­
its among sequential innovators, with the aim of finding those "settings" under
121 Merges (2001), p.125; Merges (2000). Early papers include Merges & Nelson (1990) and 
Scotchmer (1991).
122Norhaus (1969).
123For a review of the optimal design literature, see Gallini & Scotchmer (2002).
124Scotchmer (1999).
125Gallini & Scotchmer (2002), under heading "Optimal Design: The Case of Cumulative 
Innovation".
126See Barton (1997b), text accompanying notes 12 to 25.
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which profits are divided so as to respect the costs of early and later innovators 
and thus provide adequate incentives at every stage of the innovation process.127 
Unfortunately (though perhaps not surprisingly), increased attention to the prob­
lem of patent design in the context of cumulative innovation has not resulted in 
any clear guidance as to whether or how intellectual property rules should be al­
tered in order to encourage innovation. In an article reviewing ten years' worth of 
literature on cumulative innovation, Nancy Gallini and Suzanne Scotchmer cau­
tiously extract a case for broad and short patents, arguing that broad patents can 
serve the public interest by preventing duplication of research and development 
costs, facilitating the development of second generation products and protect­
ing early innovators who lay the foundations for later development; these argu­
ments are consistent with Kitch's prospect development model of patent func­
tion.128 On the other hand, John H. Barton has said that the current balance of 
incentives is probably too much in favour of initial innovators and concludes that 
the best response to the recognition that innovation is cumulative is not to find 
ways to strengthen the control of the initial innovator, but rather to find ways to 
strengthen incentives and opportunities for follow-on innovators.129
One lesson that does emerge clearly from the cumulative innovation litera­
ture is that private contracting among rights holders can dramatically affect the 
optimal design of patents. The benefits of broad patents identified by Gallini 
and Scotchmer depend on the ability of right holders to contract around con­
flicts in rights: with contracting, patent holders can profit from improvements 
instead of being threatened by them, and will therefore ensure that they arise 
even if they infringe the patent; but without contracting, there is a danger that 
broad patents will inhibit future innovators from making improvements. In other 
words, whether property rights are helpful or counterproductive in encouraging 
innovation depends on the ease with which innovators can enter into agreements 
for rearranging and exercising those rights.130
2.10 Conclusion: the importance of scientific exchange
The commercialisation of biotechnology research and development from the mid- 
1970s to the present has triggered widespread concern that privatisation of sci­
entific knowledge under an increasingly strong intellectual property protection 
regime could hinder the progress of science by taking the tools needed for fur­
ther innovation out of scientists' hands. This chapter brought together sociolog­
ical and economic perspectives on the question of what is the appropriate scope 
of intellectual property protection for biotechnology research tools.
127Gallini & Scotchmer (2002). In this connection, Barton observes that early basic research is 
more likely than follow-on research to have been publicly funded through research grants or 
other schemes which may provide adequate incentives even in the absence of intellectual property 
protection: Barton (1997b), text accompanying note 19.
128Gallini & Scotchmer (2002).
129Barton (2000), p.1934; Barton (1997b), text accompanying note 25.
130Gallini & Scotchmer (2002).
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Traditional economic theories tended to support strong intellectual property 
rights in general, while traditional sociology of science theories emphasised the 
importance of free and open scientific exchange. More recent theorising in both 
disciplines is more nuanced, but tends to emphasise the importance of informa­
tion flow for ongoing innovation. For example, Hilgartner's data stream analysis 
shows science as a complex decentred system of bargaining and gift relation­
ships in which there is a variety of incentives for researchers to transfer uncodi­
fied knowledge. The explanation, applicable in both "pure" science and technol­
ogy settings, is that innovation proceeds most efficiently by way of independent 
initiatives on the part of many different actors linked in a way that facilitates 
communication and provides incentives for individuals to signal the possession 
of new information. Intellectual property rights may or may not be useful in 
promoting the exchange of innovation-related information in other contexts, but 
could actually be harmful in biotechnology research and development, where 
much information is highly "uncodified" and information flow is particularly 
important. In particular, the dominance of the patent system as a vehicle for sci­
entific exchange creates uncertainty because of the nature of the patent monopoly, 
especially problems of defining patent scope, and when scientists cannot be sure 
of the security of their own data streams, incentives to transfer uncodified knowl­
edge are reduced. The probability of harm depends on the degree of the un­
certainty and the severity of obstacles (transaction costs) associated with the ex­
change of protected scientific information and materials.
Does the current intellectual property regime in biotechnology research and 
development introduce transaction costs that threaten ongoing innovation? If so, 
what might be done to remedy this situation? We examine these questions in the 
next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Problems and solutions
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we saw that intellectual property rights might hinder the 
progress of innovation in biotechnology research and development. We also saw 
that whether this happens depends on the level of transaction costs associated 
with transfers of protected information and material among the various actors 
involved in the innovation process. In this chapter we look more closely at how 
transaction costs affect bargaining over proprietary research tools in the biotech­
nology context.
The chapter starts with a brief introduction to the concept of a "tragedy of 
the anticommons", a common point of departure for discussion of the effects of 
intellectual property rights in the biotechnology industry.1 It goes on to exam­
ine whether anticommons tragedy has in fact eventuated in the biotechnology 
industry, and more generally, whether intellectual property rights in biotechnol­
ogy have so far proved to be helpful in encouraging research and development 
directed at solving global society's most pressing problems. Empirical evidence 
suggests they have not, so the question arises: what should be done? The final 
part of this chapter gives an overview of different classes of proposed solution 
to problems caused by intellectual property rights in biotechnology, arguing that 
what is needed is a mechanism for providing affordable, accessible, unencum­
bered "tool kits" to allow broad participation in biotechnology research and de­
velopment.
3.2 The tragedy of the anticommons
Where property rights on multiple components of a single technology are owned 
by a number of separate entities, the development and commercialisation of new 
products requires co-ordination among many different actors.2 In a transaction
lrrhe phrase "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin (1968)) was intended to suggest that not divid­
ing the common into properties may lead to overuse and destruction. The concept of a "tragedy 
of the anticommons" is explained in the next section.
2Merges (2000). According to Graff et al., the spectrum of possible means of complementary 
asset co-ordination from most internalised to most externalised or "arms length" includes ac-
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cost-free world, where everyone has perfect knowledge and there are no impedi­
ments or costs associated with negotiation, this would pose no problem because 
property rights would be transferred through private bargaining to the entity 
that values them the most.* 3 But in reality, transaction costs are positive, and the 
greater the number and complexity of negotiations, the higher the transaction 
costs. Michael Heller has described the situation where multiple owners each 
have a right to exclude others from using a scarce resource as a "tragedy of the 
anticommons": if owners are unable to negotiate successfully for the bundling 
of rights so that someone has an effective privilege of use, the resource may be 
underused and the total potential value of the rights (private and social) may not 
be realised.4
Heller's theory of anticommons tragedy is not a new idea, but a restatement 
of a problem familiar to economists -  that of co-ordinating complementary assets 
in a high technology setting. The concept of asset complementarity (possession of 
one asset has an effect on the marginal value of another asset) is highly relevant 
to biotechnology research and development because effective co-ordination can 
be particularly valuable during times of rapid technological change or in com­
plex systems industries -  both characteristics of the biotechnology industry -  yet 
is made more difficult by additional uncertainty or complexity.5 It is therefore 
unsurprising that it appears frequently in discussions of the likely impact of in­
tellectual property rights in biotechnology.
The first application of Heller's theory in biotechnology was in the biomedical 
context. In a 1998 paper in the journal Science, Heller and Eisenberg pointed to 
the proliferation of small-scale intellectual property rights in biomedical research 
since the 1980s as an example of the tragedy of the anticommons: when users 
need access to multiple patented inputs in order to create a single useful product, 
granting too many property rights upstream stifles socially valuable innovations 
further downstream in the course of research and product development.6 "An­
ticommons" terminology has since been applied to similar concerns regarding 
agricultural biotechnology (see section 3.4, below, p.46).
The next two sections of this chapter address the question whether anticom­
mons tragedy has in fact eventuated in the biotechnology industry, as well as the 
broader question whether developments in intellectual property law and policy 
have adversely affected incentives to conduct socially important research and de­
velopment. These sections focus on biomedical and agricultural applications of 
biotechnology and biotechnology research tools, to the exclusion of other areas
quisition and integration of another innovating firm; partial acquisition of such a firm; strategic
research partnership with other innovating firm; ongoing research and development contract; 
purchase or exclusive license of patent; non-exclusive license of patent or purchase of input tech­
nology component (Graff et al. (2003b), Figure 1, p.26).
3Long (2000), p.827, citing R. H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) 3 Journal of Law and 
Economics, and G. Calabresi and A. D. Melamed, "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil­
ity: One View of the Cathedral", (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089, pp.1094-95.
4Heller (1998).
5Graff et al. (2003b), pp.4-5 citing works by Teece and by Milgrom and Roberts.
6Heller & Eisenberg (1998).
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of biotechnology research and development, for three reasons. The first is that 
biomedicine and agriculture are the most advanced (in terms of product devel­
opment) and economically significant sectors of the biotechnology industry to 
date. The second is that the two fields are interesting to compare because they 
are closely related in terms of both the technology and the types of institutions 
involved, yet distinct in that they are differently funded, commercial products are 
aimed at different end consumers, and they are supported by different research 
and development communities. Finally, the legitimate end goals of biomedical 
and agricultural research -  health and food security -  are by far the most press­
ing concerns of the poor, who make up a large majority of the world's population. 
We saw in chapter 2 that the concept of "scientific progress" was originally inti­
mately connected with an ideal of science pursued as a public good in the public 
interest. To the extent that privatisation of life sciences research and development 
undermines the global public interest, even a rapid rate of technical innovation 
could therefore not be described as "progress" in this sense.
3.3 Medical biotechnology
In this section we examine three questions. First, do the necessary preconditions 
for anticommons tragedy exist in medical biotechnology? Second, has a tragedy 
of the anticommons in fact eventuated in this field? Third, if there is no unam­
biguous evidence of anticommons tragedy in medical biotechnology, what are the 
biggest obstacles to achieving good health for the world's population and how do 
they relate to intellectual property in biomedical, including biotechnological, in­
novations?
3.3.1 Preconditions for anticommons tragedy
Fleller stipulates two necessary preconditions for a tragedy of the anticommons: 
fragmented ownership of complementary assets and high transaction costs. Em­
pirical studies have confirmed Heller and Eisenberg's assertion that the first con­
dition is satisfied in the field of medical biotechnology: the patenting of research 
tools has made the patent landscape in this field more complex, and there are on 
average more patents (many on research tools) and more patent holders than ever 
before involved in a given commercialisable invention.7 The rest of this section 
therefore focuses on the issue of transaction costs.
According to Greg Graff et al., the economic literature on problems of con­
tracting for knowledge describes several general classes of problem that lead to 
high transaction costs.8 The first -  diffuse entitlement problems resulting from 
the assignment of mutually blocking property rights -  corresponds to Heller's 
first condition for anticommons tragedy. These problems are often compounded
7Walsh & Cohen (2003).
8Graff et al. (2003b), pp.4-5.
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by poorly defined boundaries among separately assigned rights. Second, value 
allocation problems result from both rational and biased asset valuation differ­
ences between providers and recipients. Third, monitoring and metering prob­
lems involve difficulties in writing and enforcing contracts over technological and 
commercial contingencies that can arise in dynamic and uncertain environments. 
Fourth, strategic problems arise from the rent dissipating effects of licensing to 
other firms and thereby creating new competitors in final product markets, or re­
sult from market power and small-numbers bargaining problems in markets for 
individual, idiosyncratic, and highly specific intellectual assets.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that all these types of problem exist in medical 
biotechnology. In relation to poorly defined boundaries among multiple sepa­
rately assigned rights, Clarisa Long notes that search costs in medical biotechnol­
ogy can be substantial.9 For example, the prospective user of a patented research 
tool must begin by identifying and determining the scope of the relevant patent 
in order to decide what licence rights are needed.10 To do this properly requires 
significant resources, and in any case cannot be conclusive because the patent sit­
uation in any given field is dynamic. If there are multiple patents in the field, the 
cost of deciding which ones are relevant to a particular avenue of research may 
itself be prohibitive.* 11
In an essay reporting insights derived from a 1997 National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) survey, Rebecca Eisenberg attributes value allocation problems in med­
ical biotechnology to heterogeneities among institutions, exacerbated by uncer­
tainty as to future technological development.12 Institutions involved in biomed­
ical research include universities, hospitals, private non-profit research institu­
tions, government agencies, small biotechnology firms and major pharmaceuti­
cal firms; these institutions have different missions, resources and constraints.13 
The NIH survey found that all types of institution recognised that these differ­
ences might sometimes justify asymmetrical terms of exchange, but each felt that 
the asymmetry should work in its favour. The problem of bias is exacerbated in 
relation to research tools because their ultimate value depends on the outcome 
of future research, which cannot be predicted at the time of the transaction; this 
uncertainty brings the self-interested bias of negotiating parties into play as par­
ties overvalue their own contributions to potentially profitable future discoveries 
at the expense of other inputs.14 Although true uncertainty is not the same as a 
simple lack of information on the part of one or both parties to a transaction, it is 
clear that both types of uncertainty affect transaction costs: in most transactions, 
licensor and licensee have asymmetrical access to knowledge about the technol-
9Long (2000), pp.828-831.
luLong (2000), p.828. Cf Mandeville's discussion of licensing transaction costs, which is framed 
around Coase's categories of costs of arriving at an agreed price and costs of defining and enforc­
ing obligations of parties to the agreement: Mandeville (1996), pp.70-71.
11 Environment and Production Technology Division and International Food Policy Research 
Institute (2001), pp.22-23.
12Eisenberg (2001), p.235ff.
13Eisenberg (2001), p.235. See also Council on Governmental Relations (2001), pp.1-2. 
14Eisenberg (2001), p.243.
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ogy, and the risk of opportunism on the part of the better-informed party makes 
it more difficult for the parties to reach agreement.15
According to anecdotal evidence, monitoring and metering problems are par­
ticularly severe in medical biotechnology. Again, uncertainty -  "a severe and 
intractable lack of knowledge on the part of all parties to the transaction regard­
ing the fundamental value of the resource changing hands" -  and heterogeneity 
of participants in transactions are the main contributing factors.16 Uncertainty 
forces the parties to incorporate terms covering a wide range of possible contin­
gencies, exacerbating the inherent complexity of most technology licensing agree­
ments (see chapter 5, p.110). If the prospective user of a research tool must ne­
gotiate multiple licences, not only will the costs be higher because of the greater 
number of negotiations to be concluded, but the complexity of each negotiation 
will be increased because the licensee must avoid committing itself to terms in 
one contract which would prevent it from fulfilling the terms of another con­
tract.17 Further, recent research on the sociology of scientific exchange, described 
in chapter 2, suggests that the problem of uncertainty may arise not just in relation 
to the value of the resource changing hands, but also the very nature of the re­
source itself. Recall that the current sociological approach undermines the notion 
of research tools as discrete, well-defined entities, treating them instead as ele­
ments of a continuous data stream. For the purposes of an exchange agreement, 
the data stream must be divided into transferable portions, and though conven­
tion provides some guidance as to how these portions should be bounded, there 
are actually many possibilities, and therefore room for negotiation -  and negoti­
ation breakdown.18
With regard to the contribution of institutional heterogeneity to monitoring 
and metering problems, participants in the 1997 NIH survey felt that their coun­
terparts in other sectors did not appreciate the difficulties they faced in comply­
ing with particular contract terms;19 but heterogeneities exist within as well as 
among institutions in medical biotechnology.20 For example, the interests of sci­
entists employed by a university do not always coincide with those of the lawyers 
and businesspeople employed to negotiate contract terms of behalf of the insti­
tution. In general, academic scientists are mainly interested in acquiring needed 
research tools as quickly as possible, whereas it is the responsiblity of university 
technology transfer professionals to protect the university from incurring oblig­
ations which would limit funding or licensing opportunities or freedom to con­
duct future research.21 Not only do these groups have different interests, they 
have different spheres of expertise and professional cultures which can lead to 
serious communication problems and sometimes to mutual hostility. Eisenberg
15Eisenberg (2001).
16Long (2000), p.834.
17Long (2000), pp.828-834 passim.
18Hilgartner & Brandt-Rauf (1994), p.362.
19Eisenberg (2001), pp.235-236. See also Heller & Eisenberg (1998), pp.700-701. 
20Eisenberg (2001), p.239ff.
21 Eisenberg (2001), pp.240-241.
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notes that, in practice, scientists often choose to bypass their employers' official 
procedures and approach other scientists directly. She points to the emergence of 
a two-tiered market in research tools: in the official "proprietary" tier, technology 
transfer professionals engage in protracted haggling over contract terms, while 
in the unofficial "free exchange" tier, scientists deal with one another according 
to the rules of scientific etiquette relevant to the field.22 Eisenberg's analysis res­
onates with Hilgartner's observations that access decisions are negotiated within 
research networks rather than made by individuals, and that audiences and mar­
kets for data do not necessarily consist of individuals or undifferentiated groups 
(see chapter 2, p.15).23 Hilgartner also notes that rhetoric based on collective de­
finitions of appropriate conduct can be important in shaping the outcome of ne­
gotiations.24 In many cases shared norms may contribute to efficiency; certainly, 
Eisenberg takes the view that transaction costs are generally lower when like ne­
gotiates with like.25 On the other hand, whether the fact of shared cultural norms 
is likely to lower or to raise transaction costs depends on the norms in question. 
For example, Stephen Maurer attributes the failure of an attempt between 1999 
and 2001 by a group of academic biologists to establish an international muta­
tions database to the fact that academic culture has no analogue to the norms 
that facilitate transactions in private enterprise.26 Maurer refers specifically to the 
habit of deal-making, procedural norms such as meeting deadlines, sticking to 
decisions once made, settling disagreements by voting and limiting discussion to 
realistic proposals, knowing how to price things, willingness to think about busi­
ness plans and commit time and energy to negotiations, and willingness to call 
on personal contacts in order to strengthen an agreement.27 Labeling the failure 
a tragedy of the anticommons, Maurer suggests this example demonstrates the 
inability of the scientific community to conduct coherent negotiations.28 It might 
be fairer to say that norms which are adaptive in one set of circumstances (such 
as the habit of constructing reasons why a particular project deserves funding at 
the expense of thinking about how the project can be marketed as a product) may 
be maladaptive when circumstances change, as they undoubtedly have done in 
academic biology with the spread of commercialisation.
Monitoring and metering problems include difficulties in enforcement as well
22Eisenberg (2001), pp.242-243. McCain has studied scientific etiquette surrounding the ex­
change of experimental materials, instruments and methods through interviews with experimen­
tal geneticists and by analysing acknowledgement patterns in published research papers. She 
identifies several factors which affect the behaviour and expectations of individuals as informa­
tion requesters and information providers. (See generally McCain (1991).)
23Hilgartner & Brandt-Rauf (1994), pp.362-363.
24Hilgartner (1997), p.7.
25Eisenberg (2001), p.239.
26Maurer (2001), p.15.
27Maurer (2001), p.15. Maurer notes that two other issues that might have been expected to cre­
ate obstacles did not arise, ie the community did not appear to have any ideological commitment 
to "op
en source" principles, and neither were members particularly concerned about "giving away" 
intellectual property.
28Maurer (2001), p.17.
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as negotiations. Long points out that the costs of enforcing the terms of a licence 
and protecting against infringement by non-licensees may include substantial in­
direct costs: the perception of potential litigation imposes planning costs, discov­
ery imposes opportunity costs, and news of a patent infringement suit generally 
causes both the patent holder's and alleged infringer's firms' values to drop.29 
Where an agreement for the transfer of proprietary research tools establishes 
an ongoing collaborative relationship, "enforcement" costs will also include the 
costs of maintaining the relationship and adjusting the terms of the agreement to 
changing circumstances.30
As for strategy-related bargaining problems, uncertainty again plays an im­
portant role by motivating parties to try to limit their exposure to risk. For exam­
ple, a pharmaceutical firm intending to licence out a research tool for scientific 
use may be concerned that research conducted using the tool might lead to in­
creased competition, undermine the firm's patent position or generate data that 
would trigger a tightening of regulatory requirements for its products.31 In re­
sponse it may seek to impose terms requiring the licensee to assign or licence any 
improvements back to the firm on an exclusive basis, requiring the licensee not 
to challenge the patent's validity or restricting the publication of research results 
produced using the tool. Other common terms include price and quantity and 
territorial restrictions, restrictions on sublicensing, and leveraging arrangements 
-  for example, terms bundling patented and non-patented products together, ex­
tending the licence to territories in which the licensor has no intellectual property 
rights, or obliging the licensee to pay royalties until the last rights in a composite 
licence expire.32 As Eisenberg points out, conflict over restrictive provisions can 
be particularly difficult to resolve where prospective users of multiple research 
tools face similar demands from several owners.33
Strategic maneuvering is not limited to formal negotiations among institu­
tions. In a 1996-97 survey of US medical school faculty, Eric Campbell et al.34 
found that academic geneticists were more likely to be denied access to other 
academic investigators' data if they were young, primarily engaged in research, 
much published, actively commercialising their research, or were leaders in their 
field. While Campbell et al.'s results do not reveal the reasoning behind refusals 
to provide access, one interpretation is that professional jealousy increases the 
chances of bargaining breakdown in Eisenberg's "informal" transaction tier. In 
addition, researchers who had denied research results to others were more likely 
to have their own requests refused,35 a finding that highlights the fact that each
29Long (2000), pp.830-831.
30Hilgartner makes this point in the context of collaboration agreements between scientists (Hil- 
gartner (1997), p.5).
31 Eisenberg (2001), p.244.
32Restrictive licence provisions have received attention in the literature on competition law 
and are also a topic of particular concern for developing countries licensing technology in from 
overseas. See, for example, Nielsen (2001), pp.12-13; Mandeville (1996), pp.71-73; Barton (1997a).
33Eisenberg (2001), p.230.
34Campbell et al. (2000).
35Campbell et al. (2000), p.305.
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negotiation (formal or informal) within the kinds of research network that ex­
ist in biotechnology (see discussion of the "data stream" model in chapter 2, p.14 
above) is not an isolated incident, but helps to shape the parties' ongoing relation­
ship and their relationships with others in the network. A bad reputation earned 
in the course of one negotiation may adversely affect a party's success in later 
negotiations -  although conversely, parties involved in an ongoing relationship 
may be more highly motivated to reach agreement in any given round of negoti­
ations, both for the sake of maintaining the relationship and because concessions 
made in one round of negotiations may be recovered in the next.36
3.3.2 Has anticommons tragedy eventuated?
The foregoing discussion established that preconditions for anticommons tragedy 
do exist in medical biotechnology. We now turn to the question whether a tragedy 
of the anticommons has in fact eventuated in this field.
It is inherently difficult to conduct rigorous studies of bargaining breakdown 
in technology licensing markets for several reasons. Firms generally do not keep 
systematic records of projects stopped and the reasons for stopping them; even if 
such records did exist, these reasons are likely to be complex and difficult to as­
cribe to a single consideration such as difficulty in accessing intellectual property. 
Practical difficulties for researchers may also arise from the fact that the relevant 
information is likely to be commercially valuable and therefore kept confidential.
Nevertheless, several empirical studies have been attempted in the field of 
medical biotechnology. In 1997, the NIH study referred to in the previous sec­
tion suggested that the problem of bargaining failure in the market for intellec­
tual property licences was real. Eisenberg reported that for scientists, bargaining 
breakdown is evidenced by significant delays attending the outcome of negoti­
ations over material transfer agreements (MTAs), patent licence agreements and 
database access agreements; for university technology transfer officials, by re­
source problems arising from the need to renegotiate previously routine agree­
ments and the need to resist attempts by outside parties to impose increasingly 
onerous terms; and for private firms, by the growing administrative burden of 
conducting negotiations and by delays in research.37
At first glance, more recent studies appear to contradict this finding. A survey 
of studies conducted in the past two years of the United States, European and 
Australian industries reveals that despite proliferation of intellectual property 
rights, a tragedy of the anticommons has not yet eventuated in medical biotech­
nology.38 This is not because transaction costs are low; as we have seen, there 
is considerable anecdotal evidence that transaction costs associated with the ex­
change of proprietary biotechnologies are substantial, and this is confirmed by 
the recent research. Rather, it appears that the value of many transactions is large
36This is the advantage of "repeat players" over "one-shotters" in litigation: Galanter (1974). 
37Eisenberg (2001), p.225.
38Walsh & Cohen (2003), Straus et al. (2002) and Nicol & Nielsen (2003), respectively.
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enough that they are not abandoned despite high costs. Instead, industry players 
have adopted various "working solutions" to keep the wheels turning, including 
taking licences (ie successful bargaining in spite of high transaction costs); in­
venting around patents; going offshore; infringement under an informal, legally 
unsanctioned "research exemption"; developing and using public databases and 
research tools; court challenges to patent validity; and mutual non-enforcement 
among members of particular research communities.
Should we be reassured by these findings that "the momentum of scientific 
research and discoveries in the biomedical fields remains strong and unencum­
bered"?39 Not entirely. The authors of the US, European and Australian studies 
all acknowledge that many "working solutions" impose costs of their own, both 
private and social; these costs matter, for the following reasons.
First, as Eisenberg pointed out in relation to the NIH study, transaction costs 
are a greater obstacle to low value exchanges than to high value exchanges, for 
the simple reason that transaction costs eat into the surplus to be gained from an 
exchange: the smaller the surplus, the greater the risk of bargaining breakdown. 
The problem is that overall progress may depend heavily on the unfettered flow 
of low value exchanges of methods, materials and data, so that even if the value of 
each individual exchange foregone due to bargaining failure is low, the aggregate 
social value of these exchanges may be considerable.40 In this context, the value 
of a transaction must be measured not only against the cost of the transaction 
itself, but against the cost of any "working solution" that might be adopted as a 
substitute. If the value is low, it is likely that not only will the transaction itself not 
take place, but there will also not be any cost-effective alternative path forward.
Second, the fact that working solutions impose significant costs means they 
may represent a serious drain on resources for some players, especially publicly 
funded and small non-profit research organisations which, as we will see, carry a 
disproportionate burden in relation to public interest research and development. 
Some strategies, such as building up a defensive patent portfolio so as to improve 
one's bargaining position, are simply unavailable to the smallest and poorest par­
ticipants -  or, importantly, would-be participants -  in the biotechnology industry.
3.3.3 Intellectual property and global public health
Accepting that there is not yet any clear evidence for a tragedy of the anticom­
mons in medical biotechnology, we turn now to the broader question of whether 
current intellectual property law and policy helps or hinders the contribution of 
biotechnology research and development to improved global public health.
For most people in the world today, health and life expectancy are affected by 
a range of complex issues to do with poverty, food insecurity and limited access to 
medical treatment. The issue of food insecurity is subsumed in the discussion of 
agricultural biotechnology later in this chapter, and most poverty-related health
39NIH Director's Policy Forum, "Introduction", http://w w w .nih.gov/about/forum /. 
40Eisenberg (2001), p.234.
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issues lie beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus, the rest of this section focuses on 
access to medical treatment. However, it should be noted that although access 
to medicines, including newly developed medicines, is important for health out­
comes, it is in many cases less important than other factors. A well fed person 
with access to clean water and living conditions and to information about how 
diseases are spread is less vulnerable to most diseases even if there is no actual 
treatment in existence, as well as being less likely to die of simple starvation or 
exhaustion. For example, Richard Lewontin notes that the rise and fall in infant 
mortality in Brazil has been closely correlated with fluctuations in real wages 
rather than with the introduction of new medical treatments.41
To answer the question of what problems exist in relation to access to medical 
treatments and how they relate to intellectual property in biotechnology inven­
tions, it is helpful to refer to the work of the Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights (the Commission), which recently conducted a broad-ranging study of the 
global impact (costs and benefits) of intellectual property rights, particularly in 
the developing world.42 Statistics quoted by the Commission demonstrate that 
developing country diseases are a huge problem in terms of global social welfare. 
Tuberculosis, malaria and HIV/AIDS (the biggest single cause of mortality in de­
veloping countries) together claimed nearly six million lives in 2002 and led to 
debilitating illness for millions more; there are also a large number of less com­
mon diseases that collectively affect large numbers of people.43 Thus, developing 
country diseases are a very big problem in terms of global social welfare. For de­
veloping country diseases that are also prevalent in developed countries, such as 
HIV/AIDS and diabetes, research directed at developing country markets may 
produce appropriate treatments.44 In such cases the problem is one of access 
(discussed below). For developing country diseases that are not prevalent in de­
veloping countries, or that commonly take a different form so that treatments 
designed for patients in developed countries would be ineffective, the problem is 
twofold: first, how to mobilise resources to develop treatments, and second, how 
to ensure access to treatments once developed.45
With respect to mobilising resources for research and development relating 
to developing country diseases, the evidence examined by the Commission sug­
gested that intellectual property rights have little positive effect. In relation to 
the private sector, the explanation is that research and development activity is 
driven by profitability, which is largely determined by the size of the market.46 
The market for a drug must be significant before it is worth investing resources 
in research and development because of a high percentage of failures at each 
stage of the process, from identification of molecular targets to clinical trials. In 
the standard "blockbuster" business model, a few enormously profitable drugs
41 Lewontin (1993), p.102.
42Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002). 
43Ibid., p30.
44 Ibid.
45Ibid., p.31.
46Ibid., pp.32-33 passim .
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effectively subsidise all the others.47 As the product life of each blockbuster can 
be extended only so far beyond the period of patent protection, and the outcome 
with respect to each new candidate is unpredictable, firms are unwilling to take 
on a project that does not promise at least the possibility of huge commercial suc­
cess. The demand for medicines for diseases that are specific to or concentrated 
in developing countries is small in terms of market size because even though 
there are many sufferers, they have little capacity to pay; there is therefore lit­
tle incentive for the private sector to develop medicines for this market. This is 
true not just for the private sector in developed countries, but also for the pri­
vate sector, such as it is, in the developing world, which responds to the same 
incentives. As for the public sector, public sector institutions in the developing 
world have little capacity for pharmaceutical research and development, while 
the priorities of public sector institutions in richer countries are determined prin­
cipally by domestic considerations.48 (Although a number of recent initiatives 
aim to address this situation, their funding is insufficient given the scale of the 
problem).49 Further, the evidence examined by the Commission suggested that 
any publicly funded research on developing country diseases that may be under­
taken in developed countries may be adversely affected by restrictions on access 
to proprietary research tools -  an anticommons effect. Thus, even though there 
may be no patent on any given research tool in a particular developing coun­
try, intellectual property rights in tools in developed countries may constrain re­
search and development on developing country diseases. For all of these reasons, 
the Commission found that less than 5 percent of worldwide pharmaceutical re­
search and development expenditure goes to finding treatments for developing 
country diseases.50
The second aspect of the problem described by the Commission on Intellec­
tual Property Rights relates to ensuring access to treatments once they are de­
veloped.51 In the Commission's view, access to the final products of biomedical 
research and development depends on two factors: affordability and the exis­
tence of a health service infrastructure that can support delivery. The evidence ex­
amined by the Commission suggested that the existence of intellectual property 
rights in medicines does adversely affect affordability. In developed countries, 
generic competition causes prices to fall quite sharply, particularly if the mar­
ket is large enough to support a number of generic competitors, indicating that 
patents, while they are in force, keep the prices of drugs higher than they would 
otherwise be.52 As to the developing world, although multinational drugs com­
panies have not patented their products in all developing countries, patents can 
still affect prices in those countries because most low income developing coun­
tries rely on imports for their supplies, so that the existence of patents in potential
47Ibid., p.33. 
48Ibid., p.32. 
49Ibid.
50Ibid.
51 Ibid., p.34ff. 
52Ibid., p.36.
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supplier countries may allow the patentee to prevent supplies being exported to 
other countries. From 2005, the benefit of transitional provisions of the World 
Trade Organisation Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS) relating to the patenting of pharmaceutical products will cease.53 This 
will affect major generic producers such as India. One solution would be for 
countries that currently import drugs to facilitate the growth of their own domes­
tic generic industries, but in most cases, the Commission concluded, it would be 
difficult for such countries to create a competitive environment for patented and 
generic products because of the small size of their markets and lack of indigenous 
technological, productive and regulatory capacity.54
As to the second factor affecting access to existing drugs -  availability of ad­
equate health infrastructure -  this factor has little to do directly with intellectual 
property rights, and the Commission noted that the pharmaceutical industry of­
ten argues that infrastructural problems are more important as constraints on ac­
cess to medicines in developing countries than intellectual property issues.55 The 
Commission's response was that there was no reason not to try to address both is­
sues,56 and that the cost of pharmaceutical products in developing countries is an 
important concern, particularly because most poor people in developing coun­
tries pay for their own drugs, which is not normally the case in the developed 
world (where costs are met mainly by the state or through insurance).57
To summarise, intellectual property rights in the products of biomedical re­
search and development raise the prices of drugs by excluding generic competi­
tion, but do not stimulate the development of the most urgently needed medical 
treatments because the relevant markets are too small to be attractive to private 
sector players following a "blockbuster" business model, while public sector in­
stitutions either lack the capacity to conduct research and development or (in 
developed countries) are preoccupied with domestic needs. Thus, it is apparent 
that the biggest concerns raised by intellectual property rights in medical biotech­
nology lie beyond the scope of the empirical studies cited above (p.42). These 
studies are limited to reporting the experiences of current industry participants 
in developed countries entering negotiations over technological assets. They do 
not address the major structural problems of markets in medical biotechnology, 
and they do not take into account the views of those who are not able to partici­
pate in biotechnology research and development at all.
3.4 Agricultural biotechnology
This section addresses the same three questions as the previous section, but in the 
context of agricultural biotechnology rather than biomedicine: first, whether the
53Ibid., p.38. 
54Ibid., p.37. 
55Ibid., p.38. 
56Ibid., p.39. 
57Ibid., p.30.
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necessary preconditions for a tragedy of the anticommons exist in agricultural 
biotechnology; second, whether such a tragedy has in fact taken place; and third, 
what are the greatest intellectual property-related concerns in this sector today in 
terms of global social welfare?
3.4.1 Preconditions for anticommons tragedy
Research and development in agricultural biotechnology relies heavily on access 
to multiple research tools.58 One reason is that most agricultural biotechnologies 
are actually packages comprising multiple components. Transformation technol­
ogy -  the means by which foreign genes coding for desired traits are integrated 
into a plant genome, allowing the regeneration of whole genetically engineered 
plants from the transformed tissue -  is a case in point.59 An essential tool in both 
commercial crop development and experimental plant biology, transformation 
requires access to specific gene sequences and functional information, to a range 
of enabling technologies (including gene introduction methods, promoters and 
selectable markers), and to germplasm or cultivars into which the novel genes 
can be integrated.60 Another reason why scientific exchange is especially impor­
tant to the progress of research and development in this field is that agricultural 
biotechnology is not a single discipline: it combines resources from many areas 
of biology, including crop genetics, breeding, agronomy, pest control and agro­
ecology in a criss-crossing of many data streams.61 For these reasons, innovation 
in agricultural biotechnology is both cumulative, in the sense that each inven­
tion builds on previous inventions, and complementary, in the sense that each 
invention contains elements derived from more than one source.62
Not only does research and development in agricultural biotechnology rely 
on access to multiple research tools, but these tools are increasingly subject to 
proprietary controls. Changes in intellectual property laws outlined in the pre­
vious chapter (p.18) have strengthened protection for inventions in agricultural 
as well as biomedical biotechnology; stronger protection has made molecular bio­
logical techniques more profitable and therefore more widely used, which in turn 
has increased the demand for protection:63 the annual count of applications filed
58Nottenburg et al. (2002), p.17.
59The process is explained in detail at the website of the University of Cali­
fornia at Davis Center for Engineering Plants for Resistance Against Pathogens, 
http://ceprap.ucdavis.edu/Transformation/tranforml.htm, last visited 6 June 2002.
60Bennett et al. (2002), p.5.
61 Graff & Zilberman (2001b), p.2.
62Nelson & Mazzoleni (1997), p.7.
63Graff et al. (2001), pp.19-20, summarising a presentation by Brian Wright. The magnitude of 
this trend is indicated by the dramatic increase in US patent applications for gene sequences from 
4000 in 1991 to 500,000 in 1996, a result of US and European court decisions allowing the patenting 
of DNA sequences of unknown function: Blakeney (2001), p.120. Note that in December 1999, the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office issued interim guidelines (finalised in January 2001) 
that raised the bar somewhat in relation to the patent utility requirement for gene fragments: 
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1098 (Jan. 5, 2001). However, many consider 
the rules are still too lax.
48 Problems and solutions
and patents granted for agricultural plant biotechnologies in the US, Europe and 
Japan and under the Patent Co-operation Treaty has grown exponentially since 
the early 1980s.64 Legal means of protecting intellectual property in agricultural 
biotechnology include patents, plant breeders' rights (in the US, Plant Variety 
Protection Certificates), trademarks, geographical indications, trade secrets and 
contracts, the first two categories being the most important: see chapter 5.65 (The 
use of intellectual property in agricultural biotechnology can also be controlled 
by technical means, such as hybridisation and genetic use restriction technologies 
-  GURTs -  which render seed unsuitable for replanting or suppress the expres­
sion of introduced traits in saved seed.66) While legal rights are established by 
national legislation and court decisions, in practice their content is determined 
by international agreements, which in recent years have further encouraged the 
proliferation of strong intellectual property rights by requiring national govern­
ments to meet certain minimum standards of protection.67 As a result of these 
trends, research tools in agricultural biotechnology are subject to numerous over­
lapping proprietary claims.68 Depending on the complexity of a product, its de­
velopment may involve the use of dozens of proprietary research tools; an often 
cited example is that of GoldenRiceTM, a genetically engineered rice variety de­
veloped using approximately 70 different patented technologies.69
Thus, researchers in agricultural biotechnology must coordinate numerous 
disparate property rights in order to obtain an effective privilege of use, and so 
the first condition stipulated by Heller as necessary to the creation of a tragedy 
of the anticommons is fulfilled.70 There is also evidence that transaction costs 
associated with obtaining freedom to research and to commercialise the results 
of research in this field are mounting.71 Indeed, streamlining access to patented 
technologies appears to have been a key motivation behind consolidation of a 
number of private agricultural biotechnology firms in the 1990s.72 As in biomed­
ical biotechnology, a primary reason for high transaction costs is uncertainty con­
cerning the scope and validity of patents. For example, two early patents origi-
64Atkinson et al. (2003), Figure 1.
65See generally Blakeney (2001).
66Nottenburg et al. (2002), pp.3-4
67Blakeney (2001), pp. 127-129, discussing in particular: modifications to plant breeders' rights 
under the latest (1991) amendment to the Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
("UPOV Convention") which limit farmer's privilege, i.e. the right of a farmer to save seed from a 
first crop grown from purchased seed of the protected variety for use in sowing subsequent crops; 
and Article 27.3(b) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on Intellectual Property 
rights ("TRIPS Agreement") of 1994, which requires that WTO "Members shall provide for the 
protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any 
combination thereof". The effect of TRIPS is that developing countries are no longer free to ignore 
the UPOV Convention limitation on farmer's privilege. See also Graff et al. (2001), pp. 19-20, 
summarising a presentation by Brian Wright.
68Nottenburg et al. (2002), p.4.
69Nottenburg et al. (2002), p.17.
70Graff et al. (2001), p.18, summarising a presentation by John Barton.
71 Graff & Zilberman (2001b), p.2.
72Graff et al. (2003b).
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nally assigned to W.R. Grace & Co. would (as written) have given the company 
control over all genetically engineered varieties of cotton.73 The scope of these 
patents was eventually narrowed following appeals and process; such reversals 
have been relatively common in agricultural biotechnology, and at times patent 
litigation has been rampant in the industry.74 Similarly, a recent survey of in­
tellectual property rights related to Agrobacterium-mediated transformation (a 
key enabling technology for plant transformation) concluded that ownership of 
the most far-reaching patents in this area cannot yet be determined because the 
broadest patents have yet to issue.75 More subtle problems have also arisen, for 
example the use of licence provisions in which a firm's agreement to insert its 
genetic traits into a collaborating firm's germplasm prohibits any third-party ge­
netic material from being inserted into the same germplasm. According to Greg 
Graff and Carol Nottenburg, high transaction costs associated with licensing in­
tellectual property rights in agricultural biotechnology result from uncertainty of 
patent validity, excessive breadth of patents, conflicting claims of patents, diffi­
culty of identifying valid licensors, the costs and slow pace of litigation and con­
cern over liability, brand image and externalities control; in some cases, owners 
have been simply unwilling to negotiate with potential users.76 Evidence of high 
transaction costs means that Heller's second condition is also fulfilled.
3.4.2 Has anticommons tragedy eventuated?
As with biomedicine, it is difficult to empirically assess the impact of proliferating 
intellectual property rights and high transaction costs in agricultural biotechnol­
ogy because post-grant transactions cannot be tracked through publicly available 
information. The picture is further complicated in this field by the fact that the 
answer to the question whether anticommons tragedy has eventuated appears to 
be different for different sectors of the industry.
Until recently, nearly all agricultural research was conducted in the public sec­
tor. However, ownership of much of the intellectual property resulting from this 
research has been transferred to the private sector. For example, the survey of in­
tellectual property rights in Agrobacterium-mediated transformation mentioned 
earlier found that although most of the basic research that led to the development 
of this important tool took place in public institutions, private sector entities now 
hold nearly all of the key patent positions. Although the remaining public sector 
intellectual property portfolio in agricultural biotechnology is still strong when
73Ibid., pp.6-7.
74 Ibid.
75Roa-Rodriguez & Nottenburg (2004).
76Recent examples of hold-ups relate to the University of California's long shelf life tomato and 
Michigan State University's herbicide resistant turfgrass: Graff et al. (2001), pp.19-20, summaris­
ing a presentation by Brian Wright. Determining freedom to operate can be costly if analysis 
is referred to a lawyer and daunting for non-legal professionals due to the dynamic nature of 
patents, difficulties in claim interpretation, the cumulative nature of biotechnologies, the diffi­
culty of searching patent literature, and frequently a lack of in-house infrastructure: Nottenburg 
et al. (2002), p.14.
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taken as a whole, its ownership is highly fragmented among different institutions, 
which now appear to be experiencing classic anticommons effects. As in the case 
of biomedical research, the problem affects different types of institutions differ­
ently. With respect to licensing out of technologies in exchange for revenue, some 
institutions own very little intellectual property, while others may own substan­
tial portfolios but face difficulties in relation to effective management and mar­
keting. With respect to licensing in (i.e. gaining access to research tools owned by 
others) the clearest distinction is between research institutions in developed and 
developing countries. Researchers in developed countries are frequently under 
the misapprehension that they do not need to obtain permission to use other peo­
ple's technology on the basis that they and their institutions are protected from 
any infringement action by a research exemption. In fact, while the extent and le­
gal basis of any research exemption depends on national patent laws (which dif­
fer on this point), in practice research exemptions in developed countries tend to 
be quite limited; though in many cases the actual risk of being sued is still low, it 
is likely to increase as public and non-profit institutions form closer relationships 
with industry. By contrast, researchers in less developed countries are inclined to 
overestimate the risks associated with using other people's technology, which are 
often not patented in the relevant jurisdiction. However, parties' perceptions that 
a particular technology is owned by someone else who would object to its use 
can be as effective in constraining researchers' conduct as the legal reality, and in 
any case, perceptions and reality are likely to converge in the near future as de­
veloping countries implement their obligations under TRIPS and "TRIPS-plus" 
agreements.77
Meanwhile, the private sector agricultural inputs industry has undergone a 
startlingly rapid and comprehensive restructuring over the past two decades as 
chemical giants like Dow and DuPont moved aggressively into plant biotech­
nology and made huge investments in the life sciences, buying up all the larger 
national seed firms in North America and acquiring most surviving start-ups in 
the research-intensive agricultural biotechnology sector by the end of the 1990s.78 
The industry structure that has emerged is characterised by a very small number 
of tightly woven alliances, each organised around a major life sciences firm and 
vertically integrated from basic research and development through to market­
ing.79 In this environment, new agricultural biotechnology start-ups are quickly 
integrated into the worldwide oligopoly once the promise of their technical inno­
vations has been demonstrated, a pattern reminiscent of the computer software 
industry.80 There is evidence that this consolidation has been driven primarily 
by the need to avoid high transaction costs associated with multiple intellectual 
property rights,81 but whether or not intellectual property rights were a major 
causal factor, the outcome is certain: most key enabling technologies are now
77See generally Nottenburg et al. (2002). 
78Graff et al. (2003b).
79 Ibid.
80Wright (1998b).
81 Ibid.
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in the hands of only a handful of firms. To return to the plant transformation 
example mentioned above, Graff et al. show that by 1999, the top seven firms 
in the industry in terms of intellectual asset holdings controlled three-quarters 
of patents on transformation technologies and genetic materials, together with 
close to 100 percent of germplasm patents.82 Similarly, in the previously men­
tioned survey of Agrobacterium mediated transformation, of 27 key patents in 
the crucial "vector" category, 26 were owned by three institutions; further, all 
of the patents on binary vectors (which largely supersede earlier vector technolo­
gies) were held by a single firm -  Syngenta -  that also held a dominant position in 
the "dicot" category (which includes most commercially important crop plants).83 
Moreover, although consolidation of intellectual property ownership appears to 
have reached its limit in relation to current technologies, it is likely that consol­
idation will increase rather than decrease with the emergence of new technolo­
gies.84 Thus, in contrast to the public sector, no tragedy of the anticommons has 
eventuated in private sector agricultural biotechnology. Instead, private indus­
try has side-stepped this outcome through an extreme form of a phenomenon 
described by self-described anticommons optimist, Robert Merges -  the forma­
tion of transaction-cost-lowering institutions.85 However, it would be surprising 
if such a high level of industry concentration had no adverse effects on innova­
tion. Richard Jefferson argues that even the remaining companies and institutions 
are fighting over who owns the tools for gene technology instead of getting on 
with developing applications, to the point of "complete and total constipation",86 
while John Gale points out that companies are now pulling back from long-term 
investments in high-tech crop improvement.87
3.4.3 Agricultural biotechnology and food security
To what extent is the current mixture of anticommons tragedy and "institution­
forming success" in the agricultural biotechnology industry a problem? For agri­
cultural technology, as for biomedicine, the stakes are high: 780 million people 
in the developing world are currently suffering from malnutrition, a large pro­
portion of them farmers who cannot grow, or sell, enough food to make ends
82Ibid., p21.
83Roa-Rodriguez & Nottenburg (2004).
84Graff et al. (2003a).
85Merges (2001), pp.129-130; see also Merges (1996) and Merges (2000). Merges argues that in 
some contexts where there are multiple owners and transaction costs are high, an anticommons 
tragedy may be avoided if communities of intellectual property owners develop collective institu­
tions to lower the transaction costs of bundling multiple licences. Such institutions include copy­
right collectives in the music industry and patent pools in the automobile, aircraft manufacturing 
and synthetic rubber industries and, more recently, the consumer electronics industry. Merges 
sees these institutions as beneficial in their own right, observing that they provide a framework 
for standardisation of techniques and for the institutionalised exchange of unpatented technical 
information -  advantages which might not be realised in the absence of strong property rights: 
Merges (2001), pl39 (cf Mandeville (1996), discussed in chapter 2 above).
860'Neill (2003), p.22.
87Knight (2003).
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meet.88 While scientific progress, including in biotechnology, cannot solve this 
problem on its own, it certainly has the potential to make a difference. Agri­
cultural innovation is important not just because it can create dramatic gains in 
production and productivity (as, for example, during the "green revolution" of 
the past four decades, discussed further below), but because it stimulates broader 
economic growth that can help break the cycle of poverty and food insecurity.89 
It has been suggested that innovations in agricultural biotechnology, being em­
bodied in seeds, are uniquely well suited to attack agronomic and environmental 
problems in economically and technologically less developed areas .90
As in biomedicine, current research and development priorities in agricultural 
biotechnology reflect the needs of large commercial operations targeting big mar­
kets. From a social welfare perspective, what is needed are traits and crops that 
are useful to small subsistence farmers. Relevant traits include those that increase 
yield potential, increase the stability of yields through resistance to biotic and 
abiotic stress, or enhance farmers' ability to grow subsistence crops in difficult 
environments (for example, drought and salinity); currently available genetically 
engineered traits, such as herbicide tolerance, are not so useful to poor farmers. 
Relevant crops are the basic staples of the poor, such as rice, wheat, white maize, 
cassava and millet.91
Although there is a general consensus as to what kinds of agricultural biotech­
nology research and development are most likely to benefit poor people in devel­
oping countries, it is less clear who might conduct such research. Not all de­
veloping countries are in a position to conduct their own agricultural research 
and development. For example, Carl Pray and Anwar Naseem categorise de­
veloping countries according to their biotechnology and seed research capacity.92 
At one end of the spectrum, some countries -  including China, India and Brazil 
-  have the capacity to do independent biotechnology research, a strong plant 
breeding capacity using international agricultural research centres as sources of 
germplasm, and in some cases also strong private sector seed companies and a 
working system of biosafety regulation. Countries at the other end of the spec­
trum have only limited conventional plant breeding capacity, and no capacity for 
biotechnology research at all. In the poorest countries the problem is not so much 
a lack of access to proprietary technologies as a lack of research capacity,93 but in
88Anonymous (2001).
89Pray & Naseem (2003).
90Graff et al. (2003a).
91 Pray & Naseem (2003).
92 Ibid.
93Researchers in less developed countries are inclined to overestimate the risks associated with 
using other people's technology: Graff et al. (2001), p.18, summarising a presentation by John 
Barton. Nottenburg et al. report a common misconception that a patent awarded in one country 
confers property rights in all countries: Nottenburg et al. (2002), p.5. In fact, the cost of obtaining 
protection in many different countries is such that most inventions are patented in just one or a 
few developed countries with large markets: in 1998, the number of patents granted in the US, 
Europe and Japan accounted for about 80 percent of the world's patents, and it is likely that most 
of the remainder were also granted in developed countries: Nottenburg et al. (2002), p.5. Al-
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developing countries with intermediate or advanced agricultural research capac­
ity, access to proprietary technologies is an issue. This is because, as noted above 
in section 3.4.2, both public and private institutions in developing countries are 
often reluctant to use technologies without explicit permission from their own­
ers. Reasons include a desire either for long-term collaboration with the technol­
ogy owner or to export products of the technology to developed countries where 
patents do apply. Thus, in general, developing countries themselves conduct 
very little agricultural research and development aimed at meeting the needs of 
their own poor, and this is especially true in relation to biotechnology research.94 
Meanwhile, in developed countries the amount of public funding devoted to 
research relevant to poor farmers in developing countries has been stagnant or 
declining since the 1960s. For example, funding for the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), provided by a predominantly first 
world donor community, has fallen in real terms since 1990 to the extent that 
both its research efforts and its ability to maintain valuable gene banks held by 
several of its sixteen independent Centres are now under threat.95 The effects of 
this decline in funding are exacerbated by anticommons effects experienced by 
public sector researchers in developed countries, who might otherwise be in a 
position to innovate on behalf of the poor in developing countries.96
As to developed countries, over the past few decades, the decline in public 
funding for agricultural research has been accompanied by a rapid growth in 
private investment, especially in Europe and North America. Private sector re­
search, supported by intellectual property protection and sustained by demand 
from farmers in developed countries and the commercial sectors of a few of the 
richer developing countries, is now the dynamic element in agricultural research 
and development.97 However, as with biomedicine, the private sector has little 
interest in developing crops for which there is no substantial market, whether 
they be minor specialty crops in the developed world or major staple crops in the 
developing world. Thus, the shift in balance between public and private sectors
though problems might theoretically arise with regard to technologies destined for crops grown 
in developing countries if those crops were subsequently exported to countries where the relevant 
intellectual property is protected, it has been shown empirically that exports from developing to 
developed countries are generally dwarfed by production and consumption in the developing 
world and that the value of these exports is concentrated in a few crops and a few exporting 
countries.Environment and Production Technology Division and International Food Policy Re­
search Institute (2000) Thus, researchers in less developed countries are probably not seriously 
constrained by intellectual property considerations in the strict legal sense. (Depending on the 
manner in which developing countries choose to implement their obligations under TRIPs, this 
may soon change: in many developing countries, new patent laws are starting to come into ef­
fect such that technologies previously legally available to researchers in those jurisdictions will 
be protected: Nottenburg et al. (2002), p.32; Graff et al. (2001), p.18, summarising a presentation 
by John Barton, and p.34. (For a detailed discussion of TRIPS obligations relevant to agricultural 
biotechnology, see Barton et al. (1999).)
94Pray & Naseem (2003).
95Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002), pp.67-68; Pray & Naseem (2003), pp.4-10 
passim; Anonymous (2001).
96Graff et al. (2003a); Wright (1998b).
97Pray & Naseem (2003), pp.8-9.
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in agricultural research means that commercial interests rather than food security 
needs are driving the current research agenda .98 Consolidation of the agricultural 
industry, described above, aggravates this situation by raising barriers to entry 
for smaller players who might be interested in serving markets that are too small 
to be attractive to agronomic systems giants like Monsanto .99 Further, a reduc­
tion in supplier numbers may elevate the costs of doing research, making it even 
harder for players in developing countries or public sector institutions in devel­
oped countries to undertake research and development on behalf of the poor, as 
well as more difficult for any organisation (private or public) to deliver agricul­
tural inputs at reasonable prices that poor farmers can afford.100 Another concern 
that arises out of the dominance of agricultural research and development by big 
private sector firms relates to the need to maintain agricultural biodiversity, both 
for the sake of the environment and for food security. The legacy of the green rev­
olution includes widespread adoption of monoculture-based farming practices 
that threaten the diversity of genetic resources.101 This problem is exacerbated 
by declining funding for the CGIAR, which plays a crucial role in guarding di­
versity by maintaining its own gene banks and assisting in the maintenance of 
collections owned by developing countries, and by the evolution of intellectual 
property norms that make traditional agricultural practices such as the saving of 
seeds more difficult.102 Finding a way to help poor farmers continue to preserve 
genetic resources is thus important not only for ethical reasons, but also for the 
future of agricultural innovation in both developing and developed countries.
An associated problem arising from the concentration of agricultural research 
and development in the hands of a small number of multinational firms relates 
particularly to biotechnology and is essentially a problem of conflict of interest. 
Most genetic engineering is carried out by private sector companies in industri­
alised countries. To the extent that biosafety concerns in connection with genetic 
engineering are scientifically justified, 103 concentration of the capacity to conduct 
biotechnology research in the hands of those who stand to gain from commercial­
ising such research -  quickly, cheaply and with minimal regulatory interference 
-  is unlikely to lead to satisfactory outcomes.
In the longer term, academic researchers who cannot gain access to state-of- 
the-art technologies risk falling behind their commercial counterparts; this may 
reduce the rate of innovation in basic science and, in turn, the rate of development 
of commercial applications, in effect killing the goose that laid the golden egg .104 
Another way to express the same idea is that all types of organisation -  from large
"Wright (1998a); Atkinson et al. (2003); Graff et al. (2003a); Pray & Naseem (2003); Anonymous 
(2001) .
"Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002), pp.74-5.
100Wright (1998a); Pray & Naseem (2003); Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002); 
Knight (2003), quoting Gary Toennissen of the Rockefeller Foundation.
101 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002), pp.68-69.
102 Ibid.
103For a detailed peer reviewed scientific listing of biosafety risks, see Scientific Working Group 
on Biosafety (1998).
104Graff et al. (2003a).
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corporations, through small private sector innovators, to university and other 
public sector institutions -  have a unique contribution to make to the progress 
of agricultural science and technology. Consistent with theoretical perspectives 
examined in chapter 2, empirical studies of the sources of biological innovation 
in agriculture show that the robustness of technology development over time 
depends on the participation of all institutional types.105
3.4.4 Summary
So far we have seen that in both medical and agricultural biotechnology, recent 
proliferation of intellectual property rights, together with difficulties in transfer­
ring those rights, has led to concerns about an impending "tragedy of the anti­
commons".
Available empirical evidence suggests that anticommons tragedy has not yet 
eventuated in medical biotechnology due to the adoption of various working so­
lutions by industry participants. However, such solutions are beyond the reach 
of many industry participants and, importantly, would-be participants. This is a 
problem because, as we saw in section 3.3.3, a review of the impact of intellectual 
property rights on access to medicines among the poor in developing countries 
-  that is, most of humanity -  reveals that only a tiny percentage of worldwide 
pharmaceutical research and development expenditure is dedicated to finding 
treatments for developing country diseases, while at the same time, use of in­
tellectual property rights as a means of excluding competition by generic drug 
manufacturers drives up the prices for treatments that already exist.
In agriculture, empirical evidence suggests that public sector researchers in 
developed countries are affected by a tragedy of the anticommons. Meanwhile, 
the private sector has avoided this outcome only at the cost of a radical restruc­
turing that has dramatically reduced competition within the industry. As a result, 
smaller markets in developed countries are likely to go unserved because there 
are insufficient incentives to conduct research and development directed at such 
markets. However, a more serious consequence is that the combination of public 
sector anticommons tragedy and private sector concentration exacerbates the ne­
glect of agricultural research and development conducted for the benefit of poor 
people in developing countries. The immediate result is continued poverty and 
hunger for many millions of people around the world. In the longer term, this sit­
uation threatens genetic diversity, undermines effective biosafety regulation and 
may hinder the overall progress of science and technology in this field.
3.5 Solutions
In this section we look at a number of proposed solutions to the problems de­
scribed in the previous section.
105Graff (2002), pp.17-18.
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3.5.1 Law reform
One class of proposed solution aims to address these problems by fine-tuning do­
mestic intellectual property and competition laws in both developed and devel­
oping countries. In intellectual property, the objective would be to stop the prolif­
eration of intellectual property rights by redesigning the rules surrounding their 
inital grant. For example, John Barton argues that in the United States the notion 
of utility could be tightened to restrict patenting of fundamental concepts, that 
novelty and non-obviousness requirements should be interpreted more strictly, 
that the "experimental use" defence to patent infringement should be expanded 
and that automatic royalty-free licences, or at least compulsory licences at a rea­
sonable royalty rate, should be issued for the use of any patented technology 
in research where the patent holder is not already making the technology suffi­
ciently available.106 Maureen O'Rourke goes further, proposing the introduction 
of a "fair use" defence to patent infringement similar to that available under copy­
right law .107 In the developing world, the Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights recommended that countries that do not yet have patent systems should 
consider carefully how particular implementations would affect innovation tar­
geted at their specific needs .108 In both developed and developing countries, com­
petition laws could be used to respond to high levels of industry concentration.109
Even though the availability and scope of patent protection is determined by 
national laws, specific features of domestic legal regimes do have an impact be­
yond national borders: for example, as we saw earlier, patent rules applying in 
developed countries affect developing countries because much research relevant 
to developing countries may be carried out in developed countries or in col­
laboration with developed country researchers. However, one disadvantage of 
approaches involving fine-tuning of domestic laws is that such changes increas­
ingly cannot be made in isolation from the international system. This system 
is still evolving, and ensuring the legitimacy and appropriateness of standards 
to be adopted requires active participation from all affected countries.110 Unfor­
tunately, many countries -  especially developing countries -  experience serious 
obstacles to participation, due to a lack of expertise, experience and familiarity 
with technical issues discussed in such international fora as the World Intellec­
tual Property Organisation and the TRIPS Council, together with an inability to 
access unbiased external advice .* 111 Even aside from these handicaps, many coun-
106See Barton (2000) and Barton (2001); see note 63 above regarding revision of the United States 
Patent and Trade Mark Office examination guidelines.
107O'Rourke (2000).
108Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002), p.25 and p.148.
109Ibid., Executive Summary.
110Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002), p.164.
111 The Commission has made specific recommendations directed at improving WIPO's sensi­
tivity to the needs of less developed countries, ensuring the appropriate timing of TRIPS-related 
obligations, avoiding pressure by developed countries on developing countries to adopt stan­
dards or timetables beyond those required by TRIPS (i.e. "TRIPS-plus" agreements), improving 
representation of developing countries in the evolution of international IP rules, and addressing
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tries -  both developed and developing countries -  that are net importers of intel­
lectual property and might therefore benefit from a weaker intellectual property 
regime at the international level suffer from a simple lack of bargaining power in 
negotiations with, in particular, the United States. This problem is exacerbated by 
the fact that both international and domestic law-making bodies may be subject 
to capture by powerful vested interests that favour a strong intellectual property 
regime.
In this connection it is worth noting that the strengthening of intellectual prop­
erty rights in biotechnology over the past two decades has not been an isolated 
event; similarly, doubts about the desirability of stronger intellectual property 
rights have not been confined to the arena of life sciences research and develop­
ment. Until recently, resistance to across-the-board privatisation of intellectual 
assets has been largely piecemeal and ad hoc, but in the past few years intellec­
tual property skeptics have sought ways to bring conceptual unity to this resis­
tance.112 An emerging literature on the public domain draws on a number of 
different strands of literature dealing with intellectual property, including both 
literature on biotechnology research tools surveyed in the previous chapter of this 
thesis and literature on the open source movement referred to in later chapters.113 
This new "public domain" or "commons" movement combines theory with ac­
tivism; one of its strengths is its incorporation of both top-down and grassroots 
approaches to dealing with the adverse impacts of intellectual property rights 
on ongoing innovation.114 Initiatives associated with this movement include the 
"Creative Commons" initative at Stanford University, which makes good use of 
Internet technology and has proved effective in promoting a more open approach 
to a range of copyrighted works (especially music and weblogs) using standard­
ised, user-friendly copyright licences that reserve some rights to the author while 
waiving others in favour of broad freedom of use.115 In the scientific sphere, 
Jerome Reichman and Paul Uhlir have proposed a "contractually reconstructed 
e-commons for science and innovation",116 while the Creative Commons' "Sci­
ence Commons" initiative is due to launch in January 2005.117
certain substantive issues in periodic reviews of TRIPS. The Commission has also recommended 
support for further research to determine the costs and benefits of IP rights on both developed 
and developing countries: Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002), pp.155-168 passim; 
see also Drahos (2002).
112Boyle (2001).
113See generally Conference on the Public Domain, November 9-11, 2001, Duke Law School: 
http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/; in relation to scientific issues specifically, see Symposium on 
the Role of Scientific and Technical Data and Information in the Public Domain, 5-6 Septem­
ber 2002, National Academies of Science, http://www7.nationalacademies.org/biso/Public Do­
main Symposium Announcement.html and International Symposium on Open Access and the 
Public Domain in Digital Data and Information for Science, 10-11 March 2003, UNESCO, Paris, 
http://www.codata.org/03march-intlsymp.htm.
114For links to a number of activist organisations, see Open Source Biotechnology Project web­
site, http://rsss.anu.edu.au/ janeth/Law.html#40.
n5Creative Commons World Wide Web address: http://creativecommons.org/.
116Reichman & Uhlir (2002).
117"The mission of Science Commons is to encourage scientific innovation by making it easier
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3.5.2 Increased public funding
Another problem-solving approach aims to redress the decline in funding for 
public research and development, while shaping more effective policies to direct 
that funding towards priority areas. In the agricultural arena, Pray and Naseem 
argue that achieving better funding for priority research would require the de­
velopment of groups prepared to lobby on behalf of the poor, supported in local 
areas by anti-poverty groups and donors committed to reducing poverty.118 In 
the pharmaceutical sphere, a proposed "World R&D Treaty" is based on the idea 
that if drug prices did not have to cover the costs of research and development, 
there would be no need for intellectual property protection on drugs: instead, 
knowledge about the manufacture of drug compounds could be in the public 
domain and drugs could become a freely traded commodity, resulting in lower 
prices.119 Under the proposed treaty, the funds needed for pharmaceutical re­
search and development would be raised by obliging countries to fund research 
and development up to a certain percentage of GDP, replacing current trade rules 
containing detailed specifications of intellectual property rules; countries could 
then decide if they wanted to follow a strictly closed system (with high drug 
prices for 20 years under patent rules), or experiment with open development 
models (discussed in detail in later chapters of this thesis).
3.5.3 Reducing transaction costs
Other approaches to preventing or countering anticommons tragedy focus on 
ways of reducing the cost of transactions aimed at co-ordinating multiple tech­
nology components, ranging from (external) market exchange of specific assets 
to (internal) integration of assets within a firm. As demonstrated by the expe­
rience of the agricultural biotechnology industry, described above (p. 50), some 
of these mechanisms can facilitate anti-competitive behaviour. However, not all 
transaction cost-lowering institutions pose an undue threat to competition. In 
the context of plant biotechnology, Nottenburg et al. put forward a range of op­
tions whereby public and non-profit institutions can gain access to proprietary re­
search tools, including cross-licensing, obtaining low cost research-only licences, 
market segmentation, scaled licence fees, mergers or joint ventures with owners 
of research tools, direct funding from the private sector, alliances within the non­
profit sector, obtaining joint grants of freedom to operate and collective rights 
organisations.120 Each option has associated advantages and disadvantages. The 
option of forging mergers or joint ventures with private sector owners of research 
tools is examined in more detail by Pray and Naseem, who draw on past expe-
for scientists, universities, and industries to use literature, data, and other scientific intellectual 
property and to share their knowledge with others": http://science.creativecommons.org/, last 
accessed 17 December 2004.
118Pray & Naseem (2003).
119Hubbard (2003).
120Nottenburg et al. (2002).
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rience to identify elements of successful private-public collaborations, as well as 
actions governments can take to facilitate such joint ventures.121 In relation to the 
option of obtaining direct programmatic funding from the private sector, Pray 
and Naseem also identify a number of incentives that might motivate private 
sector players to make such funding available, together with possible govern­
ment actions to promote this outcome. The option of forging alliances within 
the non-profit sector is well illustrated by the case of the Centre for Application 
of Molecular Biology in Agriculture (CAMBIA), an Australian-based non-profit 
research institute which aims to "invent around" key enabling proprietary tech­
nologies in order to make alternatives available to public and non-profit research 
organisations on an ability-to-pay basis.122 Until recently, CAMBIA also provided 
a publicly accessible intellectual property resource ("CAMBIA IP") that aimed 
to help lower transaction costs by making patent searches and other intellectual- 
property related information-gathering easier and cheaper; this resource has now 
been subsumed by another initiative, described in chapter 7 (section 7.3.1, p.219). 
Once alliances within the non-profit sector have coalesced, suggest Nottenburg et 
al., they can then enlist the help of funding bodies to apply political pressure for 
concessions to non-profit organisations. Funding bodies such as the National In­
stitutes of Health have substantial power to influence bargaining behaviour that 
has not yet been fully harnessed, though funding agencies (both public and pri­
vate) have been behind a number of iniatitives to promote sharing in biotechnol­
ogy research and development (for example, the Wellcome Trust was the linchpin 
in negotations to establish the SNP Consortium: see chapter 6,156).
3.5.4 Collective rights organisations
The final option suggested by Nottenburg et al., that of forming collective rights 
organisations, has been explored in some detail by several authors and has been 
partially implemented in the agricultural biotechnology context (below,this sec­
tion). Collective rights organisations can perform a range of functions, includ­
ing that of assembling useful bundles of intellectual property rights belonging 
to members and possibly also non-members. Examples include the Global Bio­
collecting Society, analogous to collecting societies that already exist in the copy­
right arena, proposed by Peter Drahos to help overcome problems of uncertainty 
and enforcement confronting life sciences companies and indigenous groups con­
tracting over the use of knowledge relating to plant material.123 The most highly 
developed proposal for a collective rights organisation relevant to biotechnology 
research and development is in agricultural biotechnology, and is based on the 
"intellectual property clearinghouse" concept developed by Greg Graff, David 
Zilberman and others.124 The Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agricul­
ture (PIPRA) was jointly launched in 2003 by a number of public sector institu-
121 Pray & Naseem (2003).
122See http://w w w .cam bia.org/.
123Drahos (2000).
124Graff & Zilberman (2001a); Graff & Zilberman (2001b).
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tions in the United States.125 If successful, such a collective intellectual property 
management regime would enable an effective assessment of freedom-to-operate 
issues and could begin to overcome the fragmentation of public sector intellec­
tual property ownership in agricultural biotechnology, while at the same time 
improving public-private sector interactions by better identifying collective com­
mercial licensing opportunities. As those involved in establishing PIPRA could 
attest, the greatest difficulty in establishing successful collective rights organi­
sations is that of fostering trust and confidence among potential members and 
users.126 The danger is that more powerful players within the group will "hijack" 
the organisation and steer it in a direction that does not benefit the majority of 
members. The problem of hijacking is discussed further in chapters 4 and 5.
3.6 Participatory research and development
We have seen that very little biotechnology research and development is cur­
rently directed to where it is most needed, and that part of the answer may be for 
governments or other powerful institutions such as funding agencies to identify 
areas of need and consciously direct research and development towards those 
areas. However, possibly a more fruitful approach is to enhance participation 
in biotechnology research and development by those with the greatest need; of 
course, this is an important motivation behind efforts, described above, to lower 
the costs of intellectual property-related transactions and thence the barriers to 
participation in biotechnology research and development by less well-resourced 
entities. A prime example of the participatory approach is "participatory agricul­
tural research" or, more narrowly, "participatory plant breeding" (PPB).127
The principal objective of PPB is to create more relevant technology and more 
equitable access to technology in order to improve the service and delivery of 
crop improvement research to the poorest and most marginalised people and ar­
eas. Secondary objectives include cutting research costs, affirming local people's 
rights over genetic resources, producing seed, building farmers' technical exper­
tise and developing new products for niche markets (for example, organic foods). 
PPB works by developing and distributing locally adapted technologies as well 
as by supporting local capacity for generating such technologies. Implementa­
tions of this approach are diverse, but in essence, PPB involves clearly identifying 
farmers' needs and preferences and the reasoning behind them so that farmers are 
treated as partners in research: most research is conducted in farmers' own fields 
with farmers and researchers working side by side. The point is to introduce a
125Bennett et al. (2002).
126Rex Raimond, personal communication.
127See generally Thro & Spillane (2000); CGIAR Systemwide Program on Participatory Research 
& Gender Anlaysis, http://www.prgaprogram.org/index.php?module=htmlpages&func=display&pid=9, 
last accessed June 1 2004; Seeds that give: participatory plant breeding (2002), International Develop­
ment Research Centre, http://web.idrc.ca/en/ev-30549-201-l-DO_TOPIC.html, last accessed 1 
June 2004.
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user perspective into adaptive research, bringing users into the early stages of 
technology development as both researchers and decision makers who help set 
priorities, define criteria for success, and determine when an innovation is ready 
for release. The application of PPB has so far been limited to the development of 
conventional technologies, but its potential in the biotechnology context is well 
recognised.128
The ideal of PPB for biotechnology research and development exemplifies a 
broader philosophy of participation and empowerment in relation to biotechnol­
ogy innovation that is being more frequently articulated as the disadvantages of 
the current system become apparent. This philosophy was neatly expressed in a 
2003 communique issued by scientists attending the XIX International Congress 
of Genetics in Melbourne, Australia:
Fifty years since the double helix structure of DNA opened our 
eyes to new means of using genetics to contribute to human wellbeing, 
we are increasingly faced with the challenge of ensuring that the next 
fifty years delivers these benefits to all peoples... . The choices people 
are being given today seem not to be the choices people want... . The 
voices people hear today seem not to be the voices people trust or wish 
to hear. ... GM [Genetic Modification] technologies offer great poten­
tial to contribute to the production of foods people want... produced 
by stewards of the land under local oversight. [They] could also be 
the building blocks of new toolkits that encourage and empower cre­
ativity and entrepreneurship among the disenfranchised. Our vision 
of how this potential will be realised requires changes in the status 
quo. We see democratisation of innovation, including genetic modi­
fication, to be essential.... This is particularly urgent in poorer parts 
of the world that have yet to experience equitable development.... We 
believe it is essential to empower innovators everywhere, small and 
large, in public and in private sectors, by ensuring their access to en­
abling technologies.... The answers are ... in encouraging local capac­
ity to innovate and respecting local choice of technologies. The free­
dom to innovate must not be hindered by barriers imposed by any 
interest group. To do so would be disrespectful of the legitimate drive 
of all people to solve their own problems. These barriers include... re­
strictive ownership of enabling technologies.... The right to innovate 
must not be the sole province of the highly capitalised, nor of a few 
owners of key intellectual property, who could thereby control, direct 
or limit innovation globally. ... The tools of innovation must not be 
withheld.129
128Thro & Spillane (2000).
129GMO Communique, XIX International Congress of Genetics, Melbourne, Australia, July 6- 
11, 2003: available at http://www.geneticsmedia.org/gmo_communique.htm, last accessed 18 
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3.7 Conclusion: the need for a biotechnology tool kit
In this chapter we have seen that essentially the same sequence of cause and ef­
fect operates in both medical and agricultural biotechnology. In both fields, the 
ability to conduct research and development depends on access to a full set of 
enabling technologies, analogous to the basic toolkits needed for cooking, gar­
dening, sewing or any of a thousand other familiar productive activities. The fact 
that the elements of these toolkits are protected by intellectual property rights 
instead of being available in the public domain has two consequences.
First, intellectual property protection means that putting a toolkit together 
requires more resources, not only because of the need to provide owners of indi­
vidual tools with some return in exchange for granting access, but more funda­
mentally because the very fact that the tools are owned gives rise to search, nego­
tiation and enforcement costs that would not otherwise exist. This need for extra 
resources in turn has several consequences. One is that low value exchanges are 
less likely to occur, an undesirable outcome because most socially valuable inno­
vation in fact takes place in small increments rather than in "great leaps forward" 
-  in other words, high value data streams are disrupted. Another is that public 
and private resources that might otherwise have been devoted to research and 
development are wasted, just as energy in an engine is lost as heat due to friction. 
Finally, the more resources that are required in order to engage in innovative 
activity, the smaller the number of people or organisations that are willing and 
able to participate. (In medical biotechnology the number of players that can still 
afford to participate is still somewhat larger than in agricultural biotechnology, 
but the same selective pressure operates in both areas.) As we saw in chapter 
2, scientific and technological problem solving proceeds most efficiently when 
carried out by many different actors working independently. A reduction in the 
number of participants in biotechnology research and development can therefore 
be expected to hinder the rate of innovation in relation to any given technology 
and is also likely to raise the total cost of production, leading to delays and higher 
prices for products and reinforcing the inadequacy of incentives to develop prod­
ucts for smaller markets. Further, a smaller pool of participants in biotechnology 
research and development means a reduction in diversity, leading to potentially 
serious blind spots in dealing with this powerful new technology. Because par­
ticipants are effectively selected on the basis of wealth and are generally free to 
follow a more or less self-interested agenda, such blind spots are likely to cover 
exactly those areas of research that would be most useful to those most in need.
The second major consequence of granting intellectual property rights in ele­
ments of the basic biotechnology toolkit is reduced competition at the next stage 
of development as tool owners impose reach-through conditions on the products 
of research and development conducted using their tools. This reinforces existing 
market power and drives up prices for end products. As an example, consider the 
pharmaceutical industry case. Patents on the actual therapeutic molecules that 
are used as drugs allow pharmaceutical companies to exclude competition from 
generic drug manufacturers selling the same molecule, however it is produced.
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This is consistent with the traditional monopoly-in-exchange-for-disclosure ratio­
nale behind patent protection. Very broad patents on drugs cover a much larger 
class of related molecules that might be shown to have therapeutic activity. Al­
though more of a stretch, this is also consistent with the traditional patent ratio­
nale. However, if a pharmaceutical company also holds patents on one or more 
essential elements of a basic research and development toolkit, it will also be in 
a position to prevent competitors from "inventing around" its other patents to 
produce an equivalent treatment based on a different class of molecules. Any 
new treatments that might be developed by non-competitors (for example, uni­
versity researchers) it can acquire on favourable terms instead of on the open 
market where it would need to outbid generic manufacturers as well as other 
brand-name companies. This is not consistent with traditional patent justifica­
tions, which often allude to increased incentives to others to invent around a 
patent as a reason for granting the patent in the first place -  and the result is un­
necessarily high prices for individual consumers or procurers. This is not to say 
that in the absence of patents on elements of a biotechnology toolkit, drug prices 
would be negligible. Considerable expense is inherent in producing a new drug. 
This is partly due to research costs -  the costs of target identification, screening 
candidate molecules and pre-clinical testing in relation to many potential drugs 
that never make it out of the laboratory -  and partly due to the need for exten­
sive clinical trials to ensure product safety. However, many big pharmaceutical 
companies spend enormous additional sums on paying large executive salaries 
and maintaining their market position through, for example, lobbying and adver­
tising (largely to doctors), yet still manage to routinely extract huge profits from 
sales. These are expenses for which the rest of society may prefer not to foot the 
bill.
Different solutions canvassed in the previous section target different links in 
this causal chain and each has its own advantages and disadvantages. Proposed 
solutions aimed at halting the proliferation of intellectual property rights are very 
important because of constant opposing pressure to "enclose" more and more of 
the public domain. However, even apart from the difficulty of persuading the 
guardians of the status quo that change is necessary and desirable, unless such 
solutions are expected to operate retrospectively they would have no immediate 
effect on the more proximate cause of problems in the biotechnology industry 
-  that is, the lack of an affordable, accessible, unencumbered toolkit. Proposed 
solutions aimed at producing such a toolkit include efforts described above to 
obtain public funding for inventing around proprietary tools (in principle, such 
funds could also be obtained through private donations) and initiatives to "pack­
age" existing tools owned by several different players for easier access. Funding 
the production of a full toolkit is probably beyond the resources of any single 
player -  even supposing every technology in the proprietary toolkit were tech­
nically substitutable -  especially considering that maintaining an up-to-date col­
lection of tools would involve ongoing expense. Moreover, a single entity might 
find it difficult to harness the full creativity of the biotechnology research and de­
velopment community. On the other hand, co-operation among diverse players
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is difficult to establish and maintain because of problems of trust and confidence 
arising largely out of a fear of technology "hijacking".
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that attempts to overcome intel­
lectual property-related problems in the biotechnology industry would be aided 
by some mechanism for producing a biotechnology toolkit that is both unencum­
bered and affordable (in terms of price and accessibility) even to the smallest 
players. Ideally, such a mechanism would not rely on law reform, reversal of 
current intellectual property policy or the co-operation of players who benefit 
from the status quo; it would allow the necessary innovation to draw on diverse 
funding sources and be distributed across many institutions; it would allow for 
incremental improvements to the elements of the toolkit over time; and it would 
provide contributors with some protection against hijacking of the evolving tech­
nology.
In fact, such a mechanism already exists outside the biotechnology industry 
in the context of computer software development. Known as "open source" li­
censing, it is described in detail in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
An introduction to open source
4.1 Introduction
In chapters 2 and 3, we saw that efficient technological innovation directed to­
wards goals that serve the public interest depends on the unfettered exchange 
of information and materials among diverse participants, but that in biotechnol­
ogy, intellectual property rights introduce friction that threatens to block impor­
tant exchanges and exclude all but a small number of organisations (mainly large 
private sector firms) from helping to shape the direction of future research and 
development.
The situation described in chapters 2 and 3 has strong parallels with devel­
opments in the computer software industry over the same period. In both in­
dustries, a few corporations achieved tight control over key technologies, includ­
ing important development tools, through aggressive use of intellectual property 
rights. However, in recent years the software industry has seen the emergence of 
an alternative mode of intellectual property management that has helped make 
software tools accessible to a much wider range of developers, from large corpo­
rations competing with the industry leaders to smaller developers and non-profit 
organisations. As foreshadowed at the end of the previous chapter, this had been 
achieved by the introduction of development toolkits on terms that enforce shar­
ing and resist proprietary control.
Later chapters of this thesis explore the possibility that an analogous approach 
might offer at least a partial solution to intellectual property-related problems 
in biotechnology research and development. This chapter discusses open source 
software, giving a brief history of the open source software movement, an overview 
of how open source development works in the context of the programming com­
munity, a description of the terms with which software licences must comply in 
order to be certified as open source licences, and a summary of the analytical 
framework to be used in subsequent chapters.
4.2 A brief history of open source software
To understand what is meant by "open source" software, it is helpful to consider 
the conventional approach, sometimes referred to as "closed source".
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4.2.1 Proprietary software licensing
A computer program is a sequence of instructions written by a human to be ex­
ecuted by computer. But computers can only execute instructions encoded as 
strings of binary numbers. So a computer program is first written in a form that 
can be read and understood by human beings, known as source code, and then 
translated by means of another program into binary form, known as machine 
or object code. To make useful modifications to a computer program, or to use 
parts of the program code in another program, it is necessary to have access to 
the source code. In addition to actual code, the source code document usually 
contains annotations intended to elucidate the design of the program, inserted 
by the programmer both as an explanation to others and as a personal reminder.1
Many biotechnology research tools are protected by patent, but source code 
historically has not been regarded as patentable subject matter because it is es­
sentially a series of mathematical algorithms or mental steps and is therefore on 
the wrong side of the discovery-invention divide in patent law.2 While patents 
protect inventions in the form of new products or processes, copyright protects 
the original expression of an idea; for this reason, source code has traditionally 
been protected as a literary work under copyright law. The owner of a copy­
righted program has certain exclusive rights, including the right to reproduce 
and distribute the program and to prepare derivative works. Unlike patent pro­
tection, copyright protection applies to unpublished as well as published works, 
so source code can be simultaneously protected by copyright and as a trade se­
cret.3
The upshot is that anyone who buys a copy of a typical proprietary software 
program is prevented from changing the program or using parts of the code to 
make a new program in two ways. First, the buyer -  in fact a licensee -  receives 
only the binary or machine code version of the program, the source code being 
kept secret. The licensor's employees who need access to the source code are re­
quired to sign nondisclosure agreements.4 Second, even if the licensee did have
Aon Krogh & von Hippel (2003).
2This position has been under siege since the 1981 case of Diamond v. Diehr (450 US 175), in 
which the United States Supreme Court ordered the Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to 
grant a patent on an invention using computer software to direct the process of curing rubber. 
Guidelines issued by the USPTO in 1995 and finalised in 1996 interpreted subsequent court cases 
as extending software patentability to programs that are essentially algorithms only distantly 
connected to physical processes: Computer-Related Inventions Examination Guidelines, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 7478 (Feb. 28,1996). Software patents remain highly controversial.
3Software can also be protected under trademark legislation. Trademarks identify the source 
of goods, processes or services and may be used in conjunction with patent and/or copyright 
protection. Trademark protection is important in the open source software context: see chapter 7, 
section 7.2.2, p.212.
4As Bill Gates has explained, "a competitor who is free to review Microsoft's source 
code... will see the architecture, data structures, algorithms and other key aspects of 
the relevant Microsoft product[, making] it much easier to copy Microsoft's innovations": 
State of New York v Microsoft Corporation, Direct Testimony of Bill Gates, 18 April 2002, 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass.trial/mswitness/002/billgates/billgates.asp at 307, 20 
April 2002, cited in Fitzgerald & Bassett (2003), p.12.
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access to the source code, he or she would be legally prevented from changing 
or building on it by the terms of the licence agreement: under a typical licence, 
the owner retains the exclusive right to redistribute or modify the program and 
authorises the making of only a limited number of copies. Most licences contain 
explicit restrictions on the number of users, the number of computers on which 
the program may be run and the making and simultaneous use of backups.5 Typi­
cally a licensee may not reverse engineer the licensed product except as expressly 
authorised by applicable law: in Australia, a contract to override reverse engi­
neering rights is prohibited by statute, while in the United States the law is less 
clear. A licensee may not rent, lease, lend or host products.6 Thus, in current 
commercial practice most software is licensed for a fee rather than sold to a third 
party as intellectual property;7 in other words, it is treated in essentially the same 
way as a manufactured good.8 In return for the licensing fee, the user is offered a 
limited warranty that the product will perform substantially in accordance with 
user documentation for a period up to 90 days from first running the program. 
Whether the final product is sold by shrink wrap or click wrap licence, licensees 
are dependent on the vendor for upgrades and patches.9
4.2.2 Free software
In the early days of computer programming, these proprietary restrictions on 
access to and use of source code were rare. Instead, most users did their own 
programming and exchanged source code over the ARPANET, the precursor of 
the Internet, according to etiquette within a community made up largely of sci­
entists and engineers employed in academic and corporate laboratories. But in 
the late 1970s to early 1980s, intellectual property aspects of commercialisation 
began to affect the culture of the computer science community in similar ways 
to those described in chapter 2 in relation to the molecular biology community 
of that time. Programmers left public sector institutions for better paid jobs with 
private companies, where they were asked to sign nondisclosure agreements as a 
condition of employment.10
One programmer who objected to these developments was Richard M. Stall- 
man, a member of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Artificial Intelli­
gence Laboratory, where the communal "hacker" culture of the 1960s and 1970s 
had been particularly strong. Stallman set out to create a suite of what he termed 
"free" software that would allow programmers to continue modifying and swap­
ping software, including source code, without fear of being sued for breach of 
intellectual property rights.11 The word "free" did not refer to price: rather, Stall-
5von Krogh & von Hippel (2003).
6Fitzgerald & Bassett (2003), pp. 12-13.
7von Krogh & von Hippel (2003).
8Raymond (2001), chapter 5: "The Magic Cauldron". See below, section 6.2.1, p.144.
9Fitzgerald & Bassett (2003), pp.12-13.
10Levy (1984); Raymond (1999); DiBona et al. (1999); Stallman (1999).
n Stallman (1999).
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man meant that software users should be at liberty to run a program for any pur­
pose, to study how it works and adapt it to specific needs, to redistribute copies, 
and to improve the program and release those improvements.12 To allow these 
freedoms, copyright owners would have to both provide physical access to the 
source code and remove legal restrictions from copyright licences.
In order to ensure that software developed as free software would continue to 
be available in all its derivative forms to the software development community 
at large, Stallman and his advisers devised a legal mechanism to enforce sharing 
in the form of an ingenious twist on the conventional copyright licence, known 
as "copyleft". The archetypal copyleft licence is the General Public Licence or 
"GPL", originally called the GNU Public Licence after the GNU project, Stall­
man's first step towards the creation of a complete suite of free software. (Begun 
in 1982, GNU -  a recursive acronym that stands for "Gnu is not Unix" -  involved 
the construction of an entire clone of the popular UNIX operating system.)13 Un­
der the terms of the GPL, the copyright owner grants the user the right to use the 
licensed program, to study its source code, to modify it, and to distribute modi­
fied or unmodified versions to others, all without having to pay a fee to the owner 
-  with the proviso that if the user chooses to distribute any modified versions, he 
or she must do so under the same terms. The right to copy and redistribute un­
der the GPL is subject to a requirement that the redistributed version carries a 
copyright notice and a disclaimer of warranties; the distributor may charge for 
the cost of distribution and may offer warranty protection for a fee. Derivative 
works distributed under the GPL must be identified as such, interactively if the 
program normally runs interactively. The work may be distributed in executable 
or binary form only, provided the source code is distributed with the executable 
or is made available for no more than the cost of distribution under a written offer 
valid for at least three years.14
More generally, copyleft licences are characterised by distribution terms that 
give licensees the rights to use, modify, and redistribute the program's code or 
any program derived from it on the condition that the same distribution terms 
apply.15 Thus, copyleft is a way of guarding against the danger of technology 
"hijacking", a problem we have already encountered in the biotechnology context 
(see chapter 3).16
Although the simplest way to make a program free is to waive copyright and 
refrain from keeping trade secrets, thereby putting it into the public domain, this 
method allows follow-on innovators to distribute derivative works under restric-
12" 'Free software' is a matter of liberty, not price. To understand the concept, you should 
think of 'free' as in 'free speech', not as in 'free beer.'" Free Software Foundation web site, 
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html
13Stallman (1999).
14 Webb ink (2003), pp.6-7.
15Free Software Foundation website, "What is Copyleft?", http://www.gnu.org/ copy­
left/copyleft.html, last accessed 17 December 2004.
16In the software community a range of tactics are used to reinforce anti-hijacking licence terms: 
O'Mahony (2003).
§4.2 A brief history o f open source software 69
tive licensing terms.17 Using a copyleft licence instead means that even as the 
licensed software evolves into forms that might be sufficiently new to attract 
copyright protection in their own right, it remains freely available to users and 
developers. This is crucial to sustaining collaborative development over time be­
cause continuing access to the evolving program is an important quid pro quo 
for contributors, as illustrated by the comments of programmers who choose to 
copyleft their software:
Because this is a very ambitious project I need help from the com­
munity. Consequently, I need to give some assurances to the commu­
nity that my intentions are honourable and that I'm not going to turn 
out as some evil proprietary guy somewhere down the line and try to 
exploit the code that they contribute to me. ... [The GPL] creates fair­
ness and honesty in the relationship between contributors on a project 
to ensure that if their contribution is born free it stays free as time goes 
on.18
Unsurprisingly, copyleft licence terms make software unattractive to some com­
mercial users who may be concerned that mixing copylefted code with propri­
etary code could give rise to an obligation to reveal the source code of the propri­
etary component. This concern gives rise to the use of loaded terminology: copy- 
left licences are often described as "viral" or "infectious"; a piece of copylefted 
code might be referred to as a "tar-baby".19 Lawrence Rosen, General Counsel to 
the Open Source Initiative, argues that the concern is exaggerated and suggests 
that copyleft provisions should be seen in a more positive light, as an "inheri­
tance" rather than an "infection".20 This issue is discussed in more detail below.
Although most free software is distributed under a copyleft licence, free soft­
ware that is not copylefted also exists.21 Software is considered "free" if it com­
plies with the Free Software Definition promulgated by the Free Software Foun­
dation (FSF), a non-profit organisation established by Stallman and others in 
1985.22 As the FSF website explains:
Free software is a matter of the users' freedom to run, copy, distrib­
ute, study, change and improve the software. More precisely, it refers 
to four kinds of freedom, for the users of the software:
The freedom to run the program, for any purpose (freedom 0).
The freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to your
17Free Software Foundation website, "What is Copyleft?", http://www.gnu.org/ copy- 
left/copyleft.html, last accessed 17 December 2004.
18Gampe & Weatherley (2003), pp.120-121.
19Lita Nelsen, personal communication.
20Rosen et al. (2003), p.33.
21 Free Software Foundation, "The Free Software Definition", http://www.gnu.org/ 
philosophy/free-sw.html, last accessed 17 December 2004.
22 According to its website, the Free Software Foundation accepts donations, but most of its 
income has always come from sales of copies of free software, and of other related services: 
http://www.gnu.org/gnu/thegnuproject.html, last accessed 17 December 2004.
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needs (freedom 1). Access to the source code is a precondition for this.
The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor 
(freedom 2).
The freedom to improve the program, and release your improvements 
to the public, so that the whole community benefits (freedom 3). Ac­
cess to the source code is a precondition for this.
A program is free software if users have all of these freedoms.23
(Recall that according to Mertonian sociologists of science, the norm of commu­
nism encouraged scientists to communicate the results of their research to other 
scientists so as preserve scientific knowledge within the public domain, where 
it could be freely used and extended: see section 2.3, p.12.) The Free Software 
Definition is not a code: the FSF maintains a list of licences it considers "free", 
but emphasises that application of the Definition is a matter of interpretation and 
judgment to determine whether a particular licence fits the spirit as well as the 
letter of the stated criteria, which may evolve in response to licensing innova­
tions.24
4.2.3 Open source software
The influence of the free software movement was initially limited because of in­
dustry suspicion of the notion of "free" software. In the late 1990s, Netscape 
hired programmer and essayist Eric S. Raymond to advise on an appropriate li­
cence for a new internet browser; the experience of thinking about free software 
from a business perspective inspired Raymond and his fellow programmer, Bruce 
Perens, to look for an alternative terminology that would not be confusing or off- 
putting to those who did not share Stallman's view of proprietary software li­
censing as morally wrong.25 In 1998 Raymond, Perens and others established the 
Open Source Initiative, a non-profit advocacy organisation that also acts as a cer­
tification body for open source licences.26 Certification indicates compliance with 
an official Open Source Definition, based on guidelines originally developed by 
Perens and other users of the Debian GNU/Linux software distribution prior to 
publication of the Free Software Definition in order to help distinguish between 
licences that really did guarantee freedom to users and licences that had some 
similar features but were basically still proprietary licences.27
Thus, the term "open source" was coined essentially as a marketing strat­
egy to promote the idea of free software to a commercial audience on pragmatic 
rather than ideological grounds (specific commercial applications of open source 
licences are discussed in chapter 7).28 The Free Software Foundation and the
23Free Software Foundation, "The Free Software Definition", http://www.gnu.org/ 
philosophy/free-sw.html, last accessed 17 December 2004.
24Ibid.
25Raymond (1999); Perens (1999); von Krogh & von Hippel (2003).
26Open Source Initiative, http://www.opensource.org/, last accessed 16 November 2004. 
27Perens (1999).
28See especially section 7.2.2, p.209 and section 7.2.3, p.214.
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Open Source Initiative maintain separate lists of approved licences,29 but there 
are few practical differences between free and open source software: both seek to 
protect basically the same set of user rights -  summed up as the freedom of "any­
one, anywhere, for any purpose, to use, copy, modify or distribute either gratis 
or for a fee" any software licensed under a free or open source licence -  and both 
identify disclosure of source code as a practical necessity for doing so.30 Specif­
ically, the imposition of reciprocal obligations on creators of derivative works is 
not the point of distinction between free and open source software: neither term 
necessarily implies that the software licence contains copyleft provisions. Never­
theless, the Free Software Foundation expresses a strong preference for the copy- 
left approach and is wary of mixing proprietary and non-proprietary licensing 
strategies, whereas proponents of open source regard this as acceptable and even 
desirable in order to capture greater "mindshare" within the developer commu­
nity.31 For reasons given at the start of chapter 7, in this thesis a conscious choice 
has been made to adopt the term "open source", with its connotation of trying 
to appeal to a business audience on the basis of economic self-interest, instead of 
referring to software (or biotechnology) "freedom".
4.3 Open source as a developm ent methodology
In ordinary usage, the term "open source" has evolved two distinct meanings. 
First, open source refers to a specific and relatively well-defined approach to the 
licensing of intellectual property in software programs. Second, the term "open 
source" is also used to denote a less well-defined yet readily recognisable ap­
proach to software development, and an accompanying set of business strategies. 
Though distinct, these meanings are closely linked because (as noted earlier) the 
use of open source software licences plays a key role in motivating contributions 
to a collaborative development effort.32 This section introduces open source de­
velopment principles, which will be explored further in chapter 6; the next section 
deals with open source licensing, explored further in chapter 5.
4.3.1 A "typical" open source project?
Strictly speaking, the term "open source" refers to a software licence that is cer­
tified by the Open Source Initiative to conform with the official Open Source De­
finition. However, in ordinary usage "open source" also refers to the way soft-
29The Open Source Initiative's list is at http://www.opensource.org/licenses, last accessed 16 
November 2004.
30Rosen et al. (2003), p.39.
31Open Source Initiative, 'Why "Free" Software is too Ambiguous': http://w w w .
opensource.org/advocacy/free-notfree.php; Free Software Foundation, 'Why "Free Software" is 
better than "Open Source"': http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-software-for-freedom.html.
32This is true even of non-copyleft licences: though they do not preserve ongoing access to an 
evolving technology, such licences do provide a minimum level of protection for the integrity of 
an author's code: see above, note 29.
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ware has been developed. Although the development methodology aspect of 
open source is far less clearly defined than the licensing aspect, some characteris­
tic practices of open source development have been identified that distinguish it 
from ordinary commercial software development.33
The project often regarded as the archetypal open source software develop­
ment effort grew out of the GNU project, mentioned in the previous section. GNU 
development was co-operative, in that it drew on contributions of code and ef­
fort from many individuals as well as donations of machines and money from 
computer manufacturers. By 1990, Stallman's Free Software Foundation had de­
veloped almost all the components of a UNIX-like operating system, except for 
the kernel. (The kernel is the core of a computer operating system; it provides 
basic services for all other parts of the operating system, including those that re­
spond to user commands.) In 1991, a Helsinki University student named Linus 
Torvalds began developing a free UNIX kernel using tools made available by the 
Free Software Foundation. He made good progress, and his initial success at­
tracted many helpers: the kernel, known as Linux, quickly became a full featured 
UNIX with entirely free and redistributable source code. By late 1993, GNU- 
Linux could compete on stability and reliability with many commercial UNIXs 
and hosted vastly more software.34
Before Linux, most people in the software development community, including 
the free software movement, believed that any software as complex as an oper­
ating system had to be developed in a carefully coordinated way by a relatively 
small, tightly knit group of people. But Linux evolved completely differently. 
Almost from the start, it was worked on rather casually by huge numbers of vol­
unteers co-ordinating only through the Internet, which was just starting to take 
off around the early 1990s. Quality was maintained not by rigid standards or 
micromanagement, but by the simple strategy of releasing the code every week 
and getting almost instantaneous feedback from hundreds of users -  a sort of 
rapid Darwinian selection on the mutations introduced by developers. In a fa­
mous essay, Eric S. Raymond likened these two styles of development to a cathe­
dral, built to a single architectural vision, and a bazaar, an emergent phenomenon 
with no discernible leadership.35 Though not in fact wholly accurate, in that Tor­
valds did exert considerable control over the development of Linux, this simile 
has entered into open source lore because it highlights the difference between a 
centrally planned approach to software development and the more decentralised 
approach described below.
Although Linux is often regarded as a "typical" open source software de­
velopment project, in fact it is only one of some twelve thousand open source 
projects currently underway, involving an estimated 120,000 developers -  num­
bers that are reported to be increasing steadily.36 The number of developers in 
each project ranges from a mere handful to many thousands. Similarly, the num-
33von Krogh & von Hippel (2003); Bonaccorsi & Rossi (2003).
34Raymond (1999).
35Raymond (2001), chapter 3: "The Cathedral and the Bazaar".
36Bonaccorsi & Rossi (2003).
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ber of users of each program produced by open source methods ranges from a 
few to many millions. Programs at the larger end of the scale in terms of user 
numbers include Apache server software, the Perl programming language and 
the GNU-Linux operating system itself; other well known open source programs 
include BIND and the email program Sendmail, both "killer" applications in their 
respective market niches.37
Thus, while Linux is certainly a prominent example of an open source soft­
ware development project, its characteristics are not actually representative of the 
majority of such projects. What, then, is a "typical" open source project? Despite 
wide variations in the size of the developer group, in user numbers and in the 
type of application being developed, most open source projects do have certain 
features in common in addition to the distribution of code under an open source 
licence. While not definitive, these features constitute a recognisable "family re­
semblance".38 A typical project is initiated by an individual or a small group who 
are prospective users of the finished program; the intended use is usually (not 
always) connected with the initial developers' professional activities, which may 
be carried out in either an academic or commercial setting. This group develops a 
rough version of the program, perhaps with only basic functionality -  enough to 
act as a "seed" for further development. This version is made freely available for 
download over the Internet, often through a clearinghouse site such as Source- 
Forge.net,39 under a specified open source licence; the initial developers may also 
establish discussion and mailing lists for the project. If the basic version succeeds 
in attracting interest, some users will create new code and may post that code on 
the project website for others to use and generate feedback. This second tier of 
developers may be independent voluteers, but are often employees of firms that 
support the project, and though some may be motivated by a desire to enhance 
personal self-esteem or develop a reputation for skilful programming, many have 
a more direct economic interest in participating.40 New code that is of sufficient 
quality is then added to an authorised or official version of the program on the 
say-so of the project maintainers, a core group that is almost always the same as 
or a subset of the initial developer group -  at least at first: the project leadership 
may change over time as participants' needs and priorities evolve.41
4.3.2 Principles of open source software development
Raymond's essay "The Cathedral and the Bazaar" identified several features of 
open source software development that he considers important to its success.42 
First, Raymond says that "good programmers know what to write; great ones
37von Krogh & von Hippel (2003).
38Bonaccorsi & Rossi (2003); von Krogh & von Hippel (2003).
39See http://sourceforge.net/.
40Possible motivations to contribute to an open source project are discussed in more detail in 
chapter 6, section 6.3 and chapter 7, section 7.2.2.
41Bonaccorsi & Rossi (2003); von Krogh «Sc von Hippel (2003).
42Raymond (2001).
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know what to rewrite and reuse" -  in other words, successful programming is 
an incremental process of innovation, requiring access to previously developed 
code. Second, the best programs are written in response to a user-developer's 
own perceived need, which Raymond refers to as "scratching a personal itch". 
Third, "given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow": treating users as codevel­
opers allows bugs to be identified and removed more quickly and effectively. 
Fourth, programs are best released "early and often" to encourage feedback from 
users.
It is easy to see strong parallels between these principles and the ideas we 
encountered in chapter 2, from sociology of science literature about the relative 
merits of centralised and decentralised scientific research to economics and intel­
lectual property literature dealing with whether certain economic justifications 
for patent rights (in particular, Kitch's "prospect development model") are suited 
to the needs of basic scientific research. Whether by convergent (adapting to 
the same pressures) or divergent (derived from the same ancestors) evolution­
ary processes, or both, the open source development model shares many of its 
claimed advantages with traditional academic scientific research, both in com­
puter science and in biotechnology:
When programmers can read, redistribute, and modify the source 
code for a piece of software, the software evolves. People improve 
it, people adapt it, people fix bugs, and this can happen at a speed 
that, when one is used to the slow pace of conventional software, 
seems astonishing. The open source community has learned that this 
rapid evolutionary process produces better software than the tradi­
tional closed source model, in which only a few programmers can 
see the source and where everybody else must blindly use an opaque 
block of bits.43
In his article "Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm", Yochai 
Benkler argues that both open source software development and traditional sci­
entific research are examples of "commons-based peer production", a means of 
ordering productive activity that is often overlooked in favour of managerial and 
market-based systems.44 While acknowledging that peer production is nothing 
new, Benkler argues that computer networks are bringing about a change in the 
scope, scale and efficacy of peer production such that it can be applied to larger 
and more complex tasks. He identifies three components in the chain of informa­
tion production -  generation of content, accreditation and determination of rel­
evance, and distribution -  and gives examples of how each component is being 
produced on the Internet using a peer based model with respect to information 
and cultural goods other than software.45 From these examples Benkler attempts
43Open Source Initiative website, http://www.opensource.org.
44Benkler (2002).
45With respect to content, Benkler cites NASA Clickworkers, Wikipedia, Kuro5hin and mul­
tiplayer and online computer games like Ultima and Everquest; with respect to relevance and
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to abstract some general principles about peer production, what makes it work, 
and what makes it better under certain circumstances than methods of ordering 
production that rely on either market signals or managerial direction. We return 
to Benkler's observations in later chapters.
4.3.3 Open source development as a business strategy
In fact, the features of the open source development model that are emphasised 
by its proponents -  speed, efficiency, quality, responsiveness to user need -  are 
exactly the features of the innovative process that, as we saw in chapter 3, are 
apparently being lost in the biotechnology context through commercialisation 
and the accompanying proliferation of intellectual property rights. Yet the open 
source community has managed to retain these features without necessarily re­
jecting either commercialisation or certain kinds of intellectual property rights in 
software.46 As the Free Software Foundation website points out:
"Free software" does not mean "non-commercial". A free program 
must be available for commercial use, commercial development, and 
commercial distribution. Commercial development of free software is 
no longer unusual; such free commercial software is very important.47
Indeed, recent research suggests overall revenue for servers, desktops, and pack­
aged software running on GNU/Linux will reach SUS35.7 billion in the next four 
years.48
Why might the open source model of software development appeal to com­
mercial users and developers? From a user or customer perspective, the most 
often cited factors are quality, better security and reliability, and freedom from 
dependence on a single software vendor.49 Users who are also developers also 
have the opportunity to influence the direction of development to better match 
their own commercial needs. From a developer perspective, the principal advan­
tage to opening up the development process to enable contributions from outside 
the company is that it provides access to more creativity at a lower cost and with 
shorter development times: as businessman Yancy Lind has commented, the "gi­
ants of this industry... have hundreds of engineers working on these products.
accreditation he cites Amazon, Google, the Open Directory project and Slashdot; and for distrib­
ution he cites Napster and Project Gutenberg.
46As discussed earlier, the free and open source software community has embraced copyright 
in software to the extent of using the copyleft mechanism to guarantee ongoing access to evolving 
technology; on the other hand, the community has little use for software patents.
47Free Software Foundation, "The Free Software Definition",
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html, last accessed 17 December 2004.
48Keizer (2004).
49In a ten month test for reliability run by ZDNet, NT servers crashed an average of once 
every six weeks, the GNU/Linux servers never went down -  Fitzgerald & Bassett (2003), p.19, 
citing David A. Wheeler, "Why Open Source Software/Free Software? Look at the numbers!", 
http://  www.dwheeler.com/oss_fs-why.html 23 April 2002.
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I have forty. ... [Ojpen source is something I can leverage... to give me a real 
economic advantage".50
Other related advantages include encouraging adoption of the developer's 
technology as an industry standard, thereby obtaining a competitive advantage 
in complementary markets; encouraging other developers to produce applica­
tions on your platforms (sometimes referred to as "capturing developer mind- 
share"); building goodwill; and gaining access to government procurement con­
tracts where the tender process stipulates a preference for open technologies.51 In 
Australia, federal legislation requiring consideration of open source software in 
decision-making concerning public agency procurement contracts has been pro­
posed in order to address concerns that "a small number of software manufactur­
ers have a disproportionate and restrictive hold on the supply, use and develop­
ment of software",52 concerns essentially the same as those described in chapter 
3 in relation to corporate tenure over data streams in biotechnology research and 
development.
Clearly, the range of commercial possibilities associated with any particular 
software program is affected by the developer's choice of licence, especially the 
choice between copyleft and non-copyleft licences (see section 5.4.4, p.129, and 
section 7.2.3, p.214). More generally, in relation to the commercial applications 
of open source software development, it is important to be aware that although 
open source is generally regarded as a proven development methodology within 
the software industry, many still question its long term significance and prospects 
of success in the marketplace.53 These issues are discussed further in chapter 
7 (section 7.3, p.218). For the present it is sufficient to note that the "proof of 
concept" for open source biotechnology is not tied to the ultimate success or even 
survival of open source software. The proof of concept for biotechnology is in 
biotechnology: open source software is not a rigid formula for success, but the 
basis for an analogy -  though it is a powerful analogy.
4.4 Open source as a licensing scheme
We saw in the previous section that the key features of open source licensing are 
the same as those of free software licensing (indeed, many licences, including 
the GPL, are on the approved lists of both the Free Software Foundation and the 
Open Source Initiative). Both types of licence ensure "the right of anyone, any­
where, for any reason, to copy, modify and (for free or for money) distribute the
50Yancy Lind, quoted in Rosen et al. (2003), p.53.
51 In the US, a recent study conducted on behalf of the Department of Defense concluded that 
open source had the potential for large direct and indirect cost savings for military systems re­
quiring large deployments of costly software products; similar considerations have driven gov­
ernments in Taiwan, Germany, China and Peru to adopt open source software for government 
use.Fitzgerald & Bassett (2003), p.16.
52Bassett & Suzor (2003), p.13.
53Rosen et al. (2003), p.54.
§4.4 Open source as a licensing scheme 77
software, and to have the source code that makes those other things possible".54 
However, the Open Source Definition (OSD) is somewhat more detailed than the 
Free Software Definition. In this section we look more closely at each of its crite­
ria; this dicussion will serve as a point of departure for an analysis (in chapter 5) 
of the feasibility of implementing open source licensing principles in the context 
of biotechnology research and development.
4.4.1 Elements of the Open Source Definition
1. Free redistribution
The first criterion in the OSD is that an open source licence must "not restrict any 
party from selling or giving away the software as a component of an aggregate 
software distribution containing programs from several different sources. The 
license shall not require a royalty or other fee for such sale."55 This means a 
user can make any number of copies of the software, and sell or give them away, 
without having to pay for that privilege.56 The Open Source Initiative website 
annotation of the OSD explains the rationale for this criterion: "[b]y constraining 
the license to require free redistribution, we eliminate the temptation to throw 
away many long-term gains in order to make a few short-term sales dollars. If 
we didn't do this, there would be lots of pressure for co-operators to defect."57
"The license shall not restrict any party from selling or giving away the soft- 
ware"/"The licence shall not require a royalty or other fee for such sale" An 
OSD-compliant licence need not prevent the licensor from charging a fee for ac­
cess to his or her technology.58 However, such a licence cannot allow the licensor 
to control the licensee's subsequent use of the technology either by prohibiting 
the exercise of any of the standard copyright rights (copy, modify, distribute) or 
by making the exercise of those rights conditional on the payment of a royalty or 
other fee to the licensor. In other words, under an OSD-compliant licence, once a 
user has been granted access to the technology (whether for free or for a price), he 
or she can exercise all the rights that would otherwise be exclusive to the owner 
without incurring any further obligations. As Lawrence Rosen puts it, "whatever 
they charge for, you only have to buy once".59
Although there is nothing in the OSD that prevents the charging of one-off 
fees, in practice the free (unrestricted) redistribution requirement means market 
pressure will tend to force the price of access to the technology down to the lowest
54Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
55This and all other references to the OSD in the remainder of this thesis are to The Open Source 
Definition (Version 1.9), available at http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.php, last ac­
cessed 21 December 2004.
56See Perens (1999).
57The Open Source Definition (version 1.9).
58Rosen et al. (2003), p.40.
59Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
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fee that any of the distributors chooses to charge -  which is often zero. Some dis­
tributors may be able to charge a higher price based on the value of their brand, 
but even in such a case the market will not bear as high a price as if every licensee 
had not been a potential distributor (because the price charged by any distribu­
tor can be undercut, even to the point of giving the software away gratis, by any 
other licensee).
As Rosen points out, the fact that the price of software itself tends toward 
zero under free and open source software licences does not exclude other ways 
of making money from software.60 As noted earlier, we will return to this issue 
in chapter 5, but one phenomenon not discussed elsewhere is worth noting: that 
of dual licensing. Technology obtained under an open source licence must be 
distributed under an open source licence (see criterion 7 of the OSD, below), and 
an ordinary licensee normally has no legal right to distribute it in any other way. 
But the developer of new technology can licence the same technology under both 
proprietary and open source licences. For example, the GPL requires a licensee to 
licence derivative works under the GPL, but doesn't prevent him or her from also 
licensing the same technology under a proprietary licence which permits charg­
ing a conventional licence fee, perhaps to a commercial entity that does not want 
to have to conform to the GPL in its turn. Charging for code that is available for 
free is a surprisingly common way for open source developers to make money.61
"Shall not restrict" Some types of restrictions on redistribution are in fact per­
missible in free and open source licences. For example, copyleft is itself a restric­
tion on redistribution, also known as a reach-through provision. Ffowever, this 
restriction is considered acceptable because it protects rather than conflicts with 
the central freedoms of free and open source software.62 Similarly, rules about 
how to package a modified version are acceptable if they do not effectively block 
users' freedom to release modified versions, as are some rules to the effect that 
if a program is released in one form it must be released in another form also in 
order to enhance accessibility; it is also acceptable for a licence to require that a 
user who has distributed a modified version must provide a copy of that version 
to any previous developer on request.63
"Selling or giving away" Lawrence Rosen has commented that this phrase is 
badly worded, and has recommended that it be amended to read, "the licence 
must permit anyone to distribute copies or derivative works free or for a price"
60Rosen et al. (2003), p.39.
61 Bill Lard, in Rosen et al. (2003), p.61. Note, however, that dual licences become difficult to 
administer in relation to software programs that have been developed by more than one pro­
grammer because redistributing under multiple licences requires the co-operation of all the au­
thors: see http://openacs.org/about/licensing/open-source-licensing, last accessed 16 Novem­
ber 2004.
62Free Software Foundation, "The Free Software Definition" http://www.gnu.org/ 
philosophy/free-sw.html.
63 Ibid.
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(or something to the same effect).64 Presumably the new wording would elimi­
nate any confusion between distributing copies of software and alienating intel­
lectual property rights to the software itself.
"As a component of an aggregate software distribution" This phrase is an his­
torical artefact originally intended to plug a loophole in the Artistic Licence, a 
licence originally designed for the programming language Perl (very commonly 
used in bioinformatics software). Most programs that use this licence are now 
also available under the GPL, so this phrase is no longer needed and may dis­
appear from future versions of the OSD.65 The essential meaning of this criterion 
would be unaltered if this phrase were simply replaced by the words "the soft­
ware".66
2. Source code
The second criterion in the Open Source Definition is that an open source licence 
must require that users be given access to the source code for a licensed program, 
and "must allow distribution in source code as well as compiled form. Where 
some form of a product is not distributed with source code, there must be a well- 
publicised means of obtaining the source code for no more than a reasonable 
reproduction cost -  preferably, downloading via the Internet without charge. The 
source code must be the preferred form in which a programmer would modify 
the program. Deliberately obfuscated source code is not allowed. Intermediate 
forms such as the output of a preprocessor or translator are not allowed."67 The 
following rationale is given on the Open Source Initiative website: "We require 
access to un-obfuscated source code because you can't evolve programs without 
modifying them. Since our purpose is to make evolution easy, we require that 
modification be made easy."68
"Source code" As we saw earlier, source code is a necessary preliminary for the 
modification of a program.69 In an effort to counter the public relations effects 
of the open source movement, some proprietary software companies have begun 
providing access to source code. However, in the open source context, access to 
source code is not an end in itself, but a necessary precondition to the exercise of 
other user rights.70
"The program must include source code. Where some form of a product is not 
distributed with source code, there must be a means of obtaining the source
64Lawrence Rosen, personal communication. 
65Perens (1999).
66Lawrence Rosen, personal communication. 
67The Open Source Definition (Version 1.9).
68 Ibid.
69Perens (1999).
70Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
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code" Note that open source licences do not require a user who simply copies 
or modifies the licensed software for his or her own use to make the source code 
publicly available. This obligation arises only if the licensee chooses to distrib­
ute -  not simply develop and use -  a copy or modified version of the original 
program:
[T]he best example I've heard is the US military using open source 
software to do some of the targeting control on some of their gunships.
There was this big issue of well, do they need to release the source 
code? The answer... is no, because they are not making available their 
program to the public. That is their program. They took the source 
and they are using it for their own purposes.71
Licences that require too much of users in this respect have been rejected by 
the Open Source Initiative. For example, a well-known company proposed a li­
cence for some of its software that required anyone who made improvements 
to the code to disclose those improvements to the company. This requirement 
was considered unacceptable because it was not restricted to software distribu­
tions, but also applied to modifications intended for in-house use; even though 
in-house use might involve issuing the modified program to hundreds of thou­
sands of employees, it is not a "distribution" of the software.72
The requirement to provide source code can be met in various ways under 
different licences. For example, the GPL requires that if the source code is not 
distributed with the executable program, it must be made available to anyone 
who requests it for three more years. One way to meet this requirement is to keep 
the information on the Internet where it can be indexed by search engines: "this 
way, people can access the information without bothering you" . 73 Interestingly, 
some open source licences do not in fact meet the requirement of obliging on- 
licensing users to make the source code publicly available (one example is the 
Berkeley Software Distribution or "BSD" licence, which does not include a clear 
definition of source code). The explanation is that the OSD came into existence 
after certain licences were already in use and those licences were "grandfathered 
in" to the approved list.74
"Preferred form in which a programmer would modify the program" Given 
the obligation to provide source code in the preferred form in which a program-
71 Drew Endy, personal communication.
72Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
73Bruce Perens, personal communication. For example, clause 3 of Version 1.0 of the Open Soft­
ware Licence reads: "Licensor hereby agrees to provide a machine-readable copy of the Source 
Code of the Original Work along with each copy of the Original Work that Licensor distributes. 
Licensor reserves the right to satisfy this obligation by placing a machine-readable copy of the 
Source Code in an information repository reasonably calculated to permit inexpensive and con­
venient access by You for as long as Licensor continues to distribute the Original Work, and by 
publishing the address of that information repository in a notice immediately following the copy­
right notice that applies to the Original Work."
74Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
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mer would modify the program, the question arises how to determine what is the 
preferred form. One of the clearest definitions of source code in an open source 
licence is in clause 3 of the Open Software Licence: "'Source Code' means the 
preferred form of the Original Work for making modifications to it and all avail­
able documentation describing how to access and modify the Original Work."75 
However, as the author of this licence explains:
I'm not talking about documentation in general. People must have 
the right to sell proprietary documentation for open source software.
That doesn't mean the documentation itself becomes open source. If I 
write a book that tells people how to do Linux, I can do that and sell 
it and I don't have to release that book under an open source licence.
But if it is documentation on how to modify the work, that they have 
to provide. So if it is documentation explaining how to change the 
program and create a derivative work, if I write such documentation 
for my software that says, "If you want to do that here's how to change 
the source code", then that's relevant documentation. Not putting that 
out is like obscuring the source code.76
"Deliberately obfuscated source code is not allowed" As the stipulation that 
source code must be in its "preferred form" implies, it is possible to obfuscate 
source code. In fact, there exists at least one program that takes source code and 
removes all the spaces and new lines so that the reader is left with a block of 
code that is almost indecipherable.77 Obfuscation, is hard to prove, but anecdotal 
evidence suggests that users generally comply with this term; if a dispute reached 
the point of litigation, presumably it would be possible in the discovery process 
for a litigant to ask to see the software owner's employees using the code in the 
form in which it has been made publicly available.78
3. Derived works
The third criterion in the Open Source Definition is that an open source licence 
must "allow modifications and derived works, and must allow them to be dis­
tributed under the same terms as the license of the original software."79 The ex­
planation for this criterion is that "the mere ability to read source isn't enough 
to support independent peer review and rapid evolutionary selection. For rapid 
evolution to happen, people need to be able to experiment with and redistribute 
modifications."80 Note that in order to comply with the OSD a licence must al­
low, but need not require, modified works to be distributed under the same terms
75Version 1.0, dated 9/25/2002.
76Lawrence Rosen, personal communication. 
77Bruce Perens, personal communication.
78Bruce Perens, personal communication. 
79The Open Source Definition (Version 1.9). 
80Ibid.
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as the original software. As mentioned earlier, open source licences vary in this 
respect: the GPL does contain a copyleft provision, while the BSD licence does 
not.
The open source community has experienced some problems with the concept 
of derivative works in open source licences, attributed by community leaders to 
two factors. The first is that the definition of derivative works in copyright law is 
unsatisfactory in relation to software. Discussion of this point with community 
leaders highlighted an interesting corollary of the use of copyleft licences to pre­
serve ongoing access to evolving software code: because copyleft is technically 
an exercise of a copyright owner's exclusive rights, a victory in the proprietary 
campaign for stronger copyright may actually reinforce copyleft freedoms (de­
pending on what actions are taken to constitute infringement). While this means 
the copyleft mechanism is very robust, it can also create some tension for propo­
nents of free and open source software. For example, Galoob v. Nintendo was a 
well known 1992 case in the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which 
established the rights of users to modify copyrighted works for their own use.81 
Galoob manufactured a product which allowed users to modify video games, in­
cluding games sold by Nintendo, so as to make the user's character invincible. 
Nintendo sued Galoob, arguing that its product created derivative works that in­
fringed Nintendo's copyright in its games. The Court held that Galoob's product 
did not create a derivative work because it did not directly modify the Nintendo 
software, but worked by modifying a data location in the game. The sentiment 
expressed by the district court -  that "having paid Nintendo a fair return, the 
consumer may experiment with the product and create new variations of play, 
for personal enjoyment, without creating a derivative work" -  is broadly consis­
tent with the open source position. However, in practice the Nintendo case has 
sometimes been invoked in order to legitimate the sidestepping of obligations 
relating to derivative works under the GPL.82
The second factor that causes uncertainty with respect to derivative works 
is that not all open source licences incorporate established legal terminology. 
Lawrence Rosen has described the GPL as "extremely vague about what you 
are really entitled to do", noting that among users of open source software ex­
pressions such as "derivative work", "work based on the work" and "combined 
works" convey different meanings to different people even though they are com­
monly assumed to refer to clear and distinct categories:
[I]n my licences I say, "You have the right to create a derivative 
work". What is a derivative work? Well, go to the court, look at the 
cases. You can talk about static and dynamic linkage -  but a court is 
not going to deal with that, just because you in your public writings 
have defined those extra terms. No, the court is going to look at the 
four corners of the contract and say, "What the hell did you intend?"83
81 Louis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d (9th Cir. 1992). 
82Bruce Perens, personal communication.
83Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
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Even apart from uncertainty over the definition of a "derivative work", some 
software authors are wary of the open source requirement to allow modifications 
and derivative works to be distributed under the same terms as the original soft­
ware, either because they are concerned about the integrity of the work and the 
effect of modifications on their reputations as programmers, or because they are 
concerned about modifications being made to serve criminal purposes. The first 
of these concerns is essentially a question of moral rights and is at least partially 
dealt with in the fourth paragraph of the OSD (see below). The second is based 
on a common misunderstanding about the function of a licence agreement: no 
licence has any valid existence outside an existing legal framework, and the use 
of software to commit crimes is covered by applicable criminal law without any 
need for a specific provision in the licence itself.84
4. Integrity of the author's source code
The fourth criterion in the Open Source Definition is that an open source licence 
"may restrict source code from being distributed in modified form only if the li­
cense allows the distribution of 'patch files' with the source code for the purpose 
of modifying the program at build time. The license must explicitly permit dis­
tribution of software built from modified source code. The license may require 
derived works to carry a different name or version number from the original soft­
ware."
The rationale for this requirement is to permit a software author to enforce a 
separation between his or her own work and modifications that, if perceived to be 
part of that work, might reflect poorly on the original author.85 Thus, though an 
open source licence must guarantee the availability of source code, it may require 
that the source code be distributed as unmodified base sources plus patches so 
that modifications can be readily identified.86 Programs that automatically merge 
patches into the main source can be run when extracting a source package, so 
such a requirement need not make any practical difference to users, although 
some may consider it inelegant; popular Linux distributions like Debian and Red 
Hat use this procedure for modifications to their versions of Linux.87
5. No discrimination against persons or groups
The fifth criterion in the Open Source Definition is that an open source licence 
must not discriminate against any person or group of persons.88 The reasoning 
behind this requirement is the same as that described in chapters 2 and 3: that "in 
order to get the maximum benefit from the process, the maximum diversity of 
persons and groups should be equally eligible to contribute to open sources."89
84Perens (1999).
85Perens (1999).
86The Open Source Definition (Version 1.9). 
87Perens (1999).
88The Open Source Definition (Version 1.9). 
89Ibid.
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Export restrictions In explaining this requirement, the Open Source Initiative 
website notes that some countries, including the United States, have export re­
strictions for certain types of software. An OSD-compliant license may warn li­
censees of applicable restrictions and remind them that they are obliged to obey 
the law, but it may not incorporate such restrictions itself.90 This requirement 
avoids imposing extra constraints on activities and people outside the relevant 
jurisdiction through the terms of the licence itself.91
Other restrictions on distribution of software to persons or groups Apart from 
government export restrictions, some software licences attempt to forbid distri­
bution to people or groups outside jurisdictions with a certain standard of intel­
lectual property protection. Such licences do not comply with the OSD, even if 
the reason for the restriction is to ensure that copyleft provisions can be enforced. 
One example of a licence that fails to comply with this aspect of the OSD even 
though it is in many other respects an open source licence is the Sun Community 
Licence.92
Examples of other restrictions that are prohibited under the OSD include re­
strictions based on political criteria. For example, a licence provided by the Uni­
versity of California during the time of apartheid in South Africa prohibited an 
electronic design program from being used by South African police. This pro­
hibition made little sense after apartheid broke down, but users whose software 
was acquired under that licence must still apply this restriction to distributions 
of derivative works .93
6. No discrimination against fields of endeavour
The sixth criterion in the Open Source Definition is that an open source licence 
"must not restrict anyone from making use of the program in a specific field of 
endeavor. For example, it may not restrict the program from being used in a 
business, or from being used for genetic research . " 94 As with the prohibition on 
territorial and other restrictions discussed in the previous section, the motiva­
tion behind this criterion is that maximum diversity of participants in software 
development is desirable; even though participation may be regulated in other 
ways, the authors of the OSD took the view that it should not be controlled by 
open source licences themselves. Bruce Perens, primary author, gives two specific 
reasons. The first is that open source licences should be useful for commercial 
purposes because there is "little incentive for anyone to develop software for aca­
demic use only" . 95 The second reason to avoid restrictions on field of use was to
90Ibid.
91Free Software Foundation, "The Free Software Definition", http://www.gnu.org/ 
philosophy/free-sw.html; Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
92Bonaccorsi & Rossi (2003), p.1249.
93Perens (1999); Bruce Perens, personal communication.
94The Open Source Definition (Version 1.9).
95According to the Open Source Initiative website, "[t]he major intention of this clause is to 
prohibit license traps that prevent open source from being used commercially. We want commer-
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forestall controversy within the developer community over politically sensitive 
applications of open source software:
I foresaw that type of thing just getting in the way... . I just did not 
want to see, for example, pro-choice software and pro-life software... .
I decided allowing everything was less complicated and would be of 
more benefit overall.96
7. Distribution of licence
The seventh criterion in the Open Source Definition is that under an open source 
licence, "rights attached to the program must apply to all to whom the program 
is redistributed without the need for execution of an additional license by those 
parties."97
This requirement raises the question whether open source software licences 
are technically contracts or merely copyright permissions: the latter can be uni­
lateral, but formation of a contract requires acceptance on the part of the licensee 
and it is therefore doubtful whether automatic, no-signature-required licences 
can incorporate contractual obligations (such as an obligation to provide source 
code when distributing derived works). This issue -  which is closely linked with 
the questions of how to achieve a proper manifestation of assent in relation to 
a contractual licence and the degree to which the method used can be dictated 
by an open source licence, dealt with below in connection with paragraph 10 of 
the OSD -  is the subject of considerable controversy within the free and open 
source software community and has not yet been the subject of an authoritative 
pronouncement by the courts. The arguments on both sides are essentially prag­
matic.
The disadvantage from the open source perspective of a contractual approach 
is that a contract allows the imposition of a wider range of restrictions on the 
use of the technology, which means "there are many possible ways such a licence 
could be unacceptably restrictive and non-free".98 In addition, contract terms are 
arguably more costly to enforce because of variations in contract law from one 
jurisdiction to another; if the licence is characterised as a copyright permission, 
it is subject to copyright law -  harmonised under the Berne Convention and, in 
the United States, codified in a federal statute. On the other hand, it is argued, 
the inclusion of quintessential^ contractual provisions such as a disclaimer of 
warranty and the requirement to publish source code does not sit easily with the 
argument that the GPL is a mere copyright permission. Further, characterising
cial users to join our community, not feel excluded from it."; The Open Source Definition (Version 
1.9).
96Bruce Perens, personal communication. Elsewhere, Perens has commented that although he 
believes political arguments belong on the floor of Congress, not in software licences, this view is 
itself controversial: Perens (1999).
97The Open Source Definition (Version 1.9).
98Free Software Foundation, "The Free Software Definition", http://www.gnu.org/ 
philosophy/free-sw.html: The Free Software Definition.
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the licence as a contract would mean that any licensee -  not just the author or his 
or her assignee -  would have standing to enforce its terms." Rosen describes the 
Open Software Licence as the GPL rewritten as a contract: "I took the concepts 
of the GPL and what it intended to accomplish, and rewrote it as a contract and 
then I added the provisions that copyright law could not deal with. ... [This 
way] I have the advantage of being able to save that contract no matter what 
the governing law is [by adding] provisions that say the licensor's jurisdiction 
sets the venue and jurisdiction -  he or she is giving you the software, if you do 
something illegal with it you have to deal with that in his or her courts."100 The 
debate over whether the GPL is a contract or a licence permission is not, however, 
of sufficient relevance in the biotechnology context to be discussed in any detail 
here. For a discussion of issues relating to translating copyleft principles into 
biotechnology licensing, see section 5.4.4, p.130.
8. Licence must not be specific to a product
The eighth criterion in the Open Source Definition is that the rights attached to 
licensed software "must not depend on the program's being part of a particular 
software distribution. If the program is extracted from that distribution and used 
or distributed within the terms of the program's license, all parties to whom the 
program is redistributed should have the same rights as those that are granted in 
conjunction with the original software distribution."101
This criterion is intended to prevent licensors from tying open source-style 
freedoms to a particular product, for example by specifying that a product that is 
identified as open source is only free if it is used with a particular brand of Linux 
distribution: the product must remain free even if it is separated from the rest of 
the software "package" it came in.102
9. Licence must not restrict other software
The ninth criterion in the Open Source Definition is that an open source licence 
"must not place restrictions on other software that is distributed along with the li­
censed software. For example, the license must not insist that all other programs 
distributed on the same medium must be open-source software."103 The Open 
Source Initiative website annotation explains that distributors of open source soft­
ware have the right to make their own choices about their own software, and 
points out that the GPL complies with this requirement because software only 
inherits (or is "infected" with) the GPL if the two programs form a single work, 
not if they are merely distributed together.104
"Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
100Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
101 The Open Source Definition (Version 1.9).
102Perens (1999).
103The Open Source Definition (Version 1.9).
104Ibid. This is the distinction between aggregation (two programs being included on the same 
CD-ROM) and derivation (one program incorporates part of another program into itself): Perens
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10. Licence must be technology neutral
The tenth and final criterion in the Open Source Definition is that "no provision 
of [an open source] licence may be predicated on any individual technology or 
style of interface.105
As discussed earlier, at least some open source licences operate as contracts 
and therefore cannot come into existence without a "meeting of the minds" be­
tween licensor and licensee. Case law indicates, though not conclusively, that 
in the case of software that is physically distributed (for example on a boxed 
CD-ROM), a licensee accepts the relevant licence conditions by opening the pro­
gram's shrink-wrap, even if the licence is not readable before the wrapping is 
removed .106 However, in the case of digitally distributed software, mere down­
loading is not sufficient, and case law suggests that the licensee must "plainly 
manifest consent" in a click-wrap agreement.107
As the Open Source Initiative website points out, licence provisions mandat­
ing "click-wrap" assent may conflict with important methods of software distri­
bution such as FTP download, CD-ROM anthologies, and web mirroring; such 
provisions may also hinder code re-use. Redistribution of the software may take 
place over non-Web channels that do not support click-wrapping of the down­
load; similarly, licensed code (or re-used portions of such code) may run in a 
non-GUI environment that cannot support popup dialogues.108 Therefore, other 
ways for the licensee to manifest assent must be allowed under open source li­
cences. Lawrence Rosen elaborates:
If there is a contract, there must be a mechanism for the man­
ifestation of assent. But you cannot, within the constraints of the 
Open Source Defintion, impose technical constraints on the creators 
of derivative works; you must leave them free to do whatever they 
want. ... If I require clickwrap and then reimplement or create a deriv­
ative work where there is nothing to click, the licence doesn't apply, 
so you are limiting the evolution of the software. So what I say in the 
licence is that it must contain a manifestation of assent, and let them 
figure out how to do it .109
(1999).
105The Open Source Definition (Version 1.9).
106Judge John Vittone, Chair, American Bar Association Working Group Report on 
the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) http://www.abanet.org/ 
ucita/report-on.ucita.pdf, January 31, 2002. Note that the enforceability of such a licence may 
depend on the fairness of the provision sought to be enforced.
107Fitzgerald & Bassett (2003), p.33.
108The Open Source Definition (Version 1.9).
109Lawrence Rosen, personal communication. Note that in practice, some open source software 
can be accessed without the user having to accept the terms of the relevant licence in a formal 
click-through process: James (2003), pp83-84. In fact, under clause 5 of the GPL, the licensee is 
taken to have assented to the licence conditions whenever he or she modifies or distributes the 
licensed program or any work based on the program, ostensibly removing the need for any other 
manifestation of assent. (Although courts might not regard this as sufficiently unambiguous to
88 An introduction to open source
4.4.2 Specific open source licences
A spectrum of freedoms
Existing open source software licences lie at different points along a spectrum 
characterised by the amount of freedom given to licensees, and conversely the 
amount of freedom the copyright owner retains with respect to how he or she 
can make money from the software (discussed further in chapter 7). Any soft­
ware author who wants to follow an open source licensing strategy must strike an 
appropriate balance between these two priorities. It is self-evident that software 
authors and their employers will value their own freedom to sell or lease their 
products in any way they choose. But freedom for users is also a priority for the 
software owner because use of an open source licence to encourage collaborative 
development relies on providing sufficient user access to the code, and sufficient 
freedom in the way it may be used, to facilitate and motivate contributions to its 
improvement.
There is a norm within the open source software community against prolifer­
ation of licences, so although it is always possible to write an entirely new licence 
that is perfectly tailored to a software owner's purposes, it is expected that licen­
sors will model their chosen licence as closely as possible upon an existing licence 
that has been accepted within the community and is demonstrably workable.110 It 
is therefore necessary when considering an open source strategy to decide what is 
important in a licence and identify which of the key existing licences comes clos­
est to striking the appropriate balance between freedom for users and freedom 
for owners. For example, some licences mandate that source code for modifica­
tions must be made available to the community as a whole, while others allow 
modifications to be appropriated; some licences allow users to merge the licensed 
program with their own proprietary software, while others prohibit mixing with 
non-free or open source software; some licences contain special privileges for the 
original copyright holder over modifications made by other contributors; and 
finally, as mentioned in section 4.4.1 above (p.78), it is possible to dual-license a 
single program, so that customers have the option of buying commercial-licensed 
versions that are not open source.* 111
If we imagine a spectrum bounded by no licence at all at one extreme -  that 
is, straight-out donation to the public domain (in the biotechnology context, this 
would be achieved by simple publication) -  and standard proprietary licences at 
the other, the open source licence that lies closest to the public domain end (max­
imum freedom for users) is the Berkeley Software Distribution Licence (the BSD) 
and other BSD-style licences such as X and Apache. The BSD licence was orig­
inally developed to release non-commercial software developed as a byproduct
establish a contractual relationship, as discussed earlier the GPL is arguably not a contract, so the 
practical importance of this is unclear.)
noBrian Behlendorf, personal communication; the discussion that follows draws on Behlendorf 
(1999). For a detailed comparison of the characteristics of frequently used open source licences, 
see Fitzgerald & Bassett (2003), Table 1, pp.22-29.
111 Bill Lard, in Rosen et al. (2003), p.61.
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of university research; it continues the academic tradition of insisting on proper 
credit for contributors, but imposes no real restrictions on use of the licensed soft­
ware.
Such a licence, of course, leaves room for proprietary strategies that free ride 
on contributions released under the BSD without contributing their own im­
provements back into the commons. This need not necessarily be a serious disin­
centive to developer contributions, especially in the biotechnology context, where 
(in principle if not always in practice) publication can block downstream appro­
priation by creating prior art.112 However, historically such proprietary strategies 
have been perceived by many software developers as an abuse. As we have seen, 
the GPL is designed explicitly to prevent this abuse by insisting that enhance­
ments, derivatives and tools that incorporate the technique are also released un­
der the GPL. As Behlendorf points out, this essentially eliminates the option of 
making money through software value-adding, but the GPL could still be used as 
a competitive weapon to establish a platform that discourages competitive plat­
forms from being created and protects the original developer's position as the 
leading provider of products and services that sit upon this platform. Behlendorf 
also notes that the GPL could be used for business purposes as a technology sen­
tinel, with a non-GPLed version of the same tool available for a price (using dual 
licences).113
Further towards the proprietary end of the spectrum (maximum freedom for 
original intellectual property owners, fewer freedoms for users) lies the Mozilla 
Public Licence, or MPL; yet further on lies the Netscape Public Licence, or NPL. 
Like the GPL, the MPL requires that changes be released under the same licence, 
therefore making them available back to the development community. The NPL 
was developed by Netscape for open sourcing the Navigator Web browser, and 
contains special privileges that apply to Netscape, specifically the ability to re­
licence modifications authored by other contributors under a closed licence. The 
NPL experience highlights the risks to building an effective developer commu­
nity associated with a licence that retains too many rights to appropriate contri­
butions in the hands of a corporate sponsor; we return to this point in a later 
chapter (section 7.2.4, page 215).114
Multiple licences attached to a single technology
As in the biotechnology context where multiple owners control complementary 
intellectual assets, different licences may apply to different modules within a sin­
gle program. For example, Red Hat Linux consists of about 2,800 modules,115 and 
by one calculation, there are more than 17 licence types represented among them: 
about 65% are licensed under the GPL or Lesser GPL; about 17% are licensed un­
der the MIT licence or its close relative the BSD; nearly 7% are licensed under
112I am indebted to one of my (anonymous) thesis examiners for suggesting this clarification. 
113Behlendorf (1999).
114I am indebted to the same examiner for this point and form of words.
115Rosen et al. (2003), p.4.
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the MPL; others have been released into the public domain.116 The application 
of a mixture of licences to different parts of a single program can lead to trans­
action costs, especially for commercial players, relating to the need to identify 
which licence applies to which portions of the code; the difficulty of providing 
for click-wrap or other execution of two or more licences for one product based 
on collaboratively developed code; and different maintenance or warranty oblig­
ations applying to different portions of the code.117
The GPL: backbone of the open source movement
The GPL is by far the most commonly used open source licence -  the "backbone 
of the open source movement".118 As we saw earlier, the "viral" (or "inherited") 
nature of this licence -  that is, the imposition through copyleft provisions of recip­
rocal obligations on authors of derived works -  is its most striking feature.
Viral nature of the GPL Contrary to common fears, merely running software 
together with code licensed under the GPL does not "infect" that software: for 
ordinary users of binary programs, including commercial users, the GPL poses 
no unusual legal problems. Similarly, as noted above, users who modify code 
licensed under the GPL to meet the needs of their own organisation or its con­
trolled subsidiaries are not required to distribute modifications or disclose sources; 
there is therefore no danger to any related trade secrets.119 On the other hand, as 
we saw earlier, users who redistribute modified or unmodified sources, whether 
for profit or otherwise, must do so under the terms of the GPL, although even 
in such a case the option of using the Lesser GPL (mentioned above, p. 89) may 
apply to permit combining or linking of code licensed under the GPL with other 
software in such a way that no derived work is created and the aggregate soft­
ware is not subject to either the GPL or the Lesser GPL.120
Borderline cases do exist: enforcement of the GPL may sometimes be tricky 
because, as discussed in section 4.4.1 (p. 81), the boundary lines of derived works 
in software are still somewhat uncertain. Although the general term is defined 
in copyright law, there have not been many cases elucidating exactly what con­
stitutes infringement via creation of derived works. According to Webbink, the 
hardest cases are those in which an open source operating system has to be mod­
ified in order to allow proprietary applications to function; the resulting link be­
tween the operating system and the proprietary application is close enough to 
suggest that they may in fact be one program, not two, which would mean the 
GPL could apply to the proprietary application.121 Rosen suggests that another 
difficult question is whether a manufacturer of hardware such as microchips or
116Webbink (2003), p.68. 
117James (2003). 
118Webbink (2003), p.6 
119Ibid„ p.7.
120Ibid., p.8.
121Ibid.
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TV set-top boxes who embeds a GPL-licensed program in the hardware together 
with proprietary software is bound by the reciprocal obligations of the GPL, even 
though there is no interface to allow a user to modify the embedded code.122
This uncertainty may be a problem for a commercial licensor if there is third 
party technology tied up in its products; this issue is discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter. For now, note that community expectations are relevant to 
interpretation of the law relating to derived works. Fitzgerald makes the point 
as follows. According to case law, in order to establish whether a later work 
infringes copyright in an original work, the copyright owner must usually prove 
that the derivative use was not customary or reasonably expected, and that the 
owner was thereby denied an opportunity for compensation. But in the free and 
open source software world, developers know that the making of a derivative 
work is customary, and further, do not generally seek compensation for use of the 
original work in the creation of a derived work, but rather specific performance 
-  that is, publication of the source code of the derived work.123
In addition to genuine uncertainty surrounding the creation of derived works 
in the software field, "FUD" -  that is, "fear, uncertainty and doubt" deliberately 
circulated by organisations whose commercial interests are threatened by the 
spread of free and open source software licensing -  also exists. This is relevant 
to the feasibility of translating open source licensing strategies into the biotech­
nology context because, while genuine uncertainty might be overcome through 
careful drafting of biotechnology licences, FUD may still have a strong enough 
effect to frustrate efforts to get such licences adopted. We will touch again on this 
issue in chapter 7.
Court interpretations of the GPL So far there have been no definitive court in­
terpretations of the GPL (though there have been some obiter dicta to the effect 
that the GPL is an effective licence intended to restrict the manner in which soft­
ware is distributed).124
The fact that the GPL has never been challenged in court is sometimes seen as 
a weakness, but could equally be regarded as evidence of the licence's durabil­
ity. Given the hostility of some software industry players towards free and open 
source licensing, there is always the possibility of an intentional violation aimed 
at having the GPL declared invalid. It has been argued that, at least to the extent 
that the GPL is a copyright permission and not a contract, this strategy would 
backfire because if the licence were found to be invalid the violator would auto­
matically be in breach of copyright. However, even if this were so, any player 
prepared to adopt an endgame strategy could still do considerable damage.
An example of such a threat is the current litigation between the SCO Group 
(previously Caldera Systems and Caldera International) and IBM.125 SCO claims
122Rosen et al. (2003), p.44; James (2003), p.73. 
123Fitzgerald & Bassett (2003), p.33.
124 Webb ink (2003), p.10.
125Bassett & Suzor (2003), p.126.
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that by a series of corporate acquisitions reaching back to the original owner, 
AT&T, it is the owner of the software program UNIX, including code that was 
used to develop the Linux kernel. In its amended complaint, SCO seeks US $3 
billion in damages, alleging that by copying or adapting code into Linux, IBM 
breached the terms and conditions contained in several licences relating to UNIX 
System V source code. SCO also alleges that IBM engaged in unfair competition 
in aiding development of Linux and that it misappropriated SCO's trade secrets 
relating to methods of running a UNIX based system on Intel processors in or­
der to further development of the Linux kernel. In a counterclaim, IBM alleges 
that SCO breached its licence terms by purporting to terminate IBM's perpetual 
and irrevocable UNIX rights, that it has publicly misrepresented the legitimacy 
of IBM's Linux-related products and services in contravention of trademark leg­
islation, and that it has also infringed four of IBM's software patents. In addition, 
IBM alleges that SCO has breached its obligation under the GPL (which it in­
curred by distributing Linux products) not to assert proprietary rights over Linux 
source code.
In connection with this litigation, SCO has announced that it plans to charge 
licence fees for commercial use of GNU/Linux systems.126 Even though the open 
source community generally reject's SCO's allegations,127 this claim has the po­
tential to slow the uptake of open source software by corporations. The issue 
of the commercial appeal of open source software is dealt with in more detail in 
chapter 7; in the present context the relevance of the litigation is that if it proceeds 
to completion it may generate precedents on several issues that are currently un­
certain in relation to the GPL, including classification of the GPL as a licence or 
a contract, discussed earlier; revocability of rights under the GPL -  according to 
the FSF, software freedoms are not real if the developer of the software can revoke 
the licence without the user giving cause;128 and enforceability.
4.5 Conclusion: the promise of open source
The previous chapter argued that the recent proliferation of intellectual property 
rights in biotechnology has caused a number of problems that could be at least 
partly resolved if industry participants and would-be participants had access to 
an unencumbered and affordable development toolkit. In this chapter we have 
seen that a mechanism for generating such a toolkit -  that is, open source licens­
ing and development -  already exists in the software context. Open source is a 
strategy that has an extremely low barrier to entry: it can be adopted unilaterally 
by any industry participant, from an individual developer through to a major 
multinational firm. This strategy has been used to harness the innovative energy 
of large numbers of independent thinkers, in accordance with theories of opti-
126 Ibid.
127See, for example, Moglen (2003).
128Free Software Foundation, "The Free Software Definition", http://www.gnu.org/ 
philosophy/free-sw.html.
§4.5 Conclusion: the promise o f open source 93
mal scientific production discussed in chapter 2, but -  importantly, in the current 
environment of declining public funding for research and development -  is not 
incompatible with commercial technology development.
The remainder of this thesis assesses the feasibility of transplanting the open 
source model into a biotechnology context as a partial solution to the problems 
canvassed in chapter 3. Chapter 5 explores whether open source licensing princi­
ples could be implemented outside the software sphere, in biotechnology. Chap­
ter 6 outlines an analytical framework that allows us to generalise the principles 
of open source technology development, then presents a systematic survey of 
how these principles could be expected to operate in biotechnology research and 
development. Chapter 7 considers the commercial possibilities of open source 
biotechnology, including the likely impact on the industry if an open source strat­
egy came to be widely adopted, and presents evidence of the seeds of an open 
source biotechnology movement already in existence.
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Chapter 5
Biotechnology and open source 
licensing
5.1 Introduction
In chapters 2 and 3 we saw that intellectual property rights are increasingly used 
to restrict access to and use of biotechnology-related innovations. We also saw 
that this practice raises the overall costs of participation in ongoing research and 
development, thereby reinforcing structural problems within the biotechnology 
industry that detract from the social value of technological innovation in this 
field. Chapter 4 described how similar problems have been at least partially 
resolved in the computer software industry through the adoption of an "open 
source" approach by some industry participants. In the remaining half of this 
thesis, we explore the possibility of translating the open source model into the 
biotechnology context.
As we saw in chapter 4, "open source" is a broad term that simultaneously de­
notes a set of licensing criteria, a development methodology and a characteristic 
approach to the commercial exploitation of technological innovations. All are im­
portant aspects of the open source model, but open source licensing is fundamen­
tal because open source exploitation strategies rely on collaborative technology 
development, which in turn relies on licensing as a means of preventing defection 
from the collaborative effort. To a large extent, therefore, the feasibility of open 
source biotechnology depends on the "devil in the detail" of incorporating open 
source principles into biotechnology licences.
The binding power of an open source licence derives partly from the threat 
of legal enforcement and partly from the concrete articulation of terms of co­
operation among developers who interact within a network of ongoing business 
and other social relationships, so that departure from those terms carries a clear 
cost in terms of the erosion of economically valuable social capital. In order to 
be effective, therefore, an open source biotechnology licence would need to be 
both legally enforceable and accepted by members of the relevant development 
network.
This means that drafting a usable open source biotechnology licence would 
require not only the application of expertise in a range of highly technical areas, 
but also an iterative program of community consultation. Proposing a suite of
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model open source biotechnology licences is therefore beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Instead, my aim in the remainder of this chapter is to give the reader 
a sense both of the issues that would need to be resolved in creating workable 
open source licences in biotechnology, and of the process by which this might be 
achieved.
The chapter begins with a brief overview of conventional biotechnology li­
censing, necessary to place subsequent discussion in context. Next, I offer some 
ideas about the respective roles of technology developers, academic and prac­
tising lawyers and technology transfer professionals and corporate, government 
or philanthropic sponsors in developing functional open source biotechnology 
licences. The conclusion to this section suggests that the necessary process of it­
erative learning with respect to practical implementation of such licences could 
be accelerated by drawing on the experience of the open source software commu­
nity, embodied in the principles of the Open Source Definition (OSD). The final 
section reports selected results of a comparison of these principles with conven­
tional biotechnology licensing practice, conducted in order to determine whether 
open source biotechnology licensing would be broadly feasible and, if so, which 
areas would require most technical and community input. While these results are 
not claimed to be definitive, they may prove useful: so far as I am aware, this is 
the first time such a comparison has been systematically undertaken.
5.2 Conventional biotechnology licensing
By definition, licensing depends on the existence of proprietary rights. Three 
main types of proprietary or quasi-proprietary rights are relevant to biotechno­
logy licensing: statutory rights (patents and plant variety rights), trade secrets, 
and personal property.
Patents are the most important form of protection for biotechnology-related 
innovations. General classes of patent claims that are relevant to biotechnology 
inventions include ordinary process and product claims as well as new uses of 
known products -  a type of process claim -  and compositions or formulations of 
biological materials -  a type of product claim. Specific classes of patentable bio­
technology inventions include classical microbial technologies, "new" biotech­
nologies based on recombinant DNA (genetic engineering) or hybridoma (cell 
fusion) technology, and therapeutic molecules used as drugs .1
Despite increasing use of such patentable biotechnologies in plant breeding, 
classical methods continue to be relevant. This means a variety developed using 
patentable methods may be protected under both patent law and plant variety 
protection laws; thus, in the plant biotechnology context, licences typically deal 
with both types of property rights.2
In contrast with plant variety protection, trade secret protection cannot over­
lap with patent protection because trade secrecy and patent laws impose oppo-
1 World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), pp.27-29.
2Ibid., p.31.
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site obligations with respect to disclosure. However, trade secrecy can be used to 
protect peripheral information surrounding a patented invention or to protect the 
early stages of development of an invention that is expected to become patentable 
at a later stage. Thus, trade secrecy and patent protection often coexist in relation 
to a particular technology.
The category of personal property rights is particularly relevant to biological 
materials. The preferred legal mechanism for transferring physical materials in 
this context is bailment, defined as the delivery of personal chattels on trust, usu­
ally on a contract (express or implied) that the trust shall be duly executed and 
the chattels redelivered in either their original or altered form as soon as the time 
or use for which they were bailed has elapsed.3 In the case of biological materials, 
the obligation to return the goods is usually explicitly extended to progeny that 
is directly traceable to the original material (see below, section 5.4.4, p.127).
Biotechnology licensing is a multi-stage process. As we saw in chapter 3 (p. 
38), the search costs involved in locating a suitable licensee or licensor can be 
substantial. Once the parties have found each other, there may be several rounds 
of negotiation between first contact and final signature. The process is generally 
documented in both formal and informal instruments including confidentiality 
or non-disclosure agreements, material transfer agreements, option agreements, 
term sheets or memoranda of understanding and, increasingly, agreements to 
negotiate.4
The key negotiated terms of a typical biotechnology licence agreement include 
provisions dealing with definitions of licensed subject matter, allocation of rights 
in derivatives of and improvements to the licensed technology, the degree of ex­
clusivity of the licence (exclusive, sole or non-exclusive), field of use and territo­
rial restrictions, sublicensing rights, responsibility for maintenance and enforce­
ment of patents, warranties, indemnities and limitations of liability (especially in 
relation to infringement of any third party rights in the technology and in relation 
to product liability), regulatory approvals, term and termination of the licence 
and remuneration.5
In addition to these key terms, a typical biotechnology licence agreement will 
contain a number of formal clauses, as well as appendices or schedules (which 
may or may not be expressed to be an integral part of the agreement). Formal 
clauses may include an introductory provision, recitals, definitions and notices 
and execution clauses, together with "boilerplate" terms dealing with dispute 
resolution, force majeure, procedures for varying the agreement, termination, 
governing law, the exclusion of pre-contractual statements and confidentiality.6
A typical licence agreement incorporates provisions dealing with intellectual 
property rights and often also with trade secrets. Rights in personal property 
are usually transferred under a separate material transfer agreement (MTA). An
3Ibid., p.78.
4von Gavel (2001), pp.4-6.
5 Ibid., pp.67-94 passim.
6Ibid., pp.40-57 passim.
98 Biotechnology and open source licensing
MTA has two key functions.7 The first is to define the extent and purposes of 
the transfer. Biological materials are difficult to control from a legal perspective 
because of their inherent ability to replicate, to be transferred from one organism 
to another, to be combined with other substances, to exist in different forms, to 
be modified and to be used to generate completely different substances.8 Thus, 
an important task in defining the extent and purposes of the transfer of such ma­
terials is to distinguish between the original biological material and other related 
substances. The second key function of a material transfer agreement is to pro­
vide a technical description of the transferred materials sufficient to enable the 
recipient to practise the technology without having to invest substantial further 
resources in bringing the materials to a usable state. Both these functions are 
discussed further below (section 5.4.3, p.121; section 5.4.4, p.127).
5.3 Developing open source biotechnology licences
The material in this section, while based on discussions with interested industry 
participants, is not intended to be predictive or prescriptive. Rather, it is offered 
in support of the feasibility of open source biotechnology, as a demonstration that 
it is possible to envisage plausible solutions to the main problems that could be 
expected to arise in developing legally enforceable open source biotechnology 
licences that are acceptable to technology developers.
5.3.1 Licences must be accessible to technology developers
As we saw in the previous section, a typical biotechnology licence is a highly 
technical document, carefully drafted by specialists and incorporating a range 
of "boilerplate" provisions to deal with unexpected contingencies. By contrast, 
many open source software licences omit formal provisions that most lawyers 
would consider important.9
This informality is a cultural artefact of the particular institutional and histor­
ical setting in which open source licensing evolved. It is not so apparent in newer 
licences, and may eventually disappear altogether as open source software moves 
into the commercial mainstream and licences are scrutinised and overhauled by 
teams of corporate lawyers.
While careless or sloppy drafting of licence agreements is clearly undesirable, 
the informality of open source software licences has had some positive conse­
quences. Technical legal language and clauses dealing with issues that are not 
central to the transaction generally make a licence more difficult to read and un­
derstand and less widely applicable, though they may make it easier to enforce. 
The absence of such technicality has almost certainly contributed to the wide­
spread adoption of open source software licences. Thus:
7von Gavel (2001), p.8ff.
8Ibid.
9James (2003).
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The GNU GPL is designed so that you can easily apply it to your 
own program if you are the copyright holder. You don't have to mod­
ify the GNU GPL to do this, just add notices to your program which 
refer properly to the GNU GPL.10
By facilitating the direct involvement of technology users in formulating li­
cence terms, the simplicity of open source licences has also contributed to their 
evolution and fine-tuning as instruments that accurately reflect software authors' 
collective understanding of the terms of open source collaboration. Apart from 
the cost of obtaining professional advice, a lawyer's role in protecting his or her 
client from legal risk means lawyers tend to be conservative in their general out­
look. While the involvement of lawyers as norm entrepreneurs has been critical at 
various stages in the evolution of open source licensing,11 the necessity of involv­
ing lawyers or other licensing professionals in the everyday execution of licence 
agreements would have been a considerable hindrance.12
Thus, although there is no question that open source biotechnology licences 
would need to be properly and professionally drafted, past experience suggests 
that a successful open source licence must also be easy to use. Indeed, the adverse 
consequences of an overly technical approach to managing technology transfer 
are already evident in the biotechnology context. For example, recall from chap­
ter 3 (section 3.3.1, p.39) Eisenberg's description of a two-tiered pattern of ex­
changes of biotechnology research tools, in which technology transfer officials 
preside over formal legal agreements which are constantly undermined by infor­
mal exchanges among researchers.13
5.3.2 Model licences
One way to make open source biotechnology licences easier for technology de­
velopers to use would be to develop a suite of model licences. John Walsh et 
al., in their study of transaction costs in the biotechnology industry (see section 
3.3.2, p.42), suggest that development of standard contracts and templates may 
be helpful in diminishing the costs of adjustment to effective intellectual property 
management by industry participants.14 This approach has also been suggested 
in the context of negotiations to establish PIPRA (described in chapter 3, p.59) to 
counteract the possibility that introducing finer-tuned licensing practices might 
create more work for overstretched public sector technology transfer officials:
One [idea] is to create a common set of procedures, of licensing 
agreements and so on, and to have a common database that they can
10Free Software Foundation, "What is Copyleft?", http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/copyleft.html, 
last accessed 17 December 2004. 
n Stallman (1999).
12A norm entrepreneur is an individual or entity that seeks to promote or change a norm: Sun- 
stein (1996), p.909.
13Eisenberg (2001), pp.242-243.
14Walsh & Cohen (2003), p.333.
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use -  in other words, to provide resources that will allow them to do 
their job better. ... [We wouldn't be aiming for] one size fits all. But... 
once you have done one, it serves as a model for the next one.15
Walsh et al. further suggest that funding agencies such as the National Institutes 
of Health could play an important role in developing and encouraging the use of 
such standards. In the PIPRA case, this function is being performed by private 
philanthropies, primarily the Rockefeller Foundation; large corporations might 
assume a similar role, though in that case it would be important to ensure that 
smaller licensors are able to retain their independence.
While all such efforts are likely to be of some use, a certain degree of tech­
nicality is probably inevitable in biotechnology licensing due to the diversity of 
licensed subject-matter and the difficulty of imposing legal conditions on the use 
of living materials. For example, the National Institutes of Health Uniform Bio­
logical Material Transfer Agreement (UBMTA) -  a standard contract developed 
for exactly the reasons and in the manner suggested by Walsh et al.16 -  is re­
garded by many as too legalistic and more cumbersome even than previously 
existing institutional material transfer agreements; as a result, it has not been 
widely adopted.17
An additional difficulty in getting standard licences adopted in biotechno­
logy is that industry participants, especially commercial firms, are generally un­
willing to commit themselves to a particular licensing policy, preferring to make 
decisions on a case-by-case basis. This was the reason for the failure of Stanford 
University's "master MTAs" initiative, intended to reduce negotiation costs by 
creating a single default agreement for each private company that had frequent 
dealings with the university.18 A similar problem has arisen in the open source 
software context, where commercial players have been reluctant to make use of 
existing licences, instead creating their own and submitting them for certification 
to the Open Source Initiative. The proliferation of open source licences that are 
essentially minor variations on a theme -  sometimes referred to as "the combina­
torial problem" 19 -  is of great concern to community leaders:
Certification organisations are not allowed to discriminate; they 
lose their right to enforce the certification if they do. One of the prob­
lems that that has caused is that we have this ridiculous propagation 
of open source-approved licences. The really bad things about that
15Gary Toennissen, personal communication.
16On March 8, 1995, the NIH published the final version of the UBMTA for transfer of mate­
rials between non-profit institutions and an Implementing Letter for the Transfer of Biological 
Material: Uniform Biological Materials Transfer Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 12771 (March 8, 1995). 
The UBTMA allows signatory institutions to transfer materials to one another using a boilerplate 
Implementing Letter for the particular transfer, to be executed by the provider scientist and the 
recipient scientist.
17John Barton, personal communication; Kathy Ku, personal communication; see also Rai & 
Eisenberg (2003), p. 305.
18Kathy Ku, personal communication.
,9Brian Behlendorf, personal communication.
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are first, that they are incompatible with one another in their terms -  
which fragments the community, and is really awful, and second, that 
practitioners of the art [of programming] are not attorneys and we are 
now giving them the burden of having to understand a whole lot of 
different licences.20
If an open source certification program is considered desirable in the biotechno­
logy context, this problem could be avoided by adopting certification criteria re­
quiring newly certified licences to be both fully compatible with existing licences 
and substantially innovative. Such an approach would result in a smaller set of 
licences, each with its own clearly defined range of applications.21
The Creative Commons copyright licensing initiative has found solutions to 
both these problems -  irreducible technicality and diverse user needs -  that could 
be applied in the development of standard open source biotechnology licences. 
The problem of technicality is overcome in the Creative Commons model by the 
introduction of multiple layers within a single licence agreement:
The human readable form, the Commons Deed, [is] an icon that 
is hyperlinked to a plain language version of the licence that anyone 
can understand. Behind that is the code, the actual legal document to 
back up your licence in case of contention in court; this is the lawyer 
readable form. The machine-readable portion we are still trying to 
work out... .22
The problem of diverse user needs is solved in an equally user-friendly way. A 
copyright owner can go to the Creative Commons website and compose a suit­
able licence by clicking on a menu of options that relate to attributes of the licence 
regarding attribution, commercial use, and derivative works. (The default is to 
allow derivative works; the menu also includes a "share-alike" option analogous 
to copyleft.)23
5.3.3 Roles of licensing experts and others
The Creative Commons example also shows how lawyers might become involved 
in the development of open source biotechnology licences without disrupting or 
distorting the process. By providing concrete examples of workable licences that 
can be used to create different kinds of common pool regimes, Creative Commons 
is engaging in what Peter Drahos has described as "model mongering", an activ­
ity for which academic lawyers are well qualified.24 It has been suggested that it 
may prove more difficult to involve patent lawyers in an open source biotechno­
logy licensing initiative than it has been for the open source software movement
20Bruce Perens, personal communication.
21Ibid.
22Neeru Parahia, Open Source Biology workshop.
23See Creative Commons, "Creative Commons Licenses", http://creativecommons.org/ li­
censes/, last accessed 21 December 2004.
24Braithwaite & Drahos (2000), p.519.
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to attract interested and supportive copyright lawyers because of cultural differ­
ences between the different legal "tribes":
Patent lawyers are like those guys in green eyeshades: very very 
technical. The copyright bar -  especially on the West Coast -  is a beast 
of a very different colour.25
However, the Creative Commons approach solves this problem by separating 
the roles of lawyers as norm entrepreneurs and as legal technicians. Academic 
lawyers, together with non-lawyer team members with close links to the com­
munity of prospective licence users, help to develop innovative licensing mod­
els, while technical drafting work is carried out largely by practising lawyers on 
a pro bono basis. Such work is perfectly compatible with lawyers' professional 
conservatism, but interesting and exciting compared with working on run-of- 
the-mill billable matters; at the time I visited Creative Commons there was an 
oversupply of volunteers. Thus, even though certain unusual legal personalities 
figure prominently in the history of open source software licensing, what would 
be needed in open source biotechnology if the Creative Commons approach were 
to be followed would be patent lawyers who like a technical challenge -  surely 
not so hard to find. In the longer term, if the open source approach becomes 
established as a viable alternative to existing exploitation strategies in the bio­
technology context, technology developers would be able to obtain professional 
advice on ordinary business terms: at least one firm of practising attorneys sup­
ports itself largely by billable work for the open source sector of the software 
industry.26
Model mongering on its own would not be sufficient to achieve a suite of 
legally enforceable and acceptable open source biotechnology licences, however; 
it is also necessary to identify intellectual property owners who are willing to 
experiment with innovative licensing models -  to risk failure so that others can 
learn from their mistakes. Contrary to my own expectations, I did meet in the 
course of my fieldwork some potential "early adopters" or "lead users" of open 
source biotechnology licences: entrepreneurial scientists who see their technol­
ogy not as a means of becoming rich or even famous, but as short-term leverage 
in creating new business models to help achieve long-term humanitarian goals.27
5.3.4 Learning from the software experience
The importance of trial-and-error testing ("selective learning", "learning by do­
ing") of new licensing models is clearer when we consider that although the term 
"open source" was coined only a few years ago, the prehistory of open source 
stretches back at least to the end of World War II.28 Thus, while it might apear
25Hugh Hansen, personal communication.
26Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
27 Anonymous informant: senior executive, small plant biotechnology firm. 
28Raymond (1999); see also Levy (1984) and Weber (2004).
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that the open source approach to technology licensing and development in the 
software context has been an instant success, there has been a long lead time on 
the development of some degree of consensus as to what licensing standards are 
necessary in order to achieve a more or less clearly defined technology commons. 
As Stephen Maurer's work on the failed Mutations Database Initiative shows, it 
cannot be expected that this kind of consensus would be easily reached among 
members of the biotechnology research and development community -  although 
one way to accelerate the process would be to involve government, corporate or 
philanthropic sponsors with sufficient clout to impose a working consensus from 
the top down.29
On the other hand, developers of open source biotechnology licences do have 
the advantage of being able to draw on previous experience. Seen in this light, the 
proliferation of open source software licences is not a disaster, but an inspiration: 
a living record of all the false starts and few successes of twenty or so years of 
experimentation. The OSD itself was not written from first principles. Rather, in 
its first incarnation as the Debian Software Guidelines, it represented an attempt 
to articulate, through a process of community consultation, collective notions of 
how a particular intellectual commons should operate that had evolved through 
everyday experience among users of the Debian GNU-Linux distribution.30
Thus, existing open source licences and the OSD contain in their texts a wealth 
of experience about how open source licensing terms function in the software 
context as an incentive mechanism for capturing contributions to a common pool 
resource.33 Even though not all of this experience will be relevant in the biotech­
nology context,32 it is certainly a valuable resource that should not be overlooked. 
The only difficulty is that in its present form, the information contained in these 
documents is not readily accessible to the biotechnology research and develop­
ment community.
In the next section, I aim to address this problem by providing an overview of 
the most important similarities and differences between conventional biotechno­
logy licensing and the OSD. While future research could usefully focus on partic­
ular open source licences (for example, the GPL),the OSD has been chosen for this 
first comparison because it is itself an attempt to articulate general principles, so 
in effect, part of the work of generalising to the biotechnology context has already 
been done.
29Maurer (2001). This issue was discussed at length at the Open Source Biology workshop. 
30Bruce Perens, personal communication.
31 For a definitive discussion of the concept of a common pool resource, see Ostrom (1990).
32Recall from chapter 2 Hilgartner's observation that access practices are most intensively 
shaped at levels of research that can be defined in terms of a characteristic data stream: section 
2.4, p. 14.
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5.4 Biotechnology and software licensing compared
5.4.1 Conventional and open source licensing in biotechnology 
and software
Software and biotechnology licensing practice share certain features that are not 
necessarily common to technology licensing in general. For example, both soft­
ware and biotechnology are relatively new and fast-evolving technologies, and 
both have expansive field-of-use and territorial applications. Further, as we saw 
in chapters 2 and 3, most biotechnologies are in fact not single technologies, but 
are made up of several components that may be subject to multiple overlapping 
proprietary claims; similarly, most software programs are only usable as part of 
a larger package of programs that are normally protected as separate pieces of 
property.
Despite these common features, there are important differences between soft­
ware and biotechnology licensing. In this thesis I have deliberately avoided lim­
iting the definition of the term "biotechnology", even though this would allow 
for greater analytical precision, because to do so would require ongoing categori­
sation of technologies for the purpose of different aspects of the discussion and 
risk losing touch with the broader debate. However, especially in relation to li­
censing, it is important to bear in mind Hilgartner's point that access decisions 
are highly contingent upon the nature of the technology in question (section 2.4, 
p.14). Compared with software licensing, biotechnology licensing deals with a 
much broader range of technological subject matter, and biotechnology licences 
as a class are therefore inherently more varied than software licences.
The same is true of the manner in which the licensed subject matter is pro­
tected. Even though both software and biotechnology have diverse proprietary 
protection implications -  typical licence agreements in both contexts deal with 
more than one type of property or quasi-property right -  the range of permu­
tations and combinations in biotechnology licences is greater than in software, 
partly as a consequence of the different commercial functions performed by li­
cences in the two fields (see below). As we saw in chapter 3, the inherent com­
plexity associated with different forms of legal protection for biotechnology-related 
innovations is often compounded by uncertainty as to the scope and validity of 
particular proprietary rights.
Perhaps the most obvious difference between software and biotechnology li­
censing is the degree of uncertainty involved in biotechnology licensing due to 
peculiarities arising from the nature of living materials. Attempts to reduce this 
type of uncertainty tend to increase the technicality of a licence. In addition to 
pecularities mentioned in the previous section, the complexity of living organ­
isms gives rise to difficulties of precise definition: while biotechnology licences 
routinely contain definitions of "materials", "products" and "technology" as well 
as of patents and other proprietary rights, drafting these definitions is not a rou-
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tine matter.33
All of these factors point to a higher degree of complexity associated with 
biotechnology licensing compared with software licensing (some implications of 
this complexity in relation to drafting usable licences are explored further be­
low). However, the fundamental difference between conventional software and 
biotechnology licences is that they typically serve different commercial purposes. 
Recall from chapter 4 that conventional commercial software is developed in 
"cathedral" style, that is, in accordance with a single architectural vision (even 
if, as with many famous cathedrals, development takes place over a long period 
under the direction of several architects and reflects a number of different archi­
tectural styles). Access to the source code is restricted to firm employees and 
contractors, and in consequence, the software can only be modified or improved 
by insiders to the firm.34 Conventional software licences of the kind described 
in the previous chapter are designed to enable the software thus developed to 
be marketed to users as a final product, as if it were a manufactured good.35 In 
other words, intellectual property in conventional commercial software is gener­
ally used to facilitate a product market (see section 2.8, p.26). In biotechnology, by 
contrast, product development is usually too large and complex a task for even 
the best resourced industry participant to undertake on its own, so different en­
tities colonise different phases in the product value chain, from basic research to 
regulatory approval and marketing; technology is often licensed at an early stage 
of development, before the precise nature and utility of the product is known 
and sometimes before it can be protected except by trade secrecy.36 In this con­
text, the function of a licence agreement is not to allow the "sale" of a product to 
the end user -  though some biotechnology licences, such as seed-label contracts, 
do perform this function -  but to facilitate the integration of valuable information 
from a range of sources by establishing, not a product market, but a co-operative 
partnership.37
In this sense, the open source approach is closer to conventional biotechno­
logy licensing than to conventional software licensing. The key difference be­
tween open source and conventional biotechnology licensing relates to the bal­
ance struck between incorporating external contributions to technology devel­
opment and restricting general access to intellectual property in order to obtain 
some benefit (licensing revenue, cross-licensing rights or other concessions) in ex­
change for granting specific access. Individual biotechnology licences support a 
range of compromises between these two goals, but in general, from a licensor's 
perspective, the aim of a conventional biotechnology licence is to retain maxi­
mum control over the technology while allowing outsiders just enough access 
to permit whatever collaboration is necessary to move the technology along the
33World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), p.67.
34von Krogh & von Hippel (2003).
35Raymond (2001), chapter 5: "The magic cauldron".
36World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), pl9.
37Recall the discussion in chapter 2 of Woody Powell's work on innovative networks in bio­
technology (section 2.8, p.29; see also Arrow (1962).
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value chain. In this model, exclusivity and sublicensing provisions control who 
is entitled to exercise the licensed rights, while field of use and territorial restric­
tions set limits on the conditions under which those rights may be exercised. Un­
surprisingly, these terms are often heavily contested in licensing negotiations,38 
but even where there is no substantial conflict of interest between the parties, 
the necessity of imposing detailed structure on an inherently fluid data stream 
inevitably raises the cost of the transaction.
By contrast, as we saw in chapter 4, the open source approach is to permit 
full access to and use of the technology by (in Lawrence Rosen's words) "anyone, 
anywhere, for any purpose". In other words, in open source licensing the scales 
are tipped all the way towards maxmising contributions to technology develop­
ment, leaving (almost) no room for the licensor to capture benefits that depend 
on restricting access to intellectual property. The qualification is necessary be­
cause copyleft-style terms do rely on the exercise of exclusive intellectual prop­
erty rights, but the point remains that in this model the exclusive right serves 
the purpose of achieving the broadest possible participation in ongoing technol­
ogy development, rather than creating excludability and rivalry-in-use so that 
the technology may be treated as a private good. The transaction costs of open 
source licensing should be much lower than those associated with conventional 
biotechnology licensing because even though the licensor must still decide which 
portion of the data stream to make available for collaborative development, there 
is no need for complicated boundary-setting beyond that point.
How does this fundamental difference between open source and conventional 
biotechnology licensing play out at the level of licence terms? The remainder of 
this section seeks to answer this question in sufficient detail to show that techni­
cal issues that could be expected to arise in constructing legally enforceable open 
source biotechnology licences would not be insurmountable. (A comprehensive 
legal analysis of these issues would require expertise in a range of highly techni­
cal subject areas and is beyond the scope of this thesis.)
The present analysis is based on information obtained during fieldwork inter­
views and the results of a quasi-technical comparison of conventional biotechno­
logy licensing principles (drawn from a World Intellectual Property Organisation 
publication on biotechnology licensing and from licensing executive society tuto­
rial materials) with the elements of the OSD, canvassed in detail in the previous 
chapter.39 The structure of the discussion corresponds roughly to the three first 
and most important elements of the OSD, dealing with free redistribution, access 
to source code and rights in derivative works.
5.4.2 Promoting broad participation in technology development
In his discussion of commons-based peer production, Yochai Benkler argues that, 
under appropriate conditions, this mode of production will have systematic ad-
38World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), pp.67-69.
39World Intellectual Property Organization (1992); von Gavel (2001). See section 4.4.1, p.77.
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vantages over other modes.40 The reason is that self-selection of participants in 
a peer production model is better at identifying and assigning human capital to 
information and cultural production processes because it loses less information 
about who the best person for a given job might be.41 In addition, says Ben- 
kler, there are substantial increasing returns in terms of allocation efficiency to 
allowing larger clusters of potential contributors to interact with large clusters 
of information resources in search of new projects and opportunities for collabo­
ration; removing property and contract as organising principles of collaboration 
substantially reduces transaction costs.42
In this section we consider how open source licensing promotes self-selection 
of participants in collaborative production. We then consider some of the implica­
tions of allowing self-selection that would be relevant to an intellectual property 
owner's decision whether to adopt an open source exploitation strategy.
Elements of the OSD that promote self-selection of licensees
The main element of the OSD that promotes self-selection of participants in open 
source development is the free redistribution requirement (paragraph 1). This 
goal is also supported by the prohibitions on discrimination (paragraphs 5 and 
6) and the requirement regarding distribution of copies of the licence agreement 
(paragraph 7).
Free redistribution In a typical biotechnology licence, the grant of rights may 
be expressed tobe exclusive, sole or non-exclusive, with the additional possibility 
of different degrees of exclusivity in different fields of use or territories. With 
respect to sublicensing, the usual arrangement is that a licensee can sublicense to 
its affiliates without the licensor's consent, and to others only with the permisson 
of the licensor.
These aspects of conventional biotechnology licensing practice are inconsis­
tent with the free redistribution requirement of the OSD. Free redistribution means 
that the licence must be entirely non-exclusive and that the licensor is prohibited 
from imposing any restrictions on the licensee's ability to sublicense the assigned 
rights. The overall effect of this requirement is to prevent the licensor from con­
trolling the number or identity of people who have access to the technology.
As noted above, conventional biotechnology licences lie along a spectrum be­
tween maintaining control for the sake of generating direct return from owner­
ship of intellectual assets and encouraging broad participation in technology de­
velopment. At the end of the spectrum closest to open source, the technology 
is non-exclusively licensed to all comers for a nominal fee. A non-exclusive li­
censing strategy is most common where the licensor has an interest in or need 
for further development of the techology; the clearest example would be that
40Benkler (2002), p.381. 
41Ibid., p.373 and p.376. 
42Ibid., p.375 and 377.
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of a university seeking to promote the development of a pioneer or fundamen­
tal technology, as in the case of Stanford University's licensing of the patented 
Cohen-Boyer recombinant DNA technology. On the assumption that some of 
the same considerations would apply to the decision whether to adopt an exclu­
sive or non-exclusive licensing strategy as to the decision whether or not to go 
open source,431 asked the Director of Stanford University's Office of Technology 
Transfer whether it would ever be appropriate from a technology development 
perspective to adopt an exclusive licence in relation to an early-stage technology 
with a broad range of potential applications. The answer was that while some 
such technologies are immediately useful to a large number of potential licensees, 
others need a "champion" to devote resources to developing them to that point, 
in which case a period of exclusivity may be appropriate. The example given of a 
technology where non-exclusive licensing would be preferred was a monoclonal 
antibody, where "all you need is a few months to grow the clones, isolate the 
antibody and put it in bottles".44
The reference in this context to monoclonal antibodies is interesting in light of 
Cambrosio and Keating's account of the development of hybridoma technology, 
which together with the discovery by Cohen and Boyer of gene splicing tech­
niques is often regarded as the basis of modern biotechnology.45 Cambrosio and 
Keating highlight the fact that the transformation of monoclonal antibodies from 
an esoteric technique used in only a few laboratories to a tool with widespread 
clinical, industrial and scientific applications was not automatic but involved sub­
stantial investments; although the technology was never patented, in its initial 
stages it was "championed" by individual scientists and commercial firms. The 
history of this technique confirms that there is a stage of development prior to 
which a non-exclusive or open source approach is unlikely to be effective, and 
that active promotion of the technology beyond the local network in which it 
first emerged will usually be required for it to reach that stage. However, it also 
shows that proprietary exclusivity is not the only way to ensure a new technology 
reaches the point where it can be taken up and improved upon by an extended 
network of users. In fact, as we will see in chapter 7, provision of an already- 
useful technology base is well understood within the open source software com­
munity to be a pre-requisite of successful open source development (section 7.3.1,
p.218).
No discrimination against particular people or groups As we saw in chapter 
4, the main rationale for the OSD prohibition on discrimination with respect to 
the identity of licensees is the belief that "to get the maximum benefit from the 
process, the maximum diversity of persons and groups should be equally eligi­
ble to contribute to open sources".46 Besides being inconsistent with the broad
43This analogy was suggested by Karl Handelsman of CMEA Ventures.
44Kathy Ku, personal communication.
45Cambrosio & Keating (1998).
46Open Source Initiative, "The Open Source Definition" (Version 1.9), http://opensource.asti. 
dost.gov.ph/docs/definition.php, last accessed 21 December 2004.
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principle of maximising control in conventional biotechnology licensing, this as­
pect of the OSD is in direct conflict with the imposition of territorial restrictions, 
a common feature of biotechnology licences.47
There are essentially two reasons why territorial restrictions are normally in­
cluded in a biotechnology licence.48 The first is to accommodate differences in 
legal systems and business practices across territorial boundaries (the second is 
discussed under the next heading). It might be supposed that the inability under 
an open source licensing regime to impose territorial restrictions for this purpose 
would create more difficulty in biotechnology than it does in software because of 
the different primary legal protection regimes in the two fields, the argument be­
ing that copyright law is more globalised than national patent systems and there­
fore patent licences need to be finer-tuned to the countries in which the parties 
operate. Recently, however, harmonisation of intellectual property principles un­
der TRIPS (see chapter 3, p.48), as well as the introduction of WIPO model laws in 
many developing countries adopting patent legislation for the first time,49 means 
that the basic rights of a patent holder tend to be the same from one territory to 
another.
A number of points may nevertheless cause difficulties in relation to cross- 
border licensing of biotechnological inventions under an open source licensing 
regime. All of the following have been raised in discussions of the feasibility of 
open source licensing in biotechnology.
One subset of issues is the variable enforceability of intellectual property rights 
from one jurisdiction to another. In the software context, the Open Source Initia­
tive has not been prepared to approve the Sun Community Licence (discussed 
in chapter 4) because in attempting to address this problem it falls foul of the 
OSD. Similar issues do arise in biotechnology, particularly in many develop­
ing countries, where patent protection is a recent development (within the last 
decade): while the legislation itself is not necessarily problematic from an intel­
lectual property owner's perspective, implementation is a "completely different 
story".50 A related set of issues arises from differing consumer protection regimes 
in different countries. For example, in some countries, the law may forbid certain 
types of disclaimers, leaving licensors vulnerable to a range of actions despite 
being protected on the face of the licence.51
A further possible cause of technical difficulties arising from licensing across 
territorial boundaries relates to export rules, which vary from one country to an­
other. Most biotechnology licences specify which country's rules will apply,52 but 
although this is prohibited under the OSD, an easy solution would be to refer to
47World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), p.69.
48Ibid.
49See World Intellectual Property Organization Co-operation for Development (Intellectual 
Property Law) Department web page, http://w w w .w ipo.int/cfdiplaw /en/, last accessed 22 De­
cember 2004.
50Francisco Reifschneider, personal communication.
51James (2003), p.77.
52World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), p.81.
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the relevant jurisdiction in general terms (for example, "the licensor's country of 
origin") instead of by name.
One point which sometimes causes concern is that an OSD-compliant bio­
technology licence could not name specific groups or people suspected of be­
ing bioterrorists as being prohibited from becoming licensees or receiving the 
licensed technology. This is true, but does not mean there could be no defence 
against "malicious people getting hold of a biotechnology and using it to develop 
bio-weapons".53 Any licence exists within a framework of other laws that may 
prohibit certain groups from having access to certain technologies. The drafting 
solution is the same as for export restrictions: the licence can simply express what 
is true in any case, that the parties must comply with applicable laws in exercising 
their rights and obligations under the licence.
While these points all indicate the need for careful attention to detail in imple­
menting an international licensing standard such as open source biotechnology 
would aspire to be, they do not demonstrate any insurmountable technical diffi­
culty. Cross-border licensing issues are not peculiar to an open source approach; 
any problems would have plenty of precedents and could presumably be solved 
given appropriate input from people with the necessary skills and knowledge 
(see discussion below). The only serious concern is that the resulting licences 
might be so technical, or ongoing transaction costs so high, that potential contrib­
utors to an open source biotechnology development effort would be discouraged 
from participating.
A possible solution is that adopted by Creative Commons in relation to its 
suite of standardised copyright licences, which are extensively used to assign and 
protect rights in web-based cultural content (above, section 5.3.2, p.101). Given 
the aim of facilitating the exchange of cultural goods via the Internet, expan­
sion of the Creative Commons licensing model so that it can be used by copy­
right authors outside the United States has been a major focus of the Stanford 
Uni versify-based initiative. In porting licences to different international jurisdic­
tions, Creative Commons has relied on the multi-layered format of its licences, 
in which the terms are expressed in "human-readable", "lawyer-readable" and 
"machine-readable" form; human-readable and machine-readable versions re­
main unchanged from one jurisdiction to another, while the lawyer-readable ver­
sion is adjusted to take account of different legal environments.54 As discussed 
earlier in this chapter (section 5.3), a similar approach could be adopted in rela­
tion to open source biotechnology licences to allow the underlying legal provi­
sions of a licence to be changed while preserving a universally applicable, user- 
friendly licensing option for non-lawyer participants.
No discrimination with respect to fields of endeavour The second reason why 
territorial restrictions are normally used in conventional biotechnology licences 
is to ensure optimal commercial exploitation of the technology, important both in
53Roger Brent, Open Source Biology workshop.
54Neeru Parahia, Assistant Director of Creative Commons, Open Source Biology workshop.
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order to generate maximum royalty revenue and to promote technology devel­
opment.55 The same basic rationale underpins the imposition of restrictions on 
field of use, often by reference to individual patent claims.56
Field of use restrictions are common in biotechnology licensing and patent 
licensing generally. The field of use clause is often the most contentious and 
difficult-to-draft part of a biotechnology licensing agreement, both because of 
uncertainty as to whether all valuable applications of the technology have yet 
come to light and because this is an area where the parties' interests are likely to 
come into conflict: the licensor will usually want the field drawn narrowly, while 
the licensee will want it drawn broadly.57 The reason field of use restrictions are 
important for the ongoing development of many biotechnology-related innova­
tions, especially pioneering or fundamental technologies, is that the breadth of 
possible applications means no single licensee is likely to have the capacity to 
realise the technology's full potential. Granting exclusivity to a single licensee in 
all fields puts pressure on the licensee to work the licence in diverse areas and 
across business sectors: in general, if the licence is exclusive, optimal exploitation 
is more likely if there are several licensees with different fields of use.58
As we saw in chapter 4 (p.84), an open source software licence may not dis­
criminate with respect to the field of endeavour in which the licensed technology 
may be used (this corresponds to the reference to "any purpose" in Rosen's for­
mulation of the open source approach). Translating open source licensing princi­
ples into biotechnology would presumably therefore entail a prohibition on field 
of use restrictions. Given that the primary purpose of field of use restrictions 
is to carve up the market for a technology in order to allow multiple exclusive 
grants in different fields, this may be less of a problem than it at first appears: 
open source licences are of necessity non-exclusive, so the danger of granting too 
broad an exclusive right to a particular licensee does not exist under an open 
source model.
On the other hand, field of use restrictions, together with territorial restric­
tions, may be a useful tool for making technology that would otherwise be bound 
up in exclusive licences more available for public interest and broader commer­
cial use. Recall from chapter 3 the recent establishment of a collective intellectual 
property management regime for agricultural biotechnology, the Public Intellec­
tual Property Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA: see p.3.5.4, chapter 3), by a group 
of land grant universities in the United States. One of PIPRA's primary aims is 
to overcome the fragmentation of public sector intellectual property ownership 
by identifying residual rights retained by members who have (partly as a result 
of a past lack of sophistication in relation to intellectual property management) 
assigned unnecessarily broad exclusive rights in important technologies to major 
commercial firms.59 One of the architects of the initiative explains the importance
55World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), p.69.
56Ibid., p.67.
57Ibid.
58Ibid., p.68.
59A sole licence grant allows both licensor and licensee to use the licensed technology; an ex-
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of field of use and territorial restrictions in this context:
So we start by asking our members: "If it is exclusively licensed, 
tell us how you cut the deal... . Did you just sell them the farm, or did 
you get more specific?" And this is [an essential part of the] initiative:
[to] hold each other accountable to a better set of licensing standards....
Best practice includes partitioning of patents. If you go and license 
something like your agrobacterium technique, license it just for cotton, 
or better, for cotton in the US, or even better -  if you can -  define 
which varieties, or if you can, constrain it to varieties owned by the 
licensee company in the US. The more you can constrain the space of 
the technology grant, the more is still left over [that you may choose] 
to put into the commons.60
Thus, the value of such field of use restrictions in terms of achieving wider access 
to key biotechnologies may outweigh the value of keeping to a strict analogy 
with open source software licensing by directly translating the criteria set out in 
the OSD.
Such a pragmatic approach would be consistent with that adopted by leaders 
of the open source software community in relation to patented code. The commu­
nity objects to field of use restrictions in software patent licences because such re­
strictions are perceived as capable of insidiously undermining freedoms granted 
in relation to the same code under an open source copyright licence.61 However, 
even patent holders that are highly supportive of open source copyright licences 
prefer to keep tight control over patent rights because of uncertainty as to their 
value:
A company will allow the use of a patent for implementing what 
they see as a rather narrow specification, and all of a sudden it is re­
alised that that same claim can be used to cure cancer. Now suddenly 
it's not just a $25 decision about whether to allow people to implement 
a standard; it's whether or not the company is going to get the $400 
billion that will come from the cure for cancer. As a matter of practical 
reality, the likelihood that a patent that is useful for implementing a 
standard is also going to have great value in some other area is minis­
cule; but when companies are granting patent licences, they don't dare
elusive licence grant means it may only be used by the licensee, so granting exclusive rights in 
research tools means researchers at the university that developed the tool can no longer use it 
without the licensee's permission.
60Greg Graff, personal communication.
61'"Field of use' restrictions are... legally incompatible with section 7 of the GNU Gen­
eral Public License, [which] is intended to prevent the imposition of side restrictions (for in­
stance, by patent licenses) which would deny the freedoms that the GPL itself gives you. If 
the software license does nothing to prevent this, you can find yourself in a situation where 
the program's license appears to give you freedom, but this freedom has been taken away 
by restrictions not stated there." Free Software Foundation, "Position on W3C Patent Policy", 
http://gnu.fyxm.net/philosophy/w3c-patent.html, last accessed 22 September 2004.
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preclude the potential blockbuster. ... No one is going to give up what 
they don't understand.62
In other words, precisely the same problem we would anticipate in the biotech­
nology context under a version of the OSD applicable to patent licences does 
in fact arise in software wherever code is protected by patents as well as copy­
right. The approach of open source community leaders to this situation has been 
to campaign for maximum breadth of patent licences, while remaining willing 
to compromise for the sake of workability. Thus, many open source licences, in­
cluding the Apple, IBM and Mozilla licences, have field of use restrictions in their 
patent grants.63 From the perspective of the free and open source community, the 
recent World Wide Web Consortium Patent Policy also represents a compromise: 
patent holders must licence patents that are essential to implementation of a web 
standard royalty-free to all comers, but may impose field of use restrictions such 
that the licence only covers standards implementation and not other uses of the 
patent.64 The author of the OSD, Bruce Perens, affirmed that a similar approach 
might be necessary in the biotechnology context. Alluding to the range of Cre­
ative Commons licences, he pointed out that although some follow a strict open 
source model, others do not, yet overall the results are still useful; an open source 
biotechnology community might also want to modify some elements of the OSD 
to achieve its ultimate goals.65
Distribution of licence The goal of facilitating participation in technology de­
velopment by a large and diverse group of contributors is also supported by other 
elements of the OSD. Recall that paragraph 7 of the OSD says that the rights at­
tached to the licensed program must apply to all to whom the program is redis­
tributed without the need for execution of an additional license by those parties. 
The rationale is that everyone who has access to the program should have it on 
the terms defined by the original licence -  that is, that the freedom of a second 
generation of licensees should not be diluted by new restrictive terms introduced 
by the first generation of licensees. Paragraph 10 supports this requirement by en­
suring that the licence can be made binding on the technology recipient through 
a proper contractual assent without hindering the evolution of the technology by 
imposing technical restraints on how this assent is manifested.
In the biotechnology context, some combination of approaches analogous to 
the "click-wrap" and "shrink-wrap" methods may be appropriate when the tech­
nology is being transferred partly in tangible form; external tear-open or "bag- 
label" licences are already used for some biological materials, such as seeds. In 
any case, there is no reason to suppose that the software controversy surround­
ing manifestation of assent would arise in relation to open source biotechnology
62Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
63 Ibid.
64World Wide Web Consortium, "W3C Patent Policy", 5 February 2004, available at 
http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/, last accessed 22 December 2004. 
65Bruce Perens, personal communication.
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licences, as such licences are clearly contracts and any practical problems could 
be minimised with sufficiently careful drafting.
Consequences of allowing self-selection of licensees
It is clear from this discussion that although translating those elements of the 
OSD directed at removing barriers to access for all potential users of a licensed 
technology would raise some technical issues, none of these is likely to constitute 
a serious obstacle. The real question is whether the prospect of lifting restrictions 
on access to and use of intellectual property is likely to be attractive to biotech­
nology licensors. Ultimately, a licensor must choose the exploitation strategy that 
best suits its overall mission. This calculation is discussed further in chapters 6 
and 7; in this section, we consider some of the implications of allowing licensees 
to self-select, with continuing reference to the comparison between the elements 
of the OSD and the provisions of a typical conventional biotechnology licence.
Remuneration Clauses dealing with remuneration are an important part of most 
biotechnology licensing agreements,66 reflecting the conventional emphasis on 
intellectual property as a private good. A typical licence provides for two kinds 
of remuneration: a one-off or upfront licence fee, and ongoing payments linked 
to the licensee's exercise of rights relating to the technology. 67
The free redistribution clause of the OSD explicitly prohibits the latter type of 
remuneration because requiring payment is one way of restricting the licensee's 
exercise of the relevant intellectual property rights (in the software case, the rights 
to copy, modify and distribute). Thus, a strictly OSD-compliant biotechnology 
licence would presumably prevent a licensor from recovering ongoing royalty- 
type licensing revenue. On the other hand, as we saw in chapter 4 (section 4.4.1, 
p.77), the OSD does not prohibit the charging of a one-off licence fee, although 
in a practical sense it limits such fees by ensuring that every licensee has the 
right to distribute the technology in competition with the original licensor. In 
the software context, some distributors are able to charge for copies of programs 
that are available gratis because of the perceived convenience or superior qual­
ity of the particular distribution, for example, Red Hat Linux.68 Licensors might 
actually find it easier to retain this type of competitive advantage in the biotech­
nology context: the relatively uncodified nature of the technology, together with 
the peculiarities of living organisms detailed earlier in this chapter, means many 
biotechnologies are more difficult than software code to copy accurately, and as 
a result licensees may be willing to pay to deal directly with the entity with the 
longest experience of the technology, or to obtain biological materials direct from 
the original source instead of from other licensees. Thus, it is too simplistic to 
say that there would be no further possibility of obtaining any licensing income
66World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), pp.44-51; 92. 
67Ibid„ p.92.
68Young (1999).
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under an open source approach. Nevertheless, such an approach would reduce a 
biotechnology licensor's direct revenue stream to that which could be obtained 
by charging one-off fees in competition with its own licensees.
The next question is whether this excludes the possibility of open source li­
censing in biotechnology. It might be argued that it does, on the basis that patent 
protection of biotechnology inventions is much more costly than copyright pro­
tection of software works. Copyright protection is free, whereas obtaining and 
maintaining patent protection, especially in more than one jurisdiction, entails 
payment of substantial upfront and ongoing fees. Obtaining patent protection 
takes time, whereas copyright arises immediately upon embodiment of a pro­
tectable work. Prosecuting a patent application requires substantial technical ex­
pertise, whereas copyright is automatic; even though registration of copyright 
ownership has some advantages, the procedural requirements are less onerous 
than for patents. Litigation to enforce patent rights is also notoriously expen­
sive.69 Remuneration provisions in biotechnology licences are often set up in 
such a way that these costs are written off against ongoing licensing revenue;70 it 
may therefore be suggested that to deprive patent holders of this income stream 
would mean they could not afford to obtain the intellectual property rights that 
are as critical to an open source approach as to the conventional approach.
Part of the answer to this objection is rooted in the fact that an open source 
strategy, like the conventional approach to biotechnology licensing, is ultimately 
based on economic self-interest. An open source approach will only be consid­
ered in preference to the conventional approach by a commercial player who cal­
culates that the loss of licensing income or other benefits obtained through grant­
ing limited access to a patented technology would be outweighed by gains from 
faster, cheaper, or better technology development under the open source model. 
The cost of obtaining patent protection is the same in both cases and therefore 
does not tip the scales either way;71 if the overall return to innovative activity, 
taking into account all possible revenue streams, would be greater using an open 
source licence as against a conventional licence, it would not matter if a particular 
revenue stream is diminished or cut off entirely.
This argument only applies, of course, if the trade-off is between the con­
ventional and open source approaches to intellectual property management. If 
the trade-off is between an open source approach, which depends on intellectual 
property ownership, and simple publication of an invention, the higher cost of 
protecting biotechnology-related intellectual property relative to software could 
mean that open source biotechnology licensing is less likely to be practicable than 
open source software because fewer potential contributors would have the re­
sources to participate. The issue of how big a pool of contributors is required 
for a successful open source development effort is discussed in detail in chap­
ter 6 (section 6.6.2, p.189); however, information gathered during fieldwork in-
69For example, see Ellis (2000).
70World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), pp.44-51.
71 In fact, it is arguable that enforcement costs would be lower under an open source regime: 
see next section.
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terviews suggested that most institutions capable of conducting biotechnology 
research and development are also capable of meeting the costs of intellectual 
property protection, provided they see value in obtaining such protection.72 Un­
der an open source model, such value would derive largely from the ability to use 
copyleft-style licensing terms to guarantee continued access to the most advanced 
version of the evolving technology (see below); presumably, given the cost of 
patent protection, non-copyleft open source licences (analogous to the Berkeley 
Software Distribution licence: see section 4.4.2, p.88) would be less often used in 
the biotechnology context.
It is worth noting that in my fieldwork discussions I did not generally receive 
the impression that those who raised the issue of the higher cost of patent protec­
tion relative to copyright had consciously considered these distinctions. Rather, it 
seemed that most were assuming open source licensing would preclude commer­
cial exploitation altogether, at least in the biotechnology context. One attorney's 
reaction is representative:
There is a strong intuitive case to be made that open source works 
in the academic-to-academic... context. [But] that is a highly unique 
situation and... at some point down the line it is going to veer into the 
commercial sector, and...[w]hen it does that, then the model breaks 
down.73
Those who expressed such sentiments may have acknowledged the existence 
of such strategies in principle, but dismissed the possibility of obtaining any 
substantial benefit from them in practice, either from the point of view of the 
speaker's own institution (which might not have been in a position to generate 
income by alternative methods), or with respect to the biotechnology industry as 
a whole. Whether sufficient income could in fact be extracted from alternative 
revenue streams in the biotechnology context is a practical question that presum­
ably has different answers in different circumstances. We consider it further in 
chapter 7.
Pedigree Determining the ownership or pedigree of the technology to be li­
censed is a critical aspect of technology transfer in any industry. As is apparent 
from the discussion in chapters 2 and 3, it can be particularly complex in biotech­
nology because the complementary and cumulative nature of innovation in this 
field means that the licensor has often developed the technology using propri­
etary inventions or materials obtained from third parties. Further, as we saw in 
the discussion of transaction costs in chapter 3, title may be obscured by unautho­
rised "unofficial tier" exchange of information and materials among researchers 
and by restrictions on commercialisation (for example, limitations on the dura­
tion of licences or on the right to grant exclusive licences) imposed as a condition 
of external funding.74 Thus, checking the pedigree of a biotechnology may in-
72 Andrzej Kilian, personal communication.
73 Anonymous informant: partner, major US law firm.
74See section 3.3.1, p.39.
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volve reviewing MTAs and funding contracts and interviewing researchers to 
discover the source of materials used in development across several different re­
search groups located in different industrial or academic organisations.75 Con­
cerns regarding the pedigree of the licensed technology are normally addressed 
in the warranties and representations section of the licence agreement. A typical 
biotechnology licence contains a warranty by the licensor, often supported by an 
indemnity, that the licensee's exercise of rights under the licence will not infringe 
the intellectual property rights of any third party.76
In the software context, many businesses are wary of open source technolo­
gies because they are concerned that they will not be able to pass a clear title to 
their own customers if some part of the open source code has been contributed 
by someone who did not actually own it; even though under an open source li­
cence there would be no obligation to indemnify customers, "try convincing a 
big multinational... that they don't deserve an indemnity".77 This situation need 
not result from deliberate dishonesty or mistake as to authorship; it can and does 
arise where an employee submits code he or she has written in the course of 
employment without first obtaining the employer's permission. A related con­
cern for commercial entities in the software context is that without the ability to 
track ownership of contributions, it is usually impossible to know on what licence 
terms any particular contribution was made, so that there is a risk of accidentally 
incorporating copylefted code into proprietary programs and, if the licensor is 
unable to demonstrate which licence applies to which section of code, of being 
unexpectedly obliged to publish the source code of the whole program.78
One way to minimise these problems in the open source biotechnology con­
text would be to start with well designed and documented processes for submit­
ting contributions, so that the origins of each part of a collaboratively developed 
technology could be readily identified. (This would be important in any case in 
the biotechnology context to facilitate peer review of contributions of experimen­
tal data obtained using protocols that may differ slightly from one laboratory to 
another.) This would not eliminate the need for contributors to perform a title 
check before making their submissions, but as this is a necessary preliminary to 
any biotechnology licensing, it need not constitute a special obstacle in relation 
to open source biotechnology. In light of the second concern referred to above, 
it would also be desirable to limit the proliferation of open source licences -  a 
precaution that has been suggested by open source software community leaders 
in any case (see above, section 5.3.2, p.100). Another possibility would be to relax 
the OSD analogy sufficiently to set up a central registration facility, similar to that
75World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), pp.75-76.
76Ibid., p.85ff.
77David Schellhase, in Rosen et al. (2003), p.48.
78Rosen et al. (2003), p.56. GPL supporters argue that a person who downloads code written by 
a thousand different contributors and uses it in a way that is inconsistent with the licence terms is 
vulnerable to a potential claim by any of a thousand people for copyright infringement and breach 
of contract; but whether the courts would hold that an earlier contributor whose contribution had 
been substantially diluted over time still had standing to sue is not clear.
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employed by the Sun Community Licence, so that each new contributor enters 
into a direct agreement with the original licensor.79 Whether this approach would 
erect an undue barrier to self-selection of project participants would be a matter 
for consultation within the biotechnology research and development community.
Product liability and safety and security concerns A typical biotechnology li­
cence contains a number of warranties, indemnities and limitations of liability.80 
One important matter usually dealt with under these provisions is liability for 
infringement of third party rights, discussed under the previous heading. The 
other key issue is product liability.
Biotechnology industry participants face substantial product liability expo­
sure, especially with respect to defective design and failure to warn of risks asso­
ciated with use and forseeable misuse; in medical biotechnology, especially, liabil­
ity concerns often influence product development and marketing strategies.81 As 
foreshadowed in the previous section, although there is no prohibition in the OSD 
on the giving of warranties, almost all open source licences state that the licensor 
gives no warranty in relation to the licensed technology, simply because "people 
who give their software away cannot afford to indemnify others" .82 Presumably, 
therefore, an open source biotechnology licence would leave downstream inno­
vators responsible for product safety, not just as a technical licensing matter, but 
because of the need to sustain incentives to volunteer contributions:
[I]t's very important [from a community perspective] that the per­
son using or developing the final product... is the person who bears 
all of the responsibility. ... Perhaps that would deter some [follow-on 
innovation], but the more important thing is to make sure that people 
who pass on information for free to other people do not have to bear 
a liability load because if they do, that would stop it dead. ... [P]eople 
who want to be protected really should be paying for a service con­
tract or for insurance: if you want protection, that's an extra priced 
service.83
The absence of warranties and indemnities in an open source licence (in soft­
ware or biotechnology) may not be a significant disadvantage in practice for sev­
eral reasons. First, a disclaimer in a licence agreement does not provide protection 
from liability imposed by other laws (for example, the Australian Trade Practices 
Act makes suppliers of open source software liable for misleading and decep­
tive conduct despite the absence of any warranty in the licence agreement) .84 
Second, disclaimers of liability are not peculiar to open source licences: many 
conventional licences in both fields incorporate such a provision (for example,
79Bill Lard in Rosen et al. (2003), p.57.
80World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), p.85ff. 
81 Ibid.
82Bruce Perens, personal communication.
83Ibid.
84Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s.52.
§5.4 Biotechnology and software licensing compared 119
Microsoft's standard end user licences for most products disclaim any warranty 
in relation to infringement of third party intellectual property).85 Finally, indem­
nities are often not worth very much in any case, both because of uncertain in­
terpretation and because the value of an indemnity is wholly dependent on the 
financial capacity of the entity that provides it.86
The relevance of product liability issues to self-selection of licensees under an 
open source biotechnology licence is that throwing open the technology devel­
opment process to anyone who wishes to participate would presumably increase 
the risk of harm resulting from application of the licensed technology. We have 
seen that this need not be an obstacle to open source biotechnology licensing 
from a licensor's point of view. However, it may be of concern from a societal 
perspective. A full discussion of the potential risks and benefits associated with 
biotechnology research and development is beyond the scope of this thesis; the 
following brief observations are made in response to concerns about the impact of 
lowering the barriers to participation under an open source approach expressed 
by people with whom I spoke in the course of my research.
Two types of problem were anticipated in these discussions. The first relates 
to biosecurity. In a recent paper titled "On response to biological attack",87 Roger 
Brent observes that ongoing developments in biological science and technology 
facilitate the creation of new biological weapons that go beyond the established 
pattern of germ warfare -  which requires resources and activities of a scale only 
likely to be feasible for a nation-state or substantially funded organisation -  to 
new threats that require far less skill, capital and effort and may therefore fall 
within the capability of small groups or even, individuals. The question arises 
whether an open source approach to biotechnology research and development 
would accelerate the growth of existing threats to biosecurity.
In the software context, the debate over whether releasing software source 
code poses a security risk for users of that software encompasses two opposing 
philosophies. The first, sometimes described as "security by secrecy", is based 
on the argument that disclosure of technical information would benefit hackers 
(crackers) and create more opportunity for virus attacks.88 Unsurprisingly, this 
philosophy is often expounded by proprietary software firms with a commercial 
interest in maintaining the secrecy of source code. By analogy with this argu­
ment, an open source regime in biotechnology would directly increase the risk 
of bioterrorism by promoting broad disclosure of information about biological 
systems that could be deliberately used for illegal purposes. As Brent points out, 
security by secrecy is no longer a realistic option in biotechnology because much 
of the relevant information is already publicly available; and of course, any tech­
nology that is patented is subject to enabling disclosure requirements. The alter­
native philosophy may be described as "security through openness". Proponents 
of this philosophy in the software arena argue that under a closed systems ap-
85Webbink (2003), p.9.
86James (2003), pp.80-81.
87Provided to attendees of the Open Source Biology workshop.
88Caelli (2003), p.102.
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proach, end users are unable to repair the system after a successful attack and 
have no ability to judge the security status of the underlying operating system or 
hardware ;89 an open approach has the advantage that users can adapt the tech­
nology to their own security needs and need not rely on the security systems put 
in place by the vendor of the technology.90 By analogy, security through openness 
in biotechnology would mean allowing the scientific community at large to keep 
abreast of technical developments that have the potential to be used for malicious 
purposes so that if new biological weapons do arise, law-abiding scientists have 
the capacity to respond (for example, by developing a vaccine against a deliber­
ately released engineered pathogen).
The second type of problem relates to biosafety (both human and environmen­
tal aspects) .91 Opponents of genetic modification highlight dangers arising from 
the disparity between scientists' ability to manipulate biological systems and 
their ability to predict the results of such manipulation. Increasing the number 
of practitioners of these techniques through open source-style licensing would 
presumably increase the potential for adverse consequences due to error or neg­
ligence. On the other hand, one attractive aspect of open source biotechnology is 
that scientific understanding might be improved and the risks reduced by more 
open scientific exchange and more rigorous peer review under an open source 
regime. Even though this is probably a better argument in favour of open source 
biotechnology than the closely related "security through openness" argument, 
scientists are generally not best placed to make it because, as a group, they have 
painted themselves into a corner with extravagant promises, made in pursuit of 
funding dollars, about the benefits of biotechnology research and development -  
a position that would be undermined by the admission that the scientific founda­
tions of the technology are still shaky.
Ultimately, however, the best answer to the argument that an open source 
approach to biotechnology licensing would increase biosecurity and biosafety 
risks is that the appropriate way to deal with these risks is directly, through ade­
quately enforced regulation of potentially dangerous activities, rather than indi­
rectly, through proprietary barriers to entry. This is not to suggest that the regula­
tory challenges are trivial. On the biosecurity side, illegal use of genetic engineer­
ing technology is extremely difficult to detect; it cannot even be assumed that a
89Caelli (2003), p 104.
90The strength of the security through openness approach is also demonstrated by the attitude 
of insurance companies, which reportedly charge clients five to fifteen percent more to insure 
against "hacking" incidents when MS Windows NT software is employed in Internet operations 
compared with Unix or GNU/Linux: Fitzgerald & Bassett (2003), p.19.
91 The most interesting aspect of my discussions with informants on this topic was the wide­
spread preoccupation with biosecurity issues -  such as the engineering of new biological weapons 
-  to the exclusion of biosafety and broader environmental issues associated with genetic engineer­
ing. No doubt this preoccupation was partly due to the timing of my fieldwork, which coincided 
with the United States' invasion of Iraq in early 2003, and its primary location in the United States, 
where consumers have historically been far less suspicious of the use of genetic engineering tech­
nologies in agriculture and food production than consumers in some other countries (see chapter 
1 ).
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biological attack would be readily identifiable as such. On the biosafety side, na­
tional regulations governing contained experimentation are expensive and some­
times ineffective, and once genetically modified organisms are released into the 
environment, the complexity of living systems means the effects are literally im­
possible to predict or control. Existing liability regimes (developed in response to 
claims for personal injury, property damage or financial loss) are not well suited 
to providing redress for any harm associated with such a release because adverse 
effects may become apparent only over a long period and can be expected often to 
be diffuse in nature; establishing proof of cause and the nature and extent of any 
damage would therefore be unusually difficult and expensive.92 However, rely­
ing on de facto controls imposed by intellectual property owners in the pursuit 
of private profits is no substitute for proper risk management that takes broader 
social goals into account. As described in this thesis, a shift towards open source 
biotechnology is not likely to lead to a sudden drastic increase in risky activities, 
but can be expected to take place more gradually (see chapter 7). While regula­
tors should certainly take note of any such developments and make appropriate 
adjustments, there is no reason to suppose a smooth transition would not be fea­
sible.
5.4.3 Access in the "preferred form for modification"
Under the OSD, an open source licence must require the distribution of source 
code with every executable (binary) version of the software (also known as run­
ning code). As we saw in chapter 4 (section 4.4.1, p.79), source code is that in­
formation which is necessary for modification or repair of a software program; 
thus, the requirement to make source code available is a necessary precondition 
to the exercise of other freedoms granted by an open source licence. Licensors 
are obliged to distribute or otherwise make this information available at no more 
than the cost of reproduction whenever the program itself is made available, but 
the OSD does not require the imposition of an obligation to provide source code 
on licensees who merely copy or modify the program for their own use. The 
source code must be in the preferred form for making modifications and includes 
all available documentation describing how to access and modify the original 
work.
What is the functional equivalent of source code in a biotechnology context?
Clearly, in order to translate open source licensing principles into the biotechno­
logy context, it is necessary to identify the functional equivalent of source code. In 
general terms, the source code simply represents the wherewithal to understand 
and make changes to the technology. Exactly what this means in biotechnology 
licensing depends on the nature of the biotechnology in question; however, ex-
92See generally Royal Commission on Genetic Modification (2001), chapter 12.
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isting practice in relation to material transfer agreements provides a useful refer­
ence.
In addition to defining the terms of transfer of the biological material itself, a 
typical biotechnology MTA includes a technical description of the material suffi­
cient to enable the recipient to use it (and thereby practise the technology) with­
out having to invest substantial further effort and resources. (As von Gavel ob­
serves, "an eppendorf tube with a label 'vector X -  gene Y' is pretty useless with­
out at least a vector or plasmid map".)93 An annex to the agreement often sets 
out exactly how any material to be transferred is to be described; the description 
is then transferred with the material itself. This technical description is roughly 
equivalent to source code, while the biological material itself (in usable form, 
whatever other conditions this may imply) is like running code.
It is important to realise that the technologically relevant information con­
tained in biological materials -  even, to hearken back to Hilgartner's "data stream" 
model, those that are neither novel nor scarce and are generally accepted as reli­
able and valuable -  is highly uncodified compared with computer software. To 
take a robust example, consider DNA sequence information. DNA sequence in­
formation is often likened to software code; compared with other kinds of bio­
logical information, it is indeed highly codified. Yet substantial extra information 
is required to make sense of a DNA sequence. As one of the leaders of the hu­
man genome project has observed, "the raw, unannotated genome is not a usable 
tool in the hands of the average biologist. ...[Providing an analysis [is] essential... 
to give users the best possible view of the data".94 A sample annex to an MTA 
relating to sequence information illustrates the point:
Provide the following information in electronic format
1. Name of sequence (plus accession number if available)
2. Sequence length
3. DNA Sequence -  in FASTA format (include ">" and indicate start 
and stop codon with underline)
4. Protein sequence -  in one letter code
5. Organism of origin
6. How sequence obtained -  eg Two Hybrid, Sequencing, Database
7. Nature of sequence -  please stipulate if it is a genomic sequence, 
a predicted cDNA, or a reverse-transcribed mRNA (real cDNA); 
full length or partial (if partial provide also predicted full length); 
what motifs are present and where; what and where are the ex­
ons.
8. Homology anlaysis -  alignments, BLAST search results (only if 
can do securely) indicating date of search and databases searched.95
93von Gavel (2001), p.8. 
94Sulston & Ferry (2002), p.207. 
95von Gavel (2001), pp .10-11.
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Sequence information that is embodied in an actual DNA molecule is stickier still:
The sequence of the gene/promoter shall be delivered physically 
in a small-size plasmid (of the "pUC" or "pGEM" type or similar) from 
which it can be easily isolated using standard restriction digestion.
The DNA shall be delivered as a pure plasmid preparation either in 
a solution or lyophilised, with concentration or amount known and 
indicated, the minimal amount being lOmicrograms of plasmid DNA. 
Provide also the bacterial strain (indicating details) transformed with 
the plasmid. Plasmid map shall be delivered in an electronic format 
(a file on a disc) compatible with VectorNTI (Informax) software and 
a description of the cloning strategy used to obtain the plasmid with 
the sequence shall be delivered. 96
Continuing with the same example, the equivalence between source code and 
the technical description requirements of a typical MTA was confirmed in less 
technical terms by a biological engineer seeking to start up a prototype open 
source biology project:
[When a genetically modified organism is released], it is no longer 
private, it is public. At this point by an open source model the owner 
should be obliged to release the sequence information and also... com­
ments on the code: what it is, what it is supposed to do, what it was 
designed for, how it is supposed to work. So that somebody else could 
get up to speed on it quickly.97
One way to interpret the need for this extra information is to say that the DNA 
base pair sequence of a given construction is equivalent not to source code, but to 
assembly code -  an easily readable but only dimly comprehensible string of ones 
and zeros.98
Thus, even if the biotechnology in question is a DNA construct -  the clos­
est analogue to software code in the biotechnology context -  providing the bald 
DNA sequence would not normally be sufficient to fulfil an OSD-style source 
code requirement. This illustrates the general point that the information needed 
to practise a biotechnological invention is more difficult to transfer -  more tightly 
bound to other elements of the data stream -  than software source code.
Given the higher cost to biotechnology licensors of providing the full func­
tional equivalent of source code, should open source biotechnology licences re­
quire them to do so? If the standard is set too high and the obligation becomes 
too onerous, potential licensors might be discouraged from making their technol­
ogy available on open source terms; on the other hand, the easier it is for users
96Ibid. von Gavel provides additional examples for different types of biological material, in­
cluding seeds, antibodies and cell lines.
97Drew Endy, personal communication.
98Roger Brent, follow-up email to attendees at Open Source Biology workshop, referring to 
discussions between Drew Endy and Rob Carlson.
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to modify the technology, the greater the likelihood that an open source develop­
ment effort will succeed. An open source biotechnology community would need 
to find an adaptation of the source code requirement that strikes an appropriate 
balance.
In fact, similar problems arise in the software context despite the lower trans­
fer costs, and for this reason open source software licences do allow licensors 
some flexibility regarding the manner in which source code is made available: 
for example, as we saw in chapter 4 (p.79), under the GPL it is sufficient to dis­
tribute the source code only on request and for a limited period (three years), an 
arrangement the community regards as "reasonable".99 Note also that the oblig­
ation to provide source code in the software context does not extend to codifying 
information that would not otherwise have been codified, or to generating new 
information in order to enable others to use the software -  even though there may 
often be an incentive to undertake such activities in order to reap the benefits of 
making the program freely available (see chapter 6, section 6.3, p.l51ff).
Hope: Suppose there are uncodified aspects of the technique, and 
you would normally have to show someone how to do it in the lab.
How far do people need to go? How much effort and cost do they 
need to go to in order to provide that information to all possible li­
censees?
Rosen: [I]n my definition you're not obliged to write any documen­
tation at all. It's just if you have written such documentation and it 
relates to how to modify the source code, you have to make it avail­
able. But nothing obliges you to generate any documentation about a 
program.
Hope: And nothing obliges you to run classes on how to do a particu­
lar technique in your lab, or whatever? -  From a community building 
perspective you might want to do it, but in terms of the licence, you 
are not obliged?
Rosen: No, there's no requirement at all.100
Given that some form of property protection is a prerequisite for open source 
as well as conventional licensing, it has been suggested that for patented biotech­
nologies, and perhaps for others as well, a description of the technology that 
meets the disclosure requirement under patent law would be a reasonable min­
imum level of information equivalent to software source code.101 Unsurpris­
ingly, since the purpose in both cases is to enable users to practise the technol­
ogy, there are strong parallels between source code-related requirements in OSD- 
compliant software licences and the patent disclosure requirement: in general 
terms, a patent specification adequately discloses an invention if it contains a de­
scription of the best mode of carrying out the claimed invention that is sufficient
"Bruce Perens, personal communication. 
100Lawrence Rosen, personal communication. 
101 Bruce Perens, personal communication.
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to enable any person skilled in the art to which the invention pertains to make 
and use the invention. (It is not necessary that the enablement be such that a per­
son attempting to make or use the invention be successful on the first try; some 
experimentation may be necessary, but the amount of experimentation required 
must not be unduly extensive.)102
How would an obligation to provide the source code equivalent be triggered?
Recall that in open source software there is no obligation to release source code 
unless one is distributing copies of the program; private copying and modifica­
tion of a software program does not incur this obligation. What, then, would be 
the equivalent of distributing a software program for the purposes of triggering 
the source code-equivalent obligation in biotechnology?
One view is that a technology should be deemed to have been distributed if ei­
ther a working version of the technology -  the equivalent of running code -  or the 
source code equivalent is made publicly available, intentionally or otherwise. For 
example, if a genetically modified organism were found to have contaminated a 
neighbouring field or public land it would be deemed to have been distributed 
and the intellectual property owner would be obliged to provide all the informa­
tion necessary for independent scientists to study and modify the organism.103 
On this view, distribution would have a similar meaning to the concept of an 
environmental release in the context of biosafety regulation. This suggestion is 
not much more than a starting point for discussion, however: there is room for 
a range of different approaches within the environmental release paradigm, and 
the notion of making a technology "public" is, as sociologists of science have 
shown, highly problematic.
5.4.4 The right to modify the licensed technology
In biotechnology generally, much more than in other technology contexts -  with 
the possible exception of software development -  it is common for the parties to 
a licence agreement to make improvements to the technology during the licence 
term.
As we saw in chapter 4 (p.81ff), to comply with the OSD, a licence must al­
low the creation of modifications and derived works and must allow them to be 
redistributed under the terms of the original licence.
The purpose of this requirement is to make sure the technology can evolve 
freely by preventing the owner from obstructing either changes to the technology 
or the spread of changes. Without such a licence provision, the owner would be 
able to block the evolution of the technology. This is because under copyright law,
102Eric G. Wright, Disclosure, Modern Drug Discovery October 2000 Vol. 3, No. 8, p. 69, 
at http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/journals/mdd/v03/i08/html/10patents.html, citing relevant 
statutes and case law. The OSD specifies that the source code be in the preferred form for modifi­
cation of the technology and that deliberate obfuscation is unacceptable (see chapter 4, p.79).
103Drew Endy, personal communication.
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as we saw in chapter 4, the permission of the copyright owner is needed in order 
to prepare or authorise the preparation of derivative works or to copy, modify 
or distribute the derivative work as a whole (although copyright in a derivative 
work is held by the author of the derivative work, this copyright covers only the 
additions, changes, or other new material appearing for the first time in the work 
and does not extend to any pre-existing material).
We saw earlier that biotechnology-related innovations may be protected un­
der patent or plant variety laws or as trade secrets or personal property. The 
scope of the exclusive rights granted to the intellectual property owner is differ­
ent under each of these regimes, but all give the owner some degree of power to 
block the development and dissemination of improvements on the technology.
As an example, consider the relationship between first or "basic" and subse­
quent "improvement" patents.104 (In the technical patent context, the word "im­
provement" generally means technology that builds directly on a prior patent. 
In a broader sense, an improvement may be considered to be something that 
modifies portions of the technology of the prior patent, as distinct from merely 
providing an alternate approach to achieving the same result.)
In patent law, the holder of an improvement patent is the owner of a separate 
invention from that protected by the prior patent. However, obtaining a patent 
does not of itself give the right to practise the patented invention: a patent only 
grants the patent owner a negative right (i.e., the right to prevent others from 
making, using, or selling the patented invention). In many instances, a patented 
improvement cannot be made, used, or sold without infringing the prior patent 
(to determine whether the improvement patent can be practised without infring­
ing the basic patent, the claims of the prior patent are compared with the im­
provements).
For example, suppose a patent is obtained for seed A. Another person decides 
that the seed would be more useful if it had an added gene B and obtains a patent 
for seed A with gene B. The improvement patent would give the owner the right 
to keep others from making, using, or selling seed A with gene B. As the original 
patent claimed seed A, making, using, or selling seed A with gene B would in­
fringe the basic patent. The presence of the additional gene permits the inventor 
of the improvement to obtain a patent, but does not avoid infringement of the 
basic patent for the seed.
Similarly, with regard to biological materials, recall that such materials are 
bailed goods, and that the definition of bailment includes an obligation for the 
goods to be re-delivered in either their original or altered form, as soon as the 
time for, use for, or condition on, which they were bailed has elapsed or been 
performed. Thus, a provider of biological materials has the ability to control the 
creation and dissemination of any modifications or improvements to the original 
material, limited only by what the recipient is prepared to agree to under the 
terms of the bailment agreement.
These examples show that an open source biotechnology licence, like an open
104This discussion is based on Silverman (1995).
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source software licence, would need to make explicit provision to ensure the free­
dom to make and distribute modifications and improvements. To what extent 
does a typical conventional biotechnology patent licence or MTA already do this?
With respect to patented technology, in conventional biotechnology licensing, 
a licensor will usually seek the right to use any improvements to a patented tech­
nology made by a licensee.105 A licensor may be tempted to seek an exclusive 
licence or outright assignment of any improvements made by the licensee, but 
provisions of this type generally offend against competition rules and are likely 
to be unenforceable.106 It is, however, quite common for the licensor to be given 
a non-exclusive, royalty-free licence to use licensee improvements, often together 
with the right to sublicense the improvement to other licensees of the same tech­
nology.107 This arrangement is discussed further below in relation to translating 
copyleft-style provisions into the biotechnology context (section 5.4.4, p.128.).
With respect to biological materials, a typical MTA attempts to deal with the 
difficulty of defining improvements and other changes to commonly transferred 
materials such as DNA, RNA, proteins, cells and organisms by creating a series of 
categories. (This is a good example of the law's "atomistic" approach to defining 
rights in evolving data streams; in the case of living materials, the data stream is 
capable of evolving independently of human intervention: see the description in 
chapter 2 of data streams as chains of products, p.14.) These categories and the 
usual terms applying to each are as follows.108
The provider owns the actual biological material transferred (the "original 
material": say, a gene X), any unmodified descendant of original material ("pro­
geny": in this example, copies of gene X obtained by polymerase chain reaction) 
and any unmodified subset of the original material ("unmodified derivatives": 
protein X, produced by translation of gene X). The recipient cannot distribute 
these to a third party.
The recipient owns any humanly altered form of the original material that 
incorporates the original material in part or as a whole ("modifications": for ex­
ample, a genetically modified plant or a vector incorporating gene X) that he or 
she might generate. Typically the terms of the MTA will provide that the recipi­
ent can distribute them to a third party, but only with written permission of the 
provider. Often the provider must be given an option to take an exclusive licence 
on any modifications, though this is not generally a royalty-free licence.
The recipient owns any other substances that he or she obtains through the 
use of the material (that are not modifications, progeny or unmodified material: 
to continue the same example, this might be a protein Y that interacts with protein 
X or a gene Z that codes a receptor for protein X), and can distribute them to 
others, again only with the permission of the provider of the original material. In
105World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), p.72.
106 Ibid.
107Ibid., p.73.
108World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), pp.76-81; von Gavel (2001), pp.8-13, 
citing Barry Datlof and the UBMTA (above, p.100), available at http://www.autm.net/ 
UBMTA/master.html, last accessed 25 October 2004.
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the case of other substances that are classified as tools, the licence will not usually 
require the licensee to give the provider of original materials an option to take 
out an exclusive new licence. However, in the case of other substances that are 
classified as technologies, templates or new uses it is common for the provider of 
the original material to be given an option for an exclusive new licence. Again, 
this is not generally a royalty-free licence.
In summary, the licensor owns the original material and any progeny and 
unmodified derivatives, while the inventor (whether licensee or licensor) owns 
modifications plus any substances obtained through the use of the material, not 
including any part of those substances which are themselves original material, 
progeny or unmodified derivatives. (Note that the concept of derivatives in bio­
technology is not related to the concept of derivative works in copyright law.)
These arrangements differ substantially from an open source-style MTA, in 
which the provider of biological materials would not impose any restrictions on 
distribution of original materials, progeny, unmodified derivatives, modifications 
or other substances obtained through the use of the material. No permission 
would be required for distribution to a third party, and the provider would not 
be given the option of an exclusive licence on modifications or other substances. 
(It would not necessarily be inconsistent with an open source-style MTA for the 
recipient of biological materials to be able to charge royalties on the use of modi­
fications and other substances by the original provider or by third parties, unless 
the original MTA was expressed as a copyleft-style agreement: see next section.)
Copyleft: preserving ongoing access to an evolving technology
We saw in chapter 4 that not all approved open source software licences incor­
porate the copyleft mechanism, but that by far the most often used open source 
licence is the GPL -  the archetypal copyleft licence. A similar preference would 
be likely among users of open source biotechnology licences, reinforced by cost 
considerations.
As we saw earlier (p.115), obtaining patent protection requires substantial re­
sources (in the order of thousands to tens of thousands of dollars), whereas copy­
right is automatic and cost-free (for a discussion of simple publication in the bio­
technology context, see below, section 5.4.4, p.135). Similarly, maintaining patent 
protection entails the payment of substantial yearly fees, while litigation to en­
force patent rights or defend against challenges to patent validity is notoriously 
complex and expensive.109
It is often assumed that these higher costs would be an obstacle to implement­
ing open source licensing principles in biotechnology because, in a typical bio­
technology licence, maintenance and enforcement costs are partially recovered 
from the licensee through royalty payments, which are precluded by the free re­
distribution requirement of the OSD. However, this reasoning is based on a mis­
understanding. In a conventional biotechnology setting, both parties have an in-
109 Above, note 69.
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terest in maintaining the licensed rights and pursuing anyone who uses the tech­
nology without obtaining a licence or in breach of the licence terms because both 
parties want to exclude free riders. (In open source the parties also have a mutual 
interest in enforcement, in this case to guard against excessive defection from the 
co-operative effort that would diminish everyone's incentive to participate.) It is 
therefore common for licensor and licensee to share in the costs of patent enforce­
ment and to notify each other of infringements by third parties.110 To the extent 
that the responsibility of maintaining and enforcing patents is shared between li­
censors and licensees, provision for these costs in the remuneration clauses of the 
licence does not represent a real transfer of funds, but is merely an administra­
tive convenience to allow maintenance and enforcement tasks to be carried out 
on behalf of both parties in the most efficient way.
Thus, the real cost issue is not related directly to licence remuneration, but to 
the overall wealth of the parties and whether they can fundamentally afford the 
costs of playing the patent game. It might be thought that technology develop­
ers who do not seek to recover licensing revenue from users would have fewer 
resources than those who adopt a conventional approach to intellectual property 
management, and might therefore be unable to maintain the strong patent po­
sition that would be needed for an effective open source strategy. As we saw 
in the discussion of open source as a business strategy in chapter 4 (p.75), the 
assumption that an open source strategy always brings lower returns than con­
ventional exploitation strategies is unsound (we return to this issue in the next 
two chapters). However, the higher cost of patent protection relative to copyright 
protection does mean that a non-copyleft open, source approach (see section 4.2.3, 
p.71) would be unlikely to be cost-effective in many situations. An example of a 
non-copyleft open source licence is the BSD licence, which imposes an obligation 
on licensees to acknowledge the work of the original author but otherwise allows 
the licensee the same freedoms as if the code were not subject to copyright. A 
copyleft approach offers greater economic benefits than a restriction of this kind, 
which is presumably not valuable enough by itself to justify the cost of patenting 
-  though it might be used where a patent has already been obtained for other 
reasons or in support of a "sell it, free it" business strategy (see chapter 7, section 
7.2.2, p.212.).
A method of rewarding contributions based on ongoing access to an evolving 
technology appears to make good sense in at least some biotechnology contexts. 
For example, a major problem in negotiating arrangements for benefit-sharing in 
regard to plant germplasm used for food and agriculture is that, while it is clearly 
unethical to disregard the contributions made by many farmers over many gen­
erations, especially in developing countries, the economics of tracking these con­
tributions and determining the value of each may not be feasible.* 111 A standard
110 World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), p.92.
111 John Barton, personal communication. Tracking ownership and negotiating and adminis­
tering remuneration clauses are two of the most complex and therefore the highest transaction 
cost aspects of conventional biotechnology licensing, even for technologies with only a few easily 
identified contributors: World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), pp.74-76.
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material transfer agreement under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Re­
sources for Food and Agriculture could incorporate open source-style terms that 
would make access to the evolving technology the usual reward for contributions 
rather than direct remuneration through royalties or similar payments.112 The 
agricultural germplasm case is an extreme example of a common phenomenon 
in biotechnology: due to the cumulative nature of most technologies and their 
origins in publicly funded academic research, the pedigree of a technology when 
it is first commercialised is often not fully known. A copyleft-like mechanism 
in biotechnology would sidestep the need to place a money value on contribu­
tions to cumulatively developed technologies; by creating an alternative form of 
compensation, it would remove a major source of uncertainty and high transac­
tion costs. Such a mechanism would also help to overcome problems of trust in 
forming collaborations among diverse institutions in biotechnology.
Thus, in order to demonstrate the practical feasibility of open source biotech­
nology licensing, it would be necessary to show that the copyleft mechanism de­
scribed in chapter 4 could be adequately translated into biotechnology. What 
would this entail?
Is a biotechnology version of copyleft broadly feasible? As with the OSD re­
quirement to provide source code when distributing an open source software 
program, the first step in translating copyleft into the biotechnology context is to 
describe the concept in functional terms. Although those who see copyleft as a 
unilateral copyright permission rather than a contract would regard any opera­
tion of copyleft outside the copyright environment as "a metaphor rather than a 
legal rule",113, there is nothing inherent in the concept that ties it to a particular 
proprietary regime. As General Counsel for the Open Source Initiative has re­
marked, "you don't need a big philosophy about copyleft, and you don't need 
a new word for it: it's just about reciprocity." 114 In particular, recall from chap­
ter 4 (section 4.2.2, p.68) that the distinctive feature of a copyleft licence is that 
it is conditional upon the licensee distributing any improvements to the licensed 
technology on the same terms as those of the original licence.
In the previous section, we saw that non-exclusive grant-backs of licensee im-
112Intemational Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Rome, 3 Novem­
ber 2001) [2002] ATNIF 14 (entered into force 29 June 2004) (PGRFA). Article 12.4 provides for 
facilitated access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture within the Multilateral Sys­
tem established under article 10, pursuant to a standard material transfer agreement (MTA) to be 
adopted by the Governing Body. The terms of the standard MTA, which are to be in accordance 
with conditions set out in Article 12.3, are still under negotiation: at Rome on 15-19 November 
2004, the Second Meeting of the Food and Agriculture Organization Commission on Genetic Re­
sources for Food and Agriculture (acting as the PGRFA Interim Committee), received a report 
on the outcome of the Expert Group on the Terms of the Standard Material Transfer Agreement, 
available at http:/ / www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/docsic2.htm, last accessed 22 December 2004. (The of­
ficial English version of the PGRFA is available at ftp://ext-ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/it/ITPGRe.pdf, 
last accessed 22 December 2004.
113Eben Moglen, personal communication.
114Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
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provements are well known in conventional biotechnology licensing. Such terms 
are commonly used to establish a limited innovative network in the following 
way. The original licence is non-exclusive; each licensee grants the licensor a 
non-exclusive, royalty-free right in any improvement developed by the licensee, 
together with the right to sublicense the improvement to other licensees of the 
same technology. The licensor circulates such improvements among all licensees 
on a royalty-free basis, with ownership in each improvement being retained by 
the party developing the technology. Such networks have been described as gen­
erating a "club atmosphere" that encourages cross-fertilisation of improvements 
among licensor and licensees so that the basic technology can continue to provide 
commercial advantage from which all parties benefit.115
This type of arrangement is very similar to that established by copyleft li­
censing, and has essentially the same rationale: both are a means of facilitating 
"collective invention" (see chapter 6, section 6.4). From a licensing perspective, 
there are two key differences between a biotechnology "club" in which members 
are obliged to grant back improvement rights and a copyleft-based open source 
development project. First, as we saw earlier in this chapter, in the copyleft set­
ting there is no limit on club membership. Not only can the licensor keep ex­
panding the number of licensees, but every licensee has full sublicensing rights, 
as does every sublicensee, and so on. At the same time, any person who ob­
tains a working version of the technology is entitled to a licence. Second, in the 
copyleft context the licensor has no special role in co-ordinating the circulation 
of improvements; instead of granting rights in any improvements to the licen­
sor alone, the licensees agree to grant such rights to all comers, so that (at least 
so far as the transfer of legal rights is concerned) dissemination of improvement 
technologies is decentralised -  similar to messages that are broadcast rather than 
routed through a telephone exchange. This is regarded as an important element 
of the open source approach: Lawrence Rosen has remarked that "the only way 
open source meaningfully works is if you can encourage people to create and use 
without having to go back to you for permission".116
It is clear from this functional description that copyleft may be characterised 
as an unusual form of reach-through licence agreement, in which the price ex­
tracted by an initial innovator for allowing the technology to be used to create 
follow-on innovations is not a royalty payment but a guarantee of continuing ac­
cess to the technology as it evolves -  not only for the initial innovator but for 
anyone who can use it. Eben Moglen, author of the GPL, describes copyleft as 
a way of using "the exclusive powers of one set of people... to create a hook for 
giving other people access to a commons from which they can't withdraw".117 
Whether or not this would prove an attractive option for biotechnology licensors, 
given the familiarity of patent lawyers with reach-through provisions designed 
for other purposes, there appears no legal reason why this type of reach-through
115World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), p.73. 
116Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
U7Eben Moglen, personal communication.
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agreement could not be incorporated into a patent licence or other type of con­
tract in the biotechnology context.
Of course, biotechnology reach-through licence agreements have at various 
times been subject to heavy criticism. Reach-through agreements are one of the 
pathways to anticommons tragedy described by Heller and Eisenberg (chapter 
3, p.35) because they give initial innovators a continuing "seat at the bargain­
ing table" in relation to downstream innovations.118 Some of the costs associated 
with stacking licences would be relevant to a biotechnology version of copyleft -  
for example, those mentioned earlier regarding the difficulty of tracing the tech­
nology's pedigree -  but in general the transaction costs would be substantially 
lower than those associated with proprietary reach-through agreements because 
the nature of the reach-through condition is to mandate licensing terms that are 
inherently less costly than the conventional approach (above, section 5.4.1, p.106).
In addition to the problem of co-ordinating multiple ownership rights in a 
cumulative technology, reach-through patent licences have sometimes been re­
garded as a form of patent misuse. Exclusive grant-backs by way of assignment 
of ownership to the licensor may be considered a violation of competition laws 
where the licensee is forced to agree to such conditions in order to gain a li­
cence to use the patented technology.119 However, this is less likely where the 
grant-back is non-exclusive and the party that developed the technology retains 
full rights. According to the World Intellectual Property Organisation, the non­
exclusive "club" arrangement described above does not amount to patent misuse 
in any major industrial country;120 by analogy, it is unlikely that a copyleft-style 
patent licence would come into conflict with competition laws.
The other obvious issue raised by the description of copyleft as an unusual 
form of reach-through agreement relates to the fact that the licensee promises to 
make improvements available not just to the licensor but to all comers. Under 
the doctrine of privity, as a general rule, even though a contract may benefit a 
third party, only a person who is a party to the contract can sue on it. This creates 
a problem of enforcement, which, however, could be solved in practice by the 
assignment of rights to a central enforcement agency (see below, section 5.4.4, 
p.140).
Specific issues to be addressed in drafting a working copyleft-style biotech­
nology licence In principle, then, it would be possible to draft a copyleft-style 
agreement to apply in the biotechnology context. The next question is what such 
an agreement might look like. The following discussion is not intended to be 
prescriptive, but merely to articulate some of the issues that might need to be 
addressed in drafting a working licence.
118Heller & Eisenberg (1998).
119World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), p.73. 
120Ibid.
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Defining the equivalent of copyright "derived works" In devising the spe­
cific terms of a copyleft-style grant-back in the biotechnology context it would be 
necessary to strike an appropriate balance between incentives to contribute based 
on the promise of continuing access to the evolving technology and licensees' 
freedom to undertake innovative activity for proprietary purposes in the same 
technology area. The part of the licence that would set the balance of incentives 
would be the definition of the equivalent of a "derived work" (referred to so far 
in this discussion as an improvement). The function of a copyleft licence as a 
means of facilitating co-operative technology development suggests that the net 
for catching improvements to be kept within the common pool should be cast 
widely:
Your definition of [the equivalent of] a derived work should be 
quite broad. If too many people are able to take advantage outside 
the expected terms of the licence -  in other words people are putting 
their software out there expecting share and share alike as with the 
GPL -  and people circumvent that quid pro quo, that tends to make 
your community walk off and do something else, and so you need to 
be careful that not too much of that happens.121
The same reasoning suggests that effective enforcement would be an impor­
tant aspect of open source biotechnology licensing. Some practical enforcement 
issues are canvassed briefly below, but one factor that would directly affect the 
ease of enforcement is the degree of certainty that could be achieved with respect 
to the above definition. In the software context, the defintion of derived works 
taps into an established (though, as we saw in chapter 4, somewhat confusing) 
body of law that gives the parties a shared reference point in interpreting the 
terms of the licence. Ideally, an open source biotechnology licence would also 
draw on established legal terminology. As we saw in our discussion of standard 
MTA provisions, there do exist some relevant terms in the biotechnology con­
text whose meanings are comparatively stable and well understood. However, 
choosing exactly the right terminology would require careful consideration. To 
illustrate the point, the difficulty of precisely defining in an MTA what consti­
tutes a "derivative" of a given biological material is well recognised, and empiri­
cal evidence suggests that lawyers and scientists define the term very differently: 
lawyers tend to define it broadly, as including anything at all that is produced 
using the original material, whereas scientists tend to adopt a more narrow defi­
nition based on scientific criteria.122
It has been suggested by the author of the GPL that the degree of certainty 
that could be achieved in defining which modifications should be subject to a 
copyleft-style grant-back obligation would be adversely affected in biotechno­
logy by the comparatively loose fit between the technology itself and the relevant
121 Bruce Perens, personal communication. 
122Kathy Ku, personal communication.
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property rights.123 The essence of this argument appears to be that in software, 
copyright subsists in the object code, itself a functioning technology, whereas in 
biotechnology, the scope of intellectual property protection is defined by a writ­
ten description of the technology (the patent claims) which is necessarily open to 
interpretation:
Copyright just says, "Here's my expression, take it as it is". The 
patent system says, "Here's how I have done what I have done"... .
The claims are what the system protects. So that process of mapping 
into claims is the primary source of the difficulty. What we really want 
is for people to say "Here's a thing, I put it in commons; it is what it is, 
it's self-describing. Use it for whatever you want, but whatever you 
make of it, put it back in the commons. " 124
The implication seems to be that there would inevitably be greater uncertainty 
about the conditions of access to a biotechnology commons than about the condi­
tions established by copyleft terms in the software context. It is further suggested 
that this difference in the relationship between technology and property rights in 
software and biotechnology means that direct translation of copyleft obligations 
into the patent context would create an inappropriate balance of incentives for 
potential users. The reasoning is that copyright in software code cannot be in­
fringed except by copying, modifying or distributing the code, whereas patent 
rights in biotechnology inventions can be infringed by actions that do not relate 
directly to the technology itself, so a "patent-left" grant-back condition would be 
more restrictive than the copyleft grant-back; on the other hand, limitations on 
patentability would mean some technologies or elements of technologies would 
not be caught by a copyleft-style patent licence:
The control the patent system offers you isn't the right amount.
It controls against independent reinvention, [and] you've got the doc­
trine of equivalents... .125 [By contrast,] copyrighted works aren't oust­
ing anybody. You can say "Look at my work, then go and invent it 
yourself, that's fine". But patents are a little stronger. At the same 
time the patent system also in some sense locks up too little because 
of the limits on patentable subject matter. So [the] gateways in and out 
[of the commons] won't be perfectly shaped; it's going to leak in ways 
that we wouldn't like and it may exclude some things that we would 
like to have .126
123This paragraph and the next reflect my understanding, possibly flawed, of points made in 
conversation by Eben Moglen.
124Eben Moglen, personal communication.
125Under the doctrine of equivalents, courts will find infringement where none literally exists. 
If the allegedly infringing device or method is sufficiently similar, even if it is not identical to 
that defined by the claims, then courts will consider it infringing because it is equivalent to the 
claimed invention.
126Eben Moglen, personal communication.
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(Another respect in which the patent system may be regarded as "locking up 
too little" relates to the term of protection: the enormous discrepancy between 
typical product life and the duration of intellectual property protection in the 
software case means that the access provided by a copyleft licence is effectively 
indefinite. This would not be true of many patented biotechnologies, despite 
patent "evergreening".127)
These observations illustrate the speculative quality of current thinking about 
how a copyleft-style biotechnology licence might work. However, conceptually 
they may not advance the discussion very far. To begin with, copyright in soft­
ware code is not tied directly to its functionality, but subsists only in those ele­
ments of a program that contain the author's original expression. In theory, the 
copyrightable elements of software code are identified by a process of abstrac­
tion, filtration and comparison,128 but in practice this process is unwieldy and 
its outcome uncertain.129 Even if copyrightable expression and functional code 
really were one and the same thing, it is not clear why a comparison between 
copyright and patent rights as the means of establishing a technology commons 
would be relevant in the biotechnology context. In software, the outcome of such 
a comparison might add fuel to arguments against the desirability of granting 
software patents, but for the present purpose the relevant comparison is between 
the "patent-left" approach and other options open to innovators in the biotech­
nology context for disseminating a new technology. One such option is to refrain 
from seeking intellectual property protection altogether, instead relying on "a 
good publication that says 'Here it is!"'.130 This approach can be dangerous in 
a proprietary environment, in that simple publication is not always sufficient to 
defeat a subsequent patent claim, but in any case, it leaves the innovator without 
any leverage by which to gain access to later technologies developed using his or 
her input. The other option is to obtain intellectual property protection and adopt 
a conventional proprietary approach to exploitation. In either case, the innovator 
will still be affected by any uncertainty inherent in the patent system. Similarly, 
the area covered by a patent holder's exclusive right is the same no matter how 
that right is exploited; the fact that patent scope may be wider in some respects 
and narrower in others than copyright has no bearing on the decision whether to 
adopt a conventional or "patent-left" approach in biotechnology.
Acknowledging the limits of ownership Nevertheless, the preceding dis­
cussion highlights an important point: you cannot use property rights to control 
what you do not own. As we saw earlier in this chapter (p.96), the conventional
127Patent owners employ a range of strategies to extend effective patent life; a common ap­
proach is to obtain separate twenty year patents on multiple attributes of a single product. See, 
for example, European Generic Medicines Association, "Evergreening of Pharmaceutical Market 
Protection", http://www.egagenerics.com/gen-evergrn.htm, last accessed 22 December 2004.
n8Computer Associates International v. Altai 982 F.2d 693, 23 USPQ2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1992); Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
129Hollaar (2002), section IIIB: "Abstraction, Filtration, Comparison".
130Lita Nelsen, personal communication.
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approach to exploiting biotechnology-related innovations involves restricting ac­
cess to the technology using a combination of intellectual property rights, per­
sonal property rights and trade secrets. Trade secrets are useful where the goal 
is to maintain overall exclusivity, but unlike true property rights used as copyleft 
"hooks", they are not so useful in achieving the opposite goal because they do 
not survive disclosure outside a confidential relationship.
An example from open hardware illustrates the point.131 The Simputer Trust 
is a non-profit group of Indian scientists and engineers who have developed a 
handheld, simple-to-use computer -  the "Simputer" -  with the aim of helping 
poor and illiterate citizens to access information. The Simputer supports soft­
ware that can read web pages aloud in several native Indian languages and uses 
Smartcard storage of user preferences to allow the purchase cost, already low, to 
be shared among many users .132 The Simputer's system software is covered by 
the GPL, and the group wanted to license the hardware on similar terms in order 
to facilitate the spread of the technology and its extensions.
Under the Simputer General Public Licence (SGPL),133, any individual or com­
pany can download the hardware specifications free of charge, but by doing so 
agrees that any derivative work will come back to the Trust within one year to 
allow for further dissemination; such improvements are subsumed in the def­
inition of "specifications" and hence governed by the same licence. Lawrence 
Rosen, General Counsel for the Open Source Intiative, gives the following warn­
ing (speaking in general terms and not as a specific comment on the SGPL) about 
this type of arrangement:
People try to license a lot more than they have a right to licence 
[because] they are afraid of the very open source characteristic that 
they are trying to build. ... [Companies] want their specifications to 
be under... a GPL-like licence, because whatever improvements are 
made by others they will be able to capture. But at the same time 
they want to be able to control those improvements. ... They say:
"I'm going to control the specifications. I'm going to let you [develop 
whatever] you want as long as you do it according to my rules, that 
everything will stay open." But wait a second -  what gave you the 
right to dictate the rules? ... Certainly if you get someone to agree 
that if he reads the specification then he will do certain things with 
respect to [technology] written to that specification, it's a contract and 
anyone who has signed... a reasonable contract... has some obligation 
to follow its terms. But what happens if a copy of the specification...
131The open hardware movement has its roots in the radical technology movement of the 1960s 
and the subsequent development of bazaar-style chip manufacture (see chapter 7, p.213), and is 
currently enjoying a renaissance, partly due to the success of the free and open source software 
movement and the advent of the Internet: Open Collector, "What is 'Open Source Hardware'?", 
http://opencollector.org/Whyfree/, last accessed 22 December 2004.
132Ward (2001); Simputer Trust (2004).
133Available at http://www.simputer.Org/simputer/license/sgplvl.3.php, last accessed 22 De­
cember 2004.
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finds its way to someone who does not make a copy of it, but simply 
finds it and starts to read it [and then] without copying the document, 
which is itself copyright, [builds a technology] to those specifications?
He's not bound."134
A similar issue might arise in relation to protocols and other technical information 
distributed with biological materials. As with hardware specifications, these doc­
uments may be at least partly protectable under copyright as expressive works, 
but the ideas they contain cannot be controlled except through confidentiality 
requirements. The SGPL attempts to solve this problem by requiring users to 
ensure that "no third party can receive or read the specifications from you with­
out having first read and agreed to the terms of this SGPL".135 Rosen (as above, 
speaking in general terms and not as a specific comment on the SGPL):
Every open source licence I write says "you're entitled to the source 
code", and the source code, by definition, is all information necessary 
to modify the program. You can't keep it secret. [So] I don't think 
that's going to fly in open source. It's a legitimate thing to do, don't 
get me wrong -  you can have confidentiality obligations and other 
kinds of things. But... it's not the point of open source."136
The Simputer Trust's response to emailed criticisms of its licence by GPL en­
thusiasts is that, "while the philosophy of the Simputer distribution is rooted 
in the GPL philosophy, where departures from the philosophy are mandated to 
achieve the social purpose, the model will be appropriately altered."137 As stated 
earlier in this chapter, this is a reasonable approach, but in this case the use of non­
disclosure agreements creates a potentially formidable enforcement problem.
Enforcement As we saw earlier, a typical biotechnology licence makes pro­
vision for maintenance and enforcement of the licensed rights. How would these 
issues be dealt with in an open source biotechnology setting? Thinking on this 
issue is also far from advanced:
If you put restrictions on [your licensees], how are you going to 
enforce your restrictions? ... Are all the good scientists out there going 
to watch out for you and report if someone violates the on-licensing 
restrictions? ... Are you going to have all this come back through a 
central repository that then handles that enforcement function? Do 
you even need an enforcement function, or could you just let things 
go and say you don't care?138
134Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
135 Above, note 133.
136Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
137 Above, note 133.
138Kevin Sweeney, Open Source Biology workshop.
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As we saw earlier (p.129), the parties to an open source biotechnology licence 
would have a mutual interest in intellectual property enforcement, not to prevent 
the use of the technology by free riders, but to guard against excessive defec­
tion from the co-operative effort: in a competitive setting, appropriation of im­
provements to technologies made freely available under a copyleft-style licence 
in breach of the licence terms could create real economic disadvantage for those 
who comply with the terms of the agreement. Also for the sake of maintaining 
co-operative development, the parties would have a shared interest in defending 
against challenges to the validity of their patent intellectual property rights.
Common warranties given by the licensee to the licensor in a typical biotech­
nology licence include an agreement not to challenge the validity of the licensed 
rights.139 Challenges by licensees to the validity of intellectual property rights 
may be less likely to arise in an open source biotechnology context because the li­
censee is not being charged a substantial sum for access to the technology and his 
or her immediate use is not being restricted. Walsh et al., in their study of biotech­
nology industry licensing practices (see section 3.3.2, p.42) found that biotechno­
logy owners tend not to challenge the validity of each other's rights where those 
rights are freely cross-licensed: rather, threats come from those who are excluded 
from cross-licensing arrangements.140 Nevertheless, an open source licensor's in­
tellectual property rights may be challenged by industry participants moving to 
an end-game strategy. This possibility was canvassed in the conventional bio­
technology setting by Walsh et al.,141 and in fact, these are the circumstances in 
which enforcement issues have arisen in open source software.142
One method that open source software licensors have adopted in response to 
the threat of litigation is to incorporate mutual defence clauses into some open 
source software licences. In software as in biotechnology, most patent licences 
are granted on the condition that the licensee will refrain from suing the licensor 
for patent infringement; some such provisions have been very broadly worded. 
The reason is that in software (as in most industries), patents are mainly valued as 
a defensive weapon because bringing a suit for patent infringement is expensive, 
cumbersome, and risky. Some open source software licences contain a "mutual 
defence" provision similar to the agreement not to challenge patent rights found 
in a typical biotechnology licence, except that it extends to rights under all open 
source licences, not just the one in dispute, and so is a stronger deterrent:
The [open source community] got together and said "OK, we can 
play that game too. ... If you sue the licensor for patent infringement, 
your licence to any OSI-certified software terminates. We're going to 
defend each other."143
139World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), p.76.
140Walsh & Cohen (2003), p.329.
141Ibid.
142Brian Behlendorf, personal communication, referring especially to the current litigation be­
tween SCO and IBM (see chapter 4, p.91).
143Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
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As we saw earlier (p.115), one practical issue often raised in discussions of the 
feasibility of open source biotechnology licensing is the high cost of maintaining 
and enforcing patent protection. Even though the blanket assumption that an 
open source strategy brings lower returns than conventional exploitation strate­
gies is not justified, most industry participants in an open source biotechnology 
setting might indeed tend to have fewer resources than most conventional play­
ers simply because open source would lower the bar to industry participation. 
The simple solution to cost problems for poorer open source industry partici­
pants would be to contribute to a joint fighting fund or to assign their rights to a 
central agency (see below, p.140). In addition, small players could expect to ben­
efit from the strength of a few larger players (see chapter 7, section 7.3.3, p.221) 
who would "go into bat" on behalf of the whole community:
It isn't worth suing unless a larger company is involved in the in­
fringing activity. If that is the case, the big company will go into battle, 
effectively defending the smaller players engaged in the same alleged 
infringement, as with IBM in the SCO case.144
In the open source software context, enforcement costs are kept to a minimum 
by the use of informal methods, such as mediation, which have been very effec­
tive in bringing about compliance with licence terms.145 Much has been made of 
the importance of community norms in this context,146, and it has been suggested 
that no sufficiently tight-knit community exists in the biotechnology context for 
community norms to play a role in enforcement.147 However, even if the existence 
of a normative community does play an important deterrent role in the software 
context, and even if there is no such community in biotechnology, it does not fol­
low that informal methods would be ineffective. If enough industry participants 
are linked to each other in a pattern of repeat transactions for non-compliance to 
carry the risk of generalised reprisals in future negotiations, informal methods of 
enforcement are likely to be successful.
A number of other difficulties arise with respect to the enforcement of open 
source licence terms due to the potentially large number of contributors to any 
given technology. Three practical issues have been noted in the open source soft­
ware context, relating to standing to sue for copyright infringement, procedural 
matters and remedies.
Standing to sue in relation to copyright infringement is strictly limited. In 
software usually only the author of a particular piece of code or his or her ex­
clusive licensee or assignee (for example, an employer if the code is written in 
the course of employment) has standing.148 An open source software program 
generally contains code written by many different authors, none of whom in-
144Brian Behlendorf, personal communication.
145Webbink (2003), p.9.
146See generally O'Mahony (2003).
147Opderbeck (2004).
148Fitzgerald & Bassett (2003), p.12; Rosen et al. (2003), p.45.
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dividually is likely to have the resources necessary for litigation.149 A common 
solution in copyright generally is for individual authors to assign their rights to 
a single organisation that can handle enforcement on behalf of all contributors to 
a particular technology or on behalf of all contributors to technology licensed in 
a particular way. This is the method employed by the Free Software Foundation 
with respect to code covered by the GPL:
In order to... be able to enforce the GPL most effectively, FSF re­
quires that each author of code incorporated in FSF projects provide 
a copyright assignment, and, where appropriate, a disclaimer of any 
work-for-hire ownership claims by the programmer's employer. That 
way we can be sure that all the code in FSF projects is free code, whose 
freedom we can most effectively protect, and therefore on which other 
developers can completely rely.150
While there are some disadvantages to this approach in relation to cumulative 
technologies -  in particular, it can be expensive in terms of transaction costs when 
dealing with existing code -  151, these are not insurmountable, and at the Open 
Source Biology Workshop in March 2003, the collecting society model emerged 
as the most promising approach to enforcement. Of course, any open source bio­
technology project should establish some efficient way of tracking the ownership 
of contributions from the beginning. As noted earlier in this chapter, such prob­
lems arise in conventional biotechnology licensing also; existing biotechnology 
licensing initiatives may therefore offer some guidance in this regard.152
Procedural issues in open source software enforcement include how to join 
a large number of copyright owners in an infringement action and how to en­
sure all owners are served notice of the proceedings.153 There may be difficulties 
as to what remedies are appropriate, given different sized contributions and the 
fact that contributors have not required payment or royalties for their work; the 
lack of financial compensation for contributions also makes conventional harm 
and loss difficult to establish. The appropriate remedy for infringement in an 
open source context would presumably be the equitable remedies of injunction 
and specific performance (to disclose the source code of any derivative work), 
together with the threat of having to account for profits.154 It would be necessary
149A mere distributor, such as Red Hat, has no standing; but note that the position of an or­
ganisation or individual that co-ordinates the programming efforts and manages the results of a 
community effort in open source develoment is not so clear: a compilation copyright may be held 
by the project manager independent of underlying copyrights in individual modules of the pro­
gram so that that person may have standing to enforce copyright in a compilation. James (2003), 
pp.83-84.
150Free Software Foundation, "Why the FSF gets copyright assignments from contributors", 
http:// www.gnu.org/copyleft/why-assign.html, last accessed 22 December 2004.
1510'Mahony (2003); Gampe & Weatherley (2003), p.121.
152For example, the PIPRA initiative (section 3.5.4, p.59) will make use of a range of existing 
Web-based patent search tools: see Graff et al. (2001).
153James (2003), pp.83-84.
154Fitzgerald & Bassett (2003), p.36; James (2003), pp.83-84.
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in establishing an open source biotechnology licensing scheme to consider how 
patent law remedies would fit with open source objectives.
It should be noted that these practical difficulties relating to enforcement are 
not so much a property of open source licensing versus conventional proprietary 
licensing as they are a property of collaborative, bazaar-style development ver­
sus in-house, cathedral-style development. As we have seen, collaboration (with 
associated transaction costs, including those related to enforcement) is already 
an integral part of biotechnology development; the question is whether an open 
source or conventional approach to collaboration is likely to be most effective in 
any given case.
5.5 Conclusion: licensing in biotechnology
In this chapter I have argued that an open source approach to biotechnology re­
search and development is not only desirable, but feasible. The first step in estab­
lishing the feasibility of open source biotechnology is to show that open source 
licensing principles can be applied in a biotechnology context. Taking the OSD as 
a statement of open source licensing principles, this chapter compared conven­
tional biotechnology licensing practice with the key elements of the OSD, relat­
ing to self-selection of licensees and to the practical wherewithal (access to source 
code equivalent) and legal freedom to make changes to the licensed technology 
necessary for cumulative development. The results of this comparison indicate 
that while translating open source principles into biotechnology licensing would 
raise a number of technical issues, these would not be insurmountable, assuming 
technical expertise could be made available. The Creative Commons example 
(section 3.5.1, p.57) shows that such help could be obtained on terms that need 
not distort technology developers' attempts to articulate the terms of their de­
sired intellectual commons. The translation process would also raise a number 
of issues that would need to be addressed by technology developers themselves 
because they relate directly to the conditions of access of the common pool re­
source that would be established by an open source biotechnology licence. This 
could occur through a combination of "model mongering" and iterative learn­
ing, drawing on previous experience in software, biotechnology and any other 
spheres of production in which commons-based peer production has been seri­
ously attempted.
The outcome of such an evolutionary approach to licence development might 
not, in fact, resemble open source software licensing very closely, though there 
would presumably be many shared attributes based both on divergent evolution 
-  similarities due to common ancestry — and convergent evolution -  in which 
similar problems are solved in similar ways. According to the author of the OSD, 
this is not a matter for concern:
I do take a purist line about what open source is supposed to be -  
but only in software. Obviously we are attempting not just to write a 
licence but to social engineer, and the parameters for successful social
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engineering may be different in different spheres. If we create some­
thing that is less than a working community, then this effort has no 
meaning.155
In the next chapter, we step back from the issue of licensing to examine whether 
and how such a community might coalesce in the biotechnology context.
155Bruce Perens, personal communication.
Open source as a development 
methodology
Chapter 6
6.1 Introduction
We saw in chapter 4 that "open source" may be characterised as a set of principles 
for technology licensing, as a methodology for technology development, and as 
a strategy for exploitation of technological innovations.
Chapter 5 addressed the question whether it would be feasible to license bio­
technologies in accordance with open source principles that have evolved in a 
software setting, building on copyright law. We now ask whether an open source 
approach to technology development could be applied in biotechnology.
To conduct a detailed comparison between open source software develop­
ment and existing and possible future approaches to biotechnology development, 
it is necessary to create or adopt an analytical framework in which open source 
development is characterised in terms of generalised principles, as distinct from 
principles peculiar to software development. There are many possible ways to 
map the highly varied landscape of open source, depending on the purpose of 
the map and the disciplinary background of the cartographer; rather than mul­
tiply analyses I have chosen to adopt an analytical framework drawn from the 
innovation management literature on user innovation.1
A user innovation approach has several advantages in constructing a gener­
alised theory of open source development. First, the literature is replete with 
empirical studies conducted in a range of industrial settings.2 *&Second, in part as
lrThe seminal work in the user innovation literature is Eric von Hippel's 1988 book, Sources 
of Innovation (von Hippel (1988)). User innovation theory has its roots in the broader fields of 
innovation management and industrial organisation.
2These include studies of user innovation in relation to printed circuit CAD software (cite-
tUrbanl988); pipe hanger hardware (Herstatt & von Hippel (1992)); library information systems
(Morrison et al. (2002)); Apache open source server software security features (Franke & von Hip-
pel (2003)); outdoor consumer products (Luthje (2000)); "extreme" sporting equipment (Franke
& Shah (2002)); mountain biking equipment (Luthje et al. (2002)); mass production of steel in the 
nineteenth century United States and the development of personal computers (Meyer (2003)); de­
velopment of the Cornish pumping engine in the British Industrial Revolution (Nuvolari (2001)); 
"pultrusion" process machinery and scientific instruments (von Hippel (1988)); wind turbines, 
agricultural equipment, currency and seeds (Douthwaite (2002)), as well as open source software
143
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a consequence, user innovation theory does not treat the open source phenom­
enon as sui generis, but places it within a continuum of approaches to promoting 
and supporting technological innovation. Third, the user innovation literature ar­
ticulates and challenges assumptions that other branches of literature, including 
law and economics, tend to leave implicit concerning the way decisions are made 
about how to exploit innovations and associated intellectual property. Finally, a 
user innovation approach is compatible with other relevant approaches in that it 
analyses the motivations of various players in terms of rational self-interest; yet 
it avoids falling into the trap of equating self-interest with pecuniary interest, to 
the exclusion of other kinds of benefit. In addition to its inherent advantages, 
the "user innovation" model of open source software development is highly ac­
cessible and already shows signs of winning the competition for "survival of the 
fittest" within the emerging scholarly niche devoted to studying the open source 
phenomenon .* 3 This means that adopting a user innovation model of open source 
should help promote inclusive yet nuanced discussion of this phenomenon across 
disciplinary boundaries.
From a user innovation perspective, open source software development is an 
example of a horizontal user innovation network supported by a community.4 
A "horizontal user innovation network" is characterised by user innovation, col­
lective invention based on free revealing of innovations, and independence from 
manufacturers (defined below ) .5 This chapter examines each of these elements, 
together with the element of community support, to determine the extent to 
which it already exists or could be reproduced in biotechnology. If all the ele­
ments of a generalised open source model are actually or potentially present in 
the biotechnology context, we may conclude that it is possible to implement an 
open source-style approach to biotechnology development.
6.2 User innovation
6.2.1 What is user innovation?
The user innovation literature draws a distinction between users and manufac­
turers of an innovation, the categories being defined according to the type of 
benefit an innovator expects to get from his or her innovation. These categories 
are termed "functional classes" because they are determined by the innovator's
(see online papers at Free/Open Source Research Community, http://opensource.mit.edu).
3The open source literature is fast-growing and multidisciplinary; the phenomenon is of broad 
interest both because the transparent nature of open source development makes it easy to study 
empirically and because it challenges conventional assumptions in many disciplines. One of 
the richest repositories of open source literature is maintained by von Hippel and others at 
Free/Open Source Research Community, http://opensource.mit.edu/, last accessed 1 November 
2004: the collection of online papers available at this site demonstrates the breadth of scholarly 
interest in this subject.
4von Hippel & von Krogh (2001); Lakhani & von Hippel (2002).
5von Hippel (2002).
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functional relationship to the innovation.6 A user is a person or a firm that ben­
efits primarily from using the innovation in-house. A manufacturer is someone 
who expects to benefit primarily by selling the innovation to users.7 The con­
ventional assumption is that manufacturers rather than users are likely to be the 
main innovators in any given field, for the simple reason that "inventing one 
and selling many" items is assumed to be the most profitable way to exploit an 
innovation. But according to user innovation theory, all functional classes are 
potential sources of innovation under appropriate conditions.8
To understand why, it is helpful to consider what motivates innovative activ­
ity. People and firms sometimes innovate in response to an expectation that they 
will derive some benefit, either from the innovation itself or from the process of 
innovating. (Process benefits may or may not be commercial in nature and in­
clude fun, learning and a sense of belonging to a community.) Alternatively, if 
the innovative activity is incidental to the pursuit of some other goal, a person or 
firm may engage in such activity without expecting any benefit: the innovation is 
then a side-effect. In other words, not all innovators innovate with the intention 
of exploiting the innovation itself. Therefore, the functional class whose members 
have the most to gain by exploiting a putative innovation need not always be the 
primary innovators in a given field.
Further, even if we limit our focus to innovation that is motivated by an ex­
pectation of benefit to be derived from exploitation of the innovation itself, the 
manufacturer's "invent one, sell many" approach is not always the most prof­
itable means of exploitation. Users are often better placed than manufacturers 
to capture economic rent from an innovation: for example, users are in a better 
position than manufacturers to protect trade secrets because selling a technology 
increases the likelihood that it will be reverse engineered; similarly, manufactur­
ers need to market an innovation in order to extract rent from it, whereas users 
need only decide whether to adopt a new technology and therefore take less risk.9 
User innovation theory predicts that where users are the best placed to derive 
benefit from an innovation, they will be the primary innovators, and proposes 
specific conditions where this is likely to be the case.10 These conditions are that 
information is "sticky" and that user need is heterogeneous.
In contexts where the information required to generate new technological de­
velopments is "sticky" -  that is, costly to transfer in usable form -  it makes more 
sense for a user, who already has most of that information, to engage in innova­
tive activity than it does for a manufacturer, who would have to invest in getting
6von Hippel (1988), pp.3-4.
7Users and manufacturers are not the only functional classes identified in the literature, though 
they are the most studied. Like manufacturers, suppliers of goods or services needed to produce 
or use an innovation and wholesale or retail distribu tors of an innovation both benefit indirectly 
through increased demand resulting from its adoption by users. Other functional classes benefit 
from increased activity in the sector as a whole, for example insurers and providers of professional 
services such as lawyers, accountants or fund managers.
8Ibid., p.4.
9Ibid., pp.46-55.
10Ibid., p44.
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hold of information about what users need and how a particular innovation func­
tions in a given industrial setting. If user need is also heterogeneous, manufactur­
ers are even less likely to make such an investment, as heterogeneity makes these 
tasks simultaneously more costly and less rewarding (because the market for any 
particular product would be correspondingly smaller). In such contexts, the costs 
of innovating are likely to outweigh the benefits for manufacturers, whereas users 
will still be able to profit by the internal use of innovations, for example through 
cost savings or quality improvements.11 This internal use value (the value of the 
innovation as an intermediate good, as distinct from its end value or value as a 
final good) has been shown to suffice as an incentive for innovation in such di­
verse applications as pultrusion process machinery, semiconductor and printed 
circuit board assembly, scientific instruments, wind turbines, agricultural equip­
ment, currency and seeds, as well as computer software.12
6.2.2 User innovation in biotechnology
Is biotechnology research and development one of those areas where it often 
makes sense for users to do most of the innovating? If the information surround­
ing biotechnological innovations is sticky and if the needs of people or firms who 
will use those innovations are heterogeneous, we may conclude that it is.
The stickiness of information is affected by several factors, including how 
much information is to be transferred, attributes or choices of information providers 
or information seekers, and attributes of the information itself.13 For example, 
information providers may decide to charge for access to information, while in­
formation seekers may lack relevant tools or complementary information or may 
be less efficient for some other reason at acquiring particular information. (In 
both cases, the existence of specialised organisational structures such as transfer 
groups, or specialised personnel such as technological gatekeepers, may affect 
the ease with which information is transferred.) The qualities of information it­
self that affect stickiness have been variously described in terms of its degree of 
"codification", "tacitness", "generalisability", or "embeddedness".14
Information surrounding biotechnological innovations is sticky in all of these 
senses. Recall from chapter 2 Hilgartner's "data stream" theory, grounded in
n Franke & von Hippel (2003); Luthje et al. (2002).
12Above, note 2. Note that the primacy of user innovation in software development is not con­
fined to open source software, though the fact that the free redistribution clause of open source 
licences eliminates any direct path for manufacturers to appropriate returns from private invest­
ment in open source products means open source is an extreme example. In his essay "The Magic 
Cauldron", Raymond addresses what he terms "the manufacturing delusion", that is, the as­
sumption that software has the value characteristics (balance of intermediate versus final value) 
of a typical manufactured good, asserting that approximately 95% of software code is written 
for internal use. Raymond suggests this assumption persists partly because the small portion of 
the software industry that manufactures for sale is also the only part that advertises its product: 
Raymond (2001), chapter 5.
13von Hippel (1994).
14Polyani (1958); Rosenberg (1982); Nelson (1990); see Mandeville (1996) for a comparison of 
terminology.
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empirical research on access practices in molecular genetics, the foundation sci­
ence of the biotechnology industry (section 2.4, p.14). According to this model, 
scientific data are not stable, well-defined entities, but elements of an evolving 
data stream that are often embedded in tangible objects whose form affects the 
purposes for which the data can be used: in other words, the information itself 
has sticky qualities. Further, a variety of attributes and choices of information 
providers and seekers have the capacity to hinder the flow of scientific data, in­
cluding the diversity of actors within research networks and the wide range of 
mechanisms available for granting, limiting or denying access to data. In par­
ticular, strategies for commercialisation, including intellectual property licensing 
practices, often increase the "stickiness" of biological data: as described in intro­
ductory chapters, this aspect of information stickiness is the motivation for the 
present investigation. As for stickiness arising from uncertainty as to the amount 
of data to be transferred or the need to transfer large amounts of data, this is 
implicit in the conceptualisation of data as a continuously flowing stream that 
cannot readily be partitioned into separate "bites".
The following comment by a senior scientist involved in efforts to model a bi­
ological system of importance to the pharmaceutical industry illustrates how the 
complexity of biological systems themselves and the early stage of development 
of many biotechnologies contributes to the phenomenon of information stickiness 
in biotechnology:
The systems we're trying to decipher are incredibly complicated.
Someone told me a joke: "How does a biologist try to figure out how 
an automobile works?" Answer: "He buys a thousand cars, shoots 
a piece off each one and tries to figure out what happened." So we 
have a lot of new technologies for trying to understand how biological 
systems work, but [although] it is very sophisticated in one sense, in 
another it's really not. And we're not just dealing with a two or even 
a three dimensional problem; it's four or five dimensional, things are 
happening over time, it's a moving target. ... There is data we still 
have not shared yet because the rate limiting step has been developing 
the tools to import, store, analyse and display the data.15
Another comment by a biological engineer illustrates the stickiness of biotechnology- 
related information with respect to both attributes or choices of information providers 
or information seekers, and attributes of the information itself -  at the same time 
recalling its stickiness in a literal sense:
People talk as though DNA is pure information, but there is more 
information contained in the molecules [than just] the sequence infor­
mation... because... it is not easy to obtain DNA simply by synthesis 
from a published sequence....
There are three ways you would normally go about [obtaining mole­
cular DNA]. The first is to "clone by phone". Journals require that
15Alfred Gilman, personal communication.
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you share with anyone who phones you up and asks, but there is no 
enforcement....Your next option, if they refuse, is to somehow obtain 
a sample [of the organism from which the sequenced clone was ini­
tially derived] and clone it yourself. That is difficult; it takes some 
work and also some time waiting for the sample to arrive, and there 
is a problem if the sample itself is dangerous -  if you want to work on 
smallpox DNA you don't really want to be culturing smallpox in your 
own lab. Your third [option] is to order synthetic DNA based on the 
sequence. Right now that is a crazy, desperate last resort; it's costly 
and you have to have it done in short sequences because you cannot 
make a long piece of DNA easily: it's fragile, and as you're working 
on one end, the end you have already made starts sticking to itself, 
goes bioactive and starts doing things you don't want it to do.
Over the next five or ten years, it will become much more realistic to 
genuinely build DNA from a sequence, and [then] I predict people 
will...find new ways to slow things down. People get sneaky: there 
was this guy who got published in one of the big journals and some­
body wrote to ask for a sample of DNA and he said no. They were 
so angry they shredded up the refusal letter and did PCR on it and 
managed to clone the sequences off it -  it had been lying around the 
other guy's laboratory and there was a whole lot of DNA stuck to the 
paper!16
Not only is biotechnology information sticky, but user need is often hetero­
geneous. One type of heterogeneity relates to the scale of research projects: in 
biotechnology, "big" science coexists with traditional biology research led by in­
dividual investigators in single laboratories with a handful of staff. The scale of 
a project has a direct impact on users' ability and willingness to pay for innova­
tions developed by manufacturers for a broad market, and can therefore tip the 
balance from manufacturer innovation towards user innovation:
Whether you can afford off-the-shelf technology depends on what 
you are trying to do. [Ready-made cDNA arrays] might be quite rea­
sonably priced for some purposes, but one of the first experiments we 
did required several hundred arrays, and Affymetrix was pricing their 
arrays at thousands of dollars apiece, so it would have cost us several 
hundred thousand dollars to do the experiment. The sheer scale of 
what we're doing here means things aren't always affordable.17
At the other extreme, in-house adaptation of an existing tool -  a process some­
times known affectionately as "bodging", familiar to every home handyperson 
and also every lab technician -  will often be more cost-effective for a small or 
short-term project than the purchase of manufactured tools specific to the task.
16Tom Knight, personal communication. 
17Alfred Gilman, personal communication.
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innovation -  analogous, perhaps, to farmer experimentation with the application 
of fertilisers to Green Revolution crops27 -  may be considered peripheral. But 
though it is true they do not relate directly to the use of biotechnologies to de­
velop the composition of a drug, many of these developments do involve the 
application of biotechnology-related knowledge, are patentable and are regarded 
by pharmaceutical companies as valuable enough to be included in "total prod­
uct" or "lifecycle maximisation" patenting strategies, in which intellectual prop­
erty owners erect "picket fences" or families of dozens of patents around a single 
product covering numerous aspects of the product.28
6.3 Free revealing
6.3.1 Proprietary and non-proprietary exploitation strategies
In the previous section we saw that user innovation theory challenges the as­
sumption that manufacturers dominate innovation. A second assumption un­
derpinning conventional theory is that any uncompensated spillover of propri­
etary knowledge developed through private investment will reduce the inno­
vator's profit from that investment. The user innovation literature challenges 
this assumption also, returning to first principles to compare the likely costs and 
benefits of proprietary and non-proprietary strategies for exploiting an innova­
tion.29 Proprietary strategies include both in-house use and licensing of innova­
tions protected by IP laws (such as copyright or patents) and trade secrecy. The 
essence of any proprietary strategy is exclusion -  to preserve a competitive ad­
vantage conferred by the innovation, and in the case of licensing out, to prevent 
non-licensees from reaping the benefits of the innovation without paying, which 
would erode potential licensees' incentive to enter a licence agreement in the first 
place and thereby prevent the owner from recovering any revenue. By contrast, 
non-proprietary strategies -  termed "free revealing" in the user innovation lit­
erature -  entail granting access to an innovation to all interested agents without 
imposition of any direct payment. According to the literature definition, free re­
vealing does not mean that recipients necessarily acquire and utilise the revealed 
information at no cost to themselves (for example, they may have to pay for an 
Internet connection or a field trip to acquire the information being freely revealed 
or may need to obtain complementary information or other assets in order to fully 
understand that information or put it to use); however, if the information posses­
sor does not profit from any such expenditures made by information recipients, 
the information itself is still freely revealed.30 Technology licensed according to
(1997), referring to the influence of HIV/AIDS patients on clinical trial techniques in the devel­
opment by Merck of protease inhibitor drugs.
27Douthwaite, op.cit. note 24.
28European Generic Medicines Association, "Patents and Lifecycle maximisation", 
http://www.egagenerics.com/gen-phrmapatents.htm, last accessed 3 November 2004.
29Harhoff et al. (2002).
30von Hippel (2002).
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open source principles is, of course, privately owned, but because open source 
licences allow use, redistribution and modification of subject matter without im­
posing any fee, open source licensing has been characterised in efforts to map the 
public domain as "contiguous territory"31 and falls within the user innovation 
literature definition of "free revealing". Free revealing may be adopted as a de­
liberate strategy, but it may also be the default if the necessary steps are not taken 
to either keep an innovation secret or obtain intellectual property protection for 
it.
A comparison of these strategies indicates that although a proprietary ap­
proach is often the most profitable way to exploit an innovation, this is not al­
ways the case. On the one hand, there are important limitations inherent in any 
proprietary strategy. For example, consider a strategy based on secrecy. Trade se­
crecy only makes sense for inventions that either can be commercially exploited 
in secret or cannot be easily reverse-engineered; further, even though there is no 
limit to the term of protection in principle, in practice it has been shown that 
most secrets cannot be kept longer than 12 to 18 months.32 The costs of preserv­
ing secrecy can be significant and must be set off against the benefits of exclusive 
access. Further, when it comes to licensing an innovation outside the innovation 
organisation, a dilemma arises: disclosing the information to too many people 
can result in the loss of legal protection, but disclosing to only a small number 
places a cap on the amount of licensing revenue that can be derived from the in­
novation 33 Similarly, there are disadvantages to a proprietary approach based on 
intellectual property protection; we return to this point below.
On the other hand, the user innovation literature documents a number of 
ways in which a self-interested innovator can benefit from a non-proprietary (free 
revealing) exploitation strategy. In the discussion that follows, we consider three 
examples relevant to a commercial setting.34 First, free revealing may grow the 
user base for a technology, thereby growing the market for complementary goods 
and services and perhaps even establishing a de facto industry standard. Second, 
free revealing may increase the value of an innovation to the innovating user. If 
this increase in value is due to network effects, it will be a direct result of growing 
the user base of the technology (in other words, these first two types of benefit 
overlap). Such an increase in value could also be due to a "certification signal" 
or "peer review" effect that enables the innovating user to treat the technology 
as reliable on the basis that it has been tested or checked by other users.35 Nei­
ther of these enhancements in use value depends on allowing others to modify 
the innovation; if the mechanism by which the innovation is freely revealed does 
facilitate improvements to the core technology by other users, there may be fur­
ther benefits for the innovating user. For example, a manufacturer may develop 
a new version of the innovation that leads to reduced production costs or in-
31Samuelson (2001)
32Mansfield (1985), cited by Von Hippel in Sources of Innovation. 
33Harhoff et al. (2002).
34 Ibid.
35Meyer (2003).
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In high tech, one of the keys to the development of markets is the 
establishment of standards. Secretly everyone wants to be Microsoft 
and establish a de facto proprietary standard; but most people recog­
nise that the Microsofts and the Intels are going to be few and far be­
tween......So given a choice between a proprietary approach which is
going to be stuck in a niche because it is proprietary, and a potentially 
very big business opportunity that's large because it's based on a stan­
dard, the standard-based approach may be rational. In this thinking, 
you could justify a non-proprietary approach where you make money 
off of supporting it, off other complementary things, off integrating 
it into other things. These opportunities might be harder to find in 
biotechnology than in software, but they probably do exist.42
For example, there could be an opportunity for an "open source" biotechnology 
firm in selling instrumentation that would conform to an open standard for mak­
ing microarrays. As we saw earlier, at present proprietary chips are too expensive 
for some users and some applications; as a result there is a ready-made customer 
base for tools that would enable users to "roll their own" microarrays in accor­
dance with a format that would ensure compatibility with other users' data:
Affymetrix [a proprietary microarray manufacturer] is probably 
the closest thing we have to an Intel in the life sciences tool business, 
and one of the reasons... is that microarray expression data is not com­
parable across different microarray technologies. So once you have 
some Affy data, if you want to use it in the context of any other mi­
croarray data, you've kind of got to have that other data in Affymetrix 
format -  in other words, use more Affy chips. The same is true for 
people who "roll their own" arrays -  the data they generate can't be 
compared to anyone else's data. If someone could develop a way of 
normalising data from different microarray formats, that would be a 
huge opportunity for a whole bunch of people, not only on the [in­
formatics] side, but also for microarray manufacturers and users. So 
that would be another area where you have a de facto [proprietary] 
standard but you could create an official, open standard. The only 
people for whom that would be bad news would be the owners of the 
proprietary standard.43
Another example might be in the area of assessing the safety of new drugs:
[Toxicology] is an area where there's a big need for tools -  and 
wherever there's a need that big for tools there's the possibility of com­
ing up with a standardised approach that would grow the overall size 
of the opportunity and benefit a lot of people.44
42Lee Bendeckgey, personal communication. 
43Lee Bendeckgey, personal communication. 
44Lee Bendeckgey, personal communication.
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A second potential commercial application of a free revealing strategy aimed 
at growing the user base for a technology would be to pre-empt the establishment 
of a proprietary standard (in this context, free revealing is often referred to as 
"defensive publishing"). In biology, the ultimate technical standard is the human 
genome: it is the platform on which every human genetic technology rests, and it 
is entirely and forever non-substitutable. Private ownership of the genome would 
be a disaster for everyone but the owner, and it is therefore not surprising that this 
is one area where free revealing has taken root in an otherwise highly competitive 
industry. The most obvious example of this strategy is the participation of large 
pharmaceutical companies in the SNP consortium (TSC) ,45 which funds academic 
scientists to collaborate in the creation of a public database of human genetic 
markers .46 Funding the creation of a public SNP map of the human genome is a 
way of sidestepping a potential "tragedy of the anticommons" in relation to SNP 
data:
[With SNPs,] as with ESTs and then with the complete human se­
quence, there was a fear that the gold rush mentality would lead to 
large numbers of SNPs being tied up in patents and pooled beyond 
the reach of further research.47
For the various commercial members of the consortium, opting out of intellectual 
property ownership meant not having to negotiate subsequently for access to in­
tellectual property either among themselves or with smaller biotechnology firms 
-  a move that has been described as "placing a blocking stone on the go board" . 48
In the case of ESTs (Expressed Sequence Tags), the free revealing strategy was 
employed by a single firm funding academic research, rather than a consortium:
The big companies weren't any happier than the academics that 
upstart genomics companies looked like cornering all the rights to 
valuable genome information. Merck funded a massive drive to gen­
erate ESTs and place them in the public databases, where they would 
be freely available to all. ... By doing this, Merck not only gave the 
entire research community, public and private, free access to valuable 
genomic data; it also made those sequences (and possibly the whole 
genes from which they came) much more difficult to patent.49
45The TSC is a public-private collaboration jointly funded by the UK's Wellcome Trust and ten 
major pharmaceutical companies: AstraZeneca, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Glaxo Wellcome, 
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Hoffman-La Roche, Novartis, Pfizer, Searle and SmithKline Beecham: 
http://www.ims-global.com/insight/news_story/news_story_990925a.htm, last accessed 20 No­
vember 2004.
46The leading research institutions participating in this effort are the Whitehead Institute/MIT 
Center for Genome Research, Washington University, the Wellcome Trust's Sanger Centre near 
Cambridge (UK), Stanford University, and the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory: The SNP Consor­
tium "Frequently Asked Questions", http://snp.cshl.org/about/faq.shtml, last accessed 3 No­
vember 2004.
47Sulston & Ferry (2002), p.199.
48Roger Brent, Open Source Biology workshop.
49Ibid., p.119.
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While it is easiest to find examples of pre-emptive free revealing in relation to 
human genome data, there are other contexts in which this type of strategy could 
make sense. The context of the following exchange was that pharmaceutical com­
panies could be expected to be keen to forestall the establishment of a proprietary 
standard in predictive toxicology (see further discussion below):
Bendeckgey: There are almost inevitably going to be technologies 
developed that have great value to [pharmaceutical companies]..., and 
[so] they will definitely want choice of suppliers. Having a supplier 
of a critical value driver be the sole source for that thing is really your 
worst nightmare.
Hope: So does that mean these larger companies might be prepared 
to support a new enterprise that was based on trying to come up with 
an open source tool?
Bendeckgey: I think if you had a credible story, they might, yes. ...
Even though pharmaceutical companies have a history of not liking 
sharing, one thing they like even less is being beholden to an Intel or 
a Microsoft -  or an Affymetrix.50
This point is worth emphasising: large downstream players in the life sciences, as 
in other technology fields, will always want competition among their suppliers, 
and could be expected to support open source to the extent that it helps achieve 
this goal.
Induced improvements The second type of free revealing benefit listed above is 
that an innovator who intends to use the technology may gain access to valuable 
improvements made by other users for their own purposes:
[W]hen as a company you spend that money it's like putting bread 
on the waters, because what happens is you stimulate all these re­
search areas, you already have a lot of interests in there and you may 
then pick up a lot of things from that research that may be advanta­
geous to your business. So...these things can very well pay off. Some­
times you are just as well off, or better off making the thing public 
because... you'll reel in bigger fish yourself by putting it out there.
... If people take the longer vision then they must benefit from this, 
because their particular product will become more widely used and 
therefore richer. 51
For obvious reasons, this motivation often sits alongside pre-emptive publishing 
as a reason for adopting a free revealing strategy, as in the case of the TSC:
A high-quality, high-density SNP map is a research tool that will 
benefit everyone involved in genomic research. By collaborating, the
50Lee Bendeckgey, personal communication. 
51John Sulston, personal communication.
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members of The SNP Consortium will be able to create a commonly- 
accepted SNP map more quickly, and with shared financial risk and 
less duplication of effort than if each company proceeded on its own. 
Additionally, The Consortium anticipates that the map that will be 
constructed will be of greater density and therefore potentially greater 
utility to the pharmaceutical industry than SNP maps currently avail­
able.52
This type of collaboration is best suited to fundamental enabling technologies 
that are not a source of competitive advantage for the companies involved:53:
[F]ive years ago, bioinformatics companies were coming into exis­
tence at a rate of several new companies a day, offering to solve the 
problem of a huge amount of data -  managing, correlating, mining 
data -  but none of them ever really made a business of it. ...[S]omewhere 
along the line the pharma companies decided to...build their own bioin­
formatics organisations, and they were all convinced their way was 
the best. ... There's got to be a lot of private grumbling going on in 
pharmaceutical companies about that, because now they're stuck with 
all this overhead... . One can imagine that if someone could [develop 
an open standard for bioinformatics], that would ultimately be a huge 
win for them. Their R&D budgets are under enormous pressure -  es­
pecially for anything that doesn't involve getting a drug through the 
clinic and onto the market.54
Thus, large companies may be expected to support an open source approach 
where it complements their proprietary business models by reducing costs, risks 
and product development time.
Other examples of important technologies that would benefit from constant 
evolution and improvement where this kind of approach might be useful include 
toxicology and management of clinical trial data. In relation to toxicology, the 
difficulty for pharmaceutical firms was once a scarcity of promising drug targets; 
with the advent of genomics this is less of a problem, and the major bottleneck 
is now that many drug candidates fail too late, after enormous investments have 
been made. Some efforts are being made within the industry to develop predic­
tive toxicology tools, but fundamentally the process still consists, as one intervie­
wee put it, of "lining up rats, dosing them and seeing which of the little buggers 
die". A tool that could identify unpromising drug candidates either predictively 
or by early analysis of the toxicology profile before they reach the second or third 
phase of clinical trials would save pharmaceutical companies a huge amount of 
money and cut a lot of time off the drug development process.55
52The SNP Consortium, "Frequently Asked Questions", http:// snp.cshl.org/about/faq.shtml, 
last accessed 3 November 2004.
53Sulston & Ferry (2002), pp.199-200.
54Lee Bendeckgey, personal communication.
55Ibid.
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In relation to the management of clinical trial data, this is still a surprisingly 
manual process; nurses and doctors at university hospitals "write things down 
in pen and ink and make stacks of little pieces of paper and send them back to 
the company".56 According to interviewees, the process is inefficient and error- 
prone in circumstances where errors have important regulatory and product con­
sequences, and is another area where pharmaceutical companies are spending 
large amounts of money on a process which is not a major source of competitive 
advantage:
I can't see that in this area they would think it was so important 
to have a proprietary version [of a management tool] that was better 
than anyone else's, so again this is a big need where they probably 
wouldn't be averse to sharing.57
As we saw in chapter 3, such shared or collaborative technology development 
is often plagued by problems of trust; in the absence of an effective mechanism 
to enforce sharing, free revealing with the aim of obtaining this type of benefit 
therefore carries some risk. Pharmaceutical companies have even been wary of 
licensing in data under a non-exclusive licence:
Pharma would be... suspicious. ... [T]hey like to keep things close 
to their vests. For example, the economics of selling databases of pro­
teins, genes and so on are only really attractive if you can resell the 
same data to many customers. It took a while to convince... the first 
[customers for these products] that it really didn't put them at a dis­
advantage to share the information with other pharmaceutical com­
panies -  that is, with other customers; that ultimately... they could get 
more information and a higher quality of information through shar­
ing the expense of generating it with multiple companies buying the 
same information than either doing it themselves in-house or paying 
someone exclusively to do it for them.58
However, as we saw in chapter 5, non-exclusive licensing arrangements with 
grant-backs of rights in improvements (somewhat analogous to a copyleft ap­
proach) sometimes bring sufficient benefits to participants for them to overcome 
their mutual suspicion, as demonstrated by the following example concerning 
Incyte Genomics' database licensing arrangements in the early 1990s:
Besides providing access to information about genes and proteins, 
Incyte gives its customers the right to use any patents that it has on the 
genes and proteins described in its database; so to the extent we have 
intellectual property, you get freedom to operate, you're not just look­
ing at it on the computer. In those days it was mostly ESTs. ... [I]t oc- 
cured to the folks at Incyte and Pfizer late in negotiatons [for Incyte's
56Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58Ibid.
160 Open source as a development methodology
first database product] that Incyte could be inadvertently starting an 
arms race among the pharmaceutical companies in the following way.
Like any good pharma company that lives and dies by its IP portfolio, 
one thing Pfizer insisted on -  like basically all others, in negotiations 
-  was that if they discovered the full-length gene based on a partial 
gene in our database, and figured out its function, they could patent 
that: it would be theirs, not ours. That seems fair, but then it started 
to occur to everyone that it was quite likely, given everyone was start­
ing with the same data, that people would identify a lot of the same 
partial genes as being of interest, and then you would get this kind 
of race in which everyone was racing to complete the gene and fig­
ure out its function and get the IP on it and then start lobbing legal 
missiles at all the others. [T]here started to be concern [that] people 
would be contaminated and face the risk of IP infringement actions 
from other people who were using the same data. So what was pro­
posed, and what Pfizer agreed to in the first agreement, and every big 
pharmaceutical company has agreed to since then, is in effect an open 
source-like grant-back. What those agreements say is that if any of our 
database users discovers and characterises a full-length gene using the 
information in our database, they grant back to Incyte and to all other 
users of our database non-exclusive freedom to operate... to use it as 
a target for your own drug discovery. This was actually before open 
source, but... it's actually the same concept: you have all these people 
working with the same starting point, and if they generate what can 
be thought of as an improvement -  you know, added value -  it gets 
granted back to everybody else. For Incyte itself,... it removes the im­
pediment [to selling the database], which was the original benefit, and 
now there is the additional benefit that it is perceived as an additional 
source of value: they're not just getting access to our IP, they are also 
getting access to the IP of all of these other pharmaceutical companies 
who have been working with this data for some significant period of 
time. So that is really the benefit to us, it increases the value of the 
product we are offering. So that story illustrates that they can be per­
suaded to share, but it's not easy -  and the closer you get to the end 
product the harder the task of persuading them will be .59
The reason for emphasising free revealing involving pharmaceutical companies 
is not that these are the only examples within the biotechnology industry, or even 
the most closely analogous to the open source approach. It is that these exam­
ples are robust: pharmaceutical companies are notoriously reluctant to co-operate 
with one another, so if it is possible to cite instances where these companies were 
prepared to adopt a free revealing strategy, it is reasonable to assume that there 
will be other examples in sectors of the industry that lack such a history of fierce 
competition.
59Ibid.
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in favour of a free revealing approach, though as we saw in the previous section, 
such an approach might be appealing in relation to research tools.69
The upper limit on potential licensing revenue represents the size of the op­
portunity cost of free revealing in relation to a proprietary strategy based on li­
censing the innovation out for others to exploit in exchange for licence fees or 
other valuable considerations (for example, concessions in a joint venture agree­
ment or access to other technology through cross-licensing).70 If an innovator 
would instead have chosen to exploit the relevant technology in-house, the op­
portunity cost associated with free revealing would be the erosion of the compet­
itive edge achieved through the use of the technology due to "free riding". The 
size of this opportunity cost depends on the circumstances. Free riding is not a 
cost if the innovator would not have been able to commercialise the innovation 
anyway, for example because the innovator is either not in business at all or is 
in a different business and the costs of changing the business model in order to 
exploit the innovation would be too high. In fact, free riders may be assets in 
that they may increase the impact of or exposure to an innovation, or if they are 
free riders in one respect but contribute in other respects, for example through 
beta testing or word of mouth marketing. The size of any loss from free riding 
will be greater the more intense the competition in the relevant field; in consid­
ering the intensity of competition, the existing pattern of competition across the 
whole industry should be taken into account as well as possible changes to the 
nature of that competition that may be effected by the innovation itself.71 For ex­
ample, although each firm in a given geographical area may be engaged in fierce 
competition with other local firms, collectively they may compete against other 
regions or sectors of the industry and therefore may have an incentive to work to­
gether as a competitive unit; information stickiness may mean that even though 
an innovation is freely revealed, diffusion may be more effective within a tighter- 
knit or geographically localised group of firms.72 One reason competition may 
be weak is due to the existence of distinct groups of consumers or geographical 
segregation within a market:
Informant: At a certain point during expansion, there will be... 
enough service providers in the area in this particular niche to sat­
urate the market, and then if there are some more they will start com­
peting, as in... any biological system -  ...there has to be a combination 
of competition and cooperation. ... I think there is no doubt that we 
could accommodate 20, maybe 100 technology providers in all the ge­
ographic and other market niches that can be identified. So that is why 
identifying people from many different backgrounds, different kinds 
of organisations, allows us to have a better penetration; if we [deter-
69Even with respect to drugs, this is not always a foregone conclusion: see below, p.173.
70von Hippel (1988), pp.46-55.
71Harhoff et al. (2002).
72Peter Drahos (personal communication) suggests that geographical indications might be seen 
as "fossil evidence" of such localised systems.
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mine in advance who can] join the network, then we are losing that 
whole... opportunity that we could have by generating a diversity of 
players in the network. So it has to be open to everybody.
Hope: So, is the geographical distribution of the market -  that is of 
potential customers for these technologies -  the biggest problem that 
you are dealing with...?
Informant: It's not a problem. It is an opportunity .73
Further, free riding represents only a small loss if the innovation is highly spe­
cific to the user-innovator and there are no complementary profits available to 
other users or there is a long response time for imitators.74 With respect to this 
last point, one difference between the software and biotechnology contexts is that 
product cycles are longer in biotechnology. As product cycle times drop, free rid­
ing becomes less of a threat because the pay-off period shrinks relative to the 
time imitators have to spend copying the technology, and it has been suggested 
that free revealing is therefore more likely to be attractive in software than in bio­
technology.75 The answer to this is that while product cycles for drugs are much 
longer than for software programs, other biotechnology-related innovations have 
product cycle times that are comparable to software:
Technologies develop in a similar way to empires: they are born, 
they develop, they plateau, they die. ... In genotyping, every tech­
nology [has] about three or four years from the concept to uptake and 
then five years of very smooth operation and taking a lot of the mar­
ket, and then they slowly start to die out because there is another 
new thing coming. ... Plant breeding is something like that too -  
the turnover of cultivars is only a few years. And so everything has 
turnover and it can be quite rapid .76
In relation to some biotechnology-related products, product cycle times may be 
far shorter:
In the case of biological databases, tiny updates are all that are 
being sold, and they come out very frequently. Companies would pay 
a big premium in order to get Genbank every twenty-four hours... .77
Related to the issue of opportunity costs of free revealing is the issue of the 
cost of innovating. It is sometimes argued that the cost of innovating in biotech­
nology is too high for innovators to be satisfied with what are assumed to be 
lower returns associated with a free revealing strategy compared with an exclu­
sive proprietary approach .78 The cost of innovating in biotechnology is discussed
73 Anonymous informants: senior executives, small plant biotechnology firm. 
74von Hippel (1988), p.84.
75John Barton, personal communication.
76Andrzej Kilian, personal communication.
77Stephen Maurer, personal communication.
78Open Source Biology workshop.
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in detail in a later section (6.5, p.l80ff); but note that different motivations for 
innovating have different implications regarding the importance of cost. If the 
innovative activity is undertaken in the expectation of benefiting from the inno­
vation itself, then cost matters, and a successful innovator will very likely pursue 
an exploitation strategy calculated to bring the greatest return on investment. If 
the innovative activity is incidental to another activity, the incremental cost of in­
novating is (by definition) zero or close to zero, while if the innovative activity it­
self generates the expected benefit (for example, fun or learning), the incremental 
cost of innovating will be negative.79 In these cases the absolute cost of engaging 
in innovative activity may constitute a barrier to innovation, but if innovation 
does occur, the innovator will not necessarily seek to exploit the resulting tech­
nology for profit.
Actual costs So far we have looked at the opportunity costs associated with free 
revealing. We now turn to actual costs. Unlike obtaining patent protection, free 
revealing involves no registration or maintenance fees, but at least to the extent 
that it is adopted as a deliberate exploitation strategy and not merely a default, 
free revealing generally requires considerable input from the innovator in order 
to ensure uptake of the technology.80 For example, von Hippel observes that in­
novators may sometimes choose to subsidise the acquisition and evaluation and 
use of their freely revealed information by investing in extensive and expensive 
lobbying to get others to adopt a technical standard.81
Often there is considerable preparation involved even in getting an innovation 
ready to be released:
The people that worked on [a project that d idn 't generate a new 
product] are thinking, "I put a few years into this thing and look 
what's happened. Maybe we should give it to the world." That might 
be the right thing to do in some circumstances, but there are ... a lot 
of hidden costs associated with properly handing off code publicly, so 
you really have to weigh the benefit of making it available for free, 
versus the costs.... There is a lot of code scrubbing that has to be done 
to be sure that it is suitable for public consumption.82
As Hilgartner points out (see section 2.4, p.13), this state of "readiness" is not an 
objective property of the technology but a matter of judgement as to whether the 
innovation is sufficiently useful in its current form, in terms of reliability, repro­
ducibility and other aspects related to the degree of codification of the relevant 
information, to interest the target audience: as has been remarked in the software
79Franke & Shah (2002).
80Of course, this is also true for any proprietary strategy based on licensing the technology to 
others.
81von Hippel (2002).
82Bill Lard, in Rosen et al. (2003), p.59.
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context, "you don't just throw your garbage into the street".83 In the case of soft­
ware source code, typical tasks carried out in preparation for release (in addition 
to quality and legal checks) include making sure there are no inappropriate com­
ments mixed in with the code such as people's names, foul language and so on.84 
In the case of biological materials, we have seen that in order to be useful the 
material must be transferred together with certain technical descriptions and in­
structions; some experimentation may be required to find the best way to transfer 
living materials.
As to actually making the innovation available to others, in the software case, 
working examples of an innovation -  the running code -  can be cheaply and in­
stantaneously distributed to a large number of recipients. In the biotechnology 
case, although it is possible to reveal just the information component of goods 
that also have non-information content, this will still be expensive if the informa­
tion is highly uncodified, and as we have seen, effective diffusion of biotechology- 
related innovations generally requires the transfer of embodied or physical prod­
ucts such as biological materials. Thus, the diffusion costs associated with freely 
revealing a biotechnology-related innovation are likely to be higher (for both 
donor and recipient) than they are in software:85
[If] we have to exchange... tangible materials,... it takes time, money, 
to ship, to pull out from the freezer and stuff like that. ... Even just to 
do it physically, it's not like pressing a button and sending an attach­
ment by email. [It's a waste if] someone asks for 100 plates and then 
throws them into the bin... .86
The question arises whether sufficiently low-cost diffusion can be achieved in 
a biotechnology context for a free revealing strategy to be cost-effective.87 This 
means that many, probably most, innovations will likely be of relatively low ben­
efit to both diffusers and adopters and so must be diffused at a low cost if they 
are to be diffused at all: recall from chapter 3 Eisenberg's finding that low value 
exchanges were more likely than high value exchanges to be disrupted due to 
high transaction costs.88 We touch on this issue again later in this chapter (sec­
tion 6.6.2, p.197), but the following points are worth noting. First, although some 
methods of transferring information are always relatively low cost -  the Inter­
net is an example that is very important to free revealing of software, and some
83 Ibid.
84Ibid., p.60.
85Recall from chapter 2 Mandeville's point that the costs of diffusing innovation-related in­
formation (including working copies of an innovation) are incurred by both the donor and the 
recipient of the information. In both cases the incentive to incur the costs depends on the ex­
pected benefits; that is, both parties to the transaction will only incur diffusion costs that can be 
justified against the benefits they expect to receive from innovation diffusion: Mandeville (1996), 
pp.65-66.
86Andrzej Kilian, personal communication.
87It has been shown that innovation streams having a large cumulative impact are likely to be 
made up of relatively small individual innovations. Nuvolari (2001).
88Eisenberg (2001), p.234.
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types of biotechnology-related information can be transferred in this way -  others 
are episodically low cost: information may be stored in batches to be transferred 
when costs are low from time to time.89 For example, scientific meetings or labo­
ratory staff exchanges provide opportunities for the transfer of many pieces of in­
formation at low incremental cost for each piece. Episodically low-cost methods 
of transferring information may in fact have advantages over consistently low 
cost methods such as Internet and e-mail for the transfer of certain types of in­
formation (especially uncodified information); further, different methods are not 
mutually exclusive but can be used in combination -  for example, open source 
software developers use a combination of electronic communication and rare but 
highly effective face-to-face meetings (such as "hackathons").90 Second, as noted 
in the previous section, free revealing is not unique to software or other infor­
mation goods, so the mere fact that free revealing of biotechnology-related in­
novations will usually involve the transfer of tangible materials and uncodified 
information does not mean it can never be a cost-effective strategy. Such inno­
vations have traditionally been freely revealed in the academic context without 
creating an overwhelming cost burden for researchers; while this says nothing 
about cost-effectiveness (as academic researchers are not generally required to be 
economically self-sufficient), it does suggest that the absolute costs of free reveal­
ing in this field are within reasonable limits.
A strategic calculation
Clearly, choosing the best strategy for exploiting any particular innovation is a 
trade-off: a non-proprietary strategy is not universally applicable, in software 
development, in biotechnology or anywhere else. The outcome of this trade-off 
will be contingent on the circumstances of each case. However, it is possible to 
identify some of the factors an innovator will wish to take into account.
Factors influencing choice of exploitation strategy These include the intensity 
of competition in the particular field, whether the innovation itself has any in­
herent bias that favours the innovator over competitors, the likely value to an 
innovating user of any improvements that free revealing may induce others to 
make and reveal, the likely increase in value of complementary assets (including 
intangibles like goodwill and reputation) if a free revealing strategy is adopted, 
the size of the opportunity cost and the actual costs of free revealing. The impact 
of community expectations or industry norms may also be a factor. For example, 
pressure from other companies may be applied to restrain "rogue" firms that take 
the proprietary approach too far:
Myriad... are very much in the position that Roche were in over 
the thermostable polymerases, and more and more what I'm hearing 
from [other people in the] industry is not anymore "Oh, you know it
89von Hippel (2002).
90Brian Behlendorf, personal communication.
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is perfectly reasonable to patent genes as long as they are out of the 
body", but "Oh yes, but you're exaggerating because Myriad is an 
extreme case -  we know they are bad". ...[W]hat I'm hearing in the 
business is that Myriad is becoming something of an embarrassment 
[for those who support a proprietary model], just as Roche became an 
embarrassment.91
(Of course, such restraints are not applied on the basis of any objective standard, 
but are a response to deviations from the industry norm, which interviewees gen­
erally reported as increasingly proprietary -  a trend that may be accompanied by 
a decline in corporate social conscience across the board.)
In the software context, Eric S. Raymond has identified a number of conditions 
that may weight the outcome of the proprietary versus non-proprietary trade-off 
in favour of a free revealing approach .92 These are, first, that the innovative tech­
nology establishes a common infrastructure, or in other words, that network ef­
fects in relation to the technology are particularly strong. Second, the technology 
is business-critical to its users, which means they will place a high value on not 
being beholden to a single supplier. Third, the reliability, stability or scalability 
of the technology is very important (the assumption being that ongoing develop­
ment of the technology by way of mechanisms based on free revealing, such as 
open source, produce better tools than do proprietary mechanisms). Fourth, peer 
review is needed to verify the correctness of design or implementation. Fifth, key 
methods or functional equivalents of key methods implemented by the technol­
ogy are common technical knowledge in the field, implying that a proprietary 
approach would not necessarily be very profitable and thus the opportunity cost 
of adopting a free revealing approach would be low.93
Raymond's final condition favouring a free revealing strategy is that the in­
novation is an enabling technology or a scientific resource that represents a non- 
substitutable standard. An example in medical biotechnology would be the hu­
man genome; in agricultural biotechnology it might be selectable markers and 
transformation tools:
To put a gene inside a plant cell and then to be able to know it is
91 John Sulston, personal communication. Douthwaite documents the influence of other agricul­
tural biotechnology firms, concerned about public relations effects across the board, in restraining 
Monsanto's aggressively proprietary behaviour in relation to genetically modified crops (Douth­
waite (2002), p.257); the recent controversy over "junk DNA" patents held by Melbourne firm 
Genetic Technologies Ltd is another example of this phenomenon. Noble (2003).
92Raymond (2001), chapter 5: "The Magic Cauldron". See also Behlendorf (1999).
93This condition suggests that the outcome of the trade-off may well change over the lifetime 
of the tool: early on, it may be better from an economic perspective to keep it proprietary; later it 
may be better to let it go open source, and the question will often be, as Raymond puts it, "when 
to let go". In this regard it is worth noting that many owners of patented research tools allow 
patent protection to lapse over the economic life of the tool; open source licensing could be seen 
as an alternative to allowing the tool to return straight into the public domain, and the question 
for the owner would then be whether the advantages expected from an open source approach 
would make up for the cost of maintaining protection.
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there -  there are only so many ways to skin this cat.94
Bruce Perens, author of the Open Source Definition, explains the distinction be­
tween "enabling" software and "differentiating" software:
Differentiating software gives someone a reason to buy you rather 
than your competitor; but no-one really cares about your command 
line, for example. ... I define it as a tree structure. Linux kernel [might 
be] the roots and trunk of the tree; your software libraries and per­
haps the Apache server are the branches, and applications are the leaf 
nodes, applications that do not block anything else, that is not de­
pended on by other software and not essential... . So on the tree, it 
is perfectly fine if the leaves are proprietary. But I would never want 
an essential facility in Linux to be proprietary; it would defeat our 
purpose.95
Greg Graff, one of the initiators of the Public Intellectual Property Resource for 
Agriculture, comments:
The tree is a pretty good analogy. The... difficulty is... it's asking 
a lot to expect people to make that differentiation. ...[P]eople bandy 
around terms like "enabling technology" and "research tools" versus 
"trait technology" or "implementation". ... [T]here are some rules of 
thumb, but when you get down to the nitty-gritty for an individual 
technology it's going to be pretty tough [because] biological technol­
ogy does not lend itself very well to this basic-versus-applied, trunk- 
versus-leaf structure.96 ... [Because] DNA exists in all living things, 
even the final product for sale, especially in agriculture, still contains 
all the coding, all the source code, everything. So it is simultaneously 
reverse engineerable, a very basic technology, and a very applied tech­
nology. In other words, you don't have a tree: you have a shrub.97
This kind of uncertainty, as we saw in chapter 3, opens the gate to cognitive bias 
and other non-rational influences on decision-making. As a result, the propri­
etary versus non-proprietary trade-off may be weighted towards the more con­
servative approach:
From the outside it all looks really great -  but from the inside there 
is fear, you're dealing with uncertainty, trust, you're dealing with is­
sues that are hard to overcome. [The open source approach resem­
bles] a model that a lot of people have proposed for the music indus­
try. Well, music is infinitely perfectly replicable: forget about mak­
ing money from that, make money from live performances, ancillary
94Greg Graff, personal communication.
95Bruce Perens, personal communication.
96Neither necessarily does software; vendors often have trouble deciding whether they have a 
"niche" or a "platform" product: Spolsky (2004).
97Greg Graff, personal communication.
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products... . But... the hook has not been set..., because everybody is 
terrified to let go of even the shrinking revenue stream that they have 
now in order to try something new.98
Uncertainty breeds conservatism One manifestation of this uncertainty-induced 
conservatism is an unwillingness to consider the peculiar role of each technology 
in creating a competitive advantage for the firm:
Tiemann: [T]here is this bipolar disorder that occurs in the tech­
nology industry. You either think a technology is so completely com­
modity and boring... that you are just going to go and buy it and never 
even think about looking at it; it is just some cheap thing and you don't 
give a damn. At the other end of the polarity you say, "This [technol­
ogy] is totally strategic to our business, and it is so strategic that we 
have to develop it ourselves, because -  heaven forbid -  if we develop 
a dependency on a third party supplier, we will be making them rich 
instead of us." And there is no middle ground between those two. I 
think that the open source model says there can actually be a pretty 
broad continuum there: you can take something that is today's com­
modity and actually build value into it, make it even more appropriate 
to your mission...; but right now I think biotechnology is stuck in the 
bipolar disorder.
Hope: Is it that people are confused about what it is that they are re­
ally trying to sell?
Tiemann: That could be it. It may just be that human beings... can 
only see things in black and white sometimes.99
In this regard, one major influence on the type of strategy adopted by biotech­
nology industry participants is the traditional emphasis on a strongly proprietary 
approach to intellectual property among pharmaceutical and big agribusiness 
firms.100 The strength of the proprietary culture in biotechnology varies from one 
sector of the industry and from one country to another (the United States often 
being reported as the most proprietary) but can be extreme:
There are limited [collaborations among pharmaceutical compa­
nies] in different therapeutic areas, but for the most part they compete 
rather than collaborate... . In the areas I've been involved in, we are 
barely able to get the companies to sit down in the same room together.
If they do they sometimes want their lawyers there.101
98Denise Caruso, Open Source Biology workshop.
"Michael Tiemann, personal communication.
100As a licensing executive from a major agricultural firm commented, "Five years ago every­
body would have just said, no way. Because everybody was looking to carve out their own niche. 
Everything had to be exclusive, that was the way you operated, your whole attempt was to build a 
fence around that so that nobody can touch it." Anonymous informant, personal communication. 
101 Stan Finkelstein, personal communication.
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Pharmaceutical companies are at the most proprietary end of the spectrum:
Pharma live, breathe and die on patent positions... . Not shar­
ing IP is deeply ingrained. So [there is a] knee-jerk reaction... with 
pharma.102
This proprietary culture is reinforced by the inertia of decision-making in a big 
organisation and by the participation of lawyers and other professionals who are 
trained and often self-selected to be highly conservative, conditions that exist in 
both medical and agricultural biotechnology:
[W]hen you are dealing with a company the size of this one, it's not 
just me as the licensing manager that makes the decision -  I can rec­
ommend it, and it can even be a decision that on this site we are com­
fortable with, but being part of something larger, like most of these 
companies are, you have to run it by other people because you are ba­
sically looking to give up materials that I don't own and the president 
of this company doesn't own -  it is owned somewhere else. [Open 
source-style licensing would be] a little bit iffy in the way that I have 
been trained, only because you are giving away something that you 
don't know quite what it is yet, and that tends to make the higher 
levels nervous... .103
Of course, similar problems exist in software:
I met a lawyer in a big technology company who had had no ex­
posure to free software, and she is marking up our assignment agree­
ment for the first time as her firm tries to assign some free software.
She sent me an email last night saying "Well, I've just tightened up 
the patent clauses a little, and the clause now says we only transfer 
patent rights to use and not to distribute and not in combination with 
any software or hardware other than the software And I wrote 
and said you don't get it, it is wrong, because the whole point is be­
ing undermined. But of course she is trained to think in a completely 
different way and she can't get out of it.104
The proprietary culture of large firms is likely to affect the outcome of the 
proprietary versus free revealing trade-off for other players in the biotechnology 
industry. Small firms are less likely to be able to license technology to large firms 
if they cannot guarantee exclusivity, and as we saw in chapters 4 and 5, any kind 
of collaborative technology development has the potential to create problems in 
this regard. For small firms, the signalling value of intellectual property must 
also be taken into account (although this is not necessarily incompatible with free 
revealing):
102Lee Bendeckgey, personal communication.
103 Anonymous informant (licensing manager, major agricultural biotechnology firm), personal 
communication.
104Eben Moglen, personal communication.
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Basically no biotech companies make any money, so they all rely 
to a great extent on capital markets... . [I]f investors don't see current 
profits what they want is a story that explains how you will get fu­
ture profits and how you won't get bulldozed by bigger, better funded 
competitors, so patent positions and barriers to entry are important 
stories for biotech companies to tell investors.105
On the other hand, pharmaceutical companies might be very willing to "suck 
up" freely revealed innovations generated upstream, and it might be possible for 
smaller firms to attract funding on that basis, just as the TSC research institutions 
have obtained funding for their research:
[Ajnother way you could think about it would be not so much 
pharma being the ones who would contribute to the technology, but 
if you could get them to essentially sign on as potential customers 
for the technology, then even to the most venal western capitalist that 
looks like a really good short term customer: we know they have the 
dollars to pay for it.106
However, in order to make this strategy work, a smaller company with a free 
revealing strategy might need to overcome some suspicion from larger firms un­
familiar with open source-style business models:
Pharmaceutical companies are big and they like to rely on other big 
companies for their infrastructure, not on some little twenty-person 
company. The whole thing in software where people are distrustful of 
Linux because it wasn't developed within a big firm -  pharma would 
be even more suspicous.107
If you say "We are working with an open source model", people 
will say, "So what is that exactly?" ... You need quite visionary people 
to think out of the box, so [we would prefer initially] to do a bit of 
business in more standard terms and then to move on and educate as 
we go... .108
Like smaller biotechnology companies, academic and public sector researchers 
and their institutions are affected by the traditional proprietary culture within the 
industry.109 Unsurprisingly, the strength of proprietary culture within biotech­
nology research communities tends to depend on the prospects for commerciali­
sation:
105Lee Bendeckgey, personal communication.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108Anonymous informant (senior executive, small plant biotechnology firm), personal 
communication.
109Cf Hilgarter's point (section 2.4, p.14) that different patterns of access subsist within different 
scientific subcultures.
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[T]he fly [genome] map was a mess, the people who did the YACs 
were in competition with the people who did the cosmids, everybody 
was competing with everybody else, it was hopeless. To go into this 
Coliseum of gladiators was out of the question. ... In the worm com­
munity these issues have seldom arisen. No fortunes were riding on 
worm genes, so everyone (more or less) was happy that information 
should be shared.
[W]ith the human genome it was a different story. The Sanger Cen­
tre began life in an environment in which commercial pressure was al­
ways going to be part of the picture. Those who were working to map 
particular human genes either expected to secure patents on them, or 
were terrified that someone else would beat them to it. It made for an 
atmosphere of mutual suspicion.110
Although proprietary traditions are likely to be influential, the outcome of the 
proprietary versus non-proprietary trade-off is not a foregone conclusion, even 
for pharmaceutical companies, and even with respect to drugs. According to 
Stephen Maurer, pharmaceutical companies' involvement in the development of 
the Salk polio vaccine in the early 1950s is instructive.111 The vaccine as devel­
oped by Jonas Salk in 1953 at the University of Pittsburgh did not meet the nov­
elty requirement under patent law, so it was in the public domain. The university 
did not have the capacity to generate enough vaccine for a large-scale field trial, 
essential to ascertain both the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine and the best 
protocol for large-scale manufacture, so it sought the help of several large phar­
maceutical companies. The companies knew that getting the vaccine through the 
next stage of development was going to require substantial investment, would 
be technically difficult and complex, and entailed substantial risk (in that it was 
uncertain whether a vaccine would ever be approved). On the other hand, if it 
could get past the field trial stage, the vaccine would be very profitable because 
the degree of public fear of polio would ensure all parents would want their chil­
dren vaccinated. This high risk, high pay-off scenario is exactly the situation in 
which advocates of a proprietary approach normally argue there is an incentive 
problem that must be solved by granting patent rights. However, the pharma­
ceutical companies in this case were willing to make their investment without 
a patent and even without any exclusive contract to produce field trial vaccine. 
The reason was that, given the size of the "pie", the lead-time advantage in being 
ready to move the moment the vaccine was approved was considered worth the 
risk.112
Given a predisposition to taking a proprietary approach, other factors that 
would be likely to affect the free revealing trade-off would include the current 
economic climate (which affects pressure on research and development budgets 
and therefore increases the attractiveness of a free revealing approach, while at
n0Sulston & Ferry (2002), p.69 and p .l l l .
11 Stephen Maurer, personal communication. 
112Smith (1990).
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the same time exacerbating conservative tendencies), how soon the pay-off (for 
example, in terms of improvements to the technology) is likely to be realised and 
how large it will be. In the software context, it has been observed that even if a 
free revealing approach promises to positively affect a company's bottom line, it 
may not be adopted unless and until there is no other option for that company:
Just the fact that Linux is ten times cheaper than proprietary UNIX 
-  you'd think that in a competitive world that would be enough. But 
it's not enough. "What about risks", and "I really like how my ven­
dor takes care of me" and a whole bunch of other reasons mean that 
a ten to one difference in cost does not guarantee success in the mar­
ketplace. ...Most people don't operate based on what is optimal. They 
operate based on whether this will kill me to do it or whether it will 
kill me not to do it.113
6.3.3 Summary
In summary, although there does appear to be a cultural difference between soft­
ware (and other industries) and biotechnology (especially pharmaceuticals) with 
respect to the attractiveness of a free revealing strategy, 114 a number of indus­
try participants can clearly see "spaces or business models that would allow a 
company to derive an income without chasing intellectual property rights" . 115 
The examples cited in this section illustrate that free revealing as an exploitation 
strategy for self-interested innovators is viable in the biotechnology context un­
der appropriate conditions; thus, we are well on the way to establishing that an 
open source approach to technology development could be implemented in the 
biotechnology context.
6.4 Collective invention
6.4.1 What is collective invention?
The third element in a user innovation literature-derived model of open source 
development is collective invention based on free revealing. When an innova­
tor decides to adopt a free revealing strategy in relation to an innovation, the 
innovation becomes available to other users. Some may take up the opportunity 
to replicate and use the innovation. Others may go a step further and improve 
upon it: as with the original innovation, follow-on innovation may take place in 
response to incentives related to benefits expected to be derived from either from 
the innovation itself or from the innovative activity, or may take place "anyway"
113Michael Tiemann, personal communication.
114"In high technology, the attitude towards IP ranges from thinking it's an obstacle to simply 
ignoring it; for [the biotechnology industry], the knee-jerk reaction goes the other way": Lee 
Bendeckgey, personal communication.
115Stephen Maurer, personal communication.
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as a side effect of other activities. Once a follow-on innovation has come into 
existence, the innovator will be faced with essentially the same set of exploita­
tion options as the original innovator and must undertake the same consideration 
of costs and benefits associated with proprietary and non-proprietary strategies. 
If enough follow-on innovators find that the outcome of this trade-off favours 
free revealing, a cycle of collective invention may emerge in which a series of 
incremental improvements to a technology are freely revealed and trigger new 
rounds of innovation.116 In Hilgartner's terms, the result is a non-proprietary 
data-stream. Note that it is not necessary for every innovation in each round 
to be freely revealed: just as river water can be diverted to irrigate surrounding 
farmland provided diversions remain below the threshold needed to sustain the 
health of the river system as a whole, a collectively produced data-stream can 
sustain both proprietary and non-proprietary uses at a range of points along its 
course, provided proprietary diversions (those that use the resource without re­
placing it) do not "dry up" the supply for downstream users.
As we saw in chapters 4 and 5, copyleft-style open source licences make use of 
intellectual property protection -  conventionally used, a key element in propri­
etary exploitation strategies -  to establish and maintain cycles of collective inven­
tion, or non-proprietary data-streams, in software development by constraining 
follow-on innovators to adopt a free revealing strategy. Other examples of collec­
tive invention documented in the user innovation literature include the develop­
ment of the Cornish pumping engine during the British industrial revolution,117 
the development of mass production steel in the United States in the mid- to late- 
1800s, and the early development of personal computers.118 A further example 
is the current development of "open source" kitesurfing (a cross between wind­
surfing and hang-gliding) equipment by amateur enthusiasts and small sports 
equipment manufacturers.119
6.4.2 Conditions favouring collective invention
The literature identifies several conditions that favour the development of a col­
lective invention regime in any given industry.120 The first condition is that a 
technological change or other new opportunity may result in a shift in the locus of 
competition, leading to sharing in relation to the newly non-competitive knowl­
edge, which may create institutions whereby other knowledge is more likely to 
be shared. The second condition is that there exists a degree of technological 
standardisation sufficient to facilitate the exchange of information among poten­
tial innovators. These conditions are both fulfilled in relation to many aspects 
of contemporary biotechnology research and development. For instance, con-
116Meyer (2003); Nuvolari (2001).
117Nuvolari (2001).
118Meyer (2003).
119Saul Griffiths, personal communication; Zero Prestige kite-building weblog, http://w w w  
.zeroprestige.org, last accessed 18 December 2004.
120Meyer (2003).
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sider the sequencing of the human genome, completed in 2001 by public sector 
researchers working in fierce competition with the private sector: in this case the 
free revealing of sequence data, together with changes in United States Patent and 
Trademarks Office guidelines on the utility requirement for gene patents, shifted 
competition away from obtaining straight sequence information and towards the 
large-scale exploration of gene function. As a result, new collaborative initiatives 
have arisen in the field of functional genomics, creating relationships among in­
stitutions and researchers that may facilitate further collective invention.121 The 
same technological change has brought about increased standardisation in the 
industry, in that the genome sequence itself constitutes a common technical plat­
form that facilitates ongoing collaborative research and development. For ex­
ample, Alfred Gilman, Nobel Prizewinning biochemist and one of the leaders of 
the Alliance for Cellular Signaling, a multidisciplinary, multi-institutional con­
sortium to study cellular signalling systems, funded from both public and pri­
vate sources,122 describes the human genome sequence (together with the Inter­
net: see next section) as a "key enabling tool for the whole project".123 Note that 
the cyclical nature of collective invention means that both the shift of compe­
tition away from enabling technologies and increasing standardisation are not 
only causes but also effects of this phenomenon; for example, both are regarded 
by participants in open source development as desirable outcomes of the open 
source approach (see chapter 7, sections 7.3 and 7.3.5). More broadly, in relation 
to standardisation of tools in the biotechnology industry, it has been observed that 
standardisation of tools has been less necessary in biotechnology than in other in­
dustries, including software, because -  despite the term "genetic engineering" -  
biotechnology as it is now practised is not really an engineering discipline in the 
sense of requiring a common man-made technical platform in order to proceed.124 
This observation ties in with an interesting theme that emerges from discussions 
about open source biotechnology concerning the boundaries and tensions be­
tween science and engineering and between data-driven and theory-driven re­
search, discussed further below. However, there are instances, aside from "nat­
ural" standards such as the human genome, where standardisation has been im­
portant in the biotechnology industry. For example, in 2001, Incyte Genomics Inc. 
and Secant Technologies Inc. formed Acero Inc. to market and update Incyte's 
"Genomics Knowledge Platform", a database tool designed to assist in drug dis­
covery by constructing an interface that allows users to search a number of in­
compatible databases as if they were part of a unified whole.125
The third condition that favours the development of a collective invention
121 See generally Sulston & Ferry (2002).
122Anonymous (2002); Alliance for Cellular Signaling, http://www.signaling-gateway.org, last 
accessed 28 November 2004.
123 Alfred Gilman, personal communication.
124Tom Knight, personal communication.
125IntelligentKM News Service, April 17, 2002, "Vendors Partner on Life Sciences Knowledge 
Platform", http://www.intelligentkm.com/news/newsapr02.shtml, last accessed 24 July 2003. 
See also Maurer's discussion of the failed Mutations Database Initiative in Maurer (2001).
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regime is technological uncertainty regarding the newly adaptable invention. 
Technological uncertainty refers to a situation in which the nature of potential 
products, production processes and markets is either not clear or not commonly 
understood; it is often accompanied by heavy investment in research and devel­
opment, leading to low profits in the industry overall, and by income inequality 
or profit inequality among industry participants such that some firms are wiped 
out while others grow rapidly.126 In these circumstances collaborative technol­
ogy development, as we saw in the previous section (section 6.3), is a means of 
sharing costs and risks. The fact that high costs in research and development 
make collective invention more likely is interesting, because one of the apparent 
obstacles to translating an open source approach from the software to the bio­
technology context is that biotechnology research and development -  in general 
-  is significantly more capital intensive; by this analysis, high costs may cut both 
ways. In this context, a corporate attorney for an established biotechnology firm 
emphasised the distinction between sharing of innovations whose main value is 
as an intermediate good and those that are valuable as final goods:
With research tools [the high cost of development as a barrier to 
innovation] has no relevance at all, and in fact from a pharmaceu­
ticals standpoint, research tools are just an expense, an overhead that 
doesn't provide any competitive advantage, arguably in the same way 
that the operating system of all of these boxes, or the Apache Web­
server -  I think it's really quite analogous in that way, once you fo­
cus on the customers for open source in software and high-tech and 
think about the pharmaceutical companies not sharing the results of 
their R&D, but sharing the tools and technologies they use to do their
R&D -  especially now when they are under such pressure to cut ex-
127penses.
As Arrow observed in his essay "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Re­
sources to Invention", information used as a tool for producing further informa­
tion will tend to be undervalued by the market because of uncertainty.128 An 
open source approach allows the full value of such information to be realised.
The condition of technological uncertainty is certainly fuliflled in relation to 
contemporary biotechnology; in fact, it is the driving force behind existing exten­
sive collaboration in the industry -  as one director of corporate development at 
a large pharmaceutical firm has observed, "No emerging or established pharma­
ceutical company is large enough or smart enough to meet all of its knowledge 
needs in isolation."129 Chris DeBresson and Fernand Amesse characterise the net­
works of innovators whose formation accompanied the biotechnology revolution 
as "relatively loose, informal, implicit, decomposable and recombinable systems
126Meyer (2003).
127Lee Bendeckgey, personal communication. 
128Arrow (1962).
129Galambos & Sturchio (1998), p.250, note 61.
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of interrelationships [that] may start with or encompass a joint venture [or other 
formal contractual relationship] but go beyond that particular isolated project", 
and assert that "successful innovation requires setting up a network and the gen­
eration of collective knowledge... . [I]n the biotechnology field, an innovative 
firm cannot exist without its links upstream on the supply side with university 
research centres and downstream on the demand side with links to hospitals and 
government regulatory bodies."130 The distinctive feature of a collective inven­
tion regime as an element of a generalised open source model is that participants 
choose to freely reveal their innovations. While there are many networks of in­
novation in the biotechnology industry that do not have this feature, some do. 
Examples in biomedical biotechnology include the Alliance for Cellular Signal­
ing (the Alliance) and the SNP Consortium (TSC), referred to above at p. 176 and 
p.156, respectively. In the case of the Alliance, according to Gilman, the most ap­
propriate description of pharmaceutical companies' motives for participating is 
"long-sighted self-interest":
I suppose [the companies, including Aventis, Merck, Johnson & 
Johnson, Eli Lilly and Novartis] would get some other modest returns 
in terms of contacts, participation in Alliance meetings, and possibly 
earlier knowledge of or access to technologies. But because all the 
participants are committed to communicating openly with the public 
there is no significant direct advantage to be had by participation, like 
seeing data before anyone else.131
A counterexample from agricultural biotechnology is apomixis research, which 
involves networks of public and private sector institutions working to achieve 
asexual production of seeds.132 Apomixis has been described as "one of the most 
cherished dreams" of plant breeders, who argue that developing apomictic crops 
would allow quicker, cheaper production of new varieties of seeds while still al­
lowing farmers to save hybrid seed for the following crop, saving money and 
keeping yields high.133 Substantial amounts of both public and private money 
have been channelled into collaborative projects in which, by contrast with the 
previous examples, the early dissemination of research results is prohibited, and 
it is argued that publication delays have led to the collapse of information flows 
within the scientific community to the point that community newsletters have 
been discontinued and scientific meetings abandoned. As a result, public re­
search programmes are left in the dark, working on their particular piece of the 
puzzle, and only the "gene giants" can see the bigger picture.134 Interestingly, 
from the perspective of translating the open source model into biotechnology, the
130DeBresson & Amesse (1991), p.365ff.
131 Alfred Gilman, personal communication.
132Calzada, Vieille et al. (1996).
133GRAIN, "Apomixis: the plant breeders' dream", Seedling, September 2001, available at 
http://www.grain.org/seedling/?id=20, downloaded 13 November 2004.
134 Ibid.
§6.4 Collective invention 179
reason why attempts to restore and maintain a non-proprietary apomixis data- 
stream have not succeeded is reportedly that despite the common interest of pub­
lic sector researchers in overcoming their collective disadvantage, the community 
has been unable to reverse the breakdown of mutual trust that accompanied en­
try into proprietary network relationships.135 Public sector apomixis researchers 
are now interested in exploring a copyleft-style licensing mechanism that could 
help them to overcome this problem.136
The failure of apomixis research consortia to maintain a healthy data-stream 
due to excessive proprietary diversions illustrates a point that holds true for net­
works of innovation and networks in general: perhaps contrary to intuition, it is 
not the density of internal relationships that sustains the network, but the exis­
tence of "weak ties" -  distant, unstable relationships -  and openness to outside 
linkages.137 DeBresson and Amesse note that close-knit clique relationships be­
tween partners in a network, while they create resilience in the collaboration, are 
resistant to change: cliques are typical of cartels and stable oligopolies, not dy­
namic networks of innovators.138 Thus, it could be argued that a collective inven­
tion regime based on free revealing -  which forms a weak tie between informa­
tion provider and recipient -  will be more effective in promoting innovation than 
a proprietary network characterised by a high proportion of strong ties formed by 
exclusive proprietary relationships, and therefore more likely to bring superaddi­
tive gains to its members. As discussed in the previous section, the opportunity 
cost of free revealing may be too substantial for prospective network members in 
biotechnology to embrace this approach. However, another feature of innovation 
networks highlighted by DeBresson and Amesse is worth taking into account. 
Geographically localised networks are reinforced by personal, cultural and sym­
bolic networks; it may even be that most external factors that reinforce and help 
maintain networks of innovators are associated with geographical proximity of 
network members.139 In a global industry characterised by intense national and 
regional competition, it may make sense for biotechnology firms and other indus­
try participants in a local area to engage in free revealing in order to establish a 
collective invention regime that builds local innovative capacity relative to com­
petitors in other locations: although the innovations would be available to non­
local competitors, they would be unlikely to be able to build on those innovations 
as effectively as firms in the local area.
6.4.3 Summary
In summary, collective invention, once the norm in academic institutions in which 
the foundational technologies of the biotechnology revolution were developed, 
has been largely replaced in both public and private sectors by complex propri-
135 Andrzej Kilian, personal communication. 
136Charles Spillane, telephone communication. 
137Granovetter (1973); see generally Buchanan (2002). 
138DeBresson & Amesse (1991), p.368.
139DeBresson & Amesse (1991), p.374.
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etary networks that combine traditional industry-researcher relationships with 
new contractual ties involving small biotechnology firms.140 Some non-propriet­
ary data-streams derived from established collective invention regimes persist, 
but more interestingly, there is also evidence of new collective invention regimes 
forming under favourable conditions within the industry, indicating that this el­
ement of a generalised open source development model could be reproduced in 
the biotechnology context.
6.5 Peer production
Given the existence of a collective invention regime constituted by a network of 
free revealing user innovators, the user innovation literature distinguishes be­
tween networks in which users depend on manufacturers to produce working 
versions of their innovations and those in which the means of production are 
within the reach of users themselves. A network of innovative users that is in­
dependent of manufacturers is termed a "horizontal user innovation network". 
Open source software development projects are of this type.
6.5.1 Commons-based peer production
The concept of a horizontal user innovation network is closely related to that of 
"commons-based peer production", proposed by Benkler in his article "Coase's 
Penguin" (see chapter 4, p.74) as a newly emerging mode of production in which 
groups of individuals collaborate on large-scale projects following a diverse range 
of motivational drives and social signals, rather than either market prices or man­
agerial commands.141 Benkler's analysis is introduced at this point as an illumi­
nating complement to the elements of a user innovation model of open source 
software development discussed in the rest of this chapter and the next. Like the 
user innovation model, the peer production model is useful in assessing the fea­
sibility of translating open source development principles into the biotechnology 
context because it describes open source development in general terms that may 
be applied outside the specific circumstances of software development.
Benkler identifies a number of cases of commons based peer production, in­
cluding free and open source software development and traditional scientific re­
search. While acknowledging that peer production is nothing new, he argues that 
computer networks are bringing about a change in the scope, scale and efficacy of 
peer production such that it can be applied to larger and more complex tasks.142 
Benkler identifies three components in the chain of information production -  gen­
eration of content, accreditation and determination of relevance, and distribution 
-  and gives examples of how each component is being produced on the Internet, 
using a peer based model, with respect to information and cultural goods other
140Galambos & Sturchio (1998). 
141 Benkler (2002), pp.371-2. 
142Ibid., p.383.
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than software.143 From these examples he attempts to abstract some general ob­
servations about peer production, including ways in which peer production sys­
tems overcome the collective action problems usually solved in managerial and 
market based systems by property, contract and managerial commands.144 Ben- 
kler perceives two primary problems: providing the necessary motivation for 
participants and integrating contributions into a useful product.145 He suggests 
these will be solved when projects have the characteristics of modularity, granu­
larity and low-cost integration.146
Modularity means that the project is divisible into components that can be in­
dependently produced such that production can be "incremental and asynchro­
nous, pooling the efforts of different people, with different capacities, who are 
available at different times".147 Granularity means that modules are "predomi­
nantly fine-grained or small in size", yet heterogeneous so that the project can ac­
commodate variously sized contributions.148 Integration entails both quality con­
trol and integration of contributions into a finished product; if the cost of these 
functions is too high, Benkler argues, then either integration will fail or the inte­
grator will seek to appropriate the residual value of the common project, leading 
to the dissipation of motivations to contribute ex ante (but see section 6.5.2, p.185, 
below).149
Recall from chapter 5 that, while not suggesting that peer production will re­
place market- or firm-based production or that it is always more efficient, Benkler 
argues that commons-based peer production has advantages over these other 
two modes in some circumstances (see section 5.4.2, p.106)150. The advantages 
of peer production relative to other modes of production are widely recognised 
in relation to scientific research. For example, recall from chapter 2 (section 2.7, 
p.25) that sociologists of science have long argued that the most efficient possi­
ble means of co-ordinating scientific research is mutual adjustment of multiple 
independent initiatives by scientists in light of their awareness of each other's 
work. In the biotechnology context, early concerns about the commercialisa­
tion of university research were sometimes expressed in terms of a conflict be­
tween this traditional scientific norm of "individualism" and the organisation of 
industry-based research in response to market and managerial signals.151 As em­
phasised by recent scholarship in the sociology of science, the image of a world of 
academic science peopled with independent thinkers who exchange information 
promptly and candidly and a commercial world peopled by scientists whose re­
search focus is narrowly restricted and who are prevented from communicating
143Ibid„ p.384; Part I (pp.381-400). 
144Ibid., p.399.
145Ibid., Part III,pp.423-444.
146Ibid., pp378-379.
147Ibid„ p.379
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150Benkler (2002), p.381.
151 Eisenberg (1989).
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with colleagues outside the firm is overly simplistic.152 However, to the extent 
that biotechnology research and development retains some of the characteristics 
generally attributed to academic science before the advent of commercialisation, 
it would seem reasonable to assume that the "horizontal innovation network" or 
"peer production" element of a generalised open source model is inherently fea­
sible in the biotechnology context. Nevertheless, some further exploration of how 
this element of the open source model might be translated into biotechnology is 
warranted, for two reasons. First, contemporary Internet-enabled peer produc­
tion, exemplified by open source software development, represents a new step 
in the evolution of traditional peer production systems and therefore appears to 
raise new issues relating especially to the exchange of information and the costs 
of participation. Second, unlike biotechnology research and development, tra­
ditional scientific peer production systems are primarily aimed at producing in­
formation about the natural world rather than engineering new products. In the 
remainder of this chapter, we examine some implications of these observations in 
light of both user innovation theory and Benkler's peer production analysis.
Benkler suggests that peer production of information is emerging because 
"the declining price of physical capital involved in information production and 
the declining price of communications lower the cost of peer production and 
make human capital the primary economic good involved" . 153 It follows that the 
advantages of the peer production mode relative to other modes become salient 
when human creativity is a salient component of production. Where the cost of 
physical capital is the central organising principle of information production -  
i.e. in a capital intensive model -  the trade-off may be different. Where physical 
capital both for fixation and communication is low cost and widely distributed, 
and where the primary non-human input (existing information) is itself a public 
good, the primary remaining scarce resource is human creativity, and it is under 
these conditions that the relative advantages of peer production in organising 
that input emerge.154
These conditions are most obviously fulfilled where the object of production is 
information or culture .155 However, it is not difficult to find instances of Internet- 
enabled commons-based peer production of goods other than information or cul­
tural goods. For example, innovative kitesurfers exchange design information via 
the Internet using digital recording equipment and written weblog-style descrip­
tions to document test flights, and scanned hand-drawn diagrams and sewing in­
structions to convey design information .156 However, in many such instances the 
physical capital costs of production are low and innovation-related information 
can be successfully separated from the actual working version of an innovation so 
that it is not necessary in order to exchange that information for users to produce 
physical goods and distribute them through the network. (As Benkler points out,
152Hilgartner (1997); and see generally chapter 2, section 2.4. 
153Benkler (2002), p. 444.
154Benkler (2002), p377-378.
155 Ibid.
156Saul Griffiths, personal communication.
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distribution of information and cultural goods via the Internet is largely a non­
issue because it is cheap and the goods can be accessed by anyone, anywhere.157) 
For example, the tools required to produce new kite designs are easily accessi­
ble general purpose items found in many homes and workplaces such as sewing 
machines, video cameras, scanners and PCs, and the raw materials are relatively 
cheap to buy (designers exchange information about discount fabric sources) or 
can be substituted with recycled goods (kite crossbars can be made from an old 
hockey stick or axe handle).158 For many other types of physical goods, however, 
production and distribution involve economies of scale that are best exploited 
by manufacturers (defined, as we saw earlier, as players who benefit principally 
from making and selling the innovation to others), so that peer production or 
horizontal user innovation networks are less likely to emerge.159
6.5.2 Biotechnology and peer production
Where does biotechnology research and development fall along this spectrum? 
Innovative activity in biotechnology is frequently claimed to be extremely capital 
intensive.160 Unlike software or other information or cultural goods, much bio­
technology research and development is either ultimately aimed at the produc­
tion of tangible goods (such as drugs or seeds) or relates to information which is 
embedded in tangible biological materials, or both. This means the capital costs 
for both fixation and communication can be expected to be higher in biotech­
nology research and development than they are in software development. This 
consideration has convinced some observers that open source principles could 
not be successfully implemented in a biotechnology context.161 It is therefore de­
sirable to examine it more closely.
Claims that biotechnology research and development is highly capital inten­
sive often conflate the inherent capital costs of fixation and communication with 
other costs. For example, it has been observed that pharmaceutical companies' 
estimates of the costs of drug discovery and development may be close to an 
order of magnitude higher than the costs of conducting the same research and 
development in a public sector setting.162 Costs associated with corporate profits 
or with tactical manoeuvring over intellectual property rights are not inherent in 
biotechnology research and development, but are attributable to the prevailing 
mode of production; they therefore cannot constitute an argument against the 
feasibility of a different mode. Other costs may be independent of whether pro­
duction is organised in response to market-based, firm-based or other signals, but 
are still not inherent in the research and development process. For example, the
157Benkler (2002), p.396.
158Saul Griffiths, personal communication; Zero Prestige kite-building weblog, 
http://www.zeroprestige.org, last accessed 18 December 2004.
159von Hippel (2002).
160Open Source Biology workshop.
161 Burk (2002) (discussion following presentation); Open Source Biology workshop.
162John Sulston, personal communication; see also Drahos & Braithwaite (2002), pp.167-168.
184 Open source as a development methodology
costs associated with meeting health, safety and environmental regulations for 
biotechnology-related innovations are very substantial, but ensuring regulatory 
compliance is a value that may be added at the distribution stage; high regula­
tory costs are not necessarily inconsistent with peer production at earlier stages 
of product development (see below).
Even the inherent capital costs of fixation and communication in biotech­
nology research and development are contingent on external factors such as the 
cost of local labour required to produce wet lab infrastructure and inventory (gen­
erally higher in developed than in developing countries) and the quality of exist­
ing transport and communications infrastructure (generally lower in developing 
countries) . 163 Further, it is necessary to distinguish between absolute costs and in­
cremental costs: for example, the incremental capital cost of ongoing research and 
development in an established and equipped laboratory may be very low despite 
high start-up costs. Similarly, established laboratories may sometimes have sig­
nificant spare capacity that could be harnessed at low cost, just as the SETI@home 
project harnesses unused CPU cycles to process large volumes of data that would 
otherwise be very costly to manage .164
Once extraneous considerations are removed, how capital intensive is bio­
technology related innovation? Clearly, the answer depends on the precise na­
ture of the research and development; even within a particular field costs vary 
significantly from project to project, not only according to project goals but also 
according to the specific strategy adopted to achieve those goals. Taking these 
limitations into account, one way to get a "feel" for the costs of innovation in 
biotechnology might be to examine the itemised project budgets collected by 
funding agencies such as the National Institutes of Health. Such an investiga­
tion was beyond the scope of the present study, but informal discussions with 
leaders of large and small projects in biomedical and agricultural biotechnology 
and with funders of research in developed and developing countries consistently 
supported two conclusions. First, capital costs of fixation and communication 
in biotechnology are higher than the corresponding costs in software develop­
ment: these costs are actually very low for biotechnology compared with many 
other technologies, including computer hardware, but software development is 
remarkably cheap. Second, capital costs almost always account for a significantly 
smaller proportion of the total ongoing project budget than labour costs. In Ben- 
kler's terms, despite a common assumption that the cost of physical capital is 
the central organising principle of information production in all areas of biotech­
nology research and development, human creativity is very much a salient com­
ponent of production in many areas, given basic infrastructure. (It is a common 
mistake in discussions of open source biotechnology to compare infrastructure 
costs in biotechnology with incremental costs in software; open source software 
development relies heavily on pre-existing infrastructure, including elements at 
the mundane end of the spectrum in Hilgartner's data-stream analysis such as
163John Sulston, personal communication.
164Michael Tiemann, personal communication; see also Benkler (2004).
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telephone connections and electricity supply as well as more specialised elements 
such as Internet protocols.) Moreover, the capital costs of both fixation and com­
munication in biotechnology research and development are falling rapidly; if cur­
rent trends continue, then by some estimates the basic tools needed for molecular 
biology research may soon be within reach of individual hobbyists in developed 
countries and farmer collectives in developing countries:
[C]onsiderable information is already available on how to manip­
ulate and analyse DNA in the kitchen. A recent Scientific American 
Amateur Scientist column provided instructions for amplifying DNA 
through the polymerase chain reaction (PCR), and a previous column 
concerned analysing DNA samples using home-made electrophore­
sis equipment. The PCR discussion was immediately picked up in 
a Slashdot.org thread where participants provided tips for improv­
ing the yield of PCR. Detailed, technical information can be found 
in methods manuals, such as Current Protocols in Molecular Biol­
ogy, which contain instructions on how to perform almost every task 
needed to perform modern molecular biology, and which are avail­
able in most university libraries. More of this information is becom­
ing available online. Many techniques that once required PhD-level 
knowledge and experience to execute correctly are now performed 
by undergraduates using kits.... DNA synthesis [is] becoming faster, 
cheaper, and longer, and it is possible that in ten years specified large 
stretches of sequence will be generated by dedicated machines. Should 
this capability be realised, it will move from academic laboratories and 
large companies to smaller laboratories and businesses, perhaps even 
ultimately to the home garage and kitchen.165
Thus, the advantages of peer production compared with market- or firm- 
based production should apply in many areas of biotechnology. Presumably, 
however, there will be areas where the cost of physical capital represents a greater 
proportion of total costs than human creative input. In such situations peer pro­
duction may not be appropriate at all; but according to Benkler and the user inno­
vation literature, there are two other possibilities. The first is for networks of in­
novative users to team up with manufacturers for the final production and distri­
bution stages (Benkler's integration step). As noted earlier, this may create obsta­
cles to motivating participation in earlier stages, but a variety of approaches may 
be used to prevent defection (see section 6.6.2, p.199, below). A biotechnology- 
related example of users teaming up with manufacturers at the integration stage 
is Stephen Maurer's suggestion of an open source drug discovery initiative, rem­
iniscent of both GNU/Linux software development and the SETI@home initia­
tive, in which volunteers scan the malaria genome looking for drug targets that 
would then be made publicly available.166 Even if promising candidates could be
165Roger Brent, email communication. 
166Stephen Maurer, personal communication.
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identified in this way, someone would still have to pay for wet lab experiments 
and clinical trials, but Maurer, Arti Rai and Andrej Sali argue that an open source 
approach would reduce the total costs in three ways. First, it would draw on 
highly trained volunteer labour; second, sponsors could avoid overpaying R&D 
costs, which are more difficult to estimate accurately earlier in the process; and 
third, because the results of the discovery effort would be freely available, any 
company could manufacture the drug, and the resulting competition would keep 
down the market price for the completed product.167
The second option is to introduce cost-lowering mechanisms to bring the costs 
of production back within the reach of users. Automated integration and itera­
tive peer production of integration are the primary existing mechanisms for low­
ering integration costs in the peer production systems surveyed by Benkler in 
"Coase's Penguin".168 In the user innovation literature, the emphasis is on "task 
partitioning" as a solution to high production costs;169 this concept is central to 
the development of tool kits for user innovation, described in chapter 7 (section 
7.2.2, p.213).
6.6 Community support
6.6.1 Innovative networks and community
We saw in the introduction to this chapter that in the user innovation literature, 
open source software development is characterised as a horizontal user innova­
tion network that is supported by a community. Earlier sections of the chapter 
deconstructed the concept of a horizontal user innovation network and consid­
ered whether each element could or does exist in the context of biotechnology 
research and development. We now turn to the role of community -  defined 
as a network of interpersonal ties that provide sociability, support, information, 
a sense of belonging and a social identity170 -  in the open source development 
model.
Although they often co-exist, user innovation networks and user communities 
are independent phenomena. This is an important point because many commen­
tators assume that all of the benefits of an open source approach to technology 
development are inextricably linked with a specific set of community values and 
practices that are peculiar to the free and open source software community. In 
fact, even user innovation networks that conform to the peer production or hor­
izontal model discussed in the previous section need not incorporate the qual­
ities of a user community; conversely, user communities are not always innov­
ative.171 Nevertheless, community support is an important feature of the open
167Maurer et al. (2004).
168Benkler (2002), p.379.
169von Hippel (1994); Jeppesen & Molin (2003).
170Franke & Shah (2002).
171 For example, brand communities are groups of brand users well known to marketers because
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source development model. In this section we consider whether the main func­
tions performed by the open source software community can be translated into a 
biotechnology context.
One important role of a project leader in the open source software context is 
to establish and maintain an effective community structure that maximises other 
users' motivation to contribute to further development. The problem of how to 
motivate participants in a collaborative development effort without paying for 
their labour in money terms was touched on in chapter 2 in the discussion of eco­
nomic justifications for intellectual property rights and is discussed extensively 
in the collective action literature.172 Briefly, the collective action model of innova­
tion applies to the provision of public goods (goods that are non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous). By requiring contributors to relinquish private control of innova­
tions, the collective action model avoids the losses associated with restricted ac­
cess to knowledge that are characteristic of a private investment model in which 
the innovator appropriates the results of innovative activity, but at the same time 
creates a problem: if non-contributors can benefit on equal terms with contribu­
tors, how can users be motivated to contribute instead of free riding on others' 
contributions? A partial solution is to supply monetary or other subsidies to con­
tributors, as in the public funding of scientific research; a pure collective action 
model relies on the characteristics of community to supply the rest of the nec­
essary incentive to participate.173 In dealing with this issue, the collective action 
literature suggests criteria for the success of collective action projects in relation to 
several aspects of community building: recruitment and retention of participants 
and leadership and co-ordination of contributions (often dealt with together un­
der the rubric of governance).174
Interestingly, empirical research suggests that successful open source software 
projects do not always meet these criteria. For example, according to the liter­
ature, small groups should be most successful at collective action because the 
members of a small group can better monitor and compare their own and oth­
ers' contributions and incentives can be more carefully tailored to the individ­
ual circumstances of potential contributors. In fact, some successful open source 
projects involve very large groups of contributors who do not know each other, 
and may involve no active recruiting of participants beyond posting the project's 
intended goals and access address on the Internet.175 The explanation given in 
the user innovation literature for these discrepancies is that open source devel­
opment is not in fact a form of collective action, but exemplifies a hybrid model 
of innovation incorporating elements of both the collective action and the private 
investment models. Specifically, in an open source context, as in the private in-
they carry out the important functions of sharing brand information, perpetuating the history 
and culture of a brand, providing assistance to other users and exerting pressure on members to 
remain loyal.Muniz & O'Guirtn (2001).
172See Benkler (2002), note 17, citing Ostrom, Rose and others.
173von Hippel & von Krogh (2001).
174Ibid.
175 Ibid.
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vestment model, private rewards to contributors are stronger than those available 
to free riders; but those rewards tend to be of a kind normally associated with the 
collective action rather than the private investment model.176
Even though the specific criteria for success stipulated in the collective action 
literature may not apply in relation to projects that follow this private-collective 
model, the approach adopted in relation to each aspect of community identi­
fied above still affects incentives to contribute. Benkler's concepts of modular­
ity, granularity and low-cost integration, introduced in the previous section, are 
also useful because they relate directly to the problem of motivating contributions 
in an open source context. The discussion that follows examines the challenge of 
building an open source community in biotechnology research and development. 
This discussion is informed by both Benkler's analysis and the collective action 
literature categories of recruitment, retention, leadership and co-ordination, but 
is not structured according to either conceptual framework; instead the focus is 
on apparent obstacles to implementing open source development principles in 
biotechnology.
6.6.2 An open source biotechnology community?
The following series of statements synthesises common arguments against the 
feasibility of open source biotechnology research and development (we deal with 
these issues in the following paragraphs). The pool of potential contributors to 
open source projects is much smaller in biotechnology than in software -  too 
small to sustain a successful development effort. There are two reasons for this. 
First, fewer people have the necessary level of skills and commitment to conduct 
biotechnology research and development. Second, fewer people have access to 
the necessary infrastructure and supplies. (In addition to directly limiting the 
number of potential contributors, these factors tend to tie biotechnology research 
and development to institutions which would restrict individual employees' free­
dom to "open source" their innovations.) Potential contributors who are not thus 
disqualified are not motivated by the same kinds of rewards as contributors to 
open source software projects. Even if they were, these motivations would not 
be strong enough to outweigh the higher costs of contributing in biotechnology, 
which are due not just to the need for more expensive equipment but also to 
higher costs associated with the exchange of uncodified information and tangible 
objects, including biological materials. The high costs of information exchange 
in biotechnology would lead potential contributors -  both project leaders (initial 
innovators) and subsequent contributors (follow-on innovators) -  to doubt the 
prospects for successful co-ordination of contributions; to the extent that incen­
tives to contribute are related to the expectation of access to the results of the 
collaborative effort, such doubt would dissipate those incentives ex ante. Short 
of this extreme, potential contributors might believe that the project itself has a 
good chance of success but decide that the costs of providing or receiving infor-
176von Hippel & von Krogh (2001); von Krogh & von Hippel (2003).
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mation, and in the case of project leaders the additional costs of setting up and 
maintaining an adequate communications infrastructure for others to use, would 
outweigh the benefits for themselves. If incentive problems arise in the soft­
ware context, they may be overcome through charismatic leadership, but there 
is no equivalent in the biotechnology sphere. Finally, even if open source biotech­
nology projects could succeed in generating useful technologies, the high costs of 
regulatory compliance would make the community dependent on large corpora­
tions for production and distribution (as discussed in the previous section), with 
the associated danger of appropriation and the ex ante disincentive to contribute 
that this implies; in the software context, community pressure is a key mecha­
nism by which this problem can be solved, but this relies on closer community 
ties than exist in the biotechnology context.
This statement of apparent obstacles to building an open source biotechnology 
community prompts the following series of questions. How big a pool of po­
tential contributors is required for successful open source development? What 
level of skill and commitment must these potential contributors possess? Would 
individuals be free to contribute despite institutional ties? Are biotechnology 
researchers motivated by the same kinds of collective action-style rewards as 
software engineers? How expensive is information exchange among collabo­
rators in biotechnology research and development? Are the qualities needed 
by open source software project leaders substantially the same as those needed 
and displayed by successful leaders of biotechnology research and development 
projects? If an open source biotechnology community needed to team up with 
external players to disseminate the outcomes of research and development, how 
would it safeguard itself from technology hijacking? There is not room in this 
thesis for an exhaustive discussion of all of these questions, but each can be an­
swered such that the possibility of success for open source biotechnology remains 
open. The observations below are offered not as a complete answer to all objec­
tions but to give an impression of the kinds of considerations that would need to 
be taken into account before the feasibility of open source biotechnology could be 
reasonably excluded.
Size of the talent pool
It is often assumed that the number of potential recruits to an open source bio­
technology project needs to be very large for it to have any prospect of success. 
The underlying reason for this assumption is probably that the best known open 
source software project, the GNU-Linux development project, involves thousands 
of contributors drawn from a pool of potential contributors that is assumed to be 
at least an order of magnitude greater in size.177 There is, however, no available 
evidence concerning the ratio of potential to actual contributors in relation to any 
given project, and certainly no reason to suppose that the ratio is constant from 
one project to another or that it necessarily would be the same in biotechnology as
177von Krogh et al. (2003).
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in software. Further, as we saw in chapter 4, there are wide variations in the size 
of developer groups in the software context, and many projects are worked on by 
a mere handful of programmers. The question of whether there is an optimal size 
for open source software development remains open; it has been suggested that 
there is a critical size of developer community of approximately thirty to forty 
people,178 but anecdotal evidence gathered in the course of this study suggests 
that a team size of six to twenty people is optimal for open source software de­
velopment because in a larger team it is too difficult for contributors to "keep 
track of all the moving parts".179 According to the same evidence, even large 
projects tend to be composed of sub-teams of a similar size, with overall goals 
being defined by programmers who are technically proficient but not deeply in­
volved in the actual coding. Open source software developers react with surprise 
to the notion that very large numbers of potential contributors would be required 
in order to implement open source principles in biotechnology:
I mean look how small biotech companies are. There are only a 
handful that even have a thousand people. Most are probably fifteen 
to a hundred and fifty people. The open source world is full of fifteen- 
person projects; it is reasonably full of hundred-person projects. What 
that means is that there are completely legitimate and completely po­
tent open source activities out there of the appropriate size. You look 
at things like BLAST; if you are a proprietary company you are just 
wasting your time to try to compete with BLAST -  and there are a 
bazillion of those things.180
Necessary skill level
Of course, what matters to the success of an open source development effort in 
terms of recruitment is not sheer numbers of potential contributors, but the exis­
tence of highly innovative contributors who can "start the ball rolling".181 In user 
innovation terms, these are "lead users"; in the open source literature, Bonaccorsi 
and Rossi describe a "small but efficacious subgroup" that "establishes a criti­
cal mass" of other participants.182 As noted earlier, one factor that could be ex­
pected to influence the number of lead users in biotechnology is the capital cost 
of biotechnology research and development (infrastructure and supplies costs), 
discussed in the previous section. Another factor is that the skill level and com­
mitment required to conduct biotechnology research and development appears 
to be much higher than that required to write software:
It's harder to build things in biology than it is to write code. It's a 
great deal harder, and it's slower. You really can't do it part-time; ...
178 Ibid.
179Brian Behlendorf, personal communication. 
180Michael Tiemann, personal communication. 
181 Brian Behlendorf, personal communication. 
182Bonaccorsi & Rossi (2003), p.1252.
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the skill level at this point is high. For fluency in nucleic acid manip­
ulations, I'd say the typical person here has had eight years of post­
undergraduate education.183
By contrast:
Every 16 year-old in the developed world today has a PC on their 
desk hooked up to the Internet, and those who are so inclined get into 
the depths of it and see how it works. So it's the pet hobby of the
184masses.
One difficulty with this argument is that it tends to play down the amount 
of skill and training needed to make a real contribution in the software field. Ac­
cording to the authors of an empirical study of community joining and specialisa­
tion in open source software innovation, software development is a knowledge- 
intensive activity that often requires very high levels of domain knowledge, ex­
perience, and intensive learning by those contributing to it.185 On the other hand, 
to some degree the necessary skills in software can be acquired "on the job" (as 
we saw earlier, learning through feedback from other developers is one motiva­
tion for joining an open source project). The quoted remarks imply that this is not 
the case in biotechnology. However, even if most biotechnology researchers have 
in fact had substantial formal training, it is not clear that this kind of training is 
actually necessary for most research-related tasks:186
[At] the sequencing facility at Whitehead in Boston, they have a 
large community of Tibetan immigrants running most of the instru­
ments and most of the stuff in the shop. They take a six month course 
at a local community college, where they learn how to synthesise DNA, 
to make plasmids, to transform bacteria and extract that DNA and 
they are doing that on a daily basis.187
[The Sanger Centre] would recruit unskilled people, who would...have 
no need of academic qualifications. We judged them on school achieve­
ments, interview and something by which I set great store: the pipet­
ting test. I showed the candidates how to use a pipette -  a hand-held 
tool for manipulating small volumes of liquid -  and invited them to 
have a go [as] an indication of their manual dexterity.188
183Roger Brent, Open Source Biology workshop.
184Greg Graff, personal communication.
185von Krogh et al. (2003).
186Nor is it clear that any formal training need necessarily be in a biology-related discipline. 
In the first "BioBricks" course run at MIT in 2003 (see further discussion below), approximately 
half of the sixteen students had biology backgrounds; the rest had backgrounds in mechanical or 
electrical engineering or media arts and sciences: Drew Endy, personal communication.
187Robert Carlson, Open Source Biology workshop.
188Sulston & Ferry (2002), p.75.
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In fact, both software and biotechnology development require a range of skill 
and commitment levels: in Benkler's terms, both activities have the potential to 
be sufficiently granular for successful peer production. In practice the degree 
of both modularity and granularity of biotechnology research depends on the 
nature of the project. For example, DNA sequencing by the method used in the 
Human Genome Project is both modular:
We divided up the job by each starting at the same place on a chro­
mosome and sequencing away from one another in opposite direc­
tions. That way we had only one overlap between the labs to worry 
about per chromosome. If it seemed like one lab had a particular prob­
lem covered, then the other left it to them.189
and granular:
[As director of the Sanger Centre] I got used to the idea that people 
would... come in at the level of routine tasks and learn what they 
could and then move up as high as they could, but there were also 
people who were coming for a short period who would pass through, 
even though they were highly qualified, and be happy to contribute 
something temporarily.190
Other projects, at least as currently constituted, may be insufficiently modular 
and granular to accommodate an open source development methodology. The 
qualification is key: some such projects could be sufficiently modular and granu­
lar if these qualities were incorporated as design principles at the strategic plan­
ning stage. To appreciate this point, recall that according to Hilgartner's data 
stream model (section 2.4, p.14) the underlying reality of scientific research is 
that of a continuous and evolving flow of scientific production on which scientists 
and others impose artificial boundaries in order to facilitate scientific exchange as 
well as for a range of other purposes. The packaging of portions of a data stream 
proceeds according to conventions which vary from one sub-field to another and 
are not entirely stable. Thus, the degree of modularity and granularity of a re­
search problem in biotechnology is not inherent but is a matter of construction. 
(In fact, the data stream model is founded in part on earlier constructivist soci­
ological studies of scientists' efforts to modularise their research so as to enable 
collaboration within and among firms in the biotechnology industry.191)
This is not to say that there are no limits to the potential modularity and gran­
ularity of biotechnology projects. The range of possible ways to package the el­
ements of a data stream is limited in practice not only by convention but by the 
nature of the data itself. In the biotechnology context, the complexity of living 
systems means that an apparently small change to one part of the system often 
leads to substantial side-effects elsewhere in the system that are inherently un­
predictable and often delayed, making them difficult to detect even after the fact:
189Ibid., p.78.
190John Sulston, personal communication. 
191 Fujimura (1987).
§6.6 Community support 193
We can't make a model of [living organisms] that lets you predict 
what happens when you change things... because biological systems 
that exist in the natural world are optimised to persist; they are not 
optimised to be easy to understand, or easily modelled, or to respond 
in predictable ways. ... And so if you're an engineer looking at biology 
-  screw it, right, that sucks!192
Nevertheless, at present the modularity and granularity of biotechnology projects 
are effectively limited not by the inherent non-modularity of biological systems 
but by the prevailing structure of data streams in biological research. This is a per­
sistent tension in biotechnology: just as living organisms, unlike software, have 
not been engineered from the ground up for human use, biological data streams 
have not generally been constructed so as to facilitate biotechnological develop­
ment (defined as the application of biological systems to solving problems or 
making products). In this view, biotechnology is an attempt to graft an engineer­
ing discipline onto an exploratory science base -  an attempt that has not so far 
been entirely successful. Constructing a truly effective set of biotechnology tools 
for any given application may ultimately require the complete refactoring of the 
relevant data stream. This refactoring would introduce abstraction barriers that 
would allow the behaviour of living systems to be predicted within a specified 
range of conditions, and at the same time create the modularity and granularity 
necessary for efficient collaborative research and development according to the 
open source or any other model. One of the initiators of the MIT "BioBricks" 
project explains:
Endy: It's about decoupling design from fabrication. [In a refac­
tored biology] people can do engineering of parts, like protein-DNA 
interactions. That's a whole level of design. Then people can engineer 
systems, and then cells that have modular systems in them, and then 
ensembles of cells, and then multicellular systems. So if somebody 
gave you a bunch of parts and told you how they behaved you could 
work entirely at [the first] level; if somebody gave you a bunch of 
systems and told you what their inputs and outputs were, you could 
work at [the next] level, but if you only wanted to make parts you 
could just do that. So it lets you focus on just one piece of an insanely 
complex problem: ... there are layers and layers and if you can sepa­
rate them from each other then different people can specialise in dif­
ferent layers and you will get a lot more happening.
Hope: But physically you haven't changed anything?
Endy: We've changed how we describe the system, and that imposes 
a new set of constraints on how things can be constructed and it intro­
duces new possibilities too.193
192Drew Endy, personal communication. 
193Drew Endy, personal communication.
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According to this analysis, the problem with intellectual property rights in bio­
technology related innovations -  which, as Hilgartner points out, involve pluck­
ing items from a continuous data stream and attempting to place them into dis­
crete categories -  is that proprietary restrictions designed to facilitate one set of 
technical goals create barriers to the reconstruction of the data stream to meet an­
other set of goals. In some sense, of course, this is merely a restatement of the 
problems described in chapter 3, but it helps to make the point that (as with the 
issue of capital costs discussed in the previous section), any lack of modularity 
or granularity in biotechnology research is at least in part a consequence of the 
current conventional approach to intellectual property management and there­
fore cannot be used as an argument against the inherent feasibility of an open 
source approach. As we saw in section 6.3.2, above (p.170), the real issue is that 
uncertainty tends to cause industry participants to view research and develop­
ment projects through mental filters that screen out all but a few tried and tested 
ways of partitioning any given data stream.
Freedom to contribute
Returning to our list of apparent obstacles to open source community-building 
in biotechnology, the next concern is whether, assuming individual researchers 
have access to the necessary skills and equipment to contribute to an open source 
development effort, they would be legally free to do so:
[In biotechnology] you don't have hackers in the same way that 
you do with software. They're professionals who work within insti­
tutions. It's not 16-year-olds sitting there with test tubes in mum's 
garage; it's people have been acculturated and indoctrinated and have 
worked up through a system.194
Provisions in employment contracts stipulating that intellectual property is to 
remain the property of the employer might prevent participation, as might the 
terms of commercial sponsorship or funding agency grants.195 Despite the stereo­
type of the hobbyist hacker, this kind of problem also arises in the software con­
text. Some participants in open source software development projects are inde­
pendent programmers, either amateur or professional, but many are employees 
whose participation is supported by employers for the sorts of reasons outlined in 
section 6.3, above.196 Thus, even if automatic assignment of intellectual property 
rights is common practice in commercial biotechnology institutions, this may not 
constitute a barrier to participation by individual employees. In the university 
sector, restrictive intellectual property policies have been contested by academic 
staff in many institutions, so that some university researchers may have the right 
to participate in open source projects without needing permission from the insti­
tutional hierarchy; in the software context, at least one major research university
194Greg Graff, personal communication.
195World Intellectual Property Organization (1992), pp.74-76. 
196Kim (2003).
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has undertaken a review of its policy on contribution to open source projects 
in response to pressure from researchers.197 Where permission is required, it 
can be expected that it will sometimes, but not always, be given as a matter of 
routine, depending partly on existing incentive and reward structures for tech­
nology transfer officers: in universities where technology transfer professionals' 
own job security depends on maximising licensing revenue from faculty innova­
tions, faculty participation in open source projects may meet with considerable 
institutional resistance. Clearly, another key factor in the biotechnology context 
would be whether the university would be expected to meet any of the costs 
involved in obtaining or maintaining intellectual property protection for open 
source-licensed innovations. This is not a major consideration in relation to acad­
emic employees wishing to contribute to open source software projects, because 
copyright protection arises automatically; there, the main cost to the institution 
is the opportunity cost, typically very low. In general, non-profit and for-profit 
institutions must make the same trade-off of costs and benefits associated with 
proprietary and non-proprietary exploitation strategies, described above (section 
6.3, p.151). Any barriers erected by research institutions to employee participa­
tion in open source biotechnology projects might be expected to contribute to 
the phenomenon described by Eisenberg and others in relation to other propri­
etary restrictions on scientific exchange, in which scientists engage in unofficial 
trafficking of resources under the institutional radar (section 3.3.1, p.39). This 
outcome, reportedly common with respect to open source software projects,198 
would be undesirable for the reasons described in earlier chapters in relation to 
the problem of tracking ownership in collaboratively generated innovations.
Effectiveness of collective action-style incentives
The next question is whether biotechnology researchers are motivated by the 
same kinds of rewards as contributors to open source software projects. The an­
swer, briefly, is yes; but the question requires some explanation. This issue is 
raised as a potential obstacle to implementing an open source approach to bio­
technology research and development on the assumption that open source soft­
ware developers are motivated by ideology or altruism and that biotechnology 
researchers and their institutions are motivated purely by short term financial 
self-interest. Abundant empirical evidence demonstrates that neither assumption 
is justified. Outside observers of the open source phenomenon have been almost 
obsessive in the search for an explanation of what motivates contributors to open 
source projects, but this reflects the narrowness of many academic disciplines' un­
derstanding of human behaviour, not the radical nature of open source -  though 
open source is radical in its potential effects (see chapter 7, section 7.3.5, p.224). 
Studies in which researchers have actually asked open source project contribu­
tors about their motivations show that the main incentive for most contributors
197Steven Brenner, personal communication. 
198Steven Brenner, personal communication.
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is the prospect of accessing better technology than they could develop on their 
own (hence the appeal of the GPL compared with other open source licences).199 
Other motivations described earlier in this chapter in relation to non-proprietary 
exploitation strategies (section 6.3, above) include process-related benefits associ­
ated with the task of coding such as learning and enjoyment200 and enhancement 
of private reputations, which can in turn be leveraged for economic gain.201 Mo­
tivations not mentioned earlier (because they relate specifically to the existence 
of an open source community) include personal identification as an open source 
developer and perceived indispensability to a team.202
None of these motivations are specific to software development, and instances 
of each can easily be found in the biotechnology context. One of the most striking 
features of my discussions with biotechnology researchers was that many ap­
peared strongly driven by scientific curiosity, often expressed as a commitment 
to the scientific enterprise itself, a class of motivation that is related but not iden­
tical to the last two categories just mentioned. Some even admitted to motives 
that sounded suspiciously like altruism.
Of course, responsiveness to collective action-style incentives does not guar­
antee that the strategic trade-off outlined earlier will result in the decision to con­
tribute to an open source project. It does not even necessarily indicate which way 
the balance will be tipped by the presence of a particular motivational factor. For 
example, it might be assumed that the desire to enhance one's private reputa­
tion would favour contribution to open source efforts, but this may not always 
be true:
[I]n relation to the cathedral and the bazaar... one thing... is how 
people ultimately get kudos. The thing about cathedrals, of course, 
is that they tend to have somebody incredibly big and important in 
charge of them, an archbishop and an arch-architect, and these people 
gain a lot of prestige. I think there is a worry in science, and I think 
it is justified, that if you head up something big, even if it is a bit 
mindless, you get kudos. ... [Tjhere is no doubt that people do see... 
their scientific career in this way -  "How can I move up and get these 
accolades?" -  and the worry is that in practice, if not in theory, the way 
to that visible lifetime achievement is through the cathedral. And so 
people get attracted to the cathedral.203
Information diffusion costs
As noted in the list of apparent obstacles to open source biotechnology given 
above, one major factor that could be expected to influence researchers' deci­
sion to participate in an open source project is the perceived cost of exchanging
199Hertel et al. (2003) (a survey of contributors to Linux kernel).
20üLakhani & von Hippel (2002).
201Lemer (2000).
2(32Hertel et al. (2003); O'Mahony (2003); and see generally Brennan & Pettit (2000).
203John Sulston, personal communication.
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biotechnology-related information. How expensive is it for collaborators in bio­
technology research and development to exchange information? In section 6.3.2, 
p.167, we saw that the incremental cost of exchanging biotechnology-related in­
formation that cannot be transferred by Internet can be low if the information is 
transferred in batches, for example at conferences or during visits to collabora­
tors' facilities. In fact, existing large-scale collaborations in biotechnology such as 
genome sequencing initiatives or the Alliance for Cellular Signaling make use of 
a range of mechanisms for exchanging information:
[A]lmost from the start we began to make the [C. elegans genome] 
mapping data available electronically over the predecessor of the In­
ternet.... I developed a system of incremental updating, to avoid hav­
ing to send the whole thing on tape every time. The map was con­
stantly on display. We had regular updates in the Worm Breeders' 
Gazette, the informal newsletter of the worm community; we showed 
it at conferences; and anyone could request clones at any time, free, 
immediately, whatever they wanted, so that they could look for genes.
... Being thousands of miles apart wasn't really a problem. We used 
e-mail a lot, and [talked] on the phone... . Individual members of the... 
labs visited each other regularly. The highlight of the year was the an­
nual lab meeting, when we took it in terms to host a visit from all the 
members of the other lab ... to see at first-hand how the other group 
was working... .204
Gilman: Communications cost a little bit, but we've found a very 
economical way to do that via videoconferencing. We can have a spon­
taneous multisite conference where people can see each other.
Hope: Is it as good as face-to-face?
Gilman: Well, it's live; it works pretty darn well. We can see each other 
and hear each other and swap computer applications, and it actually 
is quite effective; we do it on Internet 2, which is a university-based, 
separate Internet. It has zero cost and good traffic -  the only real cost is 
software and... maintenance and operations costs for the equipment.
But the Internet is very very important. We couldn't function without 
the Internet.
Hope: Does the project involve much exchange that can't be done that 
way, like swapping samples and materials or mice or whatever?
Gilman: Yes, a fair bit.
Hope: Is that a significant cost? -  Or are there big delays?
Gilman: No. I've never even thought about that, it's so far down the 
list of problems. ... It certainly isn't any kind of hassle: we just ship 
frozen samples, pieces of cells and so on, by [Federal Express]. The 
cell laboratory in Dallas is the fountainhead, it starts out with the cells 
and does incubations with various regulators and does some of the
204Sulston & Ferry (2002), p.55 and p.79.
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assays that must be done immediately on live cells, but then the cells 
are fractionated in various ways and pieces are shipped to Palo Alto 
or Pasadena or whatever. So: we just freeze 'em and ship 'em .205
Regarding the last point, conversations with stallholders at a major international 
genetics meeting confirmed that a number of companies specialise in shipping 
biological materials, mainly for clinical trials (which involve bringing materials 
from many locations to be analysed together in a central location), but also for 
research purposes .206 Same-day domestic transportation is standard, with inter­
national shipping taking two or three days; the cost is two or three times higher 
than ordinary postage, but a specialist service offers greater assurance that the 
samples (including live animals) will reach their destination in good condition 
and in compliance with regulations (for example, customs and quarantine reg­
ulations and regulations concerning clinical trial protocols). At least one such 
company sponsors regular international seminars on transportation of diagnos­
tic and infectious substances.207 These details demonstrate that the problems of 
information exchange are nothing new to the biotechnology industry and that 
mechanisms already exist for keeping costs (including time delays) to a mini­
mum.
A further point highlighted by the quoted remarks is that sophisticated In­
ternet communications are not the exclusive province of software collaborations. 
As Porter points out, the Internet is an enabling technology that can be used in 
almost any industry and as part of almost any strategy.208 All of the tools avail­
able to open source software collaborations for achieving cheap asynchronous 
communication and for tracking, archiving and searching project-related infor­
mation are also available to biotechnology researchers, though some tools needed 
in software development are not needed in biotechnology and vice versa. In this 
connection it is interesting to note that just as the explosive growth of the Inter­
net was fuelled by the implementation of standard communications protocols, 
greater standardisation would be enormously useful in establishing large scale 
open source-style collaborations in biotechnology:
Hope: In writings about why open source works, one explanation 
is that all the information involved is digital and can be communicated 
easily over the Internet. Obviously that has made a big difference, but 
what about research tools in biology that are not codified in that sense 
and can't be exchanged instantaneously and for negligible cost: does 
that rule out the possibility of open source development of those tools, 
in terms of the costs of communication and of integration of results? 
Bendeckgey: Certainly when you are talking about sharing informa­
tion, those sorts of things are the first to spring to mind. ...Bioinfor­
matics and data-management aspects of the regulatory process... are
205 Alfred Gilman, personal communication.
206XIX International Congress of Genetics, Melbourne, Australia, July 6-11, 2003.
207World Courier, www.worldcourier.com, last accessed 22 December 2004.
208Porter (2001).
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the most intuitively obvious places where the application of standards 
and the flow of data back and forth electronically would lend them­
selves to an open source approach, but it seems to me that any place in 
which standardisation would be beneficial -  ultimately on some level 
you are always talking about information, because the technologies 
are only relevant or useful to a drug company insofar as they generate 
information about something that could ultimately make a good prod­
uct. So anywhere you make it easier for things to work together by 
adopting standards, or adopting standards with regard to technology 
that make the resulting information more clearly comparable, then all 
of those are potential areas for an open source approach.209
Thus, although the exchange of uncodified information at present does not ap­
pear to be costly enough to deter open source-style collaborations in the biotech­
nology context, greater codification could lead to a whole new range of possi­
bilities. For example, the initiators of the MIT BioBricks project hope to create 
standardised parts in order to facilitate large-scale collaborative development of 
engineered biological systems:
So it's analogous to the beginnings of the Internet, in terms of small 
groups scattered around the country building their own sets of tools 
and then standardising them so that they can communicate with each 
other, and from that small network larger networks building. So we 
have a timescale, a map of the US, and these are pictures of centres 
of Internet activity in different cities, and then here are the growing 
connections between them, and then that spreads to the point where 
it is recognisable as the Internet. That is basically what we are trying 
to do.210
Governance
The establishment of shared communications protocols is only one of several 
tasks involved in co-ordinating contributions to an open source project. Co­
ordination -  which incorporates Benkler's concepts of accreditation and deter­
mination of relevance and integration -  is one of two aspects of open source gov­
ernance identified in the open source literature; the other is leadership.211
Co-ordination of contributions According to Bonaccorsi and Rossi, effective 
co-ordination relies on modularity of the good being produced, shared notions 
of technical validity, established conventions of behaviour and mechanisms for 
preventing defection as well as a common communications platform.212
209Lee Bendeckgey, personal communication. 
210Drew Endy, personal communication.
211 Bonaccorsi & Rossi (2003).
212Ibid., p.1249.
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As noted above (p.192), modularity is not an inherent quality of data streams 
in computer science or biotechnology, but because it keeps the costs of contri­
bution and co-ordination of contributions to a minimum and thus maximises in­
centives to participate in an open source project, it is considered a matter of best 
practice in the software context:
Perens: We try to make it possible for people to make modifications 
without getting their fingers all over a large piece of code.
Hope: Would that not normally be part of coding, say if you were 
writing for your own personal use?
Perens: It's a good habit in every situation.213
In open source software development, modularity is not always explicit or vis­
ible even if an ex-post examination of programmer specialisation indicates that 
it is present.214 However, the user innovation literature emphasises that clearly 
delineating different areas of potential contribution is important among large ge­
ographically dispersed groups because it lowers the cost for contributors in lo­
cating the specific areas where they can contribute and in finding the information 
and personal contacts they need in order to do so, while at the same time increas­
ing the benefit by raising the visibility of individual contributions.215 An example 
of this principle at work in the biotechnology context is the Alliance for Cellu­
lar Signaling's attempt to engage the wider signaling community in maintaining 
"molecule pages" (essentially, web-based interactive literature reviews relating 
to particular molecules of importance in cellular signaling pathways).216
In the software context, shared notions of technical validity are established 
through fundamental programming conventions; Bonaccorsi and Rossi note that 
"software itself is a convention or a common language, in which errors are identi­
fied and corrected through the mechanism of compilation."217 The ability to com­
pile source code derived from many sources and run the program to see whether 
it works is an important feature of open source software development that does 
not have a direct equivalent in biotechnology. "Compiling to wetware" is not 
only costly in terms of time and resources -  design flaws may take several life 
cycles of the relevant organism to appear and may be difficult to interpret when 
they do -  but also potentially dangerous in that it generates unpredictable pub­
lic health and environmental risks. "Dry" or in silico experiments are becom­
ing more feasible in some areas of biotechnology, but this option is still limited, 
both in technological terms and because the systems in question are only par­
tially characterised. Nevertheless, effective quality control -  both accreditation 
and determination of relevance -  is crucial to the success of any open source-style 
development effort, as the following comments indicate:
213Bruce Perens, personal communication.
214von Krogh et al. (2003).
215Ibid.
216See http:// www.signaling-gateway.org/molecule/, last accessed 22 December 2004. 
217Bonaccorsi & Rossi (2003), p.1248.
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Paul Rabinow: If you were to ask a high energy physicist how you 
find out what's going on, it is by logging onto the e-print archives.
Rob Carlson: I agree with that in principle. The problem is I stopped 
subscribing because there was so much noise. I had no idea what was 
good and bad any more.
Denise Caruso: Are you saying you stopped because it wasn't peer 
reviewed?
Carlson: I'm saying that the sheer volume of stuff -  
Caruso: Was it peer reviewed?
Carlson: No, it's not, but -  I mean peer review is important, it sepa­
rates the wheat from the chaff. But whether or not it's peer reviewed, 
it is just so easy to send in a paper, and the last time I checked there 
were thirty different topics you could put as your main heading, and 
it's maybe sixty by now, and I have no idea how to keep up.218
Of course, these issues are not peculiar to open source, but must be dealt with 
one way or another in any knowledge production system. In academic biology, 
the traditional quality control mechanism, referred to in the quoted dialogue, is 
peer review. Much has been written in the sociology of science literature and 
elsewhere about peer review, but the interesting thing for present purposes is 
that it is by no means a cheap process:
Hope: How would you make sure quality control isn't too ardu­
ous, such that it would deter people from making contributions?
Brenner: You can't. Peer review is arduous. But because it is tied to 
reputation, and career advancement and funding, people are prepared 
to do it. You just have to make the rewards matter.219
Thus, the problem of quality control, in biotechnology as in software, boils down 
to the balance of incentives.220
In fact, the high cost of quality control and other tasks involving uncodified 
biological information compared with software code weighs in favour of an open 
source (as distinct from proprietary) approach to biotechnology research and de­
velopment, not against. Even though project leaders can go some way towards 
establishing the technical validity of information that is to be incorporated into a 
technology, ultimately the burden needs to be spread as widely as possible:
Hope: When you say on your website that everything is put out 
there as soon as it is replicated, is there only one lab that does those 
replications?
Gilman: Yes, the San Diego bioinformatics lab.
218Open Source Biology Workshop transcript.
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Hope: So does replication involve doing all of the experiments again? 
Gilman: Well, we need people to do them enough times that we can 
be sure we can repeat them and the results are valid statistically.
Hope: I thought replication normally meant somebody else doing the 
experiment in a different laboratory, you know, under a variety of con­
ditions.
Gilman: Well, we can't do that. But of course, the information is all out 
there, so anyone can do it who wants to .221
The final requirement for effective co-ordination, according to Bonaccorsi and 
Rossi, is established conventions of behaviour.222 As is pointed out in the user 
innovation literature, technical infrastructure is necessary but not sufficient for 
the orderly coordination and aggregation of individual contributions over time; 
social mechanisms are also required .223 Again, the relevant issues are not unfa­
miliar in the biotechnology context, and existing large-scale collaborations ad­
dress them explicitly. For example, in relation to the sequencing of the human 
genome, John Sulston reports that the most important achievement of the first 
Bermuda meeting was to "sort out who was doing what" by establishing what 
he called an "etiquette of sharing": participants "arrived with claims on pieces of 
paper announcing their intention to sequence a particular region, and during the 
course of the meeting any competing claims were sorted out. " 224 One experienced 
open source software project leader -  Brian Behlendorf, co-founder of the Apache 
server project -  commented that a reasonable standard of behaviour needs to be 
enforced among collaborative developers: "Some good people have been asked 
to leave because of poor behaviour. In other cases, people have behaved badly 
and not been asked to leave, and that has caused difficulties for the project. " 225 
The same issues arise in biotechnology collaborations:
Gilman: We really haven't had any big fights yet. ... I guess there 
are certain people who have not participated to the extent that one 
would want them to or hoped they would... so there's been some 
turnover for that reason.
Hope: So is the approach simply to simply ask those people to drop 
out and let somebody else take their place?
Gilman: Yes. The funny thing is that the people who never show up 
are the ones who are always offended when you say "Hey, you never 
show up, so no hard feelings but let's call it a day". But it's the steering 
committee who makes those decisions.226
The steering committee referred to is this project's counterpart to the core devel­
oper group in an open source software project.
221 Alfred Gilman, personal communication.
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Leadership While establishing shared behavioural conventions relates to Bonac- 
corsi and Rossi's co-ordination aspect of open source community governance, it 
is clearly closely connected with the other aspect they identify: a widely accepted 
leadership that sets goals and drives the project forward.227 Empirical studies 
show a range of project structures in open source, with different implications for 
the nature and extent of the leadership role.228 According to hacker writings, one 
of the key roles of a project leader is to provide the base intellectual content for 
the project and continue to seed it with new contributions; experience suggests 
that cooperative development is most successful if developers can work with an 
existing body of material.229 The same is true in the biotechnology context:
At this point the genome map became truly useful -  and the com­
munity of worm biologists came into their own. They used the map 
to find the genes not just as abstract locations but as physical pieces 
of DNA. With these in hand they could carry out recombinant DNA 
experiments to find out how the genes worked, study the expression 
of the genes in different issues, make antibodies to the gene products -  
all the techniques of modern molecular biology. The genes also helped 
us by providing new landmarks on the map: it was a virtuous circle.230
Another important role for a project leader, according to the hacker litera­
ture, is to keep up community morale. This function is important in relation to 
large-scale collaborations in biotechnology too: as Alfred Gilman has reportedly 
remarked, there should be "money in the budget for pom-poms".231 To do this 
effectively, project leaders need certain social and communication skills -  that is, 
leadership qualities -  and this also is true for biotechnology:
Hope: So in terms of the costs of motivating contributions -  how 
much money do you need for pom-poms?
Gilman: (Laughs.) Ah -  well, I think I need a personality transplant, 
rather than money. ... I could do a better job of cheerleading. I guess 
I think everybody ought to see the value for themselves of being part 
of the team, part of the research. ... [But] there are other people in the 
steering committee who are just eternal optimists, and people like that 
are certainly very valuable to have around.232
Other personal qualities are also important. Open source software leaders often 
take on an advocacy role; in the biotechnology context, it has been suggested 
that one of the explanations for the successful establishment of the SNP Con­
sortium was that "the person running it was a CEO, with a CEO look and feel, 
who was therefore able to do the business in a way that other businesspeople
227Bonaccorsi & Rossi (2003), p.1249.
228Ibid., pl247.
229Behlendorf (1999).
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respected -  that a professor, however charismatic, would not have been able to 
do" . 233 The need to maintain credibility with both the academic research commu­
nity and the commercial sector is thus an important dimension of the required 
leadership qualities in biotechnology.234
Apart from personal qualities, a project leader must be seen to be free of con­
flicts of interest with respect to the project:
At one point Affymetrix had this thing they called the GATC con­
sortium and they were basically proposing a standard for micro-arrays...and 
they had signed up one or two companies to this thing, and the idea 
was to make the software and different arrays interoperable to make 
it easier for everyone. Nobody trusted them and it never went any­
where.235
[I]n Bellagio, where we had this declaration about apomixis ... the 
whole thing built for the first few hours with big interest, then dropped 
because ...there was a strong personality that was driving this idea and 
there were immediate questions whether this person did not have too 
excessive and entrepreneurial an interest in it, and who would be re­
ally managing it and how it would happen. So... that was a very 
unpleasant... outcome: people said OK, someone is going to milk the 
system for us and I'm certainly not going to put my IP into it... .236
This issue relates both to the leadership aspect of governance and the question 
raised earlier concerning the need to safeguard an open source project from "hi­
jacking" by commercial partners. Because they do not restrict improvements to 
the licensed technology, open source licences allow "forking" of code develop­
ment:
One of the things that happens in the world of software is that peo­
ple develop software that they think is really wonderful and it gets 
adopted and it gets used and it becomes popular and there is a devel­
oper organisation grows around it, but then the arteries harden. The 
creativity of the original project slows down. Then someone comes 
along and says, "You know, I could do that better. I want to fork the 
development activities and do something different. " 237
Allowing forking gives rise to the possibility that community resources will be 
spread too thin among many related projects for any of these projects to be suc­
cessful. It also means that players with market power could fork technology 
development in a direction that in practice (though not in principle, under a
233Roger Brent, Open Source Biology workshop.
234Sulston & Ferry (2002), pp.175-176.
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copyleft-style licence) excludes weaker participants. One of the functions com­
monly ascribed to open source leaders is that strong leadership helps prevent 
excessive forking by building on personal loyalties. According to Raymond, an­
other important factor is the existence of social norms against forking.238 Both 
these mechanisms are community-dependent and some observers therefore doubt 
they could be replicated in the biotechnology context, where community ties are 
supposedly weaker than in software.239 However, discussions with project lead­
ers suggested that while there may be a community dimension to the decision 
whether to fork a project, the pressure against forking has more to do with prag­
matism than with compliance with social norms or contributors' loyalty to a par­
ticular project leader:
It's all about the need to maintain momentum. If you can see a 
project getting approximately where you want it to go in a reasonable 
time, you will make substantial compromises in order to avoid diffus­
ing that momentum. If not, you will be inclined to fork it: the decision 
is just an ordinary business decision about what resources you per­
sonally want to contribute in order to get exactly what you want. 240
Perhaps all these explanations can be resolved by saying that contributors make 
a pragmatic calculation about what resources are worth devoting to steering a 
project in a preferred direction, and that the resources involved would sometimes 
include social capital or political influence. Similar considerations apply in the 
biotechnology context:
Some people have come to the project with more specific personal 
goals in mind, not so much committed to the big picture but to some 
smaller piece of it, and if that piece changed as a result of a decision 
about goals and priorities they might lose interest. ... It would be 
unusual if everyone decided that they wanted to be part of the project 
for ten years; some people will probably drop out and others will join.
It's a floating population.241
David Opderbeck has argued that while collective management by way of 
open source development is appealing, biotechnology lacks the sort of commu­
nity that would make it feasible; in particular, he says, "the classical and neo­
classical story of science as a homogenous, cooperative enterprise that is being 
corrupted by private property rights does not correspond to reality".242 In this 
thesis, I have argued for the feasibility of open source biotechnology from an un­
derstanding of scientific activity drawn from constructivist sociological theory -  
in particular, Stephen Hilgarter's data stream model (section 2.4, p.14) -  which
238Raymond (2001), chapter 4: "Homesteading the Noosphere". 
239Opderbeck (2004).
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does not rely on such a simplistic narrative. My argument in chapter 5 (section 
5.4.4, p.139) for the feasibility of informal enforcement of open source licence 
terms rested on the assumption that the prospect of losing credibility in future 
negotiations would deter defection from collaborative development for a suffi­
cient number of industry participants that motivations to contribute would not be 
adversely affected. However, in a recent paper short-titled "Sharing Nicely",243 
Yochai Benkler goes further. In an analysis based on case studies of distributed 
computing and carpooling, Benkler demonstrates the existence of sharing prac­
tices that "are not limited to tightly knit communities of repeat players who know 
each other well and interact across many contexts", but are either "utterly imper­
sonal" or take place among "loosely affiliated individuals".244 This effectively 
answers Opderbeck's objection.
6.7 Conclusion: open source development in biotech­
nology
This chapter has taken a generalised model of open source development, drawn 
from the user innovation literature, and examined each each element of the model 
to determine whether it could apply in the context of biotechnology research and 
development. In each case the conclusion is that there is no reason in principle 
why open source principles could not be implemented in biotechnology. Com­
bining the results of this and the previous chapter on licensing, it is clear that open 
source biotechnology may be feasible given an appropriate balance of incentives 
for prospective participants and a determination to work out the details of con­
structing open source-style licences for biotechnology-related innovations. Given 
the pre-commercialisation history of biotechnology as an academic discipline de­
veloped largely in the public sector, this result is not very surprising; arguably the 
real question is whether open source biotechnology could go a further step and 
become a mechanism for reconciling broad access to innovation in biotechnology 
with economic self-sufficiency, and if so, what effects this might have. This is the 
subject of the next chapter.
243Benkler (2004).
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Chapter 7
Open source biology in action
7.1 Introduction
We saw in chapter 3 that the current structure of the biotechnology industry cre­
ates barriers to participation in research and development for those who would 
stand to gain the most from applications of this powerful new technology. We 
also saw that the prevalent proprietary approach to exploiting biotechnology- 
related innovations has been a key factor in generating this industry structure. 
Chapter 4 pointed out that similar problems have been at least partly overcome 
in the software context through the evolution of open source as a technology li­
censing strategy and development methodology. In chapters 5 and 6, we saw that 
there is no reason in principle why an open source approach could not be imple­
mented in biotechnology. However, we have not yet explored in detail how an 
open source approach might help to break down barriers to participation in the 
biotechnology industry; this is the focus of the present chapter.
As we saw in chapter 2, one way to view the recent expansion and strength­
ening of intellectual property protection in biotechnology is as a consequence 
of the transition of molecular biology research from an academic environment 
supported by relatively generous public funding to an environment in which re­
search is expected to fund itself by engaging with the wider economy. In this 
view the question for researchers and policy makers is how to reconcile for-profit 
activities necessary to sustain scientific research in the face of declining public 
support with the need to maintain access to fundamental tools and resources by 
a diverse range of industry participants.
Studies of bargaining over proprietary research tools in biotechnology show 
that all current industry participants appreciate the force of the arguments out­
lined in chapter 2 in favour of sharing resources -  they just don't think these 
arguments should apply to them.1 That is, most opposition to the removal of ac­
cess restrictions associated with intellectual property rights is not principled, but 
pragmatic, and ultimately based on a perception that unrestricted access would 
conflict with individual players' immediate economic self-interest (whether in 
maximising shareholders' profits or merely in surviving in an increasingly pro­
prietary environment). Policy makers, influenced by the same perception, hes-
1 Eisenberg (2001), p.243.
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itate to promote unrestricted scientific exchange for fear of the consequences to 
biotechnology research and development overall if individual firms and institu­
tions were to scale down their participation in order to seek better returns else­
where.
The open source model provides a radical shift of perspective by challenging 
the assumption that a restrictive proprietary approach to intellectual property 
management is always the most profitable. In the sections on free revealing and 
collective invention in chapter 6 (sections 6.3 and 6.4, beginning p.151 and p.174, 
respectively) we began to explore the idea that in biotechnology, as in software, 
the net benefits to an intellectual property owner of a non-proprietary exploita­
tion strategy may sometimes outweigh those associated with a proprietary ap­
proach. The first part of this chapter provides a brief taxonomy of open source 
business strategies that might be implemented in the biotechnology context and 
identifies some issues that are likely to arise in implementing such a strategy. 
This section is directed at answering a key question: how to make money from 
open source? The second part of the chapter takes a longer view of open source 
strategies, considering how the adoption of an open source approach to intellec­
tual property management by some biotechnology industry participants could 
have far-reaching effects on industry structure, removing or greatly reducing the 
barrier to participation by less well-resourced players.
7.2 Implementing an open source strategy
In a healthy competitive industry, businesses must strive to meet consumers' 
needs. For the reasons given in chapter 6 (section 6.2, p.144) innovation by users 
is often more successful at meeting consumer needs than innovation by manu­
facturers. Therefore, mainstream businesses in several industries have sought 
ways to harness user innovation for their own commercial purposes. As a result, 
there exist a number of fairly well established mechanisms for capturing benefit 
from existing user innovation. Ranging from low to high customer involvement 
in product development, these include conventional market research, providing 
research and development assistance to users interested in new applications for 
standard products, supporting custom product groups and user groups, monitor­
ing innovative user communities and identifying and working closely with lead 
users.
Open source business strategies go a step further, actively promoting user 
innovation by making technologies available in easily-modified form, at low or 
no cost, under licensing terms that allow users to make changes to the technology 
and to use or distribute the resulting modified versions as they see fit. (Note that 
although the word "business" suggests that these strategies are only useful to 
commercial players, in fact their use is open to any industry participant seeking 
to achieve a degree of economic self-sufficiency: we return to this point in the 
next section.) If successful, this "free revealing" on the part of the technology 
owner establishes a cycle of collective invention which may enhance the value
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of the technology to users in a number of ways. The company or institution that 
owns the technology then seeks to convert this enhanced use value into economic 
benefit. Thus, a successful open source business strategy has two components: 
maximising the use value of the technology, and translating increased use value 
into economic value for the technology owner.
7.2.1 Maximising use value through open source development
A number of factors contribute to the use value of any technology. For example, 
the value of a tool to its user is often higher if the user understands how the tool 
works. In biotechnology, such understanding is often incomplete because many 
biotechnology tools were not designed from scratch by humans but incorporate 
complex living systems as components of the technology. Providing access to 
the technology in its preferred form for modification may allow users to interpret 
unpredictable results with greater confidence and to imagine new uses that might 
not have occurred to the technology owner.
The use value of a technology also depends on its quality. The overall quality 
of a tool depends on its accuracy, reliability, versatility (or, conversely, its suitabil­
ity for a specific job), interoperability with other tools and robustness to changes 
in the use environment. The open source approach of involving a large number of 
users in the development of a research tool contributes to quality improvements 
in two ways. First, a large group of users can eliminate design flaws and intro­
duce enhancements more rapidly than an in-house product development team: 
in Eric Raymond's dictum, "given enough eyes, all bugs are shallow". (This is an 
affirmation of the polycentric approach to research and development discussed in 
chapter 2, p.25.) Second, the existence of a development community that includes 
both users and owners of the tool allows users to communicate needs and prior­
ities to owners so that overall development efforts are more likely to be directed 
towards the most useful tasks.
The use value of a technology also depends, ultimately, on its accessibility. 
Accessibility is a function of availability and affordability; both are enhanced if 
a technology can be obtained from more than one supplier. Open source licence 
terms increase the likelihood that this will be so by ensuring free redistribution by 
any licensee; the same licence term enhances the accessibility of the technology in 
terms of freedom to operate by ensuring freedom from legal encumbrances (with 
the possible exception of a copyleft reach-through term).
7.2.2 Translating increased use value into economic benefit
Assuming that a technology owner's free revealing strategy has been success­
ful in inducing follow-on innovation with respect to the technology, there are a 
number of possible strategies for turning the improved use value of the tool to 
the owner's economic advantage. Which strategies are most likely to be applica­
ble depends on the owner's relationship to the tool (in user innovation terms, 
its "functional class"). Companies or other institutions (such as universities and
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public or private non-profit research institutions) that use a particular research 
tool as a core component of their business process or research program would 
benefit directly from any improvement in the use value of the tool. For example, 
large firms may conduct in-house gene sequencing even though such a service 
is not part of their commercial offering; a further example would be if pharma­
ceutical companies were to open source their chemical libraries (libraries of small 
organic molecules used as chemical probes to validate drug targets) or related 
technologies, for example methods of synthesising molecules, assays for protein 
types, instrumentation for high-throughput measurement of biological assays, or 
data sets and analysis methods for predicting toxicological and other properties 
of selected molecules.2 Other examples were given in the free revealing section 
of chapter 6. Non-user technology owners, for whom the technology is valuable 
primarily as a product rather than a tool, would need to employ a different Strat­
egy-
Several strategies have emerged in the software world for generating increased 
revenue by enhancing the value of a technology to users through open source de­
velopment. These are discussed extensively in informal "hacker" literature and 
in at least one dedicated Internet discussion group.3 The most important single 
point to emerge from this discussion is that deciding whether to implement an 
open source strategy requires a careful assessment of one's overall business or 
strategic plan. Essentially what is needed is to identify and weigh up all revenue­
generating opportunities, proprietary and non-proprietary, in order to determine 
where the firm or institution's true proprietary value lies. Everything outside the 
inner circle of protected ideas and technology is available for instigating external 
innovation from which the organisation can derive benefit;4 in some cases the 
trade-off may be between the strengths of different intellectual property assets, 
for example, patents versus trademarks.5
One essay that has been influential in the informal literature on open source 
business strategies is Frank Hecker's "Setting up shop: the business of open 
source software",6 which identifies eight distinct open source business models 
in addition to the direct user model referred to above. (Others prefer the term 
"business strategy" to "business model" because open source strategies may be 
used in combination with each other or with proprietary strategies within a single 
business model.)7 These may be classified as follows.
2NIH, "Roadmap for Molecular Libraries", http://nihroadmap.nih.gov/pdf/NIHRoadmap- 
MolecularLibraries.pdf, last accessed 22 December 2004.
3See, for example, Behlendorf (1999); Young (1999); Tiemann (1999); Hecker (2000); Initiative 
(2002); and many other papers at Free/Open Source Research Community online papers collec­
tion, http://opensource.mit.edu/online_papers.php, last accessed 22 December 2004. Internet 
discussion forum: Lawrence Rosen, personal communication.
4Gabriel & Goldman (2004).
5James (2003), p.74.
6Hecker (2000).
7Brian Behlendorf, personal communication. This is consistent with the real-world application 
of these strategies in the open source software context; for example, the Red Hat business model 
incorporates up to twenty different revenue streams: Webbink (2003), p.5.
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Exploiting complementary markets
Hecker's "widget frosting" and "service enabler" models rely on leveraging the 
improved use value of an open source technology to enhance the appeal of a 
complementary product. ("Widget frosting" refers to a model in which the pri­
mary revenue is generated by the sale of tangible goods (widgets), while in the 
"service enabler" model, the complementary product is a service.) In either case, 
the quality of the open source technology is important to the value of the overall 
product, but because it is not a direct source of competitive advantage, it makes 
sense to spread the cost and risk associated with its development. An example 
of this approach in the biotechnology context would be if a manufacturer of mi­
croarray readers were to give away instructions for spotting microarrays in order 
to sell more readers: the fact that the information would be freely available would 
mean that overall use of arrays would increase.8 In fact, use of the software ver­
sion of this strategy, in which a company primarily in business to sell hardware 
distributes enabling software such as driver and interface code at no charge along 
with the hardware, is also fairly common in the biotechnology context, where the 
hardware might be sequencers, centrifuges or a fluorescence activated cell sorter 
and the data analysis software is open source. IBM, a major user of the comple­
mentary markets strategy in the software context, is now supporting life sciences 
technology development because the company can see that, ultimately, it will sell 
more hardware if it can help push the computerisation of biology: the hardware 
is more valuable the better the data and the better the tools for manipulating the 
data.9
Providing services
Hecker's "support seller" and "accessorising" models are essentially service mod­
els. In the support seller model, the technology is distributed on an open source 
basis in order to grow the market for the technology itself and associated offer­
ings. Revenue is generated by selling the technology in a form that is easier or 
more convenient to use than the freely available version and by providing ser­
vices such as training, consulting, custom development, and after-sales support 
or accessories such as user manuals; clearly, successful implementation of this 
type of business strategy depends on careful pricing. In the software context, the 
ultimate profitability of a pure service model is still in question, but in the biotech­
nology field this model is actually more likely to succeed because the stickiness of 
biotechnological information means that users of a technology are often prepared 
to pay a premium in order to avoid some of the trouble and expense of optimising 
a published protocol. An example of this approach in the biotechnology context 
would be if an assay kit manufacturer made the assay protocol freely available, or
8see Pat Brown, Stanford University School of Medicine, "The Brown Lab's complete guide to 
microarraying for the molecular biologist", http://cmgm.stanford.edu/pbrown/, last accessed 
22 December 2004.
9Stephen Maurer, personal communication.
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the owner of a cell line or other biological material that was particularly difficult 
to work with made the material itself available on open source terms but then 
charged a consulting fee to provide advice on how to use it. Again, the software 
version of this strategy is often used in the biotechnology context in relation to 
bioinformatics software: if the software itself is open source, a company's com­
petitive advantage might derive from the user interface rather than from the un­
derlying algorithms that analyse DNA chips, protein chips, or sequencing gels. 
Similarly, in the race between the private company Celera and the public sector 
initiative to sequence the human genome, it has been suggested that Celera could 
have given away its genome sequence data and made money by selling genome 
annotations.10 Had Celera won the race, the strategy it in fact adopted would 
have been far more lucractive; but in the event, Celera lost and the company col­
lapsed -  an outcome that could have been avoided had it adopted an open source 
approach.* 11
Market positioning
Hecker's remaining strategies -  "loss leader", "sell it, free it", brand licensing 
and franchising -  all relate to market positioning. In the first of these strategies, 
an open source product is used as a loss leader for technologies commercialised 
in a more conventional way: that is, the open-source product generates little or 
no revenue, but helps to build the firm's overall brand and reputation, may add 
value to conventional products, and increases the number of technology develop­
ers and users that are familiar with and loyal to the product line as a whole. The 
second strategy is similar, except that the product that is open source is not a dif­
ferent technology, but a slightly out of date version of the product that generates 
the bulk of the revenue. Brand licensing and franchising are common business 
strategies that are closely related: in the open source context, both involve charg­
ing a fee for the right to use brand names and trademarks associated with tech­
nology that is itself open source. An example of the "sell it, free it" approach in 
the biotechnology context would be if an older version of a cell line were licensed 
on an open source basis in order to increase demand for a newer, improved ver­
sion; an analogous situation would be if a technology were licensed exclusively 
for a short period and then under a broad, low cost, non-exclusive licence. In the 
microarray context (see chapter 6, p.155), an "Affymetrix Inside" logo (analogous 
to the "Intel Inside" logo) might be a successful branding exercise, even if others 
were able to make chips using Affymetrix technology.12 An example of the fran-
10John Sulston, personal communication.
11A coda to this story, however, is that this might not have been the best outcome from a public 
interest perspective, because the open source public sector annotation intiative, Ensembl, would 
then probably not have been established: John Sulston, telephone communication.
12"Intel do not make all their own chips, but people that supply those chips to them have to 
meet certain quality standards and they also get the advantage of innovations that Intel makes 
in semiconductor chip manufacturing. So in that case, the brand includes a technology element; 
this would be true in the life sciences sector also, at least for the space occupied by Affymetrix." 
Thane Kreiner, telephone communication.
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chising strategy might be if a genotyping service provider were to open source a 
genotyping technology and sell franchises and support to other service providers 
in different areas of the world or working with different crops.13
Derivative markets
A further strategy not identified by Hecker would be to open source a technology 
in order to create or expand a derivative market. An example of this approach 
would be the strategy described in the user innovation literature as the "tool kit" 
approach, in which a manufacturer provides a set of design tools to allow users 
to participate fully in product development within a given "solution space" de­
fined by the parameters of the manufacturer's production process. This approach 
first emerged in the 1980s in the high technology field of custom integrated cir­
cuit design; by 2000, semiconductor manufacturers' sales of user-designed chips 
were worth $15 billion.14 Providing tool kits for user innovation is not incompati­
ble with a proprietary approach, and in fact, the components of most existing tool 
kits are proprietary, so that the manufacturer retains control over innovations pro­
duced through their use. However, manufacturers can also capture benefit from 
user innovation generated through the use of non-proprietary tool kits; develop­
ing an effective tool kit is arguably easier if its components are non-proprietary 
as this eliminates some of the tension between ensuring that tool kit components 
are readily available to users and enforcing intellectual property restrictions. An 
interesting example of such a tool kit in biotechnology is the MIT "BioBricks" 
initiative, discussed in chapter 6, which is intended to emulate the custom chip 
approach.
The tool kit strategy may be particularly relevant in the biotechnology context 
because, as we saw in section 6.5.2, p.186, some biotechnologies may be suited 
to open source development up to the production and distribution phase but 
then require a more centralised approach, especially where regulatory compli­
ance costs are high. The user innovation literature points out15 that the introduc­
tion of an open source approach into a particular marketplace can create signifi­
cant first-mover advantages because manufacturers tailor the tool kits they offer 
to allow easy, error-free translation of designs made by users to their own produc­
tion capabilities: thus, even if the tool kit language becomes an open standard, 
the originating firm or other institution will retain a competitive edge. This is 
not an important feature of open source software tool kits, but to the extent that 
the means of production in biotechnology remain beyond the reach of ordinary 
users such that manufacturers are required at the stage of integrating user inno­
vations to create a usable product, it may be an important motivation for some 
biotechnology firms to offer tool kits. However, the introduction of tool kits can 
impact existing business models in a field in ways that may not be to manufac­
turers' advantage in the long run, as customers and independent tool developers
13Andrzej Kilian, personal communication. 
14von Hippel & Katz (2002).
15Ibid.
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eventually learn to design tool kits that are not tied to the production facilities of 
a particular manufacturer. Some manufacturers may decide to adopt a tool kit 
approach anyway in order to obtain the short-term benefits.16 Alternatively, tool 
kits may be introduced by non-commercial players as a means of shifting compe­
tition in the industry away from fundamental enabling tools. These possibilities 
are discussed in more detail in the second half of this chapter.
7.2.3 Choosing a licence
One necessary task in implementing an open source strategy is to choose an ap­
propriate open source licence to suit the specific circumstances. A copyleft-style 
licence would be important for the success of the direct user strategy referred to 
in the previous section because the aim of such a strategy is to capture external 
innovation for in-house use; a licence that allowed licensees to distribute modifi­
cations to the technology on a proprietary basis would defeat this purpose. For 
the other strategies mentioned above, the reason for open sourcing the technol­
ogy is to ensure its widespread use. In this case, a copyleft-style licence may still 
be attractive as a way of reinforcing motivation to contribute to technology de­
velopment, but it may sometimes make sense to permit some modifications to 
be appropriated by others: the question is which approach would create more 
incentive for contributors. As noted in chapter 5 (section 5.4.4, p.129), in the bio­
technology context a further consideration is the cost-effectiveness of obtaining 
and maintaining intellectual property protection.
7.2.4 Hybrid strategies
A number of businesses and institutions in the biotechnology field have already 
adopted strategies that are not strictly open source, but either consciously bor­
row from the open source model or have evolved independently to have some 
similar features.17 The foregoing discussion highlighted the possibility of mixing 
proprietary and non-proprietary strategies in a single overall business model or 
strategic plan; "hybrid strategies" refers instead to modifying one or more of the 
essential principles of open source licensing to produce a true proprietary-non­
proprietary cross. Hecker analyses the range of possible hybrids in terms of a 
relaxation of one or more key open source licence terms: source code availability, 
nondiscrimination among users, and nondiscrimination among types of use.
Source code
Hecker notes that an open source licence grants a number of distinct rights in re­
lation to source code (or in biotechnology, the source code equivalent): the right 
to view, use, and modify the code and the right to redistribute it in modified or
16Franke & Schreier (2002); Jeppesen (2002); von Hippel & Katz (2002). 
17Hecker (2000).
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unmodified form (see above, section 4.4.1, p.77ff). In a hybrid model, any of these 
rights could be made conditional on payment of ongoing fees. For example, the 
technology owner might wish to charge a fee for redistribution of modified ver­
sions of the technology. In the software context, an example would be Microsoft's 
Shared Source program (in which users are permitted to view the source code 
but not to use, modify or redistribute it) or Sun's "Community Source Licence", 
used to preclude code "forking" and to generate some revenue in exchange for 
redistribution rights.18 In the biotechnology context this type of hybrid strategy 
is frequently adopted in relation to proprietary databases, where unconditional 
access is provided to basic data but access to extended ways of viewing the data 
that facilitate comparisons or other manipulations is available only on payment 
of a licence fee.
The viability of this strategy, as with any of the true open source strategies 
listed earlier, depends on how it is received by users. Sun's licence, while not 
approved by the Open Source Initiative as an open source licence, is accepted by 
many software programmers as a legitimate variation on the open source theme, 
whereas Microsoft's Shared Source strategy is seen as having very limited use 
and is generally regarded with suspicion.19 In the biotechnology context, the 
disadvantages of limited database access are well recognised within the research 
community:
By signing up [to Celera's proprietary genome sequence database], 
academics agree to download what they need for their own use but 
not to redistribute the data. This... means that the normal exchanges 
of bioinformatics are inhibited, can take place only through the com­
pany's database and are restricted to subscribers. How many biolo­
gists really think that this is a good way to run their research? Not 
many..., which is why there is general support for continued public 
sequencing.20
Given the danger of alienating users by imposing restrictions on the availabil­
ity of the source code equivalent in an otherwise open source licence, a company 
or institution considering such an approach -  or any hybrid approach -  should 
ensure that its reasons are commercially sound and do not simply represent a re­
luctance to depart from a more familiar proprietary strategy. For example, one 
small biotechnology company I visited during my fieldwork was interested in 
adopting an open source approach but lacked the confidence to abandon all hope 
of generating revenue from licence fees; as a result, discussions with potential 
users of the licensed techology aimed at establishing an active developer com­
munity were in danger of being sidetracked by arguments over the exact size of 
the royalty, which in any case was never intended to be significant. Thus, the 
success of the whole strategy was jeopardised for the sake of a token amount of
18Bill Lard, in Rosen et al. (2003) p.57.
19 Bruce Perens, personal communication. 
20Sulston & Ferry (2002), p.261.
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licensing revenue.21
Users
As we saw in chapters 4 and 5, a true open source licence may not discriminate 
among users. However, a hybrid strategy might distinguish between commercial 
and non-commercial users, for example allowing non-commercial users full open 
source-style freedoms but charging a fee to commercial users. This is a common 
approach in biotechnology. For example, Celera's sequence database, referred to 
above (p.215), allowed academic use at no cost but charged a fee for commercial 
users;22 Incyte's Global Knowledge Platform initiative would have made a sim­
ilar distinction. Outside the database context, Stanford University adopted an 
analogous strategy in relation to its Phoenix cell lines, which were patented for 
use in the production of a particular drug. The University licensed the patent ex­
clusively to a single firm, but made the cell line itself available to other companies 
on a non-exclusive basis to be used for research purposes.23
Fields of use
An open source licence may not discriminate according to "field of endeavour". 
However, as discussed in chapter 5, allowing field of use restrictions may be an 
acceptable modification to the strict open source approach in the biotechnology 
context. For example, we saw in chapter 5 (section 5.4.2) that field of use restric­
tions are likely to be an important aspect of PIPRA's licensing practice.24
7.2.5 Internal adjustments
After choosing a business strategy and an appropriate licence, the next step for 
an institution wishing to implement an open source approach is to review its in­
ternal incentives structure in order to avoid or overcome resistance to new busi­
ness practices. This is necessary in any strategy for externalising some aspect 
of technology development because the design and staffing of any institution's 
innovation-related activities reflects implicit biases about the source of innova­
tion;25 significant organisational changes may be required if customers or clients 
become a major source of innovation. In the case of an open source approach it 
may also be necessary to find ways of countering proprietary mental models and 
cultural biases at all levels of the organisation. We have seen in chapter 6 (sec­
tion 6.3.2) that this is likely to be a serious issue in at least some sectors of the 
biotechnology industry.
21 Anonymous informant: senior executive, small plant biotechnology firm, personal
communication.
22Sulston & Ferry (2002), p.261.
23Kathy Ku, personal communication.
24See also section 3.5.4, p.59.
25von Hippel (1988), p.118.
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7.2.6 Disseminating the technology and building a community
A key element in the success of any open source strategy is to evolve the licensed 
technology continually and rapidly in order to satisfy lead users: in open source 
software terms, "release early and release often".26 This is, of course, true for 
many proprietary tools also, but it is particularly crucial in the case of an open 
source approach because, as we saw in chapter 5 (section 5.4.4,132) the quid pro 
quo for contributing improvements to the common pool for many users will be 
the expectation of gaining access to leading edge technology. Large-scale col­
laborative efforts in biotechnology already follow this principle; for example, 
prompt release of sequence data is mandated under the Human Genome Project's 
Bermuda protocol.27
To evolve a technology sufficiently rapidly to support the business strategies 
listed above, it is essential to find or build an effective user community; as we 
saw in chapter 6 (section 6.6), this is an important aspect of the open source 
model of technology development generally. In the open source software context, 
commercial operations have not necessarily managed to optimise community in­
volvement; from the company's, and a broader, perspective there is a danger that 
the community will be swallowed up and its usefulness compromised if it allows 
itself to become too closely aligned with commercial players.28 The open source 
software community has so far successfully resisted co-option by commercial in­
terests; an open source biotechnology community would need to find ways to do 
the same, especially if it finds itself dependent on sponsorship in the early stages 
(see discussion of licence development in chapter 5, section 5.3, p.98 and below, 
section 7.3).
We considered some of the challenges to building an open source commu­
nity in biotechnology in chapter 6 (section 6.6, p.186). That discussion illustrated 
certain tensions inherent in achieving a community structure that maximises in­
centives to contribute to an open source development effort (for example, there 
is a tension between keeping down the friction costs of contributing and main­
taining tight enough organisation to reach project goals within a timeframe that 
is useful to contributors). Several specific issues have been identified in the user 
innovation literature in relation to establishing a community to support the rapid 
evolution of tool kits.29 First, the solution space of the tool kit -  that is, the techni­
cal parameters within which open source development is intended to take place 
-  should be clearly defined. Second, it should be easy for users to interact via 
the Internet or other low-cost rapid communication methods. Third, community 
web pages should be of a quality that satisfies the immediate needs of casual vis­
itors so that they will return to the site and possibly become new users. Fourth, 
voluntary user communities are more effective than those established by the tech-
26Raymond (2001), chapter 3: "The Cathedral and the Bazaar".
27Available at http://www.gene.ucl.ac.uk/hugo/bermuda.htm, last accessed 27 August 2003; 
see also Marshall (2001); Morgan (2002).
28Michael Tiemann, personal communication; Bruce Behlendorf, personal communication.
29von Hippel & Katz (2002).
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nology owner because the support they offer users is more likely to be directly 
applicable to the kinds of problems users enounter and because any information 
they distribute will be perceived to be free of commercial interest. Finally, there 
are a range of tangible or intangible rewards that may be offered to sustain com­
munity participation, including explicit recognition of useful contributions.
7.3 Structural effects of open source in biotechnology
The previous section showed why an open source commercialisation strategy 
might appeal to an individual profit-making firm or non-profit institution seeking 
some degree of economic self-sufficiency. In this section we consider the possi­
ble consequences of adoption of an open source approach to intellectual property 
management by even a few players in the biotechnology industry. The progres­
sion described in this section is not presented as a prediction of what will happen 
if some industry participants adopt an open source approach; rather, it is pre­
sented as a series of "what-ifs" in order to show how radical a shift might come 
about given favourable conditions at each stage.
7.3.1 Starting with a usable open source technology
The impact of open source business strategies within a given market segment 
begins with the development of a usable technology or set of technologies with 
sufficiently broad appeal to kickstart the diffusion process. We saw in chapter 
4 that in the software context, the Free Software Foundation set out to create a 
full suite of free technologies, from operating system through to applications, as 
an alternative to proprietary technologies. By analogy, it might be assumed that 
this is what an open source biotechnology initiative should set out to do. Inter­
estingly, however, the Free Software Foundation has never actually achieved this 
goal. What it has achieved is first, the seed of some useful technologies that other 
people found interesting enough to develop further, and second, a collection of 
very useful free development tools that allowed them to do it. It was from this 
base that the GNU/Linux operating system evolved, essentially the turning point 
for open source success.
In the biotechnology context over the same twenty year period, development 
tools have been created, and, as with software, this has occurred largely in the 
public sector. The difference is that certain key biotechnology development tools 
were then licensed or assigned to corporations on an exclusive basis in all terri­
tories and across all fields of use, such that only those corporations were able to 
use them.30 Part of the reason was a lack of sophistication on the part of the uni­
versities where important tools were developed: in particular, the importance of 
retaining as many rights as possible to allow broad licensing in service of the uni­
versities' public interest missions was not clearly understood.31 Thus, technolo-
30Atkinson et al. (2003).
31 Greg Graff, personal communication.
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gies were developed, but they were tied up in proprietary arrangements instead 
of being made freely accessible like the free software development tools. Now, 
however, some United States land grant universities are starting to take stock of 
what rights they retain, particularly in agricultural biotechnology, and to realise 
that collectively they are at least as powerful -  in terms of their intellectual prop­
erty holdings, at any rate -  as any single player in that industry sector. These 
universities are considering how to manage their intellectual property in future 
to avoid indiscriminately alienating important tools and looking at ways to create 
licensing packages that provide smaller players (for example, Californian walnut 
growers) with access to a full set of development tools. Part of this process is to 
identify what is missing from these tool kits so that licensees can be advised as 
to what other technologies they will need to obtain and so that they can chan­
nel their own resources to inventing around (their own) patents and filling those 
gaps.
Of course, once these gaps are identified, other developers may also con­
tribute to creating a full set of "meta-technologies". Non-profit research institu­
tions might seek funding from governments or philanthropies for this purpose; 
alternatively or in addition, for-profit companies might do the work, relying on 
government procurements or capital from oligopolists keen to erode one of their 
rivals' competitive edge in relation to a give type of tool. Some firms might cal- 
cuate that they could make enough income from one of the strategies described 
earlier to justify licensing their own technologies on terms that are either open 
source or so low cost that they are still accessible as components of an overall 
package that is mostly open source.
While it is in theory possible that a full set of open source biotechnology de­
velopment tools could be put together entirely out of technologies developed by 
individual firms and non-profit institutions following incentives provided by the 
open source strategies described above, current discussions of open source are 
also exploring the role that sponsors might play in bringing together a "meta­
tool kit".33 Such sponsors might be governments, philanthropies, or large corpo­
rations -  not just pharmaceutical companies or big agribusiness, but firms like 
IBM who are equipment manufacturers in both software and life sciences and 
would be interested in open source biotechnology for the same reason they are 
interested in open source software. The advantage of seeking sponsorship from 
the latter source would be that the sponsor would already have experience in 
and understanding of open source principles. A recent initiative of the Centre for 
Applications of Molecular Biology in International Agriculture (CAMBIA) that 
is, in fact, sponsored by both IBM and the Rockefeller Foundation is BioForge, an 
Internet clearinghouse for open source biotechnology development projects anal­
ogous to the Sourceforge.net open source software repository. According to its 
web introduction, BioForge aims "to catalyse a large community of innovators to 
produce high quality and relevant biological technologies for the empowerment
32This is the PIPRA initiative: see Atkinson et al. (2003) and section 3.5.4, p.59. 
33Open Source Biology workshop.
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of diverse problem-solvers in the developed and developing world, and secure 
these technologies in a new, protected, universally-accessible commons" . 34
7.3.2 Open source creates a competitive challenge
If an open source technology has greater appeal to users than competing pro­
prietary technologies, they will begin to show a preference for the open source 
technology. Conditions that would favour the diffusion of an open source tech­
nology include the following.35 First, any increasing returns to the adoption of 
a competing established technology are outweighed by network externalities as­
sociated with access to the new technology; the balance will depend on the type 
of tool. Second, the intrinsic value of the technology is high. Third, revision of 
technological choices is not too expensive: if there are high fixed costs, users of 
established technologies will want to avoid changing horses midstream. Fourth, 
there is a heterogeneous user population -  this relates to the mechanism of diffu­
sion through networks of users with a variety of social links. The final condition 
favouring diffusion of a new technology is weak or absent competitive reactions 
from industry incumbents, discussed below.
Open technologies are resistant to competitive countermeasures that are avail­
able to larger established industry participants, such as buy-outs and undercut­
ting on price: in the software context, it has been said that "today's vendors are 
facing a competitior that has no stock, no owners, no board of directors -  a com­
petitor they cannot buy and cannot attack in a price war because its products 
already sell for nothing" . 36 In biotechnology, if an open source technology is 
initially dependent on the support of a particular firm to bring the technology 
to market, there will be a short period in which the technology is vulnerable 
to traditional countermeasures mediated by attacks on the supporting firm. (If 
the support is coming from a non-profit institution of some kind this period of 
vulnerability need not occur.) However, an open source technology will rapidly 
become independent of any particular firm because as soon as the technology 
has diffused sufficiently to create a demand that would support other companies 
with open source business strategies of the kind described in the previous section, 
other suppliers will step in.
7.3.3 Competitive countermeasures
Thus, once an open source technology appears in the marketplace, players fol­
lowing a proprietary strategy have a limited range of possible responses. The 
first is to attempt to compete on quality. As noted above, theory suggests that 
the diffusion of open source depends at least in part on the initial distribution of 
user beliefs about the intrinsic value of the technology. Thus, if proprietary com-
34CAMBIA, BioForge, http://www.bios.net/bioforge, last accessed 22 December 2004. 
35Bonaccorsi & Rossi (2003), p.1253.
36Hrebejk & Boudreau (2001).
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petitors can maintain a perception among users that their technology is intrin­
sically better than the open source version, they can slow or block the diffusion 
of that version.37 One way to do this is to invest aggressively in R&D in order 
to stay ahead in the quality stakes; this is a beneficial outcome for technology 
users. However, since what matters is the perception of quality rather than ac­
tual quality, another possible strategy is to engage in a marketing war, including 
spreading "fear, uncertainty and doubt" (FUD) about the open source technol­
ogy. This is a strategy that has been deliberately adopted with some success by 
incumbent technology owners in the software context;38 the point for open source 
biotechnology is that supporters would need to be prepared to develop effective 
marketing strategies, an area where some in the open source software community 
feel it should have done better.39
A second option is to follow the old adage, "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em". 
This approach may often make sense for the runners-up among proprietary firms, 
who may perceive that given a choice between a proprietary monopoly held by 
another company and an open source level playing field, open source is the lesser 
of two evils. Existing proprietary players may be quite reluctant to adopt this 
approach because, apart from the direct effect of reducing lock-in of existing cus­
tomers, an open source strategy may run contrary to the corporate culture and 
will probably involve increased technical challenges due to the need to work with 
open standards to achieve interoperability.40 One manifestation of this reluctance 
may be that they move initially to one of the "hybrid" strategies described in the 
previous section instead of to a full open source approach.41 However, ultimately 
it may appear that the only choice given the successful introduction of a non­
proprietary tool kit into a particular market is between leading the movement 
to open source (and incidentally reaping the first-mover advantages described 
above) or following,42 and if that is how the situation appears to these firms they 
may decide to move quickly despite their reluctance.
A third option for firms who cannot see any alternative source of competi­
tive advantage to proprietary exploitation of their version of the technology or 
for firms who have sufficient market power to try to "beat 'em" instead of "join­
ing 'em" is to lobby for regulatory intervention to block the diffusion of the open 
source technology. This approach, akin to engaging in a FUD campaign but at 
a higher level, has been Microsoft's approach in relation to open source soft­
ware43 and could be expected to feature prominently in major pharmaceutical
37Bonaccorsi & Rossi (2003), pp.1255-1256.
38Open Source Initiative, "Halloween I: Open Source Software (New?) Development Methodol­
ogy", http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloweenl.php#quote4, last accessed 22 Decem­
ber 2004.
39Bruce Perens, personal communication.
40West (2003), a study of three substantial "runners-up": Apple, IBM and Sun.
41 Ibid.
42Jeppesen (2002), referring specifically to the derivative markets strategy described above at 
p.213 -  but the point applies generally to open source strategies.
43West (2003); see also Worthen (2004): "Microsoft is one of the top lobbying shops in the coun­
try, [spending] close to $10 million per year on federal-level lobbyists. ... Microsoft has tight
222 Open source biology in action
or agribusiness firms' response to an open source biotechnology, especially given 
their history in relation to other threats to their profit margin, and especially in 
the intellectual property field.44 Any open source biotechnology development 
effort that did not take this factor into account at the outset and find a way to 
divert possible opposition from major firms (for example, by persuading a group 
of them to become champions of the development effort or by securing political 
backing) could be doomed to failure.
Ultimately, unless monopolists succeed in getting governments to intervene to 
protect the proprietary approach, market forces will determine the final balance 
of proprietary and non-proprietary technologies in any given market niche. Sim­
ulations of the effects of market variables listed above in relation to diffusion of 
new technologies suggest that the ultimate outcome in the software context will 
probably be a mixed ecology of proprietary and non-proprietary approaches (in 
other words, a point of equilibrium between firms following proprietary and non­
proprietary strategies will be reached that does not involve total market domina­
tion by either approach) .45
7.3.4 Application to the biotechnology industry
The foregoing discussion is based loosely on developments in the software indus­
try since the introduction of non-proprietary tool kits in the form of open source 
software packages. The question arises how generalisable this analysis is to the 
biotechnology context. In principle there seems no reason to expect that these 
observations would not be applicable in biotechnology; however, some points 
are worth noting regarding the limits of this analysis. First, it deals only with 
successful established firms' response to open source, not with the responses of 
firms that previously pursued proprietary strategies unsuccessfully or new mar­
ket entrants46 -  which, however, would appear to have less reason to resist the 
diffusion of open source technologies.
Second, we have not yet made any comment about the scenario in which a 
newly developed open source technology opens up an entirely new market or 
taps a hitherto unserved market niche. In such a case, the effect of network ex­
ternalities associated with openness would be present without the counteracting 
lock-in factor regarding existing proprietary technologies. This means that if an 
open source technology ever colonised a new niche it would be very difficult 
for a proprietary product to compete, because the open source technology would 
have all the competitive advantages inherent in open source as well as the advan-
links with many of the most powerful and influential shapers of policy at the federal and state 
level [and over the past five years to 2004] has developed one of the most sophisticated lobbying 
networks in the country: one that... makes it difficult for anyone to pass technology-related legis­
lation Microsoft opposes. ... Microsoft has lobbied particularly hard against open source, helping 
kill state bills that advocate for open source in Oregon and Texas."
44See generally Drahos & Braithwaite (2002).
45Bonaccorsi & Rossi (2003), pp.1255-1256; West (2003).
46West (2003).
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tages accruing to an established technology. This explains the keen interest in the 
open source development model displayed by researchers and institutions with 
a public interest mission who are working to develop new technologies, such as 
apomixis:47 an open source approach would be very powerful in that case. It 
also suggests the possibility that established firms could be interested in helping 
to develop new technologies on open source terms as a means of ensuring that 
those technologies will never fall into the hands of their competitors; however, 
the attitude of such firms will obviously depend on how likely they think it is 
that they could get there first on their own.
Third, to the extent that the above analysis of the likely impact of open source 
technologies on industry structure is drawn from observations of the open source 
software case, it is important to bear in mind that these observations are necessar­
ily limited to a relatively short period of time, and are in effect only a snapshot of 
industry evolution. Aside from the general dangers of attempting to generalise 
from a still-emerging process, we are assuming that the particular open source 
technology development effort in question will be sustained over a long enough 
period for the various changes described above to take place. While considerable 
effort has been expended to gather empirical evidence as to how open source 
projects get started, little attention has been paid to how they wind down. It 
is possible, however, to offer the following ideas. Recall from chapter 6 (p.144) 
that in the user innovation literature, open source is a horizontal user innovation 
network supported by a community. Within that framework, the impact on an in­
dustry of the OS approach can be described in terms of the life cycle of a collective 
invention regime.48 With the establishment of a profitable industry, technologi­
cal uncertainty is reduced and the collective invention process may go down any 
of the following pathways. First, it may continue alongside competitive indus­
try, creating a situation where private R&D co-exists with collective invention, 
as discussed in this section. Second, the focus of collective invention may shift 
to new technological opportunities: institutions formed to facilitate collective in­
vention may persist beyond the need for collective invention with respect to a 
particular technology, but be re-activated with respect to a new technology for 
another round: this shows the culture of industry has come to accommodate the 
process. Third, it may break up into a new competitive industry that may or may 
not prove robust in the long term.
A related point is that the biotechnology and software industries may actually 
be more similar than they appear because apparently fundamental differences 
are in fact artefacts of comparing two industries at different stages in their evolu­
tion. For example, it has been suggested that one important difference between 
software development and biotechnology research and development is that, as 
we saw in chapter 6, biotechnology R&D is generally considered very expensive 
whereas software development requires nothing but "a laptop, an Internet con-
47Charles Spillane, personal communication; Richard Jefferson, personal communication. 
48Meyer (2003).
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nection and a packet of Doritos".49 It is true that at present, and in some areas 
of biotechnology research and development, capital costs are significantly higher 
than in software, and consequently it may be necessary for user-innovators to 
enlist the help of established firms or other institutions in order to integrate the 
results of their collaboration into a finished product, or to seek sponsorship to 
assist with initial technology development. However, one reason software de­
velopment appears so cheap in this analysis may be that it ignores the costs of 
building the necessary infrastructure, including developing operating systems, 
laying fibre-optic cables for fast cheap phone connections and so on; it is possi­
ble to ignore these costs only because they are sunk already, whereas in biotech­
nology huge investments are still to be made -  in other words the difference is 
one of timing in terms of infrastructure development (see section 6.5.2, p.185). 
According to Hrebejk, "time is on the side of open source. Historically, market 
economies favor monopolies when infrastructure is needed. Consider the history 
of AT&T, utilities or railroads in America. But the infrastructure building period 
ends at some point -  and we are rapidly approaching that point in the software 
industry".50 In the biotechnology industry, it is still some considerable distance 
away. For example, the distribution of pharmaceuticals is highly regulated, and 
large pharmaceutical companies control global distribution networks; there is no 
public equivalent of the Internet in this context.51
7.3.5 A tool kit for biotechnology research and development
At the end of chapter 3 I argued that there is a need in biotechnology research and 
development for unencumbered, affordable tool kits that would allow prospec­
tive users of a technology to modify that technology to meet their own needs, 
and that we should look to open source technology licensing as a mechanism by 
which such tool kits have been generated in the software context. If the sequence 
of developments described in the previous section were to occur in the biotech­
nology industry, how would they address the problems described in chapter 3?
The answer to this question is that open source biotechnology would be an an­
tidote to the concentration of corporate power and consequent loss of technolog­
ical diversity in the biotechnology industry, which results in the needs of smaller 
market segments being ignored: it would enable smaller players in developed 
and developing countries to perform sophisticated biotechnology research and 
development in support of their own goals, and at the same time, by reducing 
costs it would encourage established industry participants to engage with smaller 
markets. Open source biotechnology would also permit broader and deeper peer 
review of new technologies, enhancing their robustness and decreasing environ­
mental and public health risks (and hence the market perception of such risks).
49Kevin Sweeney, Open Source Biology workshop. 
50Hrebejk & Boudreau (2001).
51 Peter Drahos, personal communication.
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7.4 Conclusion: seeds of an open source movement 
in biotechnology
In this chapter I have argued that open source biotechnology is feasible not just 
as a licensing scheme or development methodology but as a commercialisation 
strategy that might appeal to some industry participants. Assuming that a suffi­
ciently useful technology or set of technologies can be made available on open 
source terms, it is possible to envisage a sequence of changes in industry or­
ganisation as a result of the adoption of open source strategies by a few players 
that amounts to a transformation. If such a transformation were to take place, 
it would resolve the most important structural problems that currently beset the 
biotechnology industry and diminish the social value of biotechnology research 
and development.
While it is not possible to predict whether these structural changes will in fact 
occur, throughout this thesis we have seen positive evidence that some industry 
participants are starting to move towards an open source approach in biotech­
nology. Open source bioinformatics is a trivial example in one sense, in that it 
is merely an instance of open source software development for biotechnology- 
related applications, but it is significant because it demonstrates that cultural 
resistance to open source strategies is not absolute in the biotechnology indus­
try; what resistance does exist may be broken down over time as biotechnology 
research and development comes to rely more and more on computerised mod­
eling and data analysis. Non-profit organisations such as the Molecular Sciences 
Institute and the Centre for Applications of Molecular Biology in International 
Agriculture (CAMBIA) are working towards an open source "kernel of func­
tionalities" or meta-tool kit for biotechnology development.52 Duke University 
Law School has recently won a multimillion dollar grant to research Open Source 
Drugs;53 Human Genome Project scientists at one time considered copyleft-style 
licensing of sequence data, abandoning this approach only because it was re­
garded as insufficiently "open" to be acceptable to the research community.54 
The PIPRA licensing initiative first referred to in chapter 3 (p.59) promises to 
smooth out many practical difficulties in public interest biotechnology licensing 
and to establish useful licensing precedents; further licensing issues may be re­
solved by the new "Science Commons" initiative, linked with Creative Commons
52Open Source Biology workshop; Molecular Sciences Institute, "Frequently Asked 
Questions", http://www.molsci.org/Dispatch?action-WebdocWidget:4809-detail=l, last
accessed 22 December 2004; CAMBIA, "Biological Innovation for Open Society", 
http://www.cambia.org/main/opensource.htm, last accessed 22 December 2004.
53" 'Open Genomics': Duke University was recently awarded a 5-year, $4.8 million grant, 
funded by the National Human Genome Research Institute and Department of Energy, to es­
tablish the Duke Center for the Study of Public Genomics. As part of this grant, faculty affiliated 
with Duke Law School's Center for the Study of the Public Domain will be conducting a five-year 
Open Drug Research project. This major research project will analyze 'open source'-type models 
of production in biopharmaceutical research and development.": Arti Rai, email communication 
via Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia.
54Sulston & Ferry (2002), pp.211-213.
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at Stanford University.55 Some of those involved in negotiations for the Interna­
tional Treaty of Plant Genetic Resources have indicated that open source princi­
ples should inform the drafting of a standard MTA under the treaty.56 A network 
of public sector apomixis researchers have committed in principle to establishing 
an open source-style licensing scheme;57 a professor from the Ontario Agricul­
tural College in Guelph, Canada, has drafted a "GPL for plant germplasm".58 All 
of these examples demonstrate the continued relevance in biotechnology research 
and development of Merton's 1957 dictum:
Science is an activity involving social collaboration and like any 
other such activity is subject to shifting fortunes. Science as an insti­
tution is under threat... . Scientists are now compelled, as they were 
at the point of re-emergence of science into the modern world, to vin­
dicate the pursuit of science to the rest of society. In order to do this 
they have had to undergo a process of self appraisal. This has led to a 
clarification and reaffirmation of the ethos of modern science.59
Open source biotechnology is a part of this clarification and reaffirmation.
55Creative Commons, "Welcome to Science Commons", http://science.creativecommons.org/, 
last accessed 22 December 2004.
56Susan Bragdon, personal communication.
57Charles Spillane, personal communication.
58McNaughton (1999).
59Merton (1957), pp.38-39:550-551.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
In this thesis I have argued that an open source approach to biotechnology re­
search and development is both desirable and broadly feasible.
The desirability of open source biotechnology was established in chapters 2 
to 4. Alluding to the expansion of intellectual property rights in biotechnology- 
related inventions that has accompanied the commercial biotechnology revolu­
tion of the past three decades, chapter 2 highlighted concerns that strengthening 
intellectual property protection restricts the flow of information necessary to on­
going innovation in this field. According to early sociologists of science, scientific 
progress -  defined by reference to public interest goals -  requires that scientists 
have access to a common fund of knowledge which they are at liberty to use 
and build upon in accordance with research priorities set by individual scientists 
working independently. Merton postulated that scientists' incentive to contribute 
to the common fund on terms that allow others to use and extend those contribu­
tions is provided by the existence of a norm of common ownership; intellectual 
property rights in scientific knowledge are by definition incompatible with this 
norm and therefore constitute a threat to scientific progress. More recent think­
ing in the sociology of science highlights the complexity surrounding the norm 
of common ownership, but does not contradict the fundamental point: that con­
tinuing research and development activity requires access to the output of prior 
research and that this may be compromised by private ownership of scientific 
information. For example, the "data stream" theory of scientific research empha­
sises the wide range of strategic considerations that may affect access practices 
in any given scientific context, but suggests that access restrictions tend to prop­
agate upstream from the point of potential commercialisation back into the re­
search process, resulting in tighter control over the portions of data streams that 
are believed to be precursors of potentially patentable products.
Proponents of intellectual property rights might argue that such control is use­
ful because it facilitates central co-ordination of research and development: by 
subjecting independent research initiatives to an overarching agenda, broad in­
tellectual property rights in early-stage technologies can help to avoid wasteful 
duplication of effort. However, this argument contradicts the view put forward 
by sociologists of science that co-ordination of scientific activity takes place most 
efficiently by mutual adjustment of independent initiatives in light of scientists' 
awareness of others' research output. Moreover, it assumes that the costs of con-
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tracting with the owner of the relevant intellectual property will not be so high 
as to dissipate any efficiency gains that may be associated with centralised con­
trol. In fact, recent economic theory suggests that the costs of entering into agree­
ments for rearranging and exercising rights to technological information may of­
ten be significant. Strengthening intellectual property rights in relation to uncod­
ified information may be particularly counterproductive because while intellec­
tual property rights may facilitate information exchange via market mechanisms, 
they are designed to block the flow of information via non-market mechanisms; 
such mechanisms are more efficient in transferring uncodified information be­
cause of the higher transaction costs involved. Uncodified information makes up 
a substantial portion of technological information in the field of biotechnology, 
and the importance of non-market mechanisms in facilitating information flow 
in the biotechnology industry is confirmed by sociological studies of innovative 
interorganisational networks in this field.
Thus, the discussion in chapter 2 emphasised the importance of information 
flow to ongoing innovation in biotechnology, given the essentially co-operative 
and cumulative nature of biotechnology research and development. It also ex­
plained in broad theoretical terms the potential of intellectual property rights to 
hinder such information flow. Chapter 3 began by asking whether the recent 
proliferation of intellectual property rights in biotechnology has in fact led to re­
search projects being delayed or abandoned in either medical or agricultural bio­
technology. In theory, this effect -  dubbed "the tragedy of the anticommons" -  
relies on two prior conditions: fragmented ownership of complementary intellec­
tual assets and high transaction costs associated with the exchange of those assets. 
Limited available empirical evidence suggests that public sector agricultural bio­
technology research and development is plagued by anticommons tragedy, but 
that private sector activity in agricultural biotechnology continues despite the 
existence of both prior conditions, as does public and private sector activity in 
medical biotechnology. However, the same evidence suggests that ongoing inno­
vation in these sectors is sustained only through the adoption of "working solu­
tions" that exacerbate existing structural problems within the industry. In par­
ticular, by raising the costs of participating in biotechnology research and devel­
opment, these mechanisms simultaneously reduce industry participants' incen­
tive to undertake innovative activity directed towards small markets and exclude 
smaller players, especially in developing countries, who might otherwise be able 
to conduct research and development to meet their own needs. Meanwhile, the 
prices of products developed for larger markets are driven up by both increased 
costs on the supply side and decreased competition on the demand side.
Various solutions to these and other structural problems associated with intel­
lectual property rights in biotechnology have been proposed, each with its own 
advantages and disadvantages. Chapter 3 proposes an addition to existing op­
tions, arguing that provision of an unencumbered, cheap and readily available set 
of research and development tools (a biotechnology "tool kit") would remove the 
proximate cause of many structural problems by reducing the costs of participa­
tion in biotechnology research and development. Reduced costs of research and
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development would free up resources currently devoted to overcoming transac­
tion costs. Apart from reducing waste, this would create the potential for lower 
prices for end products; make it more worthwhile for profit-seeking firms to serve 
smaller markets; reduce the number of high social value exchanges never under­
taken because their economic value would be eaten up by transaction costs under 
current conditions; and (by lowering barriers to entry) would increase the pool 
of potential participants in biotechnology research and development. Raising the 
number of participants could be expected to lower prices for end products by in­
creasing competition; it would further lower development costs and improve the 
quality and safety of products by allowing peer review and reducing the opportu­
nities for fraud and self-deception due to conflicts of interest; and it would allow 
would-be users of the technology whose needs currently go unmet to innovate 
on their own behalf. Side benefits might include increased consumer acceptance 
of biotechnology products and stronger defences against bioterrorism.
Such a tool kit could be provided entirely through publicly funded research 
and development efforts. However, this is unlikely in the present climate and 
in any case would fail to harness the considerable innovative capacity of the 
for-profit sector (much of which has been built, indirectly, using public funds). 
Chapter 4 introduces the concept of open source as an alternative mechanism for 
establishing a development tool kit with the requisite properties of affordability, 
availability and freedom from proprietary restrictions. The open source model as 
it has evolved in software is highly relevant to the intellectual property-related 
problems in biotechnology described above because it decouples the commercial 
exploitation of technological innovations from restrictions on access to and use 
of those innovations. Open source licensing -  in particular, copyleft licensing 
-  substitutes ongoing access to leading-edge technologies developed via collab­
orative methods for licensing income as a reward for innovative activity; open 
source business strategies involve exploiting complementary markets, for exam­
ple for support services, in preference to markets for development tools. Thus, 
if the open source approach could be translated into biotechnology, the creators 
of existing and future biotechnology research and development tools might be 
motivated to make those tools available to others as elements of a biotechnology 
tool kit free of legal encumbrances and at a low cost. Moreover, because an open 
source development methodology permits many different levels of involvement, 
the provision of a biotechnology tool kit via open source methods could harness 
the contributions of diverse actors drawing on a range of funding sources and 
would therefore avoid placing a disproportionate burden on any single institu­
tion or industry sector.
Assuming the desirability of an open source approach to biotechnology re­
search and development, the question arises whether such an approach would be 
feasible. In order to undertake a systematic assessment of the feasibility of open 
source biotechnology it was necessary to construct a model of open source that 
could be applied outside the software context. In common usage, "open source" 
is a rather loose term that (by my analysis) incorporates three distinct, though 
related, features: a set of criteria for technology licensing, a characteristic mode
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of innovation and an open-ended collection of business strategies. The feasibility 
of translating these three aspects into the biotechnology context was discussed in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7 respectively.
Compared with the other two aspects of the open source model, open source 
licensing is clearly defined: open source software licences may be certified as 
such according to an official Open Source Definition (OSD). Chapter 5 reports 
the salient outcomes of a quasi-technical comparison between the ten elements 
of the OSD and the provisions of a typical biotechnology licence agreement. This 
comparison showed that although open source biotechnology licensing would 
pose some technical challenges, these would not be insurmountable. Rather, the 
main obstacles to implementing open source-style licences in the biotechnology 
field would be, first, finding the functional -  as distinct from legal -  equivalents 
of open source software licensing provisions, and second, persuading biotech­
nology industry participants that open source licences would be worth adopting. 
The first obstacle could be overcome by a combination of "model-mongering" 
(which could draw on the experience of the open source software community as 
well as other examples such as the Creative Commons initiative) and trial and 
error. The second would require industry participants to be convinced that the 
advantages of the other two aspects of open source -  the open source mode of in­
novation and open source business models -  would outweigh the disadvantages 
in relation to other options for exploitation of a specific technology.
These advantages and disadvantages were discussed in chapters 6 and 7. 
Chapter 6 assessed the feasibility of open source as a mode of innovation in the 
biotechnology context by reference to a generalised model of open source as a 
development methodology that emerges from a strand of literature on user inno­
vation generated within the discipline of innovation management. In this analy­
sis, open source is an example of a community-based horizontal user innovation 
network. Using both hypothetical and concrete examples taken from fieldwork 
interviews, chapter 6 demonstrated the actual or potential existence of each of 
the elements of such a network in relation to at least some areas of biotechnology- 
related innovation. For other areas, specifically those that are particularly capital- 
intensive at the production and distribution phase, some modification of the open 
source model might be required. However, such modifications would be unlikely 
to detract from the range of benefits identified above.
Chapter 7 focussed on the potential for commercial applications of open source 
biotechnology research and development, again drawing on the user innovation 
literature, this time as it relates to the implementation of "tool kits for user in­
novation". The commercial deployment of tool kits for user innovation is not 
confined to open source software, but has occurred in a range of technology and 
business contexts; the key difference between open source software and other 
user innovation tool kits is that the elements of an open source tool kit are not 
subject to the usual proprietary restrictions on access and use. This means that 
open source tool kits not only allow users to generate products or technologies 
that meet their own needs, but also allow user-innovators to have these products 
or technologies manufactured by someone other than the tool kit supplier. This is
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of greater significance in the case of biotechnology than software because in bio­
technology there are likely to be more situations in which individual users must 
rely on manufacturers to carry out production and distribution. In the absence 
of reach-through rights to the output of tool kit users, commercial manufacturers 
must rely on other sources of revenue; chapter 7 documents ways in which open 
source software business strategies could be applied in the biotechnology con­
text. The chapter closes with an extension of the discussion in chapter 4 concern­
ing the potential impact of an open source approach on the organisation of the 
biotechnology industry as a whole. The conclusion is that although open source 
biotechnology research and development activities might be peripheral at first, 
they could become economically significant, even to the point of transforming 
the industry.
One of the most striking aspects of the comparison in chapters 6 and 7 be­
tween a putative open source approach to biotechnology research and develop­
ment and current industry practice, in biotechnology and elsewhere, is that none 
of the elements of the open source model is actually new. This makes it easier to 
envisage the application of open source principles outside the software context, 
but does it also imply that an open source approach to biotechnology research 
and development would be unlikely to have much impact? I would argue that 
it does not -  that while there may be nothing particularly radical about any of 
the component parts of the open source model described in this thesis, the poten­
tial ramifications of open source biotechnology are radical, both in relation to the 
development of specific technologies and in terms of overall industry structure. 
Addressing structural problems in the biotechnology industry could be expected 
bring the direction of technology development more into line with the demands 
of social welfare. If successful, open source biotechnology could serve as a model 
for the implementation of open source principles in other non-software contexts. 
Further, by offering researchers a means of expressing other-regarding prefer­
ences while at the same time meeting development costs, open source biotech­
nology could have far-reaching effects on the relationship between the scientific 
community and the rest of society, providing a new mechanism for reconciling 
scientists' self-interest (including, these days, commercial self-interest) with the 
public interest in scientific progress (see "Scientific progress and the 'norms of 
science'", 2.3, p.ll).1
When I began the research reported in the second half of this thesis, my ini­
tial impression was of a collection of unrelated, ad hoc practices and initiatives 
within the biotechnology industry directed at countering the worst effects of the 
prevailing proprietary approach to intellectual property management. As the re­
search progressed, however, the imposition of a generalised model of open source 
on the raw fieldwork data showed how these phenomena could relate to one 
another and suggested that conditions were ripe for the emergence of an open 
source movement in biotechnology. Few of the people I spoke with during the 
fieldwork phase were in a position to perceive this emerging structure, but nearly
M erton (1957), pp.38-39: 550-551.
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all were eager to get a sense of how others were dealing with common problems. 
At first I had been surprised at the willingness of so many scientists, business- 
people and others to talk with me; soon I came to see myself as a kind of mes­
senger going from room to room in a building full of people having essentially 
the same discussion behind closed doors, reporting -  as best I could within the 
constraints of confidentiality -  on the progress of conversations in other rooms 
and other corridors. Jamie Boyle has written of the potential value of an overar­
ching concept of "the public domain" (similar to that of "the environment") as a 
means of uniting and thereby energising initiatives opposing the encroachment 
of intellectual property protection in a range of contexts, even if the term itself 
can have no definitive meaning.2 It is possible that a coherent model of open 
source biotechnology could serve a similar purpose, although it is clear from the 
text of conversations quoted in chapters 5 to 7 that discussions of open source 
biotechnology remain, for the most part, highly speculative:
It is hard to get away from the environment you are in.... [I]n an 
increasingly rabid climate... of intellectual property possessiveness, 
you perhaps cannot imagine how you would do better. So it's good 
to be able to point to individual examples of open source success. But 
what I envisage is a situation in which everybody moves together bit 
by bit, recognising that in that way the whole network improves.3
Thus, even if the potential for an open source movement in biotechnology is 
never fully realised, the attempt to articulate a vision of open source in this con­
text still has considerable value.
2Boyle (2001).
3John Sulston, telephone communication.
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Appendix B
Open Source Biology Workshop
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